I watched the Engineering Disasters show on History channel, when they bought up the Sherman. I really don't know much about the Western Allied armor, so I was surprised to hear that the tank was a "deathtrap", an engineering disaster. I read it in a few articles, that it wasn't armored enough, didn't have the firepower, but that bold statment surprised me. (Especially from History Channel.) Anybody, some opinions?

The beauty of the Sherman was not it's ability to take on enemy armor but that it was simple to manufacture, mechanically reliable and easily adaptable to other accessories. While Tigers and Pathers seem to get all the glory for their firepower and armor they were rather unreliable and difficult to build.

Said one captured German tanker... "one of our tanks is better than ten of yours.... but you aways seem to have eleven"

American tanks were designed for infantry support. Shermans were not supposed to take on other tanks. The US had tank destroyers for that task. It wasn't until the Pershing that we had a tank killing tank.

The Sherman didn't get the nickname "Ronsin" for nothing. Gasoline powered, thinly armored and under gunned. The Sherman was reliable and was made in greater numbers that all of the varients of German armor.

An engineering disaster? It was what it was, an infantry tank.

An engineering disaster?

The Sherman wrote the book on mass-production tank-building as far as the Western Allies are concerned. It's problems weren't due to engineering shortcomings but doctrinal failures on the part of Army Ground Forces, who didn't acknowledge that tanks might end up fighting tanks (whatever AGF believed) and that what was good for 1942 wouldn't stay good for long. Blame the customer not the builder for any shortcomings.

The 75mm gunned Sherman was still useful in 1945, and the performance of the Sherman since has shown how good the basic design and engineering were.

Greetings all,

I've read a few accounts where the 75mm Sherman did great things against the German Armour. Yes, prown to burst into flames and no equal against Heavy German armour in open country, it could still worry a Tiger if the range was right and the gunnery better.

There's no doubt the Firefly version was effective, again not in armoured strength but in fire power it could destroy most German Armour.

Mass prodcution and sheer numbers won over in the end. We could build them faster than the Germans could destroy them.

Not an engineering disaster by any means, yes, perhaps a death trap if the main gun was in the wrong position when the crew had to bail out. It had to be raised if over the drivers hatch and it had to be lowered to get the crewman out on the right rand side as he had to crawl under it.

I've read personal accounts where tanks were hit 3 to 4 times before they had to be adandoned and others where 1 shot was enough to destroy them. Luck in spotting the enemy first had a lot to do with it - if you couldn't see where the fire was coming from the Germans could knock off 6, 7 or 8 in a row and as they were usually defending from well sited and covered positions, the kill rate was often very high 5/6 to 1. A lot of the crews survived though and were soon back into the fight.

At the end of the day you have to fight with way you've got and it did have speed on its side, but it's failings are down to the planners not the users.

That's what I think from all that i've read about it so far.

Cheers

Al

While the basic M4 Sherman might have been a deathtrap, it's other varients were much better. The Easy Eight, and Jumbo were quite good at taking on heavier German armor.

Wow. I didn't mean to stirr up the hornets' nest. Obviously, this tank does have fans around the world.
And yet again, a problem. (Please do not take it as a personal remark, or something -purely academical. I don't want to reach a pre-determined conclusion. I'm just curious.)
If the tank was designed according to a bad docrine, and was outgunned and underarmored (we're talking about the basic model), in which many people lost their life, becaused it failed in the battlefield, doesn't it make it a failure? I took 6 Shermans to knock out a Tiger -but they were not doing math here. Young soldiers were told to fight in these things -and to die in them. (I recently read a book by a guy who used to clean up the bits and pieces that was left of the crew. He didn't like the tank, that's for sure. The History Channel program referred to him, as well, and it bought this whole thing up again.) Also the photos of the Shermans show sandbags, wood and whatever junk their crew found used as additional armor. You saw similar photos of panzer IVs when they desperately needed something extra against the T-34. Qualitiy versus quantity sounds nice, but with tanks and tank-destroyers performing better against their peers the causalities dropped later on, right?
To say that it was not designed to fight tanks, but otherwise it was a good tank, is strange -after all, all it had to do is to fight tanks in Europe. And it wasn't good at it. It's like saying that my '87 Ford Taurus is an OK racecar, because it's much cheaper than a Ferrari, can be mass-produced, and it also has a headlight and a trunk. It just can't race very well. I'm not throwing dirt on the Sherman, don't get me wrong, but I think this was the argument.

Hi Andras,

Their are always different views on the Sherman depending who you ask. If you take it that the standard Pzr was the Mk 4 then the Sherman was the equal of that. It could also deal with a Panther but was out gunned by same, so needed to close the range. The Tiger and Royal Tiger were bigger and better but very prown to breakdown and could be destroyed by 17pdr on the Firefly.

