Kyle-- the Battle of the Crater occurs during the seige of Petersburg in 1864-65. If you visit the superbly preserved battlefield you can visit the site. I was pretty taken aback by the dimension of the crater. while deep (about 20') it looks like a bulldozer pushed some dirt aside. It is not this huge hole of the dreadful movie "Cold Mountain" dimensions. I'd have to read about the use of Union troops. Seems to me the penetration was made by black soldier without significant reinforcements to hold open the penetration and allow an exploitation. Does anyone else know the specifics of the Battle of the Crater?
thanks
DJ

DJ,

I have some first hand accounts in my "Battles and Leaders" set. I will have to review them. But part of the problem came from the "secrecy" on the Union side. The assault troops were not told about what was about to happen. So, when the mine was exploded many of the Union soldiers just watched in amazement, and lost the temporary advantage created by the shock and confusion on the Confederate side.

The Union soldiers poured into the crater, instead of skirting the edges, and got trapped inside when the Southners recovered.

It was a good idea gone bad by too much secrecy. GEN Burnsides, the Corps commander, took the fall for the disaster. No real advantage, other than killing a good number of Confederate soldiers in the intial blast was achieved. An excellent opportunity to penetrate the Petersburg defenses was lost.

Jeff

A further note on Antietam. Just finished reading a short article in "Military History" magazine that covered the Burnside Bridge debacle. One of the major problems was that McClellan consolidated all his cavalry at Army level. Burnside's IX Corps had no mounted reconnaissance assets, making it difficult to look for the fords across the creek. Burnside sent out recons to look for teh fords, and several were eventually found and used, but cavalry would have found them much faster than infantry.

McClellan was a great organizer, but a poor tactican!

While I am on a roll, and we are discussing my favorite war, let's mention two major battles that have a common link - Braxton Bragg.

Just a note, I live in Middle Tennessee, outside of Smyrna, on the edge of the Stone's River battalefield (one of the battles in this entry), and about a four-hour drive from Pittsburg Landing (also called Shiloh), the other battle in this entry.

Braxton Bragg was the Chief of Staff, and a corps commander for the Army of Tennessee at Shiloh, and was the Army commander at Stone's River (Also known as the Battle of Murfreesboro). He designed the battle plans for both battles and used his favorite attack formation - Attack-by-echelon. This tactic was a common tactic in Europe and was still a favorite of Civil War generals, particularly in the South. Divisions would attack on line, but the attack would not start as the whole line surging forward all at once, but it would start like the "Wave" you might see at an American baseball or football game. The theory was that the first unit, say the extreme right division would attack, the enemy would respond to that threat, either exposing a flank to the next division in line, or by committing the reserve. Each attacking division would attack in sequence, hopefully creating a gap to be exploited. This tactic was not well suited to the Western Theater of the ACW.

At Shiloh, the dense underbrush and numerous water courses (creating numerous swamps after a rainy Spring) made it all but impossible to keep units on line. The major problem with Bragg's plan was that there were three waves, not neccesarily a bad concept, except that each wave was made of a separate corps!!! As gaps developed in the first corps ranks, units to the rear came forward to fill the gaps, and quickly the Confederate corps became seriously intermingled and command & control was lost.

At Murfreesboro, Bragg used a similar plan, but this time the two attacking corps were side-by-side, but with divisions in two lines. Around Murfreesboro, there are heavy woods, including numerous Cedar breaks, that even today you cannot walk through. When the extreme left division, in the first line, the first in the attack-by-echelon, turned the Union right flank, it continued straight ahead, instead of wheeling to the right. Another gap, as at Shiloh, developed and the second division in line filled the gap, loosing the "Weight" on the extreme left. Both battles started with Confederate forces rolling up the respective Union armies, but then loosing momentum, because of the use of an extreme linear formation in heavily wooded terrain, and the resulting lack of fresh reserves to exploit the situation. Luckily Braxton Bragg did not lead the Northern armies!!!

How could these battles have ended differently? For one, different tactics, but the same general battle plan was used at Chickamauga, the next major battle in the West after Murfreesboro. Again another attack-by-echelon, designed by Braxton Bragg, again in terrain consisting of thck forests and open farm fields (and another battlefield on which I have been fortunate to walk, this time under the turtorship of the US Army Reserve Command's Historian). What was the difference between this battle, which resulted in a Nothern rout, and the two earlier battles? A bad move on the Union side, and LTG Longstreet, who modified his formation and was able to take advantage of the Union mistake.

Lonstreet decided to align his corps in a huge column (it would have made Napolean proud). He stacked up five divisions into a giant battering ram and luckily fell on a gap created by an errant move of a Union brigade (the desult of a patch of forest blocking the view of the Union commander. If Longstreet had not changed from line to column formation he would not have had sufficient combat power at what became the "Schwerpunkt" (hope I spelled it correctly) to exploit the Union mistake. Instead of one or two brigades entering the gap, a half dozen or more fell into the hole, widening the hole and spilting the Union line. Two things saved the Union Army and cost the South the recapture of Chattanooga: Bragg's (and Longstreet's) failure to pursue the defeated Yankees, and MG Thomas' stand on the left ring. Instead of pursuing the fleeing army, the Confederates converged on Thomas, allowing Rosecran's to consolidate in the Chattanooga defenses.

