Hi all
Bit of an open question and perhaps the perspective and opinions can be more better explained by our more well read members Was there a better fighting soldier.
Iam aware that the Germans for certain modlers are a more interesting subject multyple camo styles weapons etc however i feel that certain allied troops have been made out to be dull and lack luster.
Perhaps iam talking out of my bottom but there we go.
Cheers Chris
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Allied Troops v Axis Troops
tango20
Member Since: August 01, 2004
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 05:19 AM UTC
Halfyank
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 06:37 AM UTC
Chris I don't know if you know it or not but you posted this three times. I deleted the two extra ones. As a moderator I can do this on any body's posts. You can do it on your own posts if you ever notice you've done this.
Now, as to your question. My own feeling is that so much depends on the time period, and the troops involved. If you are asking for the early war years, say 1939 to 1943, I'd say they had better fighting ability. That doesn't mean they were better, they just had superior tactics, probably better leaders, and excellent weapons. Later on, say 1944 to the end, they were forced to use really sub-par quality troops. The allies though had excellent special troops, airborne, marines, commandos, rangers, that I'd put up man for man against any axis troops out there. Note I've been saying axis here, but I'd have to say this is mainly for German troops. That isn't to say the Japanese or Italians were bad troops, just different.
To me, and NOT to start the entire axis vs allied modelers debate, I find it interesting that in many ways the things that made the German army inferior in some ways, makes them more interesting to model to many people. People talk about the camo, the large numbers of specialized armored units, etc, but really that in many cases that was because they needed to do more with what they had in order to make up with their being outnumbered and having to deal with lower quality troops.
I fully expect to be challenged on this opinion.
Now, as to your question. My own feeling is that so much depends on the time period, and the troops involved. If you are asking for the early war years, say 1939 to 1943, I'd say they had better fighting ability. That doesn't mean they were better, they just had superior tactics, probably better leaders, and excellent weapons. Later on, say 1944 to the end, they were forced to use really sub-par quality troops. The allies though had excellent special troops, airborne, marines, commandos, rangers, that I'd put up man for man against any axis troops out there. Note I've been saying axis here, but I'd have to say this is mainly for German troops. That isn't to say the Japanese or Italians were bad troops, just different.
To me, and NOT to start the entire axis vs allied modelers debate, I find it interesting that in many ways the things that made the German army inferior in some ways, makes them more interesting to model to many people. People talk about the camo, the large numbers of specialized armored units, etc, but really that in many cases that was because they needed to do more with what they had in order to make up with their being outnumbered and having to deal with lower quality troops.
I fully expect to be challenged on this opinion.
tango20
Member Since: August 01, 2004
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 09:07 AM UTC
Hi Rodger
Thanks for sorting out my extra posts ..iam welsh..lololol
I I think you put it very well i just think that people tend to feel that the Gemans were at times very superior i can ony voice my opinion from talking to vets from both sides ones that served in Normandy Horth Africa Italy (Monti Casino) and i agree that in certain situations troops fight in a more effective way..ie Hill 112 in Normandy i have wakled that area with my dad very moving ,3000yards 2 weeks huge amounts of people killed and wounded ,and they were fighting against crack german troops , in a way i get fed up with the Brit troops be depicted as lack luster and quaint.
Cheers Chris
Thanks for sorting out my extra posts ..iam welsh..lololol
I I think you put it very well i just think that people tend to feel that the Gemans were at times very superior i can ony voice my opinion from talking to vets from both sides ones that served in Normandy Horth Africa Italy (Monti Casino) and i agree that in certain situations troops fight in a more effective way..ie Hill 112 in Normandy i have wakled that area with my dad very moving ,3000yards 2 weeks huge amounts of people killed and wounded ,and they were fighting against crack german troops , in a way i get fed up with the Brit troops be depicted as lack luster and quaint.
Cheers Chris
DutchBird
#068
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 09:12 AM UTC
Last year I read a book which deals exactly with this matter.
I do not have the book here, I borrowed it last year from the library... It was a study of all major armies involved (USSR, UK, USA, Germany, Japan at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical) and I have a slightly related book at home concerning Normandy.
The overall conclusion I drew is that there is not a single answer for it. Due to a few factors, on both sides (and apologies for some possible blunt and oversimplified statements):
The Allied side:
The allies made a trade-of between training/quality of troops and weapons and numbers. A prime example IMHO is the Sherman. It was not that good (at best the equal of the Pz IV long barreled tanks, (vastly) inferior to Panther and both Tigers), but the allies were able to crank them out in such great numbers that the Germans were unable to kill them at a fast enough rate, and the Shermans were good enough to prevent a revolt from their crews.
The book states there was a similar approach to the training of men. Combine that with some doctrinal issues (among others fire-power at platoon and squad level) and the rapid expansion and need to play catch up with the Germans, meant that on average they were German (stressing not the POW's pressed into service and such) troops were better at platoon and squad level.
The book about Normandy argues, indirectly, a similar thing. It basically states that the Allies faced comparatively few German troops, only two first rate armored units (12th SS and Panzer Lehr) were specifically intended to guard the West, the rest was there for rest and refit (and hence thrown into action piecemeal), and only relatively few infantry divisions were first rate. Against this he argues the Allies threw the best they had, rapidly outnumbered them in every conceivable category and were aided by complete superiority in the air. Yet it took them forever to break the German defenses... One of the main reason, it seems to implies, was the German superiority at the lower level.
Frankly, the fact that the Germans held out against such odds as long as they did (in the East and West) almost has to mean that the regular German soldier, combined with their lower level doctrine (squad, platoon, "kampfgruppe") on average was better then their allied counterpart. It seems to be the only way to be able to explain why it took the Allies so long to defeat the Germans.
Now from the German point of view, what I can remember:
Quality throughout the German army varied (of course). IMHO the Germans had the distinct advantage of gearing up for war long before... and hence more intensive training. Also, their youth had received some kind of mild basic training (Hitler Jugend), and the Germans had developed a very efficient doctrine, at lower levels, in which they allowed for much more initiative by local commanders at lower levels. The prime goal was to get control of an objective/reach a target. How to get there was the responsibility of the local guys. This seemed to have been much more developed in the German army then in the Allied armies. Also, from what I have understood, at a lower leve the Germans had a massive advantage in firepower (machinguns, machine-pistols and later assault rifles, mortars).
One of the prime examples of the quality of this doctrine is how the Germans countered Market Garden (in the initial stages) at Arnhem, and shortly after at Nijmegen. The troops that stalled the British advance on the bridge consisted of something like 30 (!) (semi-)independent commands. The Germans had pretty much stalled the British before Bittrich (IIRC) had a (clear) picture of what was happening, and coordinate the defense on a larger scale. They might even have sent the SS troops to Nijmegen to protect the bridge of their own initiative (though I am not sure about that).
Mind you that quality rapidly deteriorated in the final stages of the war; quality of newly raised units seems to have been kept up by transferring a core of troops from the existing elite (ie 1st SS to 12th SS) from which the new unit was formed. Also, the explosive growth of some units, like the famous Grossdeutschland, in the later stages rapidly decreased its quality as well.
The big difference in quality is of course also determined by morale and motivation. The picture that has emerged to me seems to be the following
True Elite: Some of the early Fallschirmjaegers, Mountain troops, a few of the Wehrmacht regular panzer and infantry units. Most of the early Waffen-SS units, comprised of German, Scandinavian and Dutch volunteers (roughly speaking 12th SS is the cut-off)
Good/Average: Most of the regular early/mid-war Wehrmacht units.