Remember the tank wasn't static in design, their was the M4A1 76mm used by the Americans and the Poles, and the others mentioned above.

I believe from what I've read that the losses were so high in Normandy because of three/four things, the defenders always had the advantage of well sited positions, they also had excellent anti tank guns and panzerfursts and initially the country side suited the defenders. Many of their tank crews were experienced crews who were withdrawn from Russia to meet the invasion.

Most of the British tanks ran on petrol and that was a mistake hence the term 'Ronsins', but the Americans I believe used Deisel. I'm not 100% sure but I think the reaason for that was fuel supply.

So in a way you pays your money and takes your chance. The first Shermans were the equal of the task and performed well against the German Armour in N Africa but German Tank design was, until the advent of the Comet, always one step ahead, but they had the advantage of several years experience from the Russian front and copied much of the design of the T 34, fortunately for the Allies they over engineered these machines which meant they took a lot longer to build, needed a lot of maintenance to keep going and often broke down and had to be abondened. The Russians took advantage of this, by attacking in the mornings when the complex wheels of the Tigers were stiill frozen together, with a lot of success.

It's a testiment to the courage of the men who drove the Sherman. I can see you point, it just depends upon whos views you take. A lot came down to luck, who spotted the enemy first, yes I read personal accounts of 75mm shells just bouncing off Tiger tanks but I also read reports where one well placed shot could disable the turret or destroy the tracks. The weakest point of the Tiger was its rear end so again if you got lucky - good by Tiger.

We are inclined to think of tanks individually but they rarely operated alone, normally at troop and squadron level so the Allies nearly always had the advantage of numbers and in the British structure each troop had 3 x 75mm Shermans and 1 x 17pdr Firefly. So that evened up the odds a bit because the Germans knew the Firefly with its 17 pdr was deadly.

They also had a variety of other tanks, the Churchill which although slow was exceedingly strong and the Cromwell that was exceedingly fast. As the experience of the crews grew so did their fighting ability but no Tank German or Allied could fight against a well concealed anti tank gun or shoot at something it couldn't see. The 17pdr anti tank gun was the most effective anti tank weapon of WW2. The American M10 and British Achillies with it's 17 pdr were both effective anti tank tanks.

No doubt the debate will soldier on, those who think it was a terrible tank and those who don't. The bottom line is that the troops had to fight with what they had, made the best advantage of the equipment they could and in the end won the day. You could say this was down to airpower, the Typhoon and rocket firing aircraft certainely played a big part, but this was again because the Allies had the higher number of planes and dominated the sky. Germany was always going to loose the war because it couldn't win the production game, the Allies both American and Russian could replace their losses the Germans couldn't.

The courage and determination of the men who fought in these machines shouldn't be underestimated. Here's one example:

Lt John Gorman was the first Allied tank commander to encounter a Royal Tiger in Normandy. He came across it plus 3 Tigers crossing an open field. Knowing that he couldn't destroy the Royal Tiger with his 75mm gun, he rammed it, firing a shot into the turret just before the two vehicles collided. This scared the hell out of the German Crew who abondened their vehicle. Gorman and his crew escaped.

His Troop Firefly was hit and destroyed by one of the Tigers as it came up to give support. Gorman went in search of another Firefly, found one whos commander had been decapitated, removed the body, got in the tank and using cover and sheer guts drove off the 3 Tigers who took fright and beat a hasty retreat. For this he received the MM.

That's just one example of the caliber of men who took on the Germans and their are countless others. So you could say it's not just the machine that counts but the men who fought them.

You can decide for yourself and the debate will rumble on. LOL, LOL
:-) :-) :-)

Cheers

Al

Um, does anybody remember a little dust-up that went on in the Pacific? I know it ain't sexy, but there were a few of our guys fighting over there, and the Sherman - both Army and Marine mounts - were the equivent of King Tigers over there. The Army used the gasoline version (as they did in Europe) and the Marines used (mostly) the diesel version, and they went through the Japanese tanks like sh** through a goose.

The Sherman could not go toe to toe with the Panthers and Tigers, but against the Japanese, they were the king of the hill. So, all in all, the ol' M4 did the job, albeit at the cost of too many ETO crews.

Hi Barry,

Very true mate. Sorry if the input seemed a bit one sided, that wasn't intended, I just accepted the fact that that would be taken 'as read' so to speak.

The US Army and Marines, along with the other Allies used the Lee and Shermans to very great effect in the far east. They were 'King of the Jungle' if you like as far as armour went.

Nice one - thanks for reminding everyone.