What we had was a general with limited tactical flexibility, who failed to adjust his tactics to the terrain. The North was lucky that the South continued to treat the western theater as secondary (Middle Tennessee, and northern Alabama, was the bread basket of the South, and also a major source of horses, and munitions. Where do you think all the saltpeter required for gunpowder was acquired? From the bat guano in all those limestone caves located throughout the Tennessee River Valley )

Maybe President Jefferson Davis' insistance on sticking with his friend, Braxton Bragg, was the actual disaster!

Here's another that may go in the books as a military disaster: The Battle of Little Bighorn.

For me, I tend to wonder what was Custer thinking when he led his men there?

Another operatrion that could count is that Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava during the Crimean War. Who in his right mind would lead a cavalry charge against a battery of field guns? Such a waste of men and horses.

Then there's the Siege and Fall of Dien Bien Phu which somewhat shattered French prestige and led to their eventual departure from Vietnam.

Well, now there is another interesting battle-- Little Big Horn. I read a very well written account "To Hell with Honor." If you get a chance and read a great deal about that era and Custer this book may prove of interest. As I recall, Custer's plan is bold and audacious, but not foolish. The breaj down comes when his supporting officer (Benteen and Reno) fail to carry out their assigned tasks. They literally leave Custer stranded . Interesting battle to study.
DJ

I see. So Custer was supposed to be reinforced then? This seemed to have dispelled the myth that he foolishly charged into battle without any idea of what he's up against.

Going with the trend of getting away from WWII I would like to nominate two other military distastes, this time from the Napoleonic period. The encirclement of Ulm, where the "unfortunate Mack" was humiliated, and the Jena Auerstadt (sp) campaign where nearly the entire Prussian army was held off by one superbly led French corps, under Devout, while Boney took care of the rest of the Prussians.

Slightly off topic:
Below are a couple of pictures I took at "Burnside's Bridge" a few years ago. The first picture is from the Union side of the bridge looking across the creek to the heights that were held by the Confederates. The second picture is from the heights looking down at the bridge. The creek and the bridge were both much smaller than I though they would be. When we went the water in the creek was no more than two feet deep. Just thought some of you might enjoy the pictures.

Shaun

No, as I recall, Custer went into the Indian encampment while Benteen was suppose to come forward with the mule train and ammo to re supply the forward element. He did not perform this task. Reno was the next senior officer at the battle and was to reinforce Custer. He did not attempt to penetrate the outer screen of Indians and support Custer. This is the best I can recall now, but certainly I am subject to err if someone has a better summary.
DJ

From what I have read of "Little Big Horn" was that Reno was to attack the village with about 1/2 of the regiment while Custer moved along the high ground on the other side of the river. He would then swing in on the flank and/or rear of the Indians. Reno initially attacked and then withdrew under overwhelming numbers. He retreated into a small wood along his side of the river, drawing in more of the enemy. However, he and others apparently paniced and abandoned what was a pretty good defensive position to attempt a withdrawal under pressure across the river - the most difficult, and dangerous military manuever you can attempt.

This freed up large numbers of the warriors to take on the 1/2 of the regiment unders Custer. If Benteen could have gotten through to Custer with the ammo train, I find doubtful, although the wagons might have provided a rallying point for Custer.

The US Governrment has a good bit of this disaster on its lap!! Why was the US Army using a single-shot breech loading carbine more than 10 years after the Civil War, where there were entire regiments and even at least one brigade equipped with Spencer and/or Henry repeaters????

I still believe that Custer over reached his orders. What were his orders? I don't know. Find and report the enemy locations?, find & fix the enemy?, or seek & destroy. All were missions that Custer and the 7th Cavalry had successfully completed before Little Big Horn. But, all of those actions were against much smaller parties, and involved more surprise. I can't believe that GEN Crook would have one cavalry regiment attack the size of enemy force that he knew he was facing.

Any comments?

There is so much myth that surrounds the Little Big Horn that it is very hard to wade through it all. I'm pretty sure that Reno was given a court martial after the battle and was exonerated. One thing that I am sure of, Custer had broken up a command before this with disastrous results for one branch. I can't recall the details but it had to do with a smaller group being cut off and destroyer years earlier. In the case of LBH it was Custer who was cut off and destroyed. I just can't see where dividing your command into three units when you're already so badly out numbered is a good idea.

