DJ - I agree Hallond is a very advantagous area for airborne ops and dropping on or very near arnhem would have been a better option but the decision of drop zones was neither Urqhuarts, Brownings or Montys decision but much rather that of the air commanders. Also as at least one source omments the ground south of the bridge would have been unsuitable for a major airborne drop involving gliders. The site chosen was probably the best location for the all important factor of concentration from whence the division could have been used to achieve a decisive victory. now ok this does not happen but it was attempted. there were just many factors which inhibited this. Urqhuart going missing. Bad communication. Bad intell. The list goes on.

Ross- I did a fairly intense map study of the terrain a few years back and supplemented it with a visit to the area. I know they could have placed the parachute drop on both sides of the bridge and placed the gliders a great deal closer than was done on the north side. having said that, what are your thoughts on Horrock and XXX Corps drive to aid those poor guys?
DJ

Now where shall I start...

Good to see MAhross (from the same course as me) holding up!

I will start with the landing areas selected for Arnhem...

The areas south of the river were unsuitable for gliders being soft molder land (kinda swampy) other areas were also occupied by elements of 9th SS. Dropping into a town was not practical in WW2. VonDer Heydte (FJ Col) stated that to drop troops into a town/city would require specialist equipment if not also incurring unacceptable losses. In reality the drop zone choice and its distance confused the GErman defence as to the real objective of the landings. It also allowed the 1st Airborne time to organise and prepare for a move into Arnhem. I would recommend 'It Never Snows in September' By Kershaw for a full discussion on the choice of drop zones, but will say in ending that the GErman Post War Appraisal of WW2 airborne ops agrees as to the British choice. The option that may have been possible was a glider coup de main directly onto the bridge, but this would have required many months of training, just look at how long the training for Operation Deadstick took. Market Garden was put together using Comet as the basis in two weeks.

The command confusion - This arose due to confusion as to who was to take over if Urquhart was out of action. The two Brigade commanders both had equal status but Urquharts wishes as to jis 2IC had not been communicated to them. This led to a serious delay of around 2 - 3 hours at a critical phase of the battle and allowed the GErman blocking line to become established (though not in a complete sense).

1st Airborne - Had indeed seen a great deal of action previous to Market-GArden. A better choice may have been 6th airborne but this had been bled dry in the Normandy campaign and was in no state to commence another operation. 1st had seen action in North Africa, Italy along with several smaller raids such as the Bruneval raid (led by Frost). Its men were volunteers from high quality British units and its officers were equally experienced. Frost was possibly one of the finest battalion commanders of the war. As for Urqhart I think Ross has covered that but I would recommend 'Sky Generals' for further info. Perhaps the best Airborne commander of 1st Airborne was killed in action in Italy storming a German road block...

Would American units have faired better? No. The US Airborne formations ahd a distinct lack of Anti-Tank weapons that would caused them serious problems at Arnhem. The reason for the choice was also that it was a British operation and the British felt that their troops should be the ones taking the risks. It is easy to knock the actions at Arnhem but it is without doubt one of the finest actions of the BRitish Army. The men that fought their were heroes.

I could go on, but I have a stinker of a headache at the moment so I will return tomorrow.

I will leave you with this story that was told to Frost shortly after capture by a GErman officer...

In the last few moments that Frosts battalion held out at the bridge, two Paras with a Bren gun who were trading shots with a GErman MG crew. When they ran out of ammo, one British Para attempted to draw the MG crews fire while the other charged at them with his knife...

What impressed the GErmans so much was that this was not a spur of the moment action but a thought out plan. It is thought that these two men were the last two defenders at the bridge...

I think that says it all.

From 'Arnhem' by Frost.

I also forgot to mention that had a southern drop area been chosen then the aircraft would have had to fly over the flak defenses of Deelen airfield.

Ross-- certainly a well thought out response. When you catch your breathe how about discussing Horrock and XXX Corps. Did they do all they could and should have done to accomplish the mission? This is a great discussion and trust other will contribute.
thanks
DJ

Hi to everyone, from Norfolk Naval Station, the home of the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet. I have just got back onto the net after two weeks of mobilization activities and starting training for my new duties.

There is a lot here!!!
Where to start?

