History Club
Military history and past events only. Rants or inflamitory comments will be removed.
Hosted by Frank Amato
Should Overlord have taken place in 1943?
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Thursday, July 25, 2002 - 10:49 PM UTC

Here's a question. How many of you out there think the Allies shoud have invaded France in 1943 instead of June 6, 1944?

How many think that there was no reason to mess around in Italy?

Would the invasion have worked in 1943? Would lives have been saved? Would the war have ended sooner? (In the Pacific too.)

What if Stalin had been at the Cassablanca summit? Would his desire for a second front have forced the British into accepting an invasion of France in '43?

Curious to see what you guys think.

Steve
Awall
Visit this Community
United States
Member Since: July 23, 2002
entire network: 63 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Thursday, July 25, 2002 - 11:30 PM UTC
In my opinion, I think the timing was right.
The allies, from what it seems to me, messed with Italy because it was an easier back door than Hitler's wall in the North of Europe. But the mountains of Italy proved a little hard, as it did for Hannibal.
Had the invasion in 1943 taken place, it would almost have been no different if not worse than the invasion of '44. Here's why. Messing around in Italy practically caused Italy to be little threat to the allies, not that they ever were. This allowed the allies to free up more resource for the invasion in 1944.
Also, planning. Planning didn't take place until 1943. The time to plan before that wasn't right. Invading in '43 meant planning in '42, at least. America was only in the war for a year, and therefore was still building and putting the whole country in a state of war. So America alone, which was a large driving force of the invasion, was not ready for the invasion, both in man power and resources.
This is just the way I see it.
Folgore
Visit this Community
Canada
Member Since: May 31, 2002
entire network: 1,109 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Thursday, July 25, 2002 - 11:42 PM UTC
Sorry, I don't have the time to get my books out and cite certain things, but here's what I believe. I don't think we had the landing craft available at that time to make a massive assault on the same scale as D-Day a year later. I can't say the invasion would have failed, but even after June 6, 1944, the Germans had the greater numbers in France, they just couldn't concentrate them, and even then, they held the Allies down in Normandy for some time (Caen wasn't taken for some time, for example). There would be far fewer men able to take part in the invasion (I think, I don't have the order of battle right in front of me) if it were in 1943. Given the extra year, the Allies were also able to obtain total superiority in the air. When the landings did occur, they were virtually unopposed by the Luftwaffe. The raid on Dieppe in 1942 showed how necessary air and naval support were (since the Canadians lacked it) and we might not have had this to the same extent as we did in 1944.
Much can be said of the Italian Campaign. It was supposed to hold down German troops in the south, but the peninsula was so easily defended, this did not succeed in happening. I don't think it was entirely useless though. If Italy were left alone, Mussolini might have retained power and the Axis would have Italy's extra manpower. Italy was not very successful, but if left, they could have had the chance to build a much stronger army. The Italian P40 heavy tank could have armed Italy's soldiers with a capable weapon. The Italian campaign succeeded in knocking Italy out of the war.
That's all I have time to write about now, maybe I'll add some more later. Good topic, sniper.

Nic
staff_Jim
Staff MemberPublisher
KITMAKER NETWORK
Visit this Community
New Hampshire, United States
Member Since: December 15, 2001
entire network: 12,571 Posts
KitMaker Network: 4,397 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:19 AM UTC
I would echo Nic's statements about timing. In 1943 we just were ready to attempt a landing on the French coast.

Also air superiority (for the allies) would have been less at that time if I remember my history. And think of what an additional year had done to Germany on the Eastern front. They had lost much by mid-1944.

Jim
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:22 AM UTC

Quoted Text

Sorry, I don't have the time to get my books out and cite certain things, but here's what I believe. I don't think we had the landing craft available at that time to make a massive assault on the same scale as D-Day a year later.

...

Nic



Nic,

Good thoughts.

In terms of size of the operation, the landings on Sicily were actually a bit larger than the Normandy invasion!

I know we always hear that the Overlord operation was the biggist amphibious assult, but if you look at the numbers I think you will find Sicily was a bit larger.

The British were terrified of a cross-channel invasion, partly because of Dieppe and partly because the stalemates of WWI were still in the back of their minds. Churchill actually suggested 1945 for the invasion up until the Tehran conference!

