Rodger-- great find! Many thanks for providing the information.
DJ

I have seen pictures of the Boys AT rifle and also of the AT rifles used by the Russians. The Russians had some success against early German armor, even the early Pz III & IV. The rifle was easy to hide for flank shots and had very little shot signature.

I pity the poor rangers that had to hump that 6-foot plus long rifle!!!

The Red Army was the only nation to keep the A/T rifle in use for the duration of the war. It was often deployed in an anti-sniper role, but there are recorded uses of the weapon against heavy GErman armour. Soviet tactics was to use the A/T rifle to shoot out the tanks optics.

Also in the Tiger 'historys' I have there are several references to this tactic and indeed a large number of men injured. So to take a Tiger out all you have to do is blind it... But you got to have a steady hand to face down a Tiger with an A/T rifle!

If i remember my dad said that it was like a bakalit shoe that wrapped around part of the shell as it left the barrel of the 6 pounder it incressed the velocity and then discarded hence self discarding sabot,helped out damaging tanks tracks movement mecs, but as dad said pretty in effective against the heavy armored tanks as with the PIAT had to get in close perhaps that was why he got wounded twice.
Regards christango 20

gents,

the british actually invented the sabot round, with the first examples being issued in early 1944.

the previous german rounds were tungsten cored, and did not feature the discarding sabot.

as has been mentioned, both 6 and 17-pdr guns were issued the rounds, which doubled their previous penetration.

the original penetration for the 6-pdr AP rounds was 74mm at 1000yds at 30' striking angle.

with the APDS rounds this increased to 150mm at 1000yds at 30' striking angle.

this is very impressive for a 57mm weapon, being far better than weapons such as the PAK40 and this performance is often forgotten when people disregard the quality of allied AT guns.

for reasons only known to themselves, the US authorities, although offered them, never issued the APDS rounds, speeding the obselescence of the 57mm M1 gun.

strangely 6-pdr APDS was not issued for use in tanks, and no attempt was made to produce a round for US 75mm guns. although fireflies were issued APDS rounds, most of the production went to royal artillery units, and anti-tank platoons of infantry regiments.


regards

joe

Some units kept their Churchills armed with a 6pdr to fire apds...

now where did I read that!

Red - You are right. Churchill units did keep 6pdr armed tanks in order to have some form of anti-tank capability as they were not issued with Fireflys.

Ross

Does anyone want to start a topic on WW II AT guns?