1. Monty was the original subject - I found it interesting to listen to the British discuss one of their most famous commanders. Sort of like Americans discussing R.E. Lee or U.S. Grant. Monty, as was stated earlier, was a product of WWI. He was apparently a solid commander of an infantry divison (10th Division?) in May 1940. He benefited from a solid plan left him by his predecessor at Alamein. Auchinlech had already defeated Rommel at the 1st Battle of Alamein. Monty's pursuit of Rommel and Army Group Afrika allowed Rommel to turn in defense on the Tunsian border, however, Montgomery's plan to go around the the old Italian defenses on the Libiyan/Tunisian border was "classic Rommel" and quite aggressive.

In Sicily, he was so insistent on being first to Messina, that he refused to see that the Americans had a better opportunity to turn the German's open flank. But here some of the blame must go to Eisenhower - As Supreme Commander, he should have given Patton his head instead of Patton having to stretch his orders and take the "long cut" to Messina. Eisenhower was being too "politically correct" in not wanting to upset Monty with what should have been a secondary mission for the right flank (British forces).

It is my belief that after Normandy, Montgomery, rewrote history. There is too much surviving written evidence that Monty planned to breakout on his flank and head for the Rhine. Only after several ill-conceived offensives were smashed in and around Caen, did he develop the story that his plan was to draw in the German armor away from the American flank, allowing the Americans to breakout. The deployment of German armor versus german infantry was a case of the Germans applying proper analysis of terrain. The 21 Army Group was on the edge of the hedgerow country and had easier access to good tank country. This forced the Germans to concentrate their armor on the eastern end of the beachhead. The 12th Army Group were buried deep inside the headgerows and the German infantry with some armor support had the issue in hand until the Americans were able to unlease their style of mobile warfare and blast a hole thru the depleted German ranks. The German counteroffensive at Mortain finally drained enough armor from the eastern end of the beachhead to give Monty some manuever space.

At this point Bradley was the stick in the mud on closing the Falaise gap. He was worried about fracticide and that the US armor was exposed at the eastern end of the gap. He wanted more infantry divisions to close up before he let the armor loose.

Market-Garden was Montgomery's baby and he should be held for much of the problems. I too have been to Arnhem and have traveled "Hell's Highway". I even stayed in a bed & breakfast that was located within sight of the Hartenstein (sp?) hotel. I and some friends have "fought" the battle several times, and with the benefit of perfect intelligence, and absolutely no "fog of war" developed the following plan: Now onto the splinter discussion of Market-Garden -

(1) Drop the either entire 82nd or 101st AB Dvision on first lift and drop them as close to the highway bridge at Arnhem as possible. One brigade is parachuted to south side of bridge. At the time their were some dykes on southside that would have allowed a defense of a bridgehead on south side. The original reason for only part of division at Arnhem was to give two southern divisions more manpower to capture bridges closer to XXX Corps start line.

(2) Drop 6 ABN at Nijmegen. The 17 lbr AT guns would be more effective in the more open terrain along the middle of the corridor and this was a major problem area during the battle as German counterattacks came from both sides. (We also had alternate plan with entire 6 ABN dropping at Arnhem as close to target as possible. The 6 ABN was used, again for their 17 lbr AT guns)

(3) The remaining US airborne division with three brigades of two battalions each would drop closest to XXX Corps. The reason being, they would be first relieved and could wait for next day for rest of their battalions to help defend the corridor.

(4) The Polish Brigade was the reserve.

(5) - Now for biggest change to plan - XXX Corps broke thru along two routes - sending the cavalry and other fast elements along a route further west in a coup de main effort to reinforce Arnhem with armor. We also attempted to utilize other bridges near, but not on "Hell's Highway" along secondary roads. More routes mean more possible supply routes and makes it harder for the Germans to cut the MSR (main supply route). Because the original XXX Corps advance was only a couple hundred meters wide, the Germans could cut the MSR by direct fire, they did not have to actually occupy it. With a wider spearhead, we could more easily keep them out of direct fire range along more of the route.

(6) In my humble opinion, the Nijmegen bridge was the key point in the battle. There were multiple routes from the start line to Nijmegen. then they were all choked at Nijmegen. The river could be crossed elsewhere on ferries, but not with the entire force. Don;t capture the Nijmegen bridges, you can just give up. That is why we dropped the 6 ABN north and south of Nijmegen with their AT guns to keep the 9 & 10 Pz Divisions from getting into the city.

As I said above, we had the advantage of perfect intel and history. But we also had good IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield), order of battle analysis and didn't worry about putting an American division at the end of the tether.