Cheers

Al

if it's alright to include..another vehicle..the humvee. the vehicle was designed for all terrain-mobility and troop transport. throught the years..the military upgraded/converted the humvee and used it as a figthing vehicle. trucks and jeeps also evolved into the same criteria as an AFV. as an engineering standpoint..it was a good design vehicle and for its purpose..but when you start upgrading/converting this vehicle..comes the shortcomings. though the label says..'all purpose'..just something to talk about.

please check..discovery channel..top ten figthing vehicles.

Hi Ed,

A bit , I don't really know much about the Humvee so can't offer much in the way of converstaion. Sorry mate.

Cheers

Al

Hi Alan,

I wasn't trying to be a smart alec - just a gentle reminder regarding the "other" theater. I'm always amused by the Germans whining that they had to fight a 2 front war. What the heck were we doing, learning how to stir fry vegetables over there?

If you look at the casualty numbers U.S. forces suffered relative to their numbers, it was a grim meat grinder. And heaven help you if you were captured.

The M4 really helped the troops over there, and they needed all they could get.

One thing ive noticed is that the Shermans high profile would make it an easy target!

John

Interesting, that "Engineering Disaster" soldiered on for almost another 40 years in various guises, in various armies.

Hi Barry,

Didn't think you were being a smart alic for one moment mate, very valid point.

Sometimes the focus sits on the European theatre of War too much. There was a major conflict raging throughout the Pacific and from India down through Burma. That's probally why they call it the 'Forgottten War' back here in the UK.

The Americans in their Pacific Campaign had some horrific fighting to do against a very determined and stubborn enemy and the Shermans and Lees palyed a major part in helping them winkle the enemy out.

The focus on Europe is also one of the reasons the Sherman gets a death from time tio time, everybody forgets just how effective it was in the other campaings.

No problemo!!!

Cheers

Al

Maybe the Sherman fell under the doctrine of Something good now is better than something perfect next year.

"lights the first time, Every time!!"

Dear all
Thanks for taking the time to answer. Since then I have taken a long road, and though far from a converted "shermaholic", I do know more about the tank, what's more, it does appeal to me. History Channel was never a good source of information; most of the programs there can be regarded as propaganda, the way they distort history. That's why I was a bit surprised about the stalk judgment on the sherman.
After reading a lot I can appreciate the contribution of the tank to the war effort better now. (What's more, I already have two kits in my closet; one is already waiting the first coat of paint now.) It certainly wasn't a perfect tank, but what many Tiger- and Panther-maniac likes to forget, neither were the German AFVs. For me I vote for the T-34
Thanks again.

One of the main causes of the difficulties the Allied armies faced in the invasion of Western Europe was the weakness of their main battle tanks versus the tanks of the German army. Allied tankers began the invasion believing that their machines were the best in the world. The forces of the Western allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944 with the expectation that the war would be over well before Christmas. North Africa had already been taken back, Italy had been knocked out of the war, German industries and homes were being pounded day and night from the air, and a resurgent Soviet Union had ground up the best of the German army and was poised to shatter the Eastern front all over again. Nazi Germany was being pushed back on all fronts and was dwarfed by the combined economic and military might of the allies. Instead to win the war in Europe took almost a full year from the time of the Normandy invasion, Allied causalities were severe, and Allied armies suffered many reverses. This paper will show that one of the main causes of the delay was that Allied tanks were deficient in the critical factors of armour, mobility, and most of all armament.

Armour protection was the first drawback of Allied tanks, as it tended to be too thin and had poor sloping compared to the latest German designs. The main Allied tank, the American M4 Sherman, had armour thickness not exceeding 51 mm in the front, and the British equivalent, the Cromwell, was not much better with 76 mm. The tank destroyers, which had the main task officially of seeking out and destroying German armour, had even thinner armour, only 12 mm on the M 18 Hellcat. On the other hand the main German tank in 1944-45, the Panther, had armour up to 110mm thick, which furthermore was very well sloped, making it even more effective at deflecting shells. The heavy counterpart to the Panther, the Tiger II, had sloped armour of up to 180mm in thickness. Therefore allied crews turned to adding additional armour plate, sandbags, logs, even concrete to the front of their tanks, despite the fact that this was often ineffective, with shots penetrating layers of sandbags, the armour plate, and then exploding inside the crew compartment. A hit on an Allied tank usually meant a penetration instead of a ricochet, even at ranges of 3000 yards, something that was very discouraging for the crews. The fact that the heavier sloped armour on the front of a Panther normally deflected Allied tank shells in a head to head meeting made this doubly discouraging, and Allied commanders were shocked by the first reports of tank losses in Normandy.