I found the discussion about anti-tank guns fascinating, but we do seem to have drifted off-subject slightly. The guy who fired the PIAT from the shoulder mentioned above was probably Major Robert Cain VC of the South Staffs Regt - the subject of a recent documentary on British TV.
As regards Monty, he was probably his own worst enemy. I have just finished reading Carlo D'Estes book about the "Normandy myth". Monty always claimed afterwards that the battle went off exactly as he planned. This was obviously wrong, and in fact he did himself a disservice in so pretending, as it is surely good generalship to make the most of circumstances, even if unplanned. He had been great friends with Bradley up to Normandy, but the friendship became very strained after Goodwood, and ended to all intents during the Bulge.
The main reason for his unpopularity with Americans, is directly down to one press conference during the Battle of the Bulge. With the American forces in the Ardennes split in two, and the northern troops seperated from their commanders by 3 German Armies, command reverted logically to Monty. He first built a stop line on the Meuse, using British troops, then proceded to "tidy up the battlefield" in his terminology. At the press conference, his demeanor was described as similar to that of "Christ clearing the Temple", in giving the impression that the Americans had made an enormous mess he had to put right! This was hardly politic, nor was it correct.
Monty was not the first choice for command of the 8th Army, but his predecessor was killed in a plane crash.
He was popular with British troops as he was perceived as being concerned for their welfare and less likely to use them as cannon fodder. He did however inform his armoured brigade commanders before Alamein that he was prepared to accept 100% losses in the armoured regiments to achieve a breakthrough!
The Supreme Command were wary of appointing Monty to Ground Commander for Overlord. However due to his success in Africa, as stated above public opinion was behind him. This secured him the post above Paget (who was Alanbrookes preferrred appointee) and Alexander, who was likeable and popular with the Americans but not as able militarily as Monty. Incidentally, the feelings expressed about Monty during "Saving Private Ryan", would not have been voiced in that way at that time.
As regards Arnhem, an interesting aside on the Market Garden plan, was that a pre-war exercise at the Dutch Staff College involved an attack on Arnhem from the south. Candidates who opted to attack up the main road failed. Had the plan succeeded, it would have shortened the war considerably. The Allies would have been poised to take the Ruhr, which would effectively have put Germany out of the war. It was to all intents and purposes Monty's plan.
XXX Corps have been criticised considerably since the war for being "sticky". This was not confined to them, and they had been fighting constantly since Normandy.
Speculation as to whether a landing closer to Arnhem bridge would have succeeded is disabused by the German commanders. Harzer & Harmel (9th & 10thSS) are of the opinion that paratroops dropped on Arnhem would just have been closer to their "alarm units". 1st Airborne was picked deliberately for the northernmost mission, as it was a British unit, and the political consequences of a disaster in which British groundtroops failed to relieve American paratroops made their use at Arnhem unthinkable.
What is interesting about Market Garden is that the German SS units began the battle in roughly the same shape as the British were at the end. Despite this they counterattacked and contained their enemy, and absorbed all manner of discordant units and bonded them into a cohesive whole. This almost certainly would not have happened in a British unit.

Your comments on Patton were interesting Tom. A big difference between the two was that Monty was an infantryman, whereas Patton was a cavalryman through & through. The thing was that they were probably too alike to get on!
What is interesting is that the American High Command recognised Pattons gifts and applied them in the correct context, ie the Cobra breakout and pursuit. In the British Army, many of our most experienced armoured officers were treated deplorably, e.g. "Hobo" Hobart of 79th Armoured.
Monty was a far more experienced battlefield commander than almost all the American generals. He had commanded 3rd Division in 1940, & his experience went back to the 1st World War. He tended to regard them somewhat as amateurs. This obvoiusly rankled.
Monty was not popular with the Canadians who regarded him as something of a "poseur". The figure who made the greatest impression on them was George VI.

It's not that Monty didn't interfere in what was happening at a lower level, he actually took a very keen interest, but using his "eyes & ears", a collection of staff officers he despatched around the battlefield to keep him up-to-date. He was particularly guilty of meddling with British 2nd Army, Dempsey's command, in Normandy, often giving orders direct to subordinates missing out Demsey & his staff completely.
Goodwood was Dempsey's plan. He knew it wasn't perfect, but he managed to sell it to Monty on the basis that it would use resources that the British had aplenty (tanks), while not wasting resources that were short (infantry). In the end it didn't even do that. Monty's mistake here was that he allowed SHAEF to believe that he was expecting a complete breakthrough.
Monty distrusted armoured commanders, after his experience in the Desert. He was of the opinion that they tended to hare off and get themselves killed (rather like the Duke of Wellington's opinion of his cavalry, Monty liked to imagine himself as a new D o W). Field Marshall Harding was the first member of the RTR to achieve top rank, this was post-war. O'Connor, commanding VIII Corps was able, his record in the Desert was second to none, but he had been captured in North Africa and therefore "out of the loop" until his release, by which time Monty and others had the limelight.
British armoured doctrine was still muddled as late as 1944. On the one hand there were the armoured divisions, equipped with "cruiser" tanks (Shermans & Cromwells). On the other there were the Army Tank Brigades, equipped with Churchills, which were for close support. The concept of a main battle tank was still sinking in.

Old Georgie Patton had some choice words when discussing Monty:

"We roll across France in less time than it takes Monty to say 're-group' and here we sit stuck in the mud of Lorraine."