As to the comments about whether an American Division could have done a better job at Arnhem - I take they could have. "COL" Gavin had jumped with his regiment (505th ?) at Sicily. They were badly scattered, but junior officers, as low as LT, knew their missions and completed most of them. Again, at Normandy, due to poor discipline of transport units, the two American Divisions were badly scattered behind Utah Beach. But again they completed the majority of their missions, because the leaders knew their missions. They were use to fighting without an intact chain of command.

This by no means takes away any of the accomplishments of the 6 Para and in particular the individual skills and bravery of the soldiers involved.

The British airborne did have one policy that the Americans should have adopted. Their glider pilots were formed into a ground combat element after landing. the American glider pilots were kinda on their own until they could be withdrawn. Maybe it was because the British had enlisted/NCOs as glider pilots, wereas the Americans had more officers! Without adult leadership, all those officers probably would have been more dangerous to themslves than to the enemy.

Time to press a uniform and go to bed.

Jeff

Bit poiintless to drop 6th Airborne... It was in bits after Normandy.

I take it you mean 1st Airborne! Very interesting stuff. I am undertaking a re-fight of the campaign at the moment, my only change is the ability to have two lifts on day one, with the rest of 1st Airborne arriving in the evening as 6th Airborne did on D-Day. This enables a far stronger push against the German blocking line... I shall let you know how I get on...

One reason why I commented on the US not faring much better is in the difference of the personal A/T weapons, and this is apoint overlooked by almost all historians (though not me in my MA!). The US bazooka would not have been a suitable weapon to have used from enclosed spaces and in buildings. The back blast would have proved dangerous to its users in such confined areas. The Bristish PIAT, however had no back blast and was an ideal weapon that could be fired from windows onto German armour. A unique advantage for a weapon with a very dubious history.

I am sure a US airborne division would have fought as hard as the British, their fighting abilities are without doubt, but to me it seems unlikely they would have fared any better. Dropping the entire 1st Airborne on day would have yeilded better results but this would have required two air lifts, something Brereton was unwilling to consider. This in my opinion was what doomed the operation. The key to a succesful airborne assault was to deliver the entire formation on the first day to maximise the surprise and confusion of the defender. Regardless of whose airborne force dropped, without a single day delivery vital numbers of troops would be required to hold the drop zones, crucial for subsequent waves and disaterous if bad weather delays the lift schedule.

As for the advance of XXX corps, then alot of damage has been done to the reputation of Horrocks by the fil 'A Bridge Too Far'. XXX corps fought very hard to make its way up Hells Highway, along a route which the GErmans in 1940 had considered unsuitable. Perhaps a charge that could be laid at his door is the lack of impetous passed down to Junior commanders but this has to be looked at in the context of the Allied thoughts at the time. The killer to the ground op was the single roadway and the traffic congestion this caused. The advance was often held up while troops waited for re-supply and support.

It is interesting that the one thing never mentioned in regards to Market-Garden is the German response. Many German commanders considered it to be the finest victory that they achieved, and certainly the last major victory of the war. Although the 9th & 10th SS had very little armour they had a unique advantage. They were both specifically trained in an anti-airborne role. It was this that really doomed the operation. Along the route of XXX corps was Students Fallschirmjager, who better to know the weakness of an airborne force and the need to hold up their relief. I could go on, but I urge people to read 'It Never Snows in September' by Kershaw. It is the German view of Market-Garden and show the operation in a utterly different light from the GErman perspective and what a close run thing it was.

It is good to see a decent debate on both Monty and Market-Garden. Too many of our cousins frm the other side of the big pond are too eager to slag him off. I personally have no great love for the man, I never have, but I do have alot of respect for the troops who landed on that sunny autumn day near Arnhem. They represented the finest the British Army could offer in the dying months of WW2.

Regards

RED

I follow your discussion until I come to your reasoning about the PIAT versus the M1A1 Bazooka. It seems to me that the British glider delivered several large pieces of artillery. In fact there are two I recall seeing. One outside the hartkenstein Hotel and the other in the vicinty of the Frost Bridge. If someone can refresh my mind, were these artillery pieces capable of direct fire as an anti-tank weapon like the German 88s? Also, we need to flesh out the role of XXX Corps.
DJ

Large pieces of Artillery?

The only artillery delivered by glider were...