Surprisingly despite the fact that due to less armour Allied tanks were generally smaller and lighter than their opponents, their mobility was somewhat inferior due to suspension and track designs that had high ground pressure. When tracked vehicles traverse soft ground, the pressure under the track rises and falls as the bogie wheels of the track run over the track itself, as in effect a tracked vehicle is a continuous track-laying device. The average of the peaks of ground pressure, the MMP, is determined by factors such as vehicle weight, track width, track pitch, and the number and size of bogie wheels, with the lower the MMP the better. Due to experiences with soft ground in Russia and the adaptation of large diameter overlapping bogie wheel suspension for axle loading and suspension travel concerns, German tanks such as the Mk V Panther and Mk IV Tiger had low MMP’s of 150 and 230 respectively. Even the Tiger II, weighing over 65 tonnes, had a MMP of only 184. Therefore this would appear to give these tanks huge advantages in soft going over tanks such as the M4 Sherman at 282 and the Cromwell IV at 352. This was born out in practical experience where, especially in snowy or muddy conditions, Allied tankers repeatedly found that Panthers and Tigers could drive where their own tanks would risk bogging and immobilization.

The greatest deficiency of all was armament. Allied tankers repeatedly complained about the inability of their main armament to punch holes in the opposing armour. The most common gun that Allied tanks possessed, a short 75 mm, simply did not have enough punch to tackle a Panther frontally at anything but point blank range. A new longer and more powerful 76 mm gun that was being introduced was not much better. Neither gun was any comparison to the long 75 mm gun of the Panther, whose higher muzzle velocity gave it not only higher penetrating power, but also a flat trajectory and therefore excellent accuracy. Compounding these difficulties German sights had greater magnification and clearness, and the gunpowder used was lower in flash and smoke. Therefore Panthers and Tigers developed tactics in which they would often sit in open terrain, daring Allied tanks to show up, then knocking them out with accurate long-range gun fire that could not be replied to. Incidents would happen in which Allied tankers bounced numerous rounds off their German counterpart, only to be knocked out immediately if they were hit once.

The net result of all of these deficiencies was that advancing was much slower and more expensive in terms of tanks and infantry than it otherwise would have been. Five hundred burning British tanks at the end of the failed operation Goodwood made dramatic testimony to the disadvantages that inferior tanks brought on to the Allies. Total Allied armour causalities in Normandy were running at three times the German total. The tankers kept fighting but costs were extremely high and the men were losing confidence in their tanks, despite usually having superior numbers.


"As we go now each man has resigned himself to dying sooner or later because we don’t have a chance against the German tanks. All of this stuff that we read about German tanks being knocked out makes us sick because we know what prices we have to pay in men and equipment to accomplish this."

Eventually the Allies blasted their way out of Normandy with the aid of 3300 planes dropping a total of 14,000 tons of bombs in three hours, literally obliterating anything in the path of the advance with a tonnage of bombs only exceeded by Hiroshima. Advantages in numbers, a willingness to take losses, and massive advantages in artillery, air support, fuel and supplies made it possible for the Allies to advance in Western Europe and eventually win. However the inability to produce a tank that could take on the panzers on even terms and the terrible causalities that this caused in men and machines is something that should not be forgotten.


The hull of the Tiger was a comparatively simple welded unit with a one-piece superstructure welded on top. At the front it was 100 mm, around the sides 80 mm, and 26 mm on the top. To assist production all shapes were kept simple. The turret was also simple, and the sides were almost upright. It remains a curious fact why Henschel's engineers came up with what was essentially a square box for the Tiger's hull. The only steeply sloping element on the Tiger was the short glacis plate, forward of the hull upper front plate with its ball-mounted machine gun and driver's vision slots, which was set at 81 degrees to the vertical. However, the vertical plating was massive enough to withstand virtually everything. The mantlet was very heavy, with 120 mm of armor, and carried the long and heavy gun. Below, the armor tables for the Tiger I:

According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), "The Tiger's armor was invulnerable to attack from most tank guns firing normal armor-piercing shells or shot at ranges over 800 meters, including the American 75 mm and the Russian 76 mm. It is obvious that the 17-pdr. firing normal APCBC rounds could defeat the frontal armor of the Tiger I at most combat ranges for tank vs. tank actions in Europe. However, by 23 June 1944, only 109 Shermans with 17-pdrs. had landed in France along with six replacements. By the end of the war, on 5 May 1945, the British 21st Army Group possessed 1,235 Sherman tanks with 17-pdrs., while the remaining 1,915 Sherman tanks were all equipped with the 75 mm M3 gun". Below, three more tables from the same source (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), that show clearly the tactical superiority the Tiger I had over its contemporary adversaries:


The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but it was thick. Here is where many fail to understand that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness is a quality in itself, since armor resistance is mainly determined by the ratio between armor thickness and projectile diameter (T/d). The T/d relationship regarding armor penetration demonstrates that the more the thickness of the armor plate overmatches the diameter of any incoming armor piercing round, the harder it is for the projectile to achieve a penetration. On the other side, the greater the diameter of the incoming projectile relatively to the thickness of the armor plate which it strikes, the greater the probability of penetration. This explains why the side armor of the Tiger I, being 80 mm thick, was so difficult to be penetrated at combat ranges by most Allied anti-tank and tank guns, whose calibers were overmatched by the thickness of the Tiger I armor. The quality of the armor was another major asset of the Tiger I, and it can't be emphasized enough that the Tiger I was a very special kind of Panzer, since it had the best quality of everything, compared to any other German tank. The rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate, electro-welded interlocking-plate construction armor had a Brinell hardness index of 255-260 (the best homogeneous armor hardness level for WW II standards), and rigorous quality control procedures ensured that it stayed that way. The Tiger I's armor was much superior to that of, for example the Panther, which armor had a much higher Brinell index, and consequently, was very brittle. The Tiger, as a side effect from the usage of this special armor, also was a very expensive tank. The nominal cost of a Tiger was 250,000 Reichsmarks. In contrast, a PzKpfw III cost RM 96,200, a PzKpfw IV RM 103,500, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM 117,000; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios.

Another fact that helped the Tigers a lot was the "shatter gap" effect which affectted allied ammunition, a most unusual situation where rounds with too high an impact velocity would sometimes fail even though their penetration capability was (theoretically) more than adequate. This phenomenon plagued the British 2 pounder in the desert, and would have decreased the effectiveness of U.S. 76mm and 3" guns against Tigers, Panthers and other vehicles with armor thickness above 70 mm. It should be noted that the problems with the 76 mm and 3" guns did not necessarily involve the weapons themselves: the noses of US armor-piercing ammunition of the time turned out to be excessively soft. When these projectiles impacted armor which matched or exceeded the projectile diameter at a certain spread of velocities, the projectile would shatter and fail.

Penetrations would occur below this velocity range, since the shell would not shatter, and strikes above this range would propel the shell through the armor whether it shattered or not. When striking a Tiger I driver's plate, for example, this "shatter gap" for a 76mm APCBC M62 shell would cause failures between 50 meters and 900 meters. These ammunition deficiencies proved that Ordnance tests claiming the 76 mm gun could penetrate a Tiger I's upper front hull to 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) were sadly incorrect.

As a general rule, BHN (Brinell Hardness Index) effects, shot shatter, and obliquity effects are related to the ratio between shot diameter and plate thickness. The relationship is complex, but a larger projectile hitting relatively thinner plate will usually have the advantage. There is an optimum BHN level for every shot vs plate confrontation, usually in the 260-300 BHN range for World War Two situations. Below that, the armor is too soft and resists poorly, above that, the armor is too hard and therefore too brittle.

The 13.(Tiger) Kompanie, of Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland, reported on the armor protection of the Tiger: "During a scouting patrol two Tigers encountered about 20 Russian tanks on their front, while additional Russian tanks attacked from behind. A battle developed in which the armor and weapons of the Tiger were extraordinarily successful. Both Tigers were hit (mainly by 76.2 mm armor-piercing shells) 10 or more times at ranges from 500 to 1,000 meters. The armor held up all around. Not a single round penetrated through the armor. Also hits in the running gear, in which the suspension arms were torn away, did not immobilize the Tiger. While 76.2 mm anti-tank shells continuously struck outside the armor, on the inside, undisturbed, the commander, gunner, and loader selected targets, aimed, and fired. The end result was 10 enemy tanks knocked out by two Tigers within 15 minutes"

All this considered, it stands clear that, "based on opposing ranges, without considering other factors, the Tiger I had only been outclassed by the Russian Josef Stalin heavy tank with the 122 mm gun". The rule of thumb was that it took at least five American M4 Sherman medium tanks to knock out a cornered Tiger. When speaking of opposing ranges, it becomes necessary to take a look at another essential Tiger I feature: the KwK 36 L/56 8.8 cm gun.