And the idea of going into France through the Alps? Boy, that one is silly! Did the Brits really think that was posible?

Here's one more thing, the year delay also gave the Germans a bit more time to fortify the Atlantik Wall...

Steve
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:28 AM UTC

Quoted Text


Also air superiority (for the allies) would have been less at that time if I remember my history. And think of what an additional year had done to Germany on the Eastern front. They had lost much by mid-1944.

Jim



I'd argue that there would have been time to nail the Lufftwaffe before a 1943 invasion if the Allies didn't have to take care of Italy.

Maybe more men would have been lost in a 1943 Overlord but would that be greater than the additional numbers lost in the Italian campaigns (for very limited overall success)?

My feeling is that if the war were a year shorter, there would have been fewer casualties.

And, think about what was happening in Poland in 1943. By the time the allies were able to think about liberating concentration camps, 90% of the killings had been completed...

What if we had been a year earlier there?

Steve
Awall
Visit this Community
United States
Member Since: July 23, 2002
entire network: 63 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:29 AM UTC
Maybe not so much as to use Italy as a back door as it was to knock out Italy to the point where an Italian threat was non-existant.
And yes, the Brits may have very well thought that they could get to France through Italy. There is hardly many reasons to attack Italy without an aim to move onward.
210cav
Visit this Community
Virginia, United States
Member Since: February 05, 2002
entire network: 6,149 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,551 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 02:43 AM UTC
Well, we should have invaded Italy only to the line slightly north of Foggia. Taking the rest of the country diverted and consumed valuable resources (men, materiel, time). And for what? I support the trend that says the German Air Force was a formidable foe in 1943. Without air supremacy, the invasion could never have achieved the tactical surprise the June 1944 invasion attained. We had no where near the landing craft required in 1943. I ask that you consider we could not mount the invasion of southern France until well after the Normandy invasion due to the crisis in Anzio. 1944 was the best we could do. The Brits were justifiable edgy about any seaborne invasion -- they got killed at Gallipoli in 1915, stopped the Germans from doing it in 1940, and got the crap kicked out of them at Dieppe in 1942. They had reason to be cautious.
DJ
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 03:27 AM UTC

Quoted Text

Well, we should have invaded Italy only to the line slightly north of Foggia. Taking the rest of the country diverted and consumed valuable resources (men, materiel, time). And for what? I support the trend that says the German Air Force was a formidable foe in 1943. Without air supremacy, the invasion could never have achieved the tactical surprise the June 1944 invasion attained. We had no where near the landing craft required in 1943. I ask that you consider we could not mount the invasion of southern France until well after the Normandy invasion due to the crisis in Anzio. 1944 was the best we could do. The Brits were justifiable edgy about any seaborne invasion -- they got killed at Gallipoli in 1915, stopped the Germans from doing it in 1940, and got the crap kicked out of them at Dieppe in 1942. They had reason to be cautious.
DJ



As far as the number of landing craft, they had to get all those guys to Sicily and Italy somehow. Certainly, if they were lacking more could have been built in a short time if the plans for invasion had been pushed up to '43.

Not sure what you mean by the crisis in Anzio. There would have been no Italian campaign and therefore no Anzio landings. (Why the hell didn't Clark decide on a landing NORTH of Rome anyway?)

It was the Brits who were cautious. Certainly Stalin wanted a second front as soon as possible! And the Americans actually wanted to invade in '42! (Now, I don't think that would have worked.)

As I mentioned, it might not have been easier in '43...

Steve
staff_Jim
Staff MemberPublisher
KITMAKER NETWORK
Visit this Community
New Hampshire, United States
Member Since: December 15, 2001
entire network: 12,571 Posts
KitMaker Network: 4,397 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 06:21 AM UTC

Quoted Text



In terms of size of the operation, the landings on Sicily were actually a bit larger than the Normandy invasion!

I know we always hear that the Overlord operation was the biggist amphibious assult, but if you look at the numbers I think you will find Sicily was a bit larger.

Steve



I know you seldom hear this in online debates. But man I think you may have sold me on this concept. I did look up the statistics as you noted the initial Sicily landing (in terms of manpower) was three times larger than the initial Normandy landing. Geeese. 500,000 men....talk about overkill for the German forces on Sicily. I will never again be able to watch the movie Patton again and think for a minute the Jerry's had a chance.