6pdr
17pdr
75mm Howitzer


As for the PIAT, what dont you get? The Bazooka had a back blast which makes it dangerous to use from a confined space, for example a room, like the defenders at Arnhem fought from. The PIAT has NO back blast, thus allowing its use from an enclosed space.

You seem desperate to discuss the role of XXX Corps in this operation. Perhaps you could give us an idea of your views?

Then we will answer if we disagree!

Dohh!!! I obviously meant 1 Para, a temporary brain cramp.

As for the bazooka, yes it has a back blast hazard, however soldiers are trained to compensate for that hazard. Even today with the M72 LAW, the dragon and TOW systems crews are trained to recognize the room requirements and even I have been cintinually trained about checking back blast area is clear. So the bazooka is not really an issue. The American airborne divisions were equipped with 57mm AT guns (copy of the 6 lbr) and with the 75mm pack howitzer and a battery of 105mm light weight howitzers. Witht he ranges involved in the fighting at Arnhem, the 57mm could be as useful as the 17 lbr AT gun, but also much more mobile. The 57mm could be moved about by manpower, something that was not easily done with the much bigger 17 lbr.

The plan to which I referred made a single drop of the 82nd or 101st at Arnhem - it was possible in one lift by reducing the size of the drop at the other sites. The British 17lbr was to be put to better uses where its heavier hitting power at longer ranges around Nijmegen.

Red Baron is corrct in stating that supplies could not get up Hell's Highway. That is why more than one road must be cleared to improve chances. It is common practice today too have an MSR and that all other traffic stay off the MSR. With only one road, this was impossible.

I will be interested to see your study results.

On one of the other subjects concerning Field Marshal Montgomery was his relationship with LTG Patton. I think I agree with the earlier supposition that Monty and Patton actually respected each other as they were both extremely aggressive and had large egos. That can be a dangerous combination if it wasn't for the fact that both commanders were also highly competent.

Jeff

My views on XXX Corps:
-it was no secret that the Dutch road system was restrictive.
-An offensive operation demands large supplies of ammunition, fuel and personnel
-Bridging material is essential when undertaking an operation to capture bridges--they just migh not be there when you attempt to use then, need a back-up means
-An offensive operation results in large numbers of prisoners and casualties
So, if you know the road is restricted, that you will require a two way supply route to take materiel forward and evacuate to the rear.....what is XXX Corps plan? Did they use a Red Ball type of road network in which vehicle went one way in a circular motion? Did they prioritize their supplies so that essential bridging materiel was well forward? Did they employ MPs to guide and control traffic? Did they control enthusiastic civilians and thus preclude the huge traffic jams that took place each time they entered a city? There was a great deal that should have done and a great many situations where XX Corps should have been more pro active. Everything I read on the subject implies that XXX Corps was far from an aggressive, well-organized staff supporting the field commanders.
As to the AT weapon systems, I will take a 2.36 rocket launcher any day over a PIAT. The British brought in some heavy weapons such as the 57mm which could should have assisted their efforts to hold the Arnhem bridge. I also wonder why no one used the river system to re supply the troops.
DJ

The rason they didnt use the river would be the flak and recce elements of 9th SS sat in the brickworks and able to fire over the river at the approaches to Arnhem centre. Boats would have been cut to ribbons. I have one German source that states that 200 20mm cannon were present in one form or another... Seems a tad high but you get the idea!

I will have a read up on XXX corps... I have Horrocks book somewhere...

I will have a read up on the PIAT. I have para sources tthat said with more PIATS and the ability to fire them down from windows on the rear of tanks it was quite effective.

But this is offset by the PIAT being particuarly fragile in airborne drops. Several were mentioned to be damaged at Pegasus bridge so it seems likely that many were damaged on landing at Arnhem and would explain the large amounts of PIAT ammo but a lack of launchers.

I will be back... busy at work at the mo!