Bad: anything consisting of POW's pressed into service. Most of the ethnic eastern European units (though this might be a bit bad-rep from the Germans during the war).
I do not have the book here, I borrowed it last year from the library... It was a study of all major armies involved (USSR, UK, USA, Germany, Japan at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical) and I have a slightly related book at home concerning Normandy.
The overall conclusion I drew is that there is not a single answer for it. Due to a few factors, on both sides (and apologies for some possible blunt and oversimplified statements):
The Allied side:
The allies made a trade-of between training/quality of troops and weapons and numbers. A prime example IMHO is the Sherman. It was not that good (at best the equal of the Pz IV long barreled tanks, (vastly) inferior to Panther and both Tigers), but the allies were able to crank them out in such great numbers that the Germans were unable to kill them at a fast enough rate, and the Shermans were good enough to prevent a revolt from their crews.
The book states there was a similar approach to the training of men. Combine that with some doctrinal issues (among others fire-power at platoon and squad level) and the rapid expansion and need to play catch up with the Germans, meant that on average they were German (stressing not the POW's pressed into service and such) troops were better at platoon and squad level.
The book about Normandy argues, indirectly, a similar thing. It basically states that the Allies faced comparatively few German troops, only two first rate armored units (12th SS and Panzer Lehr) were specifically intended to guard the West, the rest was there for rest and refit (and hence thrown into action piecemeal), and only relatively few infantry divisions were first rate. Against this he argues the Allies threw the best they had, rapidly outnumbered them in every conceivable category and were aided by complete superiority in the air. Yet it took them forever to break the German defenses... One of the main reason, it seems to implies, was the German superiority at the lower level.
Frankly, the fact that the Germans held out against such odds as long as they did (in the East and West) almost has to mean that the regular German soldier, combined with their lower level doctrine (squad, platoon, "kampfgruppe") on average was better then their allied counterpart. It seems to be the only way to be able to explain why it took the Allies so long to defeat the Germans.
Now from the German point of view, what I can remember:
Quality throughout the German army varied (of course). IMHO the Germans had the distinct advantage of gearing up for war long before... and hence more intensive training. Also, their youth had received some kind of mild basic training (Hitler Jugend), and the Germans had developed a very efficient doctrine, at lower levels, in which they allowed for much more initiative by local commanders at lower levels. The prime goal was to get control of an objective/reach a target. How to get there was the responsibility of the local guys. This seemed to have been much more developed in the German army then in the Allied armies. Also, from what I have understood, at a lower leve the Germans had a massive advantage in firepower (machinguns, machine-pistols and later assault rifles, mortars).
One of the prime examples of the quality of this doctrine is how the Germans countered Market Garden (in the initial stages) at Arnhem, and shortly after at Nijmegen. The troops that stalled the British advance on the bridge consisted of something like 30 (!) (semi-)independent commands. The Germans had pretty much stalled the British before Bittrich (IIRC) had a (clear) picture of what was happening, and coordinate the defense on a larger scale. They might even have sent the SS troops to Nijmegen to protect the bridge of their own initiative (though I am not sure about that).
Mind you that quality rapidly deteriorated in the final stages of the war; quality of newly raised units seems to have been kept up by transferring a core of troops from the existing elite (ie 1st SS to 12th SS) from which the new unit was formed. Also, the explosive growth of some units, like the famous Grossdeutschland, in the later stages rapidly decreased its quality as well.
The big difference in quality is of course also determined by morale and motivation. The picture that has emerged to me seems to be the following
True Elite: Some of the early Fallschirmjaegers, Mountain troops, a few of the Wehrmacht regular panzer and infantry units. Most of the early Waffen-SS units, comprised of German, Scandinavian and Dutch volunteers (roughly speaking 12th SS is the cut-off)
Good/Average: Most of the regular early/mid-war Wehrmacht units.
Bad: anything consisting of POW's pressed into service. Most of the ethnic eastern European units (though this might be a bit bad-rep from the Germans during the war).
DutchBird
#068
Member Since: April 09, 2003
entire network: 1,144 Posts
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 09:17 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Hi Rodger
Thanks for sorting out my extra posts ..iam welsh..lololol
I I think you put it very well i just think that people tend to feel that the Gemans were at times very superior i can ony voice my opinion from talking to vets from both sides ones that served in Normandy Horth Africa Italy (Monti Casino) and i agree that in certain situations troops fight in a more effective way..ie Hill 112 in Normandy i have wakled that area with my dad very moving ,3000yards 2 weeks huge amounts of people killed and wounded ,and they were fighting against crack german troops , in a way i get fed up with the Brit troops be depicted as lack luster and quaint.
Cheers Chris
IMHO,
those saying that the British troops were lackluster and quaint do them a great disservice. I never saw them as that.
The idea that I would associate with lackluster and quaint is that they were reluctant to fight, that they did not have their hearts in it.
As far as I know, I have never said it, nor will I say so.
IMHO the elite of the American and British troops (Airborn, commando's, rangers, SAS) was surely the equal of the Germans.
However, in my eyes, the average allied infantry unit, let alone armored unit was IMHO definately inferior for much of the war (until late 1944/early 1945), on the condition that the Germans had some supplies available to them.
tango20
Member Since: August 01, 2004
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 09:40 AM UTC
Hi Harm
Avery interesting and informitive reply,i feel that in the situation that the Germans found them selfs in in a way they should have creamed us on the beaches ...a well armed and well trained army battle expericened.
My dad told me that during their trainning to go to normandy in fact not long before the jump off they would throw pigs blood over you as you were going around the assault course yes it took a long time for the break out,but what gets forgoten was that they really they should not haver got off the beaches they should not have been able to form a beach head and in fact a well prepared defencive force should have held that advance.
Thats why when we went to the Falklands moving forward was the essence even if they were conscipts.
I get ticked off witrh some of the people that write books about the break out from Normandy the troops did an outstanding job not quite to plane but as i was always taught the plan goes out the window when the first shot is fired Generals talk about it Historians say well this should have happened the Infantary man fights it,in Military terms they should have kicked our ar--- but they didnt cos we did what in effect we were never suppossd to do..pure determination and Grit Plan it ...talk about it... write about it FIGHT IT different ball game all together
Chris
Avery interesting and informitive reply,i feel that in the situation that the Germans found them selfs in in a way they should have creamed us on the beaches ...a well armed and well trained army battle expericened.
My dad told me that during their trainning to go to normandy in fact not long before the jump off they would throw pigs blood over you as you were going around the assault course yes it took a long time for the break out,but what gets forgoten was that they really they should not haver got off the beaches they should not have been able to form a beach head and in fact a well prepared defencive force should have held that advance.
Thats why when we went to the Falklands moving forward was the essence even if they were conscipts.
I get ticked off witrh some of the people that write books about the break out from Normandy the troops did an outstanding job not quite to plane but as i was always taught the plan goes out the window when the first shot is fired Generals talk about it Historians say well this should have happened the Infantary man fights it,in Military terms they should have kicked our ar--- but they didnt cos we did what in effect we were never suppossd to do..pure determination and Grit Plan it ...talk about it... write about it FIGHT IT different ball game all together
Chris
tango20
Member Since: August 01, 2004
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 09:48 AM UTC
Hi Harm
In no way did think or feel that you said that the Brits were lack luster i felt your post was informative and balanced .