Thank you for the very extensive and informative reply.
A few things are not clear, though. (Please keep it in mind that I'm a molecular biologist/biochemist by training not engineer or soldier.) These pieces of information I collected from different sources, and they contradict some of what you've written. These are not my opinion, and can be easily wrong.
Most of the books I've read about the Tiger I-II agree on one thing: these tanks were anything but cross-country (especially the TigerII). Their true cross-county speed was minimal (5-10km/hr), and in many cases the Tiger II could not even leave the roads. Extensive mud did clog the interlocking wheels making it impossible for them to advance (and throw the track) -and the interlocking system made maintance a nightmare. The T-34 on the other hand was excellent in this perspective. During the Battle of the Bulge King Tigers were left in the last waves, as they wouldn't have been able to advance anyway. They simply weren't fit for their role. On top of this their low number made it imperative to use them at strategically important places only -therefore the enemy always knew where the most important targets lied.
During the Italy campaign there were more Tigers lost during break-downs while retreating, than combat. It was not uncommon that a tank company had 60% breakdown during a 50 mile road march. If the summer was hot, the engine, transmission could burst into flames.
The 17 pounder gun of the firefly could easily knock the tiger out -Withmann's and two other Tiger were knocked out by a single firefly in less than two minutes. The IS-2 could just as easily deal with the Tiger II. (By the way, a friendly-fire incident showed that an 88 can deal with Tigers from distances greater than 1400m.)
I'm not sure about the accuracy of the Russian reports, but they had 3 intact King Tigers on their hands -and they could hardly get them to the railroad to transport them back due to transmission failings, ball-bearing failings, and so on. Their evaluation of the tank showed that the gun was excellent, the optics superior, but the armor weak (low molybdenum content, prone to brittle, and inferior to the IS-2's armor), underpowered (they never could achieve the speeds given by the manual), and overcomplicated. (These two are true to the Tiger I as well.) I'm not sure how trustworthy these reports are. A Sherman or T-34 could go on forever without maintance and little gas. (The diesel is better choice, that's true, but the German tanks "ate" gasoline as well.)

The other thing, that really makes the Tiger and King Tiger inferior is the low, very low number they were available -thus their impact was low. An average tanker on either fronts had more greater chance to meet with a pnzIV or StuG than a Tiger.

This is the picture I gained about the "wunderpanzer" so far I cannot stress enough: it can be wrong, inaccurate, and so on. I did err in the past -it can happen again

Just as an aside, the nickname for the Sherman is not 'Ronsin' but Ronson, after the famous sigarette lighter brand.

The equally offputting "Tommy-cooker" was another nickname...

Yep, in the info supplied here there has been conflicting evidence...
But as Drader pointed out waaay back in the thread, the shortcomings was borne out of doctrine, in that the M4 was deployed wrongly.
The Pershing was already developed sufficiently before D-Day, but the choice was made against going into production...
It could also be said that intelligence was AWOL regarding the bocage south of the landings, as it was proven that once the breakout of Operation Cobra began that the Sherman fared well on solid open terrain where it could use it's superior mobility and numbers to great advantage... And back to square one when the rains of September occurred...
Therefore narrow tracks should definitely be added to the obvious list of shortcomings...

FIGHTING IN NORMANDY
Bucking the Hedgerows The terrain in the area selected for the initial penetration of French soil was generally level or gently sloping. However, it was broken up into a "crazy quilt" pattern of small fields separated by "hedgerows." These consisted of an earthen mound or wall 8 to 10 feet in width and 4 to 6 feet in height, covered with a scrub undergrowth.

Along the top of this wall grew rows of trees. Forming an important part of the obstacle thus created was the ditch which ran along one or both sides of the mound. The roads, narrow and winding, ran between these hedgerows, and offered the defenders many advantageous positions for ambuscades or surprise attacks on advancing foot-troops and armor. Observation was normally limited from one hedgerow to the next, although an occasional structure, such as the church tower in a village would widen the horizon.

These peculiarities of terrain led to the development of special operational techniques in the application of tactical principles. Quoted below are some experience reports, from the battlefield, of hedgerow fighting


Cross Section of Typical Normandy Hedgerow.


The German Defense Ever since August 1940 the Germans have been studying and organizing the beach defenses of the French coast. They are past masters of the art of utilizing the terrain to advantage.

As set forth in a letter from the Commanding General, U. S. XIX Corps: "The Germans have been thorough in their defense. Their weapons are normally sited to provide long fields of fire. The 88-mm dual purpose gun, the ‘Tiger’ tank with its 88-mm gun, or the ‘Panther’ tank which has a 75-mm high-velocity gun, normally takes you under fire at ranges up to 2,000 yards. All weapons are well dug in. The mobility of their tanks is often sacrificed in order to secure the protection of a ditch or the walls of a building.

Sniper Trouble "The German soldiers had been given orders to stay in their positions and, unless you rooted them out, they would stay, even though your attack had passed by or over them. Some of their snipers stayed hidden for 2 to 5 days after a position had been taken and then ‘popped up’ suddenly with a rifle or AT grenade launcher to take the shot for which they had been waiting.