Let's discuss that PIAT. Certainly a weapon that is currently the basis for the Carl Gustav. Nice idea, spring loaded it projects a grenade type projectile that can certainly cause a World War II tank mobility kill. I assume it could cause a catastrophic kill on a thin skinned vehicle-- Marder comes to mind. My reading of anti-tank weapons indicates that the weapon had an extremely limited kill range (see Major Howard's experiences on Pegasus Bridge for a nice summation). There is one story that states a British Soldier received the VC for firing and destroying several tanks with a PIAT fired from the standing shoulder position. The joke is that he received it for firing the weapon from the standing position...must have had a wicked recoil. True there is no back blast and therefore a limited ability for the enemy to detect a firing position which is not true when using the 2.36 rocket launcher. I want to urge us to continue to explore this interesting controversial figure in military history. What does anyone think about Monty and the Battle of the Bulge? He took over the norther sector. Did he bring order to chaos?
DJ

DJ,

some info on the PIAT;

The retreat to Dunkirk, in May 1940, had proved to the British Army that it was equipped to fight a war that had ended 20 years earlier. Anti-Tank weaponry of any kind was very poor and the principle armament of the infantry at the time, the Boys anti-tank rifle, could only penetrate light armour and as such was wholly ineffective against the modern German Panzers, which were at liberty to break through the Allied lines at will.

Rocket-propelled anti-tank weaponry was still in their infancy at this stage in the war and so the several earmarked replacements were based on the design of the spigot mortar, a simple projectile weapon. The retired Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker had, prior to the war, specialised in inventing a range of inexpensive home-made weaponry in his work shop, amongst which was the large "Blacker Bombard" spigot mortar. With a view to making a single-handed variant for the infantry, he turned his attention towards designing the "Baby Bombard". Major Jefferis took over the design when Blacker was posted to other duties, and so emerged the Jefferis Shoulder Gun.

The weapon was so simple in its design and so crudely constructed that at a glance it appeared to be amongst the very worst of amateurish efforts. Its main component was a cylindrical steel tube housing a powerful spring, at the end of which was a spigot and a trough, into which one placed a high-explosive projectile, and this was fired by pulling an almost comically large trigger. It was a most unlikely weapon and initial trials were not promising when the projectile struggled to make much of an impression upon armoured targets, however it was found that by shaping the tip of the bomb into a long point its effectiveness was considerably improved.

Towards the end of 1942, the War Office took on board the design and christened it the PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti-Tank). It became the undisputed anti-tank weapon of the British infantryman during the Second World War, and by 1945 a total of 115,000 were in circulation.

The PIAT entered service during 1943 and was first used by Canadian troops in Sicily. Its debut performance was not a happy one due to a fault in the bomb which misfired if it struck a target from any position other than square-on, and as a result the confidence of soldiers in the PIAT was greatly undermined. There followed a considerable effort to remedy the problem and restore the Army's faith before the weapon was used on French soil. Even so the bomb remained, throughout the war, considerably volatile due to the premature detonation of fuses. Such was the extent of the problem that live firing exercises were banned when the war came to an end.

In spite of its unlikely appearance, the PIAT was amongst the most effective infantry anti-tank weapons of its day, with a performance equal to that of the visually more sophisticated American bazooka. Although it was a cumbersome device, it possessed a number of advantages over such rocket weapons, namely that there was no back-blast from firing, and so not only could it be safely fired from an enclosed space, but it would also not give away its handlers position to the enemy. The PIAT could also be used as a makeshift mortar, by rotating the T-shaped shoulder stock through 90 degrees and wedging the weapon into any solid foundation, such as a tree or a wall.

The range of the PIAT was, however, very short. It was effective against large targets, such as buildings, at 350 yards, but it was only truly effective against armour at a range of 100 yards, although many operators preferred their target to be closer still. The PIAT bomb could penetrate 100mm of armour plate and so was ideally suited to dealing with light or medium armoured targets, however given the right conditions it was capable of dispatching any tank in service.
By 1944 a sabot round had been developed that could penetrate the frontal armour of almost any german tank.

Despite its effectiveness, the PIAT could be a brute to handle and it was not the soldier's best friend. It was heavy and awkward to carry, and commonly two soldiers were needed for its use: one to carry the weapon, the other the ammunition. The mechanism was not easy to load, although once cocked for a first time it was designed so that the recoil would, in theory but seldom practice, reload the spring automatically. With a 90kg draw, reloading required both strength and the acquired skill. It was relatively easy to prime whilst in a standing position, however this was not recommended during a battle, lying in a trench whilst under fire, and as such the PIAT was considered to be a one-shot weapon. The trigger required at least two fingers to pull and there was always a slight delay in firing, during which time an inexperienced operator might not hold the trigger back long enough, causing the spring reload to fail, not to mention the weight of the recoil being redirected into their shoulder, leaving it stunned. Also there was a 12lb shift in weight towards the front of the PIAT a tenth of a second before the round was released, thus the operator had to be ready to counter this effect.