Cheers Chris
In no way did think or feel that you said that the Brits were lack luster i felt your post was informative and balanced .
Cheers Chris
DutchBird
#068
Member Since: April 09, 2003
entire network: 1,144 Posts
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 10:21 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Hi Harm
Avery interesting and informitive reply,i feel that in the situation that the Germans found them selfs in in a way they should have creamed us on the beaches ...a well armed and well trained army battle expericened.
My dad told me that during their trainning to go to normandy in fact not long before the jump off they would throw pigs blood over you as you were going around the assault course yes it took a long time for the break out,but what gets forgoten was that they really they should not haver got off the beaches they should not have been able to form a beach head and in fact a well prepared defencive force should have held that advance.
Thats why when we went to the Falklands moving forward was the essence even if they were conscipts.
I get ticked off witrh some of the people that write books about the break out from Normandy the troops did an outstanding job not quite to plane but as i was always taught the plan goes out the window when the first shot is fired Generals talk about it Historians say well this should have happened the Infantary man fights it,in Military terms they should have kicked our ar--- but they didnt cos we did what in effect we were never suppossd to do..pure determination and Grit Plan it ...talk about it... write about it FIGHT IT different ball game all together
Chris
Hi Chris,
thanks for the compliments. The way I have come to understand is that, in theory, the Germans indeed should have creamed the allies at the beaches. The argument that I have seen made, and IMHO certainly has it merits, is that by and large the Allies during the first day(s) did not face battle hardened troops. And by the time these arrived it was too late.
According to these arguments, there were a few problems with the assumption that the Germans should have creamed the Allies at the beaches. Arguments that can only be made in hindsight, by the way:
1) The Germans had (relatively) few completely up to strength first rate units in the area. Those being the Panzer Lehr and 12th SS (Hitler Jugend). The other first class units were further away, spread out and some of them still in the process of refitting. Hence they were either thrown into battle piecemeal or at a far later stage.
And, as far as I know both 12th SS Hitler Jugend, Panzer Lehr, the reconstituted 21st Panzer and 17th SS (Panzer Grenadier) had no previous combat experience!! Both 12th SS and Lehr made up for this with eauipment, training, and in the case of 12th SS, with its cadre of officers and NCO's (IIRC transferred from 1st SS).
2) Combine that with, apparently, most of the defenses not being finished.
3) The only decent division sized units directly in the area were 352nd infantry and 21st Panzer (coincidently the only armored unit in the German army not deemed fit for service on the Eastern Front!). The American experience at Omaha (where they faced elements of 352nd) proved how lucky in that respect the allies were. The infantry units had to cover a very large sector of the front.
By the time the first decent bigger German units arrived, it was too late to throw the allies back into the sea. Both at Caen and further west.
4) The huge advantage the allies had in fire-power, both naval and from the air. This worked twofold. The naval fire-power, even with all its deficiencies, made the coastal zone basically a no-go for the Germans. And the German artillery was no match for them. Second, the absolute control of the sky by the allies gave them the opportunity to seriously disrupt the German efforts to intervene, especially with mobile troops. Maybe not so much by outright distroying the German forces as by causing confusion, delays and taking out or disrupting supplies.
Based on this last point I have seen some good arguments made that Rommels plan (armor close to the beaches) never would have worked either. It would simply have been bombed and bombarded to smitherines.
So the conclusion seems to be that in hindsight, the Germans never had a reasonable chance to stop the allies at all of the beaches. At least not with the disposition of troops as it was. The troops directly facing the Allies by and large were not well trained, well equipped and in some cases might have had doubtful morale, while facing pretty much the best the Allies had to offer.
IMHO the allied troops by and large (as there are always utter failures, as IMHO that is the nature of war) did an outstanding job. The issues, IMHO, are with the decisions higher up, or perceptions thereof after the war (among others Monty and Patton).
spooky6
Member Since: May 05, 2005
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Posted: Monday, April 10, 2006 - 05:36 PM UTC
One of the biggest failings of the British Army at the time was its officer corps, which largely contributed to the failings of its units, and to huge losses, particularly early on, like the loss of the entire 51st Highland Division before Dunkirk.
While the German Army was a modern one, fuelled by volunteers from an industrialized nation, the British Army was still a holdover from the feudal era, with aristocratic officers leading serfs grouped into regiments from particular areas. Officers were picked (even for elite units like the Commandos) just on the grounds that they were 'good chaps' and went to Eton. Bob Laycock and Geoffrey Keyes are good examples. Professionalism was frowned on, as was any sort of technical proficiency like skill with a radio or motor vehicles. These were all seen as beneath an officer compared with knowledge of horse riding and wine. It took many long years and defeats for this attitude to change and for a professional force to emerge at the end of the war.
On the other hand, men like Rommel had served as enlisted soldiers and knew every aspect of their units. Even rear area officers like clerks and quartermasters were proficient in forming up ad hoc units and leading them, as was seen at Arnhem and in Libya when the 'Rommel Raid' was defeated.
Another reason why the Germans were superior was that their company grade officers were trained to take over battalions and brigades if their commanders were killed. British company grade officers were never trained in anything beyond platoon and company tactics until they went to staff school.
The British enlisted troops in comparison were far superior to their officers, but the British use of conscripts early on in the war meant that the troops will to fight had largely been diminished in later years. Older soldiers were unwilling to risk their lives in the push across across Europe. In comparison, the German vets fought hard even in the closing years.
While the German Army was a modern one, fuelled by volunteers from an industrialized nation, the British Army was still a holdover from the feudal era, with aristocratic officers leading serfs grouped into regiments from particular areas. Officers were picked (even for elite units like the Commandos) just on the grounds that they were 'good chaps' and went to Eton. Bob Laycock and Geoffrey Keyes are good examples. Professionalism was frowned on, as was any sort of technical proficiency like skill with a radio or motor vehicles. These were all seen as beneath an officer compared with knowledge of horse riding and wine. It took many long years and defeats for this attitude to change and for a professional force to emerge at the end of the war.
On the other hand, men like Rommel had served as enlisted soldiers and knew every aspect of their units. Even rear area officers like clerks and quartermasters were proficient in forming up ad hoc units and leading them, as was seen at Arnhem and in Libya when the 'Rommel Raid' was defeated.
Another reason why the Germans were superior was that their company grade officers were trained to take over battalions and brigades if their commanders were killed. British company grade officers were never trained in anything beyond platoon and company tactics until they went to staff school.
The British enlisted troops in comparison were far superior to their officers, but the British use of conscripts early on in the war meant that the troops will to fight had largely been diminished in later years. Older soldiers were unwilling to risk their lives in the push across across Europe. In comparison, the German vets fought hard even in the closing years.
bgazso
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 12:12 AM UTC
Hi Chris,
I assume you were looking for an overall impression as opposed to a particular battle, which is no easier, of course.
I think most Allied vets would consider the Germans a very worthy foe indeed. A professional Army, well trained and, in most cases, highly motivated. The Italians probably never really had their heart in the fight. They were Mussolini's pawns in dreams of "Roman Glory". The Japanese command had little regard for the average soldier, so squandered them in the bogus Bushido stuff.