So, perhaps we did make an error in retrospect. I think it was the case in 1943 that the Axis forces still had that aura of invincibility about them. The reality is that if we had the equipment (which apparently we did) then we could have certainly made the Normandy invasion sooner IF all the plans and preparations could be made in that time frame. That is probably the sticking point you see. I think all the planners wanted every detail worked out before they tried to step one foot in France. And that obviously took longer than anyone would have liked. "So why not go after Italy in the mean time?" some adjutant probably piped up.

Jim
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 07:28 AM UTC

Quoted Text


I know you seldom hear this in online debates. But man I think you may have sold me on this concept. I did look up the statistics as you noted the initial Sicily landing (in terms of manpower) was three times larger than the initial Normandy landing. Geeese. 500,000 men....talk about overkill for the German forces on Sicily. I will never again be able to watch the movie Patton again and think for a minute the Jerry's had a chance.

So, perhaps we did make an error in retrospect. I think it was the case in 1943 that the Axis forces still had that aura of invincibility about them. The reality is that if we had the equipment (which apparently we did) then we could have certainly made the Normandy invasion sooner IF all the plans and preparations could be made in that time frame. That is probably the sticking point you see. I think all the planners wanted every detail worked out before they tried to step one foot in France. And that obviously took longer than anyone would have liked. "So why not go after Italy in the mean time?" some adjutant probably piped up.

Jim



Jim,

I too had always thought that Overlord was the biggest amphinious invasion. I guess you just can't trust what they say on TV! But, every show I have ever seen about Normandy inevitably says that D-day is the biggest.

Really, it was poor tactics by the Allies (Clark) and really good defences by the Germans (Kesselring) that cost so many casualties in the Italian campain. You know that this was really the last place the Germans were holding out at war's end in '45. Italy wasn't taken untill after Hitler's death...

As for the planning of the invasions, I think the key factor in the decisions was politics. The big three never met outside of Soviet controlled territory. Stalin was afraid to leave Russia for fear that there would be a military coup while he was out of the country and not in direct control. (The purges in '38 - 39 were still pretty fresh in everyones mind and there were plenty of higher-ups who weren't too pleased with Stalin's performance against the Germans.)

So when Churchill and Roosevelt met in Cassablanca to decide what was coming next (funny they should meet in Africa . That's really flipping Hitler the bird!) the U.S. wanted to go into France in '43. Stalin would have wanted this more than anything else in the world at this time but since he wasn't there to side with Roosevelt the comprimise became Italy. Like I said, Churchill was saying invade in '45 up to the Tehran conference (Stalin was at Tehran, just happened to be under Soviet control ).

Hey, who knows what would have happened. Sometimes outcomes of world events are decided by trains that are late or snowstorms. It is fun to think about though!

Steve
210cav
Visit this Community
Virginia, United States
Member Since: February 05, 2002
entire network: 6,149 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,551 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 10:43 AM UTC

Quoted Text


Quoted Text

Well, we should have invaded Italy only to the line slightly north of Foggia. Taking the rest of the country diverted and consumed valuable resources (men, materiel, time). And for what? I support the trend that says the German Air Force was a formidable foe in 1943. Without air supremacy, the invasion could never have achieved the tactical surprise the June 1944 invasion attained. We had no where near the landing craft required in 1943. I ask that you consider we could not mount the invasion of southern France until well after the Normandy invasion due to the crisis in Anzio. 1944 was the best we could do. The Brits were justifiable edgy about any seaborne invasion -- they got killed at Gallipoli in 1915, stopped the Germans from doing it in 1940, and got the crap kicked out of them at Dieppe in 1942. They had reason to be cautious.
DJ



As far as the number of landing craft, they had to get all those guys to Sicily and Italy somehow. Certainly, if they were lacking more could have been built in a short time if the plans for invasion had been pushed up to '43.

Not sure what you mean by the crisis in Anzio. There would have been no Italian campaign and therefore no Anzio landings. (Why the hell didn't Clark decide on a landing NORTH of Rome anyway?)