"We found fire crackers with slow burning fuse left by snipers and AT gun crews in their old positions when they moved. These exploded at irregular intervals, giving the impression that the position was still occupied by enemy forces.

"High losses among tank commanders have been caused by German snipers. Keep buttoned up, as the German rifleman concentrates on such profitable targets. This is especially true in villages. After an action the turret of the commander’s tank is usually well marked with rifle bullets.

Enemy in Ambush "On several occasions the Germans have allowed small patrols of ours to enter villages and wander around unmolested, but when stronger forces were sent forward to occupy the village they would encounter strong resistance. The Germans will permit a patrol to gather erroneous information in order to ambush the follow-up troops acting on the patrols' false report."

German Weapons One infantry regimental commander has given a good detailed description of the defensive organization: "We found that the enemy employed very few troops with an extremely large number of automatic weapons. All personnel and automatic weapons were well dug in along the hedgerows in excellent firing positions. In most cases the approaches to these positions were covered by mortar fire. Also additional fire support was provided by artillery field pieces of 75-mm, 88-mm, and 240-mm caliber firing both time and percussion fire. Numerous snipers located in trees, houses, and towers were used.

Our Attack "The most successful method of dealing with these defensive positions was the closely coordinated attack of infantry and tanks, with artillery and 4.2-inch chemical mortars ready to assist where needed. The use of these supporting weapons was severely handicapped by the limited observation."


TANK-INFANTRY COMBINE

Teamwork the Key The great emphasis placed on the importance of tank-infantry teamwork is reflected in the many reports and training instructions that have been issued by combat commanders. For example the Commanding General, VII Corps published the following narrative of such an action in a training memorandum: "The capture of the high ground north of the MONTEBOURG-QUINEVILLE ROAD was accomplished by the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, closely supported by the 70th Tank Battalion, which was operating at a reduced strength of 18 tanks.

"Upon receiving the order for the attack at 1830, 13 June, the tank battalion commander immediately initiated a route reconnaissance to a suitable assembly area and arranged for a conference between his key officers and those of the infantry battalion.

Elements of the Plan "At this conference the following essential elements to effect coordination were agreed upon:

"1. H-hour would be at 0930.

"2. An artillery preparation would be fired from H-15 minutes to H-hour.

"3. When the artillery fire lifted, the tank mortar platoon, from positions immediately in rear of the Line of Departure, would fire on all known and suspected AT gun locations.

"4. Each of the two infantry assault companies would be directly supported by six tanks. The remaining six tanks would be in general support.

"5. All tanks would be held 800 yards in rear of the LD, moving forward in time to cross the line with the infantry at H-hour.

The Advance "The attack jumped off on time, the tanks advancing very slowly, spraying the hedgerows with machine-gun fire. The infantry advanced abreast of the tanks, mopping up as they proceeded. The supporting tank company remained about 500 to 600 yards in rear of the assault companies and covered their forward movement by overhead fire.

"The objective was seized at 1500 after an advance of over 2,000 yards against a well-organized resistance which utilized both open and concrete emplacements."

Corp Commander’s Comment: In discussing this attack the Corps Commander made the following comments on infantry-tank cooperation:

"Tank companies require at least 3 hours and tank battalions a minimum of 5 hours of daylight in which to prepare for an attack.

"Tank assembly positions should be selected well in rear of the Line of Departure.

"Tank officers and infantry commanders should discuss and arrange all details of their cooperative effort by personal conference at some prearranged location. If possible this location should allow visual reconnaissance of the zone of activity.

"The tanks should not be advanced to the LD until the time of the attack.

"Artillery observers should be with the leading wave of tanks.

"Radio communication between the infantry CP and the tanks should be maintained.

"The speed of the tanks should conform to the infantry rate of advance. Gaps should not be allowed to develop between the two elements.

"The infantry can assist the tanks in passing through hedgerows by protecting them from hostile AT personnel using AT grenades or rockets.

"In the absence of definite targets forward infantry elements should fire at the nearest cover to the front and flanks. Rifle fire directed along the lower structures of friendly tanks will discourage enemy use of magnetic mines.

"Enemy AT guns firing at our tanks should be immediately smothered by our mortar and automatic-weapons fire, thus forcing the gun crews to take cover and permitting the tanks to outflank and destroy the enemy guns.

"Tanks should be employed on both sides of hedges when advancing along a hedgerow.

"If at all possible tanks should avoid roads during the attack.

"The tanks in general support should mop up any positions which are bypassed by the first wave of tanks.