The Russians were throwing people in the way of the Germans until they could get their act together, which still involved throwing huge numbers in front of the Germans. Effective but unbelievably brutal strategy.
The British suffered catastrophic losses in WW1, and were naturally more cautious in risking their manpower. Well trained and motivated, I believe they weren't led as well as they could've been, but that's just my opinion.
The G.I's had to play catchup big time, and had to learn the hard way as they went along. One thing we learned was how to conduct amphibious operations, something none of the other combatants had to deal with in large, combined ops. Leadership was all over the map ranging from putrid to inspired.
Equipment quality varied, some better on the Aliied side, some on the Axis. No need to beat that one to death.
"Elite troops" on either side would have the advantage, naturally, over regular troops. Only when facing one another could any conclusions be drawn, and then only if the playing field was level - hardly ever.
In the end, material and numbers won the day, but the sacrifice of those who moved to the sound of the guns was necessary to secure the final victory.
Barry
I assume you were looking for an overall impression as opposed to a particular battle, which is no easier, of course.
I think most Allied vets would consider the Germans a very worthy foe indeed. A professional Army, well trained and, in most cases, highly motivated. The Italians probably never really had their heart in the fight. They were Mussolini's pawns in dreams of "Roman Glory". The Japanese command had little regard for the average soldier, so squandered them in the bogus Bushido stuff.
The Russians were throwing people in the way of the Germans until they could get their act together, which still involved throwing huge numbers in front of the Germans. Effective but unbelievably brutal strategy.
The British suffered catastrophic losses in WW1, and were naturally more cautious in risking their manpower. Well trained and motivated, I believe they weren't led as well as they could've been, but that's just my opinion.
The G.I's had to play catchup big time, and had to learn the hard way as they went along. One thing we learned was how to conduct amphibious operations, something none of the other combatants had to deal with in large, combined ops. Leadership was all over the map ranging from putrid to inspired.
Equipment quality varied, some better on the Aliied side, some on the Axis. No need to beat that one to death.
"Elite troops" on either side would have the advantage, naturally, over regular troops. Only when facing one another could any conclusions be drawn, and then only if the playing field was level - hardly ever.
In the end, material and numbers won the day, but the sacrifice of those who moved to the sound of the guns was necessary to secure the final victory.
Barry
Hohenstaufen
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 01:36 AM UTC
What a fascinating thread! Here's my two penn'orth.
At the beginning of the war, apart from senior officers who had served in WW1, only one army in Europe had a battle experienced, professional hard core. That was the British Army (this was also the case at the beginning of WW1). This was due to the constant demands on the army of the duties of Empire (NW Frontier, Palestine etc). It was also the only army in the WORLD to be fully mechanised.
The German Wehrmacht had a few units that had seen action in Spain with the Condor Legion, as had the Italians, also they had the experience of Abyssinia, but they had fought a relatively backward foe there.
But the majority, including senior officers or long serving rankers had seen no action since 1918. They had some excellent ideas & new equipment which had been tried out in Spain, but it remained to be seen how they would work against a first-class trained opposition.
In the Far East, the Japanese had been fighting in China since 1931, so it could be assumed that much of their army was battle trained & hardened.
Going back to Europe, all the above changed in 1940. The new German tactics worked & they conquered Western Europe. They discovered along the way, that the British infantryman was every inch as tough in defence as their fathers had found in WW1. The French were much more patchy, but some units fought very hard indeed (e.g. Foreign Legion, some of the North African troops, some tank units, St Cyr cadets), but others were second rate.
But the Germans also learned, & entered their Eastern campaigns as battle hardened veterans. The Russian opposition, once again like WW1, relied on the tactics of mass attacks. This was very expensive in modern warfare, & Russian casualties were high.
But the Germans found the individual "Ivan" could be a very tough opponent indeed.
As the war progressed, every nation found that their high grade, well trained early units were "watered down" to some extent by an influx of conscripts. The British regimental system is one of the British Army's great strengths (as well as one of it's major weaknesses as some commentators would have it), as it creates a strong esprit de corps based on local associations & previous historical successes in new recruits. Most other nations just raised more & higher numbered units, which didn't have the same strong affiliations. This is not to say, however, that they didn't fight just as well. In the British county regiments, the long periods of inactivity in Britain before the return to Europe led to a constant drain of their best men to the more dashing Special Forces units, in the hope of earlier action.
By the time of D-Day, there were some very experienced units in the invasion armies, which had fought in North Africa, Sicily & Italy (e.g. British 7th AD, the "Desert Rats", 51st Highland Div & US 1st Infantry - the "Big Red One"), but the majority had seen no action. Conversely, it was found that the newer units tended to show a more aggressive spirit, generally speaking, the older units being overtired & "used up".
Their German opposition included Russian prisoners in German uniform, old or ill soldiers with long term ailments (the "Ear & Stomach" battalions) as well as a leavening of good quality troops. Despite this the German Army in Normandy proved to be a very tough opponent, reluctant to give ground, & as more elite troops were pulled in from other battle fronts, bellicose in attack. Partly this was due to the Allied declaration of "Total War", & insistence on unconditional surrender. Faced with the possible total dismemberment of the Fatherland, even the most bolshy "Landser" would fight hard. SS & Falschirmjager units were particularly well motivated, tending to regard themselves as an elite, & more imbued with Nazi zeal. American post combat assessments of the Normandy fighting concluded that individually the German fighting man inflicted casualities in a proportion of 11/2 to 1 on the Allies, inplying they were fighting harder than the British & Americans.
However ther were individual units on the Allied side that were every bit as good, if better than anything the Germans could produce. American 82nd Airborne is widely credited as being the finest division in the ETO, & Jim Gavin as the finest division commander. Individually, the SAS, Commandos & Parachute Regiment soldiers more than stacked up alongside HJ, LAH Panzer Lehr etc.
In the Far East, the Japanese soldier was particularly adept at jungle living & fighting, & until the Allies learned the required lessons, was a sometimes frighteneing opponent. However once these skills were mastered, it was discovered that the Japanese army relied too much on Bushido & not enough on modern equipment. Individual marksmanship was not highly stressed in the Japanese army, & many of the weapons were of ineffective calibres. The exploits of the Chindits proved that the jungle was indeed neutral.
So the answer to Chris' original question "Was there a better fighting soldier?" is really, I believe, no. All the various forces engaged in WW2 could point to some unit or other that was exemplary (even the Italians, who are often castigated for their poor performance had units that fought well, their Alpini, parachute units, & frequent mention is made of artillery units who fought to the last man & gun).
At the beginning of the war, apart from senior officers who had served in WW1, only one army in Europe had a battle experienced, professional hard core. That was the British Army (this was also the case at the beginning of WW1). This was due to the constant demands on the army of the duties of Empire (NW Frontier, Palestine etc). It was also the only army in the WORLD to be fully mechanised.
The German Wehrmacht had a few units that had seen action in Spain with the Condor Legion, as had the Italians, also they had the experience of Abyssinia, but they had fought a relatively backward foe there.
But the majority, including senior officers or long serving rankers had seen no action since 1918. They had some excellent ideas & new equipment which had been tried out in Spain, but it remained to be seen how they would work against a first-class trained opposition.
In the Far East, the Japanese had been fighting in China since 1931, so it could be assumed that much of their army was battle trained & hardened.
