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Military history and past events only. Rants or inflamitory comments will be removed.
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Do you believe in 'Turning Points'?
Posted: Monday, November 17, 2008 - 11:13 AM UTC
I would say the turning point of WW2 was not a battle at all, but the decision by the Germans and Japanese to be allies. The USA didn't want any part in what was seen as another European war, I fully accept that Britain was reliant on supplies of food, raw materials, and weapons from the USA, but Americans fighting in Europe was not part of the plan. Britain would have succumbed to Germany sooner or later if the Germans had been more picky about whom it would be allies with.
Stoottroeper

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Posted: Monday, November 17, 2008 - 01:09 PM UTC
@ Robin,
I admit that the British, French and Dutch were beaten easily by the Japanese, but that is not the point. You claimed they were out of the way at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and they were not. So at the moment of the attack, they were stil a uncertain gamble for the Japanese.
About the carriers: I don't say the Japanese would have won the war if they were sunk at Pearl Harbor, only that the US could fight back immediately, thus having the Japanese not being ready with creating ring of island fortresses they planned to stop the US.
@ Finch,
Sure, the US was lucky at Midway, but the fact that there was a carrierbattle was good intelligence work. For the Japanese also attacked the Aleutian Islands at the same moment, which they deliberity leaked to the US, just to have the US carrierfleet away.
As for the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler insisted on using telephone in stead of radio for this attack. Must agree on your other points though.
Makes me think of Isaac Asimov's "The Machine That Won the War" story. It's about a supercomputer that makes all the decisions to be taken in the war against an extraterrestrial race and the leading general just flipping a coin to decide whether or not to follow the advise.
Guess that Napoleon was right when he exclaimed: I know he is a great general, but is he lucky?
So should the real turning point be: Luck?
Doesn't give a lot of honour to all those who died in war, but does "explain" how some battles are won against the odds.
Peter
I admit that the British, French