It was the Brits who were cautious. Certainly Stalin wanted a second front as soon as possible! And the Americans actually wanted to invade in '42! (Now, I don't think that would have worked.)

As I mentioned, it might not have been easier in '43...

Steve



Steve---Clark went ashore in January of 1944 at Anzio. The force was far too small to create more than atemporary diversion for the Germans. They bottled the Allies up at Anzio until June of 1944. In the intervening six months, landing craft designated for the invasion of Southern France were diverted to maintaining a flow of men and supplies into Anzio. I appreciate the argument that assumes we could produce more landing craft if we wanted, but we did not. The industrial base always has peaks and valleys. They were pumping out landing craft for world wide operations. Normandy had first claim to assets. Once that went well, most of the craft shifted to Southern France. It was immaterial where Clark landed. He did not possess the forces to allow widely separated sustained combat operations.
DJ
Folgore
Visit this Community
Canada
Member Since: May 31, 2002
entire network: 1,109 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 11:49 AM UTC
There have been many excellent responses and valid arguments here. One of the more important aspects doesn't have to do with landing craft, or even the troops available. Air superiority was key to a successfully gaining a foothold in Fortress Europe. In the months before the D-Day landings, RAF and USAAF bombers switched from the ineffective bombing of cities to attacking railroads and coastal defences, preventing the Germans from quickly reinforcing Normandy, where they were far more successful. It can be argued that much of what the Germans were able to build between 1943 and June 1944 was destroyed or damaged by these heavy bombers. Air superiority was a must, and, though the Allies were bombing Europe in 1943, it was not with the same numbers and lack of defending fighters as in 1944. Plus, these softening up attacks had to begin months before the invasion, in order to inflict maximum damage and not give away the intended target to the Germans. Then, of course, there was the necessity of local air supremacy over Normandy while the landings were taking place.

We must be careful in our assumptions about the landings in Normandy. Operation Overlord and the events that followed were not outright Allied victories. Even in 1944, when all the planning and preparations were done, and the Allies had complete air superiority (so much so that German tanks and transport columns could only move at night), the fighting in Normandy was brutal. On D-Day, not one Allied Army met all of its initial objectives (though some Canadian units reached theirs). I need not mention the difficulties faced by the Americans at Omaha Beach (even with the experiences of 1943, they Americans failed to support their infantry with enough "funnies" or duplex-drive tanks). And all this difficulty with the Germans holding their best armoured divisions around the Calais area, where they expected the real invasion (would the Allied ruse have worked so well in 1943? Probably not, it took time for the Germans to gather this faulty intelligence). We should not underestimate the Germans, and after their lighning victories from 1939-1942, the British had reason to be cautious. The fighting raged on in Normandy, a bloody battle of atrition, really, for another three months. The Germans using the advantages of the defense. The difference between 1943 and 1944 is particularly vital here, in my opinion. Again, air superiority prevented the Germans from maneuvering in daylight. By 1944, Allied armies were considerably larger and better trained than they were a year before. The Germans had the same advantage, too, didn't they? Not to the same extent. Germany's forces were pretty well fully mobilized after four years of war and, though it is true more German troops were sent to France as 1944 drew on, many more were sent to Russia, where they were suffering setbacks already.

I was not aware that more Allied soldiers landed in Sicily than in Normandy, but what exactly does this fact tell us? Landing craft were available in the Mediterranean. I can't say this is a fact, but many landing craft might already have been there from the Torch landings in late 1942. In Normandy, though the initial attackers were fewer in number than those in Sicily (perhaps because of the size of the beaches? I don't know), thousands more soldiers kept being sent across to Europe for some time after D-Day. Among these were battle hardened Canadian divisions taken out of the line in Italy. The fewer number of men during the amphibious assault is misleading, just as the movies telling us D-Day was the biggest is, because more and more troops kept getting sent over after the invasion. The initial landings consisted of only 5 divisions, but the force assembled in the UK to fight the Battle for Europe was 45 divisions strong. I assume the reason only 5 divisions were used was mainly tactical. Only so many men can fit on a beachead.
Sorry for rambling on, but I find this to be an interesting topic (maybe I should write a paper on this, using better research for a history class.....). Maybe I will add another post on the Italian Campaign......