Going back to Europe, all the above changed in 1940. The new German tactics worked & they conquered Western Europe. They discovered along the way, that the British infantryman was every inch as tough in defence as their fathers had found in WW1. The French were much more patchy, but some units fought very hard indeed (e.g. Foreign Legion, some of the North African troops, some tank units, St Cyr cadets), but others were second rate.
But the Germans also learned, & entered their Eastern campaigns as battle hardened veterans. The Russian opposition, once again like WW1, relied on the tactics of mass attacks. This was very expensive in modern warfare, & Russian casualties were high.
But the Germans found the individual "Ivan" could be a very tough opponent indeed.
As the war progressed, every nation found that their high grade, well trained early units were "watered down" to some extent by an influx of conscripts. The British regimental system is one of the British Army's great strengths (as well as one of it's major weaknesses as some commentators would have it), as it creates a strong esprit de corps based on local associations & previous historical successes in new recruits. Most other nations just raised more & higher numbered units, which didn't have the same strong affiliations. This is not to say, however, that they didn't fight just as well. In the British county regiments, the long periods of inactivity in Britain before the return to Europe led to a constant drain of their best men to the more dashing Special Forces units, in the hope of earlier action.
By the time of D-Day, there were some very experienced units in the invasion armies, which had fought in North Africa, Sicily & Italy (e.g. British 7th AD, the "Desert Rats", 51st Highland Div & US 1st Infantry - the "Big Red One"), but the majority had seen no action. Conversely, it was found that the newer units tended to show a more aggressive spirit, generally speaking, the older units being overtired & "used up".
Their German opposition included Russian prisoners in German uniform, old or ill soldiers with long term ailments (the "Ear & Stomach" battalions) as well as a leavening of good quality troops. Despite this the German Army in Normandy proved to be a very tough opponent, reluctant to give ground, & as more elite troops were pulled in from other battle fronts, bellicose in attack. Partly this was due to the Allied declaration of "Total War", & insistence on unconditional surrender. Faced with the possible total dismemberment of the Fatherland, even the most bolshy "Landser" would fight hard. SS & Falschirmjager units were particularly well motivated, tending to regard themselves as an elite, & more imbued with Nazi zeal. American post combat assessments of the Normandy fighting concluded that individually the German fighting man inflicted casualities in a proportion of 11/2 to 1 on the Allies, inplying they were fighting harder than the British & Americans.
However ther were individual units on the Allied side that were every bit as good, if better than anything the Germans could produce. American 82nd Airborne is widely credited as being the finest division in the ETO, & Jim Gavin as the finest division commander. Individually, the SAS, Commandos & Parachute Regiment soldiers more than stacked up alongside HJ, LAH Panzer Lehr etc.
In the Far East, the Japanese soldier was particularly adept at jungle living & fighting, & until the Allies learned the required lessons, was a sometimes frighteneing opponent. However once these skills were mastered, it was discovered that the Japanese army relied too much on Bushido & not enough on modern equipment. Individual marksmanship was not highly stressed in the Japanese army, & many of the weapons were of ineffective calibres. The exploits of the Chindits proved that the jungle was indeed neutral.
So the answer to Chris' original question "Was there a better fighting soldier?" is really, I believe, no. All the various forces engaged in WW2 could point to some unit or other that was exemplary (even the Italians, who are often castigated for their poor performance had units that fought well, their Alpini, parachute units, & frequent mention is made of artillery units who fought to the last man & gun).
Hohenstaufen
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 03:22 AM UTC
Quoted Text
One of the biggest failings of the British Army at the time was its officer corps, which largely contributed to the failings of its units, and to huge losses, particularly early on, like the loss of the entire 51st Highland Division before Dunkirk.
While the German Army was a modern one, fuelled by volunteers from an industrialized nation, the British Army was still a holdover from the feudal era, with aristocratic officers leading serfs grouped into regiments from particular areas. Officers were picked (even for elite units like the Commandos) just on the grounds that they were 'good chaps' and went to Eton. Bob Laycock and Geoffrey Keyes are good examples. Professionalism was frowned on, as was any sort of technical proficiency like skill with a radio or motor vehicles. These were all seen as beneath an officer compared with knowledge of horse riding and wine. It took many long years and defeats for this attitude to change and for a professional force to emerge at the end of the war.
On the other hand, men like Rommel had served as enlisted soldiers and knew every aspect of their units. Even rear area officers like clerks and quartermasters were proficient in forming up ad hoc units and leading them, as was seen at Arnhem and in Libya when the 'Rommel Raid' was defeated.
Another reason why the Germans were superior was that their company grade officers were trained to take over battalions and brigades if their commanders were killed. British company grade officers were never trained in anything beyond platoon and company tactics until they went to staff school.
The British enlisted troops in comparison were far superior to their officers, but the British use of conscripts early on in the war meant that the troops will to fight had largely been diminished in later years. Older soldiers were unwilling to risk their lives in the push across across Europe. In comparison, the German vets fought hard even in the closing years.
Do I detect a certain bitterness here Spooky? You must be a serving squaddie LOL!
I think you are being a bit unfair here, after all Hobart, Wingate & Stirling were products of this system, albeit mavericks. For that matter so was Monty ('nuff said!). This same "feudal" system also spawned the SAS, LRDG, Popski's Private Army, the SBS, Commandos & the Parachute Regiment. It could be argued that the public school "gung-ho" approach was exactly what was needed for these types of units, that & the characteristic eccentricity. The Germans didn't seem to be quite so good at this! Also if we're feudal, what were the Junkers like!
The German officer system had always been different. Before qualifying as an officer, after cadet school an aspirant had to serve as Fahnrich (or "ensign") in an army unit for 6 months. This was a sort of "on the job training", which if passed, led to Leutnant rank. It wasn't quite like serving in the ranks. That was an SS requirement.
There were plenty of "stick-in-the-mud" senior officers in the pre-war Heer who didn't like the idea of phasing out cavalry for tanks, & didn't approve of Guderian & his ilk. One of Germany's biggest problems was finding enough qualified mechanics to go round. There were not so many people who were aquainted with driving in those days, unlike say America.
You are absolutely correct, however in what you say about German training. All ranks were encouraged to "understudy" for the ranks above them, & even privates were capable of leading small parties in extremis - something we were poor at. In addition the Germans were very good at forming "Kampfgruppen" from very disparate elements, as seen to advantage at Arnhem.
This brings me onto one of my favourite battles, because this was a clash of elites. Or was it? Much of the fighting on the German side was by rear area troops, even Hohenstaufen & Frundesberg had lost most of their "teeth arm " troops in Normandy. On the Allied side, 1st Airborne was fighting as a division for the first time, & recent writing has suggested that it's level of training was not as high as might be liked. So if the Germans were the "rag,tag & bobtail" of a defeated army, it could be argued their performance was excellent; also 9th & 10th SS started the battle in the shape 1st AB was at the end, yet still were capable of fighting as a cohesive force. So just maybe, very generally speaking, the Germans were better? Doesn't this put the Allied victory in an even better light?
DutchBird
#068
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 08:15 AM UTC
Quoted Text
....
This brings me onto one of my favourite battles, because this was a clash of elites. Or was it? Much of the fighting on the German side was by rear area troops, even Hohenstaufen & Frundesberg had lost most of their "teeth arm " troops in Normandy. On the Allied side, 1st Airborne was fighting as a division for the first time, & recent writing has suggested that it's level of training was not as high as might be liked. So if the Germans were the "rag,tag & bobtail" of a defeated army, it could be argued their performance was excellent; also 9th & 10th SS started the battle in the shape 1st AB was at the end, yet still were capable of fighting as a cohesive force. So just maybe, very generally speaking, the Germans were better?