"Montgomery went to great lengths to explain why the British had done nothing."

"Monty is a tired little fart. War requires the taking of risks and he won't take them."

"Montgomery had the nerve to get someone in the United States to suggest that General Eisenhower was 'over worked' and needed a Deputy Ground Force Commander for all of the troops in Europe and thatt he, Monty was'God's gift to war' in this respect."


No love loss between these two. Remember in the movie Patton, when Patton admits he's a prima donna, but is annoyed that Monty won't.

I guess Monty had his good point - he was organized and could amass great numbers of men and material. Although it seems he was more like the American Civil War General George B McClellan - who too was a great little organizer but when it came to fighting was timid, unless he possessed overwhelming odds and rarely chased the enemy. Of 'Little Mac' President Abraham Lincoln said, "He's got a case of the slows."

Monty had a case of the slows. The time it took to take Caen was unexcusable and cost the Allies much in the way of men and material.

Yes Frank, there's no doubt that Monty & Patton didn't see eye to eye!
However in Monty's defence, it has to be said that he knew the British army was a dwindling resource - to the extent that by July 1944 he knew he would be 35000 replacements adrift. At one time there were only enough replacements for one out of every two or three casualties. This was not the case with the American army, as there were fresh divisions lining up ready to be committed. As it was Monty was breaking up British divisions & combing out anti-aircraft & other troops to get enough infantry replacements.
Patton was highly effective in the pursuit across France, no one would deny this. But what would he have been like in the bocage?
One criticism of the British command generally was that they were too slow to sack ineffective divisional commanders, & the performance of the 7th Armoured & 51st Highland divisions during the early part of the Normandy campaign are usually quoted in this context.
By comparison, American commanders were criticised for being too quick & not giving their divisional commanders time to "grow into" the job.
Whatever the details, the Allies did win in Normandy!

Not being a huge admirer of Monty, he did have several aspects which were fundamental in his development of a military commander. Much of his cautiousness came from his personal experience as a subaltern in the 'Meat Grinder' which was WW1 trench warfare, This perhaps, influenced his (at times) over-cautiousness. A desire to avoid the mass casualties to little effect which was WW1...

Patton, sadly was a showman. A good tactician but (IMHO) a poor strategist. The epitome of the 'political general' which was to reach its zenith with both Westmoreland and Powell....Jim

I think this thread has highlighted some of the differences between the UK & America, "two nations seperated by a common language".
I don't think Patton's methods would have worked with British troops, and I'm not convinced from my reading that he was all that popular with American troops @ times(cf Willy & Joe cartoon)! Likewise, I don't think Monty would ever have been seen as "pushy" enough for American troops. After Falaise the British 21st Army Group made advances across northern France that rivalled those of Patton (remember his drive from Avranches was achieved against negligable opposition, a classic cavalry/armoured exploitation).
Overall I think both were good field commanders, they both made mistakes (Monty: Arnhem, Caen; Patton: attempt to rescue his son-in-law etc). They were human. Their mistakes did cost lives. It was war.
Monty's perceived slowness @ Caen isn't entirely his fault. He was at times ill-served by some of his divisional commanders. He had set ambitious targets for D-Day, he envisioned armoured patrols penetrating as far as Falaise - this didn't happen. The only unit to achieve it's D-Day targets was 2nd (?) Canadian division.
The "left-hook" around Caen @ Villers Bocage, famously blocked by Wittman, should have been pressed more strongly. This wasn't Monty's fault. What was his reaction? To drive to the front, publicly bawl out his subordinate, "bowler-hat" him? No, that wasn't his way.
Monty seemed to think that Eisenhower didn't understand the way Monty fought the Battle of Normandy. He may be right. Ike could, maybe should, have "gripped" Monty more strongly & made him behave himself. The fact he didn't, damaged Monty's reputation more than anyone elses involved. But it's senseless to criticise Ike, because overall his handling of the difficulties of a mixed alliance was impeccable - no one had a bad word for him.
Patton didn't have to face the politicians directly, he could afford to be controversial. In many ways Patton epitomises everything Europeans perceive to be bad in Americans. He had a private fortune & was arrogant, brash & foul mouthed. You couldn't get a greater contrast between him & Monty, who was the son of a bishop, didn't smoke or drink. However Monty never allowed his own high standards of conduct to cloud his feelings towards his troops. He frequently distributed cigarettes @ his briefings & when the war became static in Holland was concerned that the troops needed some form of sexual release out of the line.
Omar Bradley found Patton to be a difficult subordinate, it probably didn't help that Patton had originally been his boss! During the Normandy campaign, Monty & Bradley had got on well. This changed afterwards, when they both became army group commanders & therefore competitors to some extent. What really wrecked their friendship was Monty's pronouncements ref the Bulge (see above).
Was Patton like the German generals? Well he could be ruthless. His hard-driving style was similar to Rommel in Africa. But Rommel drove his staff to distraction, they never knew where he was, & thus found themselves having to make high-powered decisions without him (read Von Melenthins "panzer Battles"). Is this good generalship?