Nic
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:14 PM UTC

Quoted Text


...

Germany's forces were pretty well fully mobilized after four years of war and, though it is true more German troops were sent to France as 1944 drew on, many more were sent to Russia, where they were suffering setbacks already.

...

I was not aware that more Allied soldiers landed in Sicily than in Normandy, but what exactly does this fact tell us?

...

Nic



Nic,

I'd say that by 1944 the German's were suffering more than 'setbacks' in Russia. You could argue that they were a defeated force by then and had been fighting defense for awhile. The Allies had driven them from Africa, Italy was more problem for them then benefit, they had no Navy to worry about. Not to say that they were not a force to be reckoned with and still a great army.

Everyone has mentioned air superiority and it's a good point. But was the Luftwaffe strong enough in '43 to drive an invasion back into the sea?

What about the build up of the Atlantik Wall? Certainly Rommel was a better offensive tactician than a defensive one (unlike Kesserling), but he did do a pretty good job building up the coast of France. What were the defenses like in '43 compared to '44?

As for the numbers for the invasion of Italy, it merely tells us that there were sufficiant forces available to invade France in '43. People always seem to be under the impression that we were building up forces before we could invade Europe, that the Allies didn't have the numbers to do the job. I think this says otherwise.

But numbers and types of weapons and who had the better tank are just the facts of conflict. I think the thing that I'm trying to get at is the decision making behind the scenes. It is, after all, politicians who are ultimately in charge.

The U.S., Britian, and Russia all had different reasons for doing what they were doing. Sometimes it seems to me, if I listen to too much Stephen Ambrose, that the war was a Crusade and the goal of the Allies was to make the world safe for Democracy. OK, true to a point, but the Europeans feared the Communists as much, if not even more than the Fascists. Britian and the U.S. knew that when Germany was defeated there was going to be a problem with Russia; there was no love loss between these people.

Steve
Folgore
Visit this Community
Canada
Member Since: May 31, 2002
entire network: 1,109 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 01:40 PM UTC
Yes, they were much more than setbacks. Can't argue with you there.

The Allies should have been able to maintain local air superiority in 1943, but not to the same extent that had so much impact during and after the landings as I have described already.

One thing I have a bit of a problem with is the view that more casualties in a 1943 D-Day would be more favorable than a longer war. With greater casualties, there is a possiblility that we wouldn't have enough strength to push as far as we did the first few days, ending in bottled up groups of beacheads like Anzio. Without total air supremacy and the preparations going into the invasion, casualties could have been high enough to slow us down or even stop the Allies. Commonwealth forces especially had a problem with having too few infantrymen. They had to be careful not to suffer heavy infantry losses.

I talked about the Atlantic Wall in my previous post. Allied heavy bombers and naval support were very effective in damaging these installations.

The soldiers used against Italy could not be used against France (not many of them anyway). These troops came across from North Africa. If there were no Allied force in Southern Europe, there would have to be a sizeable one left in North Africa to defend against further German and Italian (they're still in the war and shouldn't be underestimated) advances towards the oilfields of the Middle East, or at least to keep the Axis looking south, fearing an invasion there. Furthermore, with Italy in the war, the Germans could leave them to defend the south and move their elite divisions from Italy to France. That wouldn't exactly aid the Allied invasion.

I understand what you are talking about when it comes to politics. I've just been trying to analyze the situation and determine how feasible an invasion in 1943, without a second prong in the south, would be.

Nic
Eagle
Visit this Community
Noord-Brabant, Netherlands
Member Since: May 22, 2002
entire network: 4,082 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 02:41 PM UTC
Guys,

Really good thinking and good writing in this post ! Though I can give anadditional "YES" to invasion in 1943, there are a couple things that come to mind, that could have made invasion in 1943 a disaster :

Bearing the weather for safe passage and good supply posibilities in mind, the invasion would have too place around may or juni 1943.

German airpower was far more intense at that period, than it was a year after. There would be far more air-resistance than they experienced in 1944.

Besides that Germany still had a lot of factories producing war material. In 1944 most factories where severely damaged or even destroyed bij Bomber Command. Invading in 1943 would have given the Germans more recourses than they had in 1944.