"Once the final objective is reached the tanks should immediately withdraw to a predetermined rally point. If they remain with the infantry they will attract heavy enemy artillery fire which will seriously interfere with the infantry reorganization."

Limited Objective A letter from Headquarters, XIX Corps, stresses the importance of the limited objective in controlling the combined infantry-tank action: "The major objective given in corps, division, and even regimental plans and orders is reached by a series of limited-objective attacks by infantry and tank platoons and companies. Thus the designation of the major objective should be considered as indicating an axis of advance and an ultimate goal for the smaller assault units. Here in NORMANDY the normal objective of each attack is the next hedgerow where there will be a pause for reorganization and for planning the next advance. Keep the distance to be traversed short so that the tanks will not outstrip the infantry, thus losing the close support that is mutually necessary to make the fight effective. It is very desirable whenever conditions permit that each limited objective be visible from the line of departure.

Personal Reconnaissance "The closely coordinated team play that is called for in hedgerow fighting requires a maximum of personal reconnaissance. The key to success in each fight from hedgerow to hedgerow is personal reconnaissance by the commanders concerned."

Bulldozer Tanks An infantry battalion commander wrote from NORMANDY: "The light and medium tank equipped with a bulldozer blade was successfully used to plow through the hedgerows, cutting openings through which the other tanks would file to fan out and cover the next field. The steep banks which line the roads would be cut down at predetermined crossing points."

Fighting Infantry Infantry Regimental Commander, NORMANDY: "Fire and movement is still the only sound way to advance your infantry in daylight fighting. Build up a good strong base of fire with automatic rifles and light machine guns. The heavy machine guns are much more effective, but it is difficult to keep them up with the advance. Use your 60-mm mortars to deepen and thicken your covering fire. When you are all set, cut loose with all you’ve got to keep Jerry’s head down while the riflemen close in from the flanks and clean him out.



Hedgerow Hints "Because of the limited range of observation, scouts tended to operate too close to their units. They should try to keep at least one hedgerow ahead of the remainder of the squad.

"Riflemen still have a tendency to wait for a definite, visible target before shooting. Each man should cover with fire any assigned sector which he believes occupied. Only then will he provide the needed protection to his comrades on the move.

"Avoid the areas in the vicinity of large trees when digging in. Enemy artillery fire in these trees will cause tree bursts with the same effect as time fire."

Hedgerow Explosives Observer’s Report, NORMANDY: "The engineers played their part in the tank-infantry team. The sketches show graphically how the closely coordinated tank-infantry-engineer team worked in one of our divisions.

"The tank would place covering fire on the far hedge from a position behind the hedge to be breached. Under this fire the infantry would move into the field ahead to cover the engineer operations. The engineers would place explosive charges to breach the hedge during the infantry advance.

"When the tank fire had to stop to avoid endangering our own infantry, the tank would momentarily withdraw, and the charges would be detonated. The team would then move forward to the next hedgerow to repeat the performance. It was found that two charges of 50 pounds each placed as shown were adequate to breach any type of hedgerow."







Lean on the Artillery Preparation Commanding General, 79th Division, NORMANDY: "Heavy artillery preparation fires, terrifically expensive in ammunition, have been wasted because they were not closely followed up by the attacking infantry. Remember these supporting fires do not destroy the enemy but merely force him underground for a brief period. You must be on top of him when he ‘pops up’ again."

The Useful 4.2 Infantry Battalion Commander, NORMANDY: "The 4.2-inch chemical mortar has proved to be a wonderful close-support weapon. Captured prisoners stated that they feared it more than artillery shell because they could not hear the projectile. The Germans have shown a marked dislike for WP, and on many occasions a few rounds, thrown in their hedgerow positions have caused their precipitate withdrawal.

"We fired the mortars like artillery pieces, using forward observers with the assault rifle companies. The mortars did their best work at ranges of 1,500 to 2,000 yards, but on occasion they have done deadly execution at 3,500 yards."

Battlefield Recovery Under Fire Letter, First U. S. Army Group, NORMANDY: "A tank battalion used the following procedure to recover one of their tanks which had been immobilized only 200 yards from the German lines:

"An infantry platoon was placed in concealment in the hedgerow facing the German position and disposed so that its fire would cover the disabled tank. An 81-mm mortar was emplaced on the right flank of the infantry platoon. Then the tank recovery vehicle (T-2) started forward. Almost immediately a German machine gun opened fire but was silenced in short order by the mortar.

"When the recovery vehicle reached the disabled tank, the German infantry opened fire and moved forward, but the heavy fire from our infantry platoon, coupled with a concentration from the mortar, caused their precipitate retirement. The recovery vehicle hooked on to the tank and towed it to safety with no further difficulty and no casualties."