I am refreshing my faulty memory as I read the last two posts. Reno and Benteen hated Custer as I recall . The 7th Cavalry (of which I am a proud member--Garry Owen!) was fractured by the intrernal strife. Reno was not exactly an aggressive supporter of Custer and Benteen was relegated to the supply train because he was a whinner and complainer. The exoneration of Reno is questionable in that he was removed from the military for his alcoholism and many years later the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records felt the disease was caused by the Custer massacre. I recall reading that Reno had been away from troops too long and rejoined the regiment fighting Indians for the first time at the Little Big Horn. Reno had a fairly valorous time during the Civil War. Jeff's comment on the weapons is amazing. Didn't the brass in the Spencer's expand from the heat as the weapon fired? Thus causing ejection failures and adding to the misery of the moment. What a disaster!
DJ

Yes, the weapon the 7th was saddled with, excuse the pun, was really bad, when compared to the rapid fire weapons the Indians had, and that had been available in the AMC. I can think of three reasons why this was so. One, I know the head of the department that chose weapons for the Army in the early part of the AMC was against rapid fire weapons. Maybe somebody with the same mind set was back in charge of that department? The American army has a tradition of long range fire. Perhaps the service weapon was chosen over the Henry, for example, because of long range fire? This would be something like Hitler not liking the MP43/44 for the same reasons. Third It's possible that there were just so many of these weapons left over after the AMC that the army was forced to use them?

There is a series on The Discovery channel, or maybe it's The History Channel, called Battlefield Detectives. They claim to be able to trace the course of the battle by finding spent shell casing from various weapons and tracing where they were found on the field. It's really a pretty interesting show and I recommend it if you ever get a chance to see it.

For a while there, I thought they were already using lever-action Winchesters. I based it on the illustrations I saw and westerns. I didn't know the US army (cavalry) of the 1870's still used those single-shooters.

Firepower is a subject we should discuss. For example, did we really have to up gun to the 120mm or was the 105mm adequate?

DJ - If I recall correctly, the carbine ammo had a copper casing and not brass. When the breech got hot the casings would swell and when the troopers tried to pull out the spent cartridge, the cartridge would tear, leaving the poor soldier to dig it out with his knife! All the while the enemy swirled about.

As far as upgrading from the rifled 105mm to smooth bore 120mm, I do not think it was absolutely necessary. I know that was new 105mm ammo in testing that had as good penetration as the then current 120mm ammo. I do not know if the 120 has much better range than the 105. Anywhere but Kuwait, SE Iran and northern Saudi Arabia any difference in range would be useless. I know the change from 105 to 120 reduced ammo capacity by 25%.

Jeff-- you are so right on the storage. On the M60 we took on 63 rounds, the M-1 was 55 then we got the M1A1 and went to 44 rounds. I am one of the crowd who felt that the M60A3 was simply the finest tank ever to hit the road. The M-1 certainly had improvements, but also growing pains (painful ones at that). The M1A1 and the follow-on derivatives are fine vehicles and systems that can take an RPG and still keep on truckin. But, that A3 was a doll!
DJ

DJ: The M60A3 looks pretty but in your view, do you think it can withstand an initial hit of AT rounds given that the front armor (in the turret) is not sloped as the Abrams? I hear that sloped armor seemed to be in vogue when they realize it has a better chance of dissipating hits from enemy AT rounds.

My tank company was the last in Europe to draw M60A3s, almost a year after the 3rd ID had starting drawing M1s!!

I really liked the M60A3 - our thermal sights were second generation, while the M1 carried first generation sights. The turret on the M60A3 was better balanced and from a stationary firing position the M60A3 was more accurate than the M1 We could go further on less fuel than an M1 and had better internal stowage.

But there the comparison ends - The M1 had better frontal armor, but only against HEAT rounds, goes faster and shoots better on the move.

If we had invested the money in the M60A3 as had the Israelis, then it would have the same survival as the M1-family.

But as DJ has stated in another thread - it is the crew that fights the tank, and as an example, the 4th Armored Division crews of Sherman tanks were able to kick butt on a German force of Panthers at Nancy, France in 1944. Using terrain, superior speed and poor weather to their advantage the US tankers racked up an impressive victory.

I never got to "play" with the M1, so I am partial to my old Pattons.

As m y good friend from the PI so correctly states, the M60 series just could not absorb the hits that the M-1 can and does take. I fired the M1 and M1A1 on tak qualification courses and the A1's fire controls are magnificent. Plus when you slam an MPAT round into a turret it is gone! No doubt in your mind that you hit paydirt. Wonderful system.

There's one more thing I'm dying to know for a long time:

Between a rifled and smoothbore gun (tank) is the speed of the round fired affected by the barrel/gun it is fired from?

Were US WW2 tank guns rifled or smoothbore? (Shermans, Chaffees, Jacksons, Pershings)

My educated guess is that the US had rifled barrels until the arrival of 120mm M256A1 which is a German Rheinmetal smooth bore weapon. Now, we put a metal sleeve down it to extend tube life but it is a smooth bore. I am on travel and obviously do not have access to my reference data. Jeff will know better than I on the subject.
DJ

Could anybody confirm this: I read somewhere (I could not recall the article) that they are upgrading armor to depleted uranium. I guess it's meant (supposedly) to defeat sabot rounds. Was it scrapped?