And finaly, let's not forget about German moral in 1943. Like said before, they really thought they where invincible at that time.

just my 2cents
210cav
Visit this Community
Virginia, United States
Member Since: February 05, 2002
entire network: 6,149 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,551 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 08:48 PM UTC

Quoted Text

Guys,

Really good thinking and good writing in this post ! Though I can give anadditional "YES" to invasion in 1943, there are a couple things that come to mind, that could have made invasion in 1943 a disaster :

Bearing the weather for safe passage and good supply posibilities in mind, the invasion would have too place around may or juni 1943.

German airpower was far more intense at that period, than it was a year after. There would be far more air-resistance than they experienced in 1944.

Besides that Germany still had a lot of factories producing war material. In 1994 most factories where severely damaged or even destroyed bij Bomber Command. Invading in 1943 would have given the Germans more recourses than they had in 1944.

And finaly, let's not forget about German moral in 1943. Like said before, they really thought they where invincible at that time.

just my 2cents


Danny--I agree with you. In 1943, the submarine menace was threatening, the Germans were securely holding Western Europe, the Allied bomber campaign was just getting started, and we were starting to reap the benefits of the draft. Who could we have sent into Normandy in '43? We had only one airborne division (the 82nd then in Sicily). The 101st was still developing. So, the force structure was not there to sustain operations into Western Europe. We waited and built up overwhelming strength and a a large replacement pool. Getting ashore was one thing, building up and driving into Europe required a troop strength and divisional structure that we were only approaching in 1943.
My two cents for the morning.
DJ
sgtreef
Visit this Community
Oklahoma, United States
Member Since: March 01, 2002
entire network: 6,043 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,603 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 08:54 PM UTC
But did not Stalin want us to launch one is say 1942 or 1943? Did he not get all up tight when FDR and Churchill tell him noway Jose?
Very good points taken up here.
Kencelot
Visit this Community
Florida, United States
Member Since: December 27, 2001
entire network: 4,268 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,174 Posts
Posted: Friday, July 26, 2002 - 09:56 PM UTC
Okay, here's my two cents: Between 1942 and 1944, the events in Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific had a tremendous influence on both the Allied and Axis powers respective strategies and objectives. The Allies' successes in these diverse theaters of combat not only paved the way for the Normandy landings, but ultimately shaped the course of World War II. By taking into account the influence of the critical campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and the Pacific, one can gain a deeper understanding of the Normandy invasion. The turning of the tide, which resulted from Allied victories in Africa, Italy, and the Pacific, created the context within which D-day must be viewed. The amphibious invasions prior to Normandy were particularly significant because they provided the Allies with vital experience which they were able to successfully apply in Operation Overlord. The Allies could make their supreme attempt--a major cross-Channel invasion of France--only after gaining experience in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.
It is my opion that we, the Allies, were in no way prepared nor experienced to take on the Nomandy invasion prior to '44.
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 12:11 AM UTC

Quoted Text

The turning of the tide, which resulted from Allied victories in Africa, Italy, and the Pacific, created the context within which D-day must be viewed.



Lot's of people consider the turning of the tide in WW2 to be Stalingrad and the defeats in Russia. Remember though, we are all veiwing events with future knowledge of what will happen. The people making the decisions an the time didn't have this luxury. I don't believe the grand strategy was based on a series of experience gaining invasions and victories.

Really, what was North Africa? Nothing there. It was an Italian blunder that began the whole mess there. There was no need for the Germans to be there, they had no interest in Libya. Please, don't say Suez Canal. It just drained the Germans of much needed Eastern front troops and one of their best generals (you know who!).

One more thing, imagine if you can, when the Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor what does Roosevelt decide to do? He decides to defeat Germany! First would be Europe and then they'd defeat Japan. True story. We don't hear about this much, but there were opinion polls (yep, had them back then too) and people were furious at Roosevelt and the decision to go to war with Germany and focus on Europe before Japan! If the U.S. had been a parlimentary system, Roosevelt would ahve a gotten a vote of No Confidence! (Good thing for us he stayed where he was!)


Quoted Text


The Allies could make their supreme attempt--a major cross-Channel invasion of France--only after gaining experience in the Mediterranean and the Pacific.