Following the end of the war, technology in other methods of anti-tank weaponry were improved and the PIAT soon become obsolete, however it did experience a swansong during the Korean War before being finally retired from service in 1951.

Specification:

Manufacturer : ICI Ltd., various others.
Overall Length : 990mm or 39"
Weight : 31.7 lbs or 14.4kg
Projectile Weight : 3lb or 1.35 kg
Muzzle Velocity : 137 m/s or 450 ft/s
Effective Range : 100 m or 109 yards


not a perfect weapon by any means, but highly effective at short range. and if how many tank engagements took place at further ranges in arnhem?

regards

joe

Joe-- beautiful write-up. Cover a great deal of terrain and I highly recommend it to those of our members writing historical papers . Does anyone know if these weapons were used by US troops ... I suspect that the Ranger Battalions employed them, but refrain from stating until so one can provide a reference. Nice job on the details of the system.
thanks
DJ

Very nice Joe, ban I pinch a few lines for my MA?

Nice write-up on the PIAT. However, I have a question concerning the sabot round. It takes a very large charge to get the velocity necessary to generate the kinetic energy a sabot or solid shot needs to penetrate armor. Currently, only conventional cannon can produce that muzzle velocity (I know rail guns and other similar weapons can fire kinetic energy rounds, but they aren't in production). Recoilless rifles and other similar weapons have all relied on HEAT warheads. How can the PIAT generate enough muzzle velocity using a spring?

The 2.35" and 3.5" bazookas also had problems with rounds bouncing off the target without detonating. The fuze at the tip of the rounds had too small a contact surface and if the round did not impact the target perfrectly perpendicular to the armor it would not detonate. That is one reason the tip of modern HEAT rounds have a contact point over an inch in diameter - the American 105mm HEAT round had fuzes not only on the tip of the stand-off rod, but on the shoulders of the round - more contact surface.

DJ - I have read only the use of bazookas by the Ranger Battlalions. Although I do believe they trained with them in Ireland and Scotland as the British Commandos carried them. I do not have my references with me here at Norfolk.

This is just a random memory but I think the PIAT may had used some sort of blank charge but Im not sure.. I will have to read up!

Jeff--- I recall that the 1st Ranger battalion deployed to North Africa carrying a British anti-tank weapon. I believe it was known as the Boys Anti-Tank weapon. It is a rather large rifle type instrument. Understand it was a bear to fire and the damage done to a tank was negligible. They used it quite effectively against pillboxes and sof skinned vehicles. Probably did not have the PIAT.
DJ

sorry gentlemen,

ranger is correct, it wasnt sabot, an error on my part.

the actual round i was refering to was a HESH round,

regards

joe

Joe-- what do you have the predeccesor to the PIAT, I believe it was called the Boys AT rifle. Looks like a monster.
DJ

Jumping in here for Joe the Boys ATR, anti-tank rifle. It was a large, 55 caliber weapon that used kinetic energy to penetrate armor. It wasn't very effective. I can tell from bitter wargamming experience that it was pretty much a "door knocker" at anything under point blank range, or against anything other than light tanks. I understood at one time some modern sniper rifles were loosly based on the Boys.

The Tamiya LRDG truck has a Boys in it, also I think one of the Bren carriers.

http://www.britishairborne.org/weaponsairborne.html

Hi guys
With ref to the sabot rounds i remember my dad saying that on the 6 pounder anti tank gun they had a self dicarding sabot round are we talking about the same thing
Cheers chris tango 20

I seriously doubt the availability of sabot rounds during World War II. Someone can correct me here, but my recollection is that the Germans produced some tungsten core sabot type rounds. They were expensive and the material was in short supply. We used hyper shot which was a type of kinetic energy round of dubious value. I know that the M-48s used an early type sabot round, but do not believe this was a WW II system. If there is an ordnance guy in the crowd help me out here on the sabot question.
DJ

Actually they did have sabot rounds for the 6 pounder and 17 pounder. They were responsible for giving the 6 pounder a new lease on life. With the sabot rounds they had a chance against some of the newer German armor. I THINK I've heard some American forces tried some interesting trades to get the 6 pounder sabot ammo for their 57mm guns.

Here is some info on it.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A2187506