Doesn't this put the Allied victory in an even better light?
An interesting question, the last one, and one I could see it being argued both ways. However, I would say that it, overall would not put the Allied vitcory in a better light. It does highlight however the willingness and morale IMHO of "Joe private, " to do whatever it took, seeing how they kept on trying again and again. Something of which Monte Cassino is IMHO another good example.
However, looking at the overall picture (strategic situation) it still is amazing, IMHO, how the Germans were able to hold as long as they did... if anything it would leave me wondering about the Allied war-policies... (both political, strategic and at the higher levels within the military (operation and planning)).
Though perhaps a a monument to the sacrifices Joe-private was willing to make to defeat the utter evil that was Nazi-Germany, battles like Monte Cassino, Anzio, Kasserine Pass, Normandy, Market Garden and the Bulge seem to me (with the massive benefit of hindsight) to be hardly the epitome of effectiveness by the higher ranks within the military.
This is IMHO even highlighted by a look at the overall disposition of German troops (focus on the East Front) and total control over the skies that the Western Allies had from the summer of 1944 onwards.
The strategic disadvantage Germany had throughout the war was such that I have seen historians stating two things:
1) Without getting the Skoda works in 1938 in the aftermath of Munich (and getting his hands on the equipment of the Chech army) Hitler never would have been able to go to war in the first place (at least not for quite a while).
2) Based on pure numbers, and quality of equipment, Hitler should never have been able to beat France in 1940. What beat the French was the difference in training and doctrine.
hellbent11
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 09:58 AM UTC
I think we all could write pages on this one! Without doing that here's what I think down and dirty (focusing on ground troops)
British suffered a lack of a good officer corps. Certainly fought bravely because they were backed into a corner and had nowhere to go.
Americans took a while to get going but once started they were hard to stop especially because of logistics and numbers of equipment.
Germans as a whole were very ideologically motivated (less towards the end of the war) and this has a tremendous effect. Also had good equipment but couldn't do much with bad commanders (Hitler and his yes-men)
Japanese were also ideologically motovated to a point only comparable to modern day islamic terroists. Death and sacrifice was the highest honor you could achieve. Commitment beyond measure was a part of thier everyday lives and deaths. Eg: the Japanese soldier who finally surrendered on Tarawa ( I think that was it) in the 70's! Would you sit in the jungle that long?
Like I said just a few thoughts and I'm sure there are many exceptions but I'm speaking more in generalities and just IMHO!
British suffered a lack of a good officer corps. Certainly fought bravely because they were backed into a corner and had nowhere to go.
Americans took a while to get going but once started they were hard to stop especially because of logistics and numbers of equipment.
Germans as a whole were very ideologically motivated (less towards the end of the war) and this has a tremendous effect. Also had good equipment but couldn't do much with bad commanders (Hitler and his yes-men)
Japanese were also ideologically motovated to a point only comparable to modern day islamic terroists. Death and sacrifice was the highest honor you could achieve. Commitment beyond measure was a part of thier everyday lives and deaths. Eg: the Japanese soldier who finally surrendered on Tarawa ( I think that was it) in the 70's! Would you sit in the jungle that long?
Like I said just a few thoughts and I'm sure there are many exceptions but I'm speaking more in generalities and just IMHO!
blaster76
Member Since: September 15, 2002
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 12:11 PM UTC
Quoted Text
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I know basically the Japanese were terrible, the Army was considered un-popular (read un-cool) by the Emporer. Therefore they recieved less funding and had awful supply problems, also the fighting age was younger in Japan: children as young as 12 and 13 were drafted and sent to fight. And lastly Japanese tactics were oriented to individual acts of bravery rather than team work.
I think my father would take great exception to this comment. The Japanese were hardly terrible. Ever heard of Guadalcanal.Tarawa,Pelilu, retaking the Phillipines, Guam, Iwo Jima, Saipan,Okinawa. They were light infantry. they didn't have air superiority or massive amount of supplies, superior equipment interior lines of supply and communication. I could on about interlocking fields of fire, infiltrational techniques that they utilized with great effect which would also dispute your lack of team work comment. Where do you come up with 12 year old children sent to fight?
DutchBird
#068
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 12:55 PM UTC
Quoted Text
I think my father would take great exception to this comment. The Japanese were hardly terrible. Ever heard of Guadalcanal.Tarawa,Pelilu, retaking the Phillipines, Guam, Iwo Jima, Saipan,Okinawa. They were light infantry. they didn't have air superiority or massive amount of supplies, superior equipment interior lines of supply and communication. I could on about interlocking fields of fire, infiltrational techniques that they utilized with great effect which would also dispute your lack of team work comment. Where do you come up with 12 year old children sent to fight?
Let me start beforehand that I know very little about the war in the Pacific. Though I by and large agree with you, there was still one major deficiency in the Japanese army, and that was armour and heavy weapons. And that one only got exposed in the last month of the war, when the Russians completely overran them in Manchurija.
That the Japanese infantry-men were awful is something I indeed do disagree with. If they were, they would never have had the successes they had the ealry stages of the war. Nor would the allies have had such a hard time getting them of the islands, despite their massive advantage in firepower (especially in the later stages of the war).
Where again though there might be a slight core of truth is that the seemingly semi-official policy of fighting to the death, and their fanaticism led to an awful atrition, and thus a rapid detorioration of the quality of the infantryman.
spooky6
Member Since: May 05, 2005
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Posted: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 - 01:10 PM UTC
Quoted Text
Do I detect a certain bitterness here Spooky? You must be a serving squaddie LOL!
:-) I've been out of the Sri Lanka Army for over 15 years now, and yup, I was an OR, but we were pretty much a working/middle class army.
Quoted Text
I think you are being a bit unfair here, after all Hobart, Wingate & Stirling were products of this system, albeit mavericks. For that matter so was Monty ('nuff said!). This same "feudal" system also spawned the SAS, LRDG, Popski's Private Army, the SBS, Commandos & the Parachute Regiment. It could be argued that the public school "gung-ho" approach was exactly what was needed for these types of units, that & the characteristic eccentricity.
Actually, Steve, quite to the contrary. These special units were meritocracies, formed by men who saw how flawed the existing system was, and wanted to have something more effective. All the units you mentioned (barring some Commandos) were not regionally manned. And while (even by their own admittance) these officers never got their units to the point they hoped for, they did a good job of it by going against those rules. And while many of the flamboyant leaders we remember (such as Sterling and Laycock) were products of the 'old boy' system, the units were so effective because they were officered by men who were not (like Andersen, Pedder and Mayne).
And if you want to see a comparison of effective and disastrous special forces leadership and use, compare the Litani attack (where 11 Scottish Commando was used in support of the Australians in Syria) the Rommel Raid (by Layforce), and the first L Detachment parachute drop, against the later ops like the 'Cambeltown raid'. The first three were all of the "let's muddle through and it'll be ok on the day" type of op, and were ridiculous in the extreme, sacrificing highly trained men because their officers were incredibly inept at their jobs.
There was nothing wrong with the 'gung ho' attitude. It was the incompetence and sometimes inflated sense of self-importance by many mid-level officers that was to blame. For instance, when 8 Commando was detailed to cover the Crete evaccuation, and detailed to hold out til the last and then surrender, Bob Laycock (CO), Evelyn Waugh (int officer) and the whole HQ element deserted and jumped on the transports, leaving their men to the Germans. Laycock's excuse was that he was needed in Egypt.
Quoted Text
The Germans didn't seem to be quite so good at this!
True. But Brit SF came out of a failiure on the part of the regular forces. The Germans didn't see a reason for SF because their conventional forces were so successful.
Quoted Text
There were plenty of "stick-in-the-mud" senior officers in the pre-war Heer who didn't like the idea of phasing out cavalry for tanks, & didn't approve of Guderian & his ilk.
True again, but Germany largely ignored the 'sticks' and let men like Rommel & Guderian do their thing, while Britain sidelined and humiliated the officer who came up with the original thinking on armoured warfare that Guderian adopted (can't remember the name, Hughes or Hodges, I think). And the Heer recognized the fact that armour was a new concept and not just a case of replacing horses with tanks, which the British never did, continuing to convert elite cavalry regiments like the Hussars to armour with just a rudimentary training of its officers. Many cavalry officers hadn't a clue about the internal combustion engine, even though they drove sports cars. Mechanical defficulties were left to the 'stable staff'.
Overall, British special forces were arguably the best of the war, but the war was largely fought and won by conventional units, and I think this is what we're discussing. The fact that most of these special units were disbanded in '45, proved that the officer corps largely didn't see the merits of a 'meritocracy' and were happier with their elitist officer corps. Luckily it was too late, and the British Army was forced into change.
Damn, sorry for being so long-winded!
blaster76
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Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 01:23 AM UTC
Rodders:
Take some time and study up on the Pacific war. I am sure you will find it fascinating. The Japanese Army and soldier was one tough cookie. What they accomplished in taking SIngapore was amazing. The Aluetian Islands Campaign was a sideshow to them as well as the US. It was meant mainly as a diversion to Midway, of course the Japanese had no idea that we had broken their code and therefore would not take the bait. The figting there was very minimal and most of the troops were evacuated off (which caught us by toal surprize by the time we discovered it). As to taking China in 8 years, well the US spent 10 in Viet Nam without success. To my knowledge, no one ever defeated China they were merely absorbed by the vastness. It is indeed quite interesting to hear about young children being forced into the Army, of course Germany did it as well which has been well documented.
Take some time and study up on the Pacific war. I am sure you will find it fascinating. The Japanese Army and soldier was one tough cookie. What they accomplished in taking SIngapore was amazing. The Aluetian Islands Campaign was a sideshow to them as well as the US. It was meant mainly as a diversion to Midway, of course the Japanese had no idea that we had broken their code and therefore would not take the bait. The figting there was very minimal and most of the troops were evacuated off (which caught us by toal surprize by the time we discovered it). As to taking China in 8 years, well the US spent 10 in Viet Nam without success. To my knowledge, no one ever defeated China they were merely absorbed by the vastness. It is indeed quite interesting to hear about young children being forced into the Army, of course Germany did it as well which has been well documented.
Hohenstaufen
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Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 02:32 AM UTC
Quoted Text
The fact that most of these special units were disbanded in '45, proved that the officer corps largely didn't see the merits of a 'meritocracy' and were happier with their elitist officer corps. Luckily it was too late, and the British Army was forced into change.
Well I agree that some of the "private armies" disappeared after the end of the war, IMHO this was because they had been created for a specific set of circumstances which no longer applied. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, many wartime units were disbanded, & the Rifle Brigade were eventually taken out of the numbering system to try & ensure their survival (it was always the junior regiments that went). Many career officers wanted the rifle regiments disbanded on the basis that their men were taught some independance of thought, which was considered dangerous! So nothing really changes!
In actual fact, the Parachute Regiment continued, as did the Commandos (as RM Commandos). The SAS became 21 SAS (Artists Rifles), a TA unit. What I was trying to get at was that it took a certain vision to recognise the merit of the ideas behind the founding of these units, & these decisions were taken by regular officers.
I would agree that there were (are?) some useless "hooray Henrys" as officers, but I feel that this is the same in every army to some extent. The massive enlargement of all the armies of every nation meant that there was a shortage of trained officers, many men were overpromoted beyond their competence. This was a serious problem for the Americans, as their army expaned by a factor of 40 times or more. It is not a basic requirement of an officer that he understand the internal combustion engine; ask the average driver on the roads today how much he/she really knows about the mechanics of the vehicle they are driving.
I would agree that there was a certain "cavalry spirit" in the old horse regiments, & particularly in the Yeomanry, which was much resented by the professionals of the RTR.
But despite the above, this "feudal" approach worked for us in general, because a) we were used to it, & b) it was basically similar to the formula which had succeeded all over the world for generations (albeit after usually starting off with a no-nonsense disaster). The men who led the Fusilier Brigade at Albuera, or stormed the ramparts of Badajoz would have recognised their counterparts in the British army of WW2, & in the final analysis it did work.
As far as the Germans are concerned, they do approach everything in a measured professional way. The German General Staff system was methodical in the extreme. It guaranteed that a German officer would always act in a set way for a given set of circumstances. This was their greatest strength, & also their greatest weakness in that it made them predictable. German soldiers were trained to undertake the duties of the next one ot two superior ranks if necessary, but it is interesting to note that there were some German officers who complained that their men were too independent & they wished they were as obedient as the British!
Hohenstaufen
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Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 03:11 AM UTC
How did I end up defending the 
Ruperts? I can't
stand them either!
Ruperts? I can't stand them either!
JPTRR
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Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 11:00 AM UTC
Oh man, what a lot of interesting info here!
I haven't read a fraction of your stuff--my poor eyes-- so at the risk of duplicating some of you, here is my input. Some of the statistics may not be 100% but I believe they are close. I will also avoid considering political exigency "what-ifs".
Things I've read:
Germany's Fallschirmjaegers were initially formed by recruiting experienced troops; NCOs were made privates. I don't recall if officers were reduced to NCOs. Thus, their paratroopers were all pretty experienced, motivated soldiers.
In a recent issue of Military History or a similar magazine, there was an article made up of a 1944 US Army survey of captured Germans, the survey was of Germans who were experienced fighting against the Soviets and Western Allies. The purpose was to see how they rated the US Army VS the Russians and the British, the strengths and weaknesses. It was a pretty interesting article. IIRC, the Germans feared the Red Army for the racial/cultural factor, but would rather fight them than the Western Allies because they were easier. They did not seem to find the American troops to be armatures, as so often depicted. Our problem was that the bulk of the US Army was green at the time of D-Day. Rommel or another highly regarded German remarked about the US troops 'no other troops were so bad at their first battle, and so good for their next.'
I read in the book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (postulate--the Allies only beat the Germans by overwhelming them) that man for man, throughout the war, whether attacking or defending, the German soldier inflicted more casualties than they received. True? I'll leave that for number-crunchers. FWIW: WWII Timelines, Maps, Statistics, Trivia, and Glossary
However, there is no denying that many US and UK forces went eye-to-eye with the Wehrmacht on equal terms (and often at a disadvantage) and beat them, at all stages of the war. The pre-war doubt that Western Democracy could produce warriors on par with Fascism turned out to be wrong.