Maybe that is true in retrospect, but the American's would have planned for '42 if the Britts agreed (Stalin would have wanted '41!) and really wanted to go in '43. Churchill was still saying '45 right into '44.

I don't agree that North Africa and Italy (and even Guadalcanal) were meant as 'experience gaining' exercises. These killed tens of thousands and cost lots of materials and time. And, as I mentioned earlier, with dubious benefits.

Not everyone who came ashore in Normany was a seasoned vetern either. Not even close.


Quoted Text

It is my opion that we, the Allies, were in no way prepared nor experienced to take on the Nomandy invasion prior to '44.



You might be right. Question is, would it have worked? I think so. Would it have been different? Certainly. Would there be set-backs? Certainly. How would the war have been different? I have no idea!

During the war one thing was always know by the Allied leadership: The U.S. supplied the money and the materials. The Brits supplied the unsinkable aircraft carrier. And the Russians supplied the blood.

But, I still say ending the war earlier always saves lives. Again, I have to look at what was happening in Poland. Just a few months earlier there could ahve saved hundreds of thousands of innocent lives...

Steve

PS - All you guys have some great, well thought, and provoking ideas! Great website!


Folgore
Visit this Community
Canada
Member Since: May 31, 2002
entire network: 1,109 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 04:49 AM UTC
I'm going to make one last post here and then, I think, I'll be spent.
One thing we have seen from this thread is that even history is opinionated and our views on it are always changing. This is one of the great things about the subject. New perspectives can be found on events that took place many years ago. This thread was not an argument, but a debate (and a good one at that). No one here is really trying to make everyone else see things his way. This is why I am majoring in history, because I love it!

Having said that, I have a few last comments to make regarding this topic on Operation Overlord. Asking "what might have been" is not history. Debating whether an invasion would have been possible in 1943, by analyzing and comparing the situations facing the waring nations in that year and 1944, is, in my opinion, a legitimite historical debate. However, what Ken mentioned about "context" is entirely correct. We can't just say that the campaigns in North Africa and Italy were stupid, so they never should have happened. The fact is, they did happen, and this has a profound impact on the discussion here. To me, going so far to say that the Allies shouldn't have been in the Mediterranean is nothing more than fantasy and not very useful to historical debate. Italy had colonies in Africa; so did the British. When Italy declared war, North Africa became a theatre of war. For Mussolini, the North African campaign was fought for prestige and land. His forces failed. Hitler was forced to send aid (for a number of reasons: preserve the aura of invincibility the Axis had, maintain control over the Mediterranean, a vital body of water for thousands of years before WWII, seizing the Suez Canal (yes I'm going to say it, it was another valid strategy), and reaching the oil of the Middle East). These are facts, which set up the context in which the invasion was forced to take place. They can not be dismissed, or we get into a completely different debate; one that perhaps would be just as well placed in the Spaceship Talk forum as History Talk.

Nic
sgtreef
Visit this Community
Oklahoma, United States
Member Since: March 01, 2002
entire network: 6,043 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,603 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 10:23 AM UTC
well it all comes down to the US was not ready in 1943 for the event to happen. A lot of equiptment had to be assembled and passed thru the North Atlantic what with the U-Boots patroling. I can not seem to guess how much stuff lays on the bottom of the Atlantic from this event. MY cousin was a merchant Marine in WW II. and my uncle was a member of the Italian Navy. Plus Dad and his stuff.
excuse the rambling #:-)
210cav
Visit this Community
Virginia, United States
Member Since: February 05, 2002
entire network: 6,149 Posts
KitMaker Network: 1,551 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 11:03 AM UTC

Quoted Text

I'm going to make one last post here and then, I think, I'll be spent.
One thing we have seen from this thread is that even history is opinionated and our views on it are always changing. This is one of the great things about the subject. New perspectives can be found on events that took place many years ago. This thread was not an argument, but a debate (and a good one at that). No one here is really trying to make everyone else see things his way. This is why I am majoring in history, because I love it!