Hi Steve
That was post was put together in a wonderful way,factual and to the point,i have visited some very key areas around the Normandy areas, with my father who in fact fought there,the thing is the generals had the difficult job of planning however as my father said it is the infantery that "get in amongest it" so to speak as we have seen recently in Iraq.
At times they might have been bad planning at all levels of the chiefs of staff ,but as my dad had often indicated the germans facing the allies were often under estimated i visited a place called Hill 112 near a small airdrome called Carpiquet it was crucial as it was the only high ground in the area.
The germans fought like hell as did the Canadiens and Scots and was the place were my father was wounded, all great plans often fall to bits after the first shot Caen did take longer then was expected (good book Caen Anvil Oof Victory) but the Germans fought hard and effectivley for people to in effect blame Monty for this delay is i feel i complete misunderstanding of what it is like to fight up close and personal.
If during the first G

Sorry my link jumped to post
If during the first Gulf War the goal had ben Bagdad and that it was to be taken in a certain time again you can not under estimate the forces that will face you.In the houses and in the fields
Different Geneals have different ways of commanding and for historians to surrgest and arm chair generals to deminish what individuals had to do and huge choices to make does tick me off at times it was not Monty or any other General that delayed the taking the many stratigic objectives but hard fighting tenacious german infantary.
Just my thoughts
Chris

Chris, you are very kind. Hill 112, yep a real butchers bill there. The Germans called it "the Hill of Calvary" & the small wood on the top the "Crown of Thorns". On the British side, we called it "Cornwall Hill" because of the DCLI Battalion that was destroyed there. The Germans came up the hill in Tiger tanks & shot up the Cornishmen from point blank range. For weeks in the summer of 1944 it was like a WW1 battlefield, with the enemies only yards apart. Neither side could hold the brow of the hill, & it became one of the most shelled bits of country in Normandy. I think there are several memorials up there.
As I mentioned above, everyone underestimated the scale of infantry casualties incurred. Normandy was a real infantryman's battle, with combat almost face-to-face in the hedgerows (yep they had those in the British sector too), & as you point out Chris it was the Germans who dragged it down to this level.

Hi Steve

Yea visited "Hill 112" during the 40th with my dad very emotional for him to say the least.
We walked the route that his section took to the point were my father was shot, 2 or three thousand yards no distance what so ever really....it took them 2 weeks to get to that point. and the death and destruction he said was mind blowing,like he says he was one of the lucky ones,i have never heard my father talk ill of Monty and in that fact alone i will not pass judgement but will always leave that to the ones that managed to survive the many Hill 112s and who were and always will be the point of the spear the edge of the sword... "the Infantary" like in Faulija i wonder wno will be judged there one day as not quite getting it right.
Cheers Chris