Now, demographics. Populations & Casualties
The Wehrmacht started the war with a country of 69.3M people. Add Italy's 43.8M (I do not consider Germany's minor allies as I believe they turned out to be insignificant, or an actual detriment to Hitler's war) and Black Fascism attacked the world with a population of 113.1M people. With this they warred against 120M people of France's 41.7M and UK's 78M, totaling 137M if you include Holland and Belgium. Already the Axis was inferior in resources.
I do not know of any way to figure slave labor and the input of occupied countries, but after Greece fell, UK was practically alone until Barbarossa added Soviet Red Fascism's 168.5M people. With that the Axis were outnumbered 246.5M to 113M. The Soviet population's men of military age already outnumbered Germany's about 2.5 to 1.
Consider that after 1943 Germany lost most of Italy's 43M, and faced UK, USA and USSR total of 312.5M Allies (accounting for about 40% of USA directed against Japan) with 69M.
I think the fascination with Nazi Germany is that despite those numbers, and considering Germany really had no resources other than coal and wood, that they came close to succeeding with their war of conquest. By 1945 the UK was exhausted, Stalin was facing manpower shortages, and the USA experienced approximately 2/3 of her total casualties in the 9 months after D-Day.
Add to that the Nazi products of war. They created weapons of sheer genius and incredible stupidity, and employed many of both.
Also consider that much of what the Third Reich developed and perfected (original to them or not) was adopted by all sides for the Cold War.
I think this accounts for the popularity of German military subjects.
I haven't read a fraction of your stuff--my poor eyes-- so at the risk of duplicating some of you, here is my input. Some of the statistics may not be 100% but I believe they are close. I will also avoid considering political exigency "what-ifs".
Things I've read:
Germany's Fallschirmjaegers were initially formed by recruiting experienced troops; NCOs were made privates. I don't recall if officers were reduced to NCOs. Thus, their paratroopers were all pretty experienced, motivated soldiers.
In a recent issue of Military History or a similar magazine, there was an article made up of a 1944 US Army survey of captured Germans, the survey was of Germans who were experienced fighting against the Soviets and Western Allies. The purpose was to see how they rated the US Army VS the Russians and the British, the strengths and weaknesses. It was a pretty interesting article. IIRC, the Germans feared the Red Army for the racial/cultural factor, but would rather fight them than the Western Allies because they were easier. They did not seem to find the American troops to be armatures, as so often depicted. Our problem was that the bulk of the US Army was green at the time of D-Day. Rommel or another highly regarded German remarked about the US troops 'no other troops were so bad at their first battle, and so good for their next.'
I read in the book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (postulate--the Allies only beat the Germans by overwhelming them) that man for man, throughout the war, whether attacking or defending, the German soldier inflicted more casualties than they received. True? I'll leave that for number-crunchers. FWIW: WWII Timelines, Maps, Statistics, Trivia, and Glossary
However, there is no denying that many US and UK forces went eye-to-eye with the Wehrmacht on equal terms (and often at a disadvantage) and beat them, at all stages of the war. The pre-war doubt that Western Democracy could produce warriors on par with Fascism turned out to be wrong.
Now, demographics. Populations & Casualties
The Wehrmacht started the war with a country of 69.3M people. Add Italy's 43.8M (I do not consider Germany's minor allies as I believe they turned out to be insignificant, or an actual detriment to Hitler's war) and Black Fascism attacked the world with a population of 113.1M people. With this they warred against 120M people of France's 41.7M and UK's 78M, totaling 137M if you include Holland and Belgium. Already the Axis was inferior in resources.
I do not know of any way to figure slave labor and the input of occupied countries, but after Greece fell, UK was practically alone until Barbarossa added Soviet Red Fascism's 168.5M people. With that the Axis were outnumbered 246.5M to 113M. The Soviet population's men of military age already outnumbered Germany's about 2.5 to 1.
Consider that after 1943 Germany lost most of Italy's 43M, and faced UK, USA and USSR total of 312.5M Allies (accounting for about 40% of USA directed against Japan) with 69M.
I think the fascination with Nazi Germany is that despite those numbers, and considering Germany really had no resources other than coal and wood, that they came close to succeeding with their war of conquest. By 1945 the UK was exhausted, Stalin was facing manpower shortages, and the USA experienced approximately 2/3 of her total casualties in the 9 months after D-Day.
Add to that the Nazi products of war. They created weapons of sheer genius and incredible stupidity, and employed many of both.
Also consider that much of what the Third Reich developed and perfected (original to them or not) was adopted by all sides for the Cold War.
I think this accounts for the popularity of German military subjects.
spooky6
Member Since: May 05, 2005
entire network: 2,174 Posts
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Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 11:29 AM UTC
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What I was trying to get at was that it took a certain vision to recognise the merit of the ideas behind the founding of these units, & these decisions were taken by regular officers.
I understood what you meant, Steve. What I was saying was that these officers saw the flaws in the system and realized they needed a better one.
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I would agree that there were (are?) some useless "hooray Henrys" as officers, but I feel that this is the same in every army to some extent.
Absolutely, but the British Army today is far more professional and efficient than it was in 1939/40, which was before the massive wartime expansion.
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As far as the Germans are concerned, they do approach everything in a measured professional way. The German General Staff system was methodical in the extreme. It guaranteed that a German officer would always act in a set way for a given set of circumstances. This was their greatest strength, & also their greatest weakness in that it made them predictable. German soldiers were trained to undertake the duties of the next one ot two superior ranks if necessary, but it is interesting to note that there were some German officers who complained that their men were too independent & they wished they were as obedient as the British!
Actually, you couldn't be more wrong, Steve. This is the generalised caricature of the German officer that has been around for decades :-) Heer officers were always taught to think outside the box, and their picture of the British officer was exactly as you describe above: hide bound, rigid, chained to every detail of his orders. And a study of small unit combat throughout the war (I'm talking conventional infantry & armour here) will back up what I'm saying. Germans were always open to new ideas and methods (wish it was true today!). A couple of examples that come to mind was the almost single-handed capture of Budapest by an SS officer, and the capture of the bridges in Holland. I know there are examples of Brits doing similar things, but your opinion of German officers was a cultural holdover of the Prussians of WW1, and that attitude was actively discouraged by the Nazis in the '30s.
BTW, Steve, have you read 'Armageddon' by Max Hastings and/or 'Get Rommel' by Michael Asher. Great analysis of the two styles of officers, and brings up a lot of the differences.
On a note to Blaster, the capture of Singapore wasn't so much about brilliance on the part of the Japanese, as absolute narrow-mindedness on the part of the British. They couldn't imagine anyone actually attacking through jungle! The Brits were ordered to hold the roads and fell back time and again as the Japanese outflanked them through the jungle. Simple infantry tactics from the Japanese, but very few British junior officers attempted to do anything different. Inability to think outside of their rigid orders was one of the greatest flaws of company-grade officers.
spooky6
Member Since: May 05, 2005
entire network: 2,174 Posts
KitMaker Network: 613 Posts
Posted: Wednesday, April 12, 2006 - 11:41 AM UTC
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In a recent issue of Military History or a similar magazine, there was an article made up of a 1944 US Army survey of captured Germans,
Don't take this as a put-down or anything, but I would look a bit askance at some of those wartime surveys which often had a lot of propoganda to flavour them. Most indications are that the Germans would much rather have fought on the western than eastern fronts.
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