Having said that, I have a few last comments to make regarding this topic on Operation Overlord. Asking "what might have been" is not history. Debating whether an invasion would have been possible in 1943, by analyzing and comparing the situations facing the waring nations in that year and 1944, is, in my opinion, a legitimite historical debate. However, what Ken mentioned about "context" is entirely correct. We can't just say that the campaigns in North Africa and Italy were stupid, so they never should have happened. The fact is, they did happen, and this has a profound impact on the discussion here. To me, going so far to say that the Allies shouldn't have been in the Mediterranean is nothing more than fantasy and not very useful to historical debate. Italy had colonies in Africa; so did the British. When Italy declared war, North Africa became a theatre of war. For Mussolini, the North African campaign was fought for prestige and land. His forces failed. Hitler was forced to send aid (for a number of reasons: preserve the aura of invincibility the Axis had, maintain control over the Mediterranean, a vital body of water for thousands of years before WWII, seizing the Suez Canal (yes I'm going to say it, it was another valid strategy), and reaching the oil of the Middle East). These are facts, which set up the context in which the invasion was forced to take place. They can not be dismissed, or we get into a completely different debate; one that perhaps would be just as well placed in the Spaceship Talk forum as History Talk.

Nic



Nic--your comments cause me to pose several points for consideration. One, the German actions in the Middle East were not (fact not opinion) based on seizing oil fields or the Suez Canal. They committed Rommel and his meagre force to North Africa to stabilize the Italians who were getting pummeled by the British. Instead of defending, Rommel attacked with startling results. The German rather than rein him in continued to supply this theater to the detriment of their other adventures. There was no well thought out and executed strategy at work here. It was opportunism and adventurism. I for one argue that our invasion of Italy should have stopped north of the airfireld at Foggia. Read Carlo D'Este's fine books on the Italian Campaign to gain an appreciation for the needless Allied expenditures driving into Italy. Italy surrendered while our guys were enroute to Salerno in September of 1943. We did what we set out to do, knock Italy out of the war. We should have stopped then and there. The Italian campaign mirrors the German romp in North Africa. They was little or no strategy here if we define strategy as ways, means, and ends. We certainly expended the means, and explored the ways, but what was the end?
Thoughts for your consideration and comments
DJ
Folgore
Visit this Community
Canada
Member Since: May 31, 2002
entire network: 1,109 Posts
KitMaker Network: 0 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 11:14 AM UTC
Actually, DJ, I completely agree with you. The oilfields and Suez Canal were targets of opportunity, not the reason Rommel was sent to Africa. But I dis also mention the real reason that you also spoke of, to bail out the Italians. Still, Hitler didn't have much choice. With Italy in the war, if North Africa was lost, the underbelly of Europe (which really wasn't that soft) would be open to invasion. Control of the Mediterranean was also important, enabling German and Italian subs to roam those waters destroying British shipping passing through Suez. I will not argue against your idea that the Allies should have stopped at Foggia. I think the Italian campaign was necessary, up to the point of knocking Italy out of the war, but once the Germans rushed in, further advances would cost the Allies too much. Definitely too much resources were thrown into that theatre. Perhaps at the time, the Allies believed if they could keep up the pressure in Italy, the Germans would have to lighten their defences in France. This didn't happen. These details were not quite what I was getting at in my post, but I do thank you for clarifying them, DJ.

Nic
sniper
Visit this Community
New York, United States
Member Since: May 07, 2002
entire network: 1,065 Posts
KitMaker Network: 497 Posts
Posted: Saturday, July 27, 2002 - 12:16 PM UTC

Quoted Text

With Italy in the war, if North Africa was lost, the underbelly of Europe (which really wasn't that soft) would be open to invasion. Control of the Mediterranean was also important, enabling German and Italian subs to roam those waters destroying British shipping passing through Suez.

Nic



Nic,

I'm not so sure I understand your point about North Africa being lost. Was it ever the Axis' to begin with? It was the Italians who invaded Egypt and when it went to hell, Hitler had to make a decision to come to the Italians aid.

I think this decision had as much to do with honoring political agreements (yes, even Hitler kept some promises ) as it had to do with strategy.

I think the German should have been worried about the situation in Russia more than any possible invasion from the south over hundreds of miles of Alps. No way could that have happened.

And as far as needing the Italians in the war. What the Germans were doing with the Italin troops (putting the Alpini on the Steppe for example ) didn't seem to be doing them that much good anyway.

I do agree with the the issue of control over the Med. But playing around in Africa wouldn't help that too much...

Steve