Robin, you have made a number of very good points.

The Pacific War is a tough one to decide a turning point. To say Pearl Harbour was a turning point, you would have to alter my definition of a turning point. The US lost the battle, but was not left in an irrecoverable state.

Chas

If I were to engage Gary Kasparov in a game of chess it wouldn't matter in which order and how/when I lost my chess pieces, I would be certain of losing as soon as he accepted the challenge.

A lazy historian would apply this thinking to the Pacific War, by saying there were no turning points, that the war was lost from the moment it started. A revisionist historian would pick out a specific battle, analyse the effects had it been lost, and claim it was the turning point of the war. My preferred historian is the one who analyses an actual battle, not its causes or effects, and then looks at how it leads to the next battle. As I said earlier, all battles are interlinked to produce a final outcome. They should be analysed as they happened, no hypothetical material should be introduced.

Chas

Japan had China reasonably under control, the British holdings were taken or about to be taken, the Netherlands were beaten and nothing else stood in their way.
The only power that might threaten Japan was the US and the US was mostly isolationist anyway and didn't want to go to war. At that moment Japan decides to attack and by that
attack turns the opinion in the US from 'don't want to join' to 'all out war, no holds barred'.
If that wasn't one big bad mistake I don't know what would be.

As you can see from the above document, I have come to the conclusion that the Battle of Britain was the turning point of the European war. Although I believe in only one turning point per theatre, I am very sceptical of the whole concept of 'turning points' because they rely almost entirely on assumptions, sometimes impossible predictions. By claiming that the Battle of Britain (or any other conflict) was a turning point, it is necessary to first look at all the ifs and buts had the conflict been lost. Predicting the outcome/consequences of a lost battle (which in reality was won) upon another battle is an almost impossible task relying on guesswork for the best part.

Japan had China reasonably under control,

I would say, Intelligence.
Considering its Ultra's influence on the BOTA and the breaking of the Japanese codes by the US on the Battle of Midway I'd say that breaking the Enigmaby the Polish and British scientists was the decisive turning point. Maybe not as glamourous as a hard won battle, but which general has ever won a battle without knowing anything about his opponent?

Peter

ative kill ratios do come into it but numbers will eventually prevail.
If force A is 5 times as "efficient" in killing the enamy than force B but force B is 7 times
as many, how many of force B will there be left when force A is don to zero ?

If I may coin the term 'battle history' then picking a battle and following the chain of events would be the proper method.

In this scenario (which itself would have had to rely on numerous theoretical 'tuning points' of its own), the 3rd reich may have lasted 12 rather than 6 years.

The German blitzkreig tactics only worked until their opponents learned to understand them, at which point they failed to pack anywhere near the same punch as they did in 39-41. By 42-43 the Russians would have wised up and learnt how to counter them regardless of any extra troops that weren't on the Atlantic coast.

It's true the Chinese never surrendered, but they didn't do a heck of a lot of fighting either. What they did was consume mountains of lend-lease supplies for no good outcome.

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It's true the Chinese never surrendered, but they didn't do a heck of a lot of fighting either. What they did was consume mountains of lend-lease supplies for no good outcome.

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Hmmm. This could become subject to debate. Certainly they held up significant Japanese forces, putting as much drain on Japanese supplies, if not more, than Allied supplies.

Chas

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ative kill ratios do come into it but numbers will eventually prevail.
If force A is 5 times as "efficient" in killing the enamy than force B but force B is 7 times
as many, how many of force B will there be left when force A is don to zero ?

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You might really enjoy reading some of the Dupuy Institute's studies on numbers and combat effectiveness. A lot of it is on the web. The post-1945 Red Army was heavily influenced by this kind of thinking also, although I'm not saying they read Dupuy.

I was reading the original US government report on Lend-Lease a year or so ago, looking for some info on shipments to the USSR, but what I happened to notice was the incredible quantity of stuff shipped to the Chinese and how useless it all was. Stilwell was incredibly frustrated that the KMT forces in China were basically sitting on their hands waiting for someone else to win the war.



So I don't know what military value the Chinese army had, frankly. I do know an awful lot of the weapons we sent them ended up being used against UN forces in Korea later on.

Reminds me of an old joke: "For sale, Chinese rifles. Like new, never fired, only dropped once"

If I may be so bold as to making what could be a controversial statement:
I think both Chinese sides were trying to preserve as much as possible of their
fighting capacity (and hoard whatever could be hoarded) for the real fight which
would take place as soon as the irritating Japanese interruption had ceased.
KMT and Mao's Army still had their game to settle ...

/ Robin

Chinese tactics in North Korea: Run straight ahead and yell, hoping that the enemy will
run out of bullets before he has killed all of the attackers.
Unless I have managed to completely misunderstand something I read somewhere ...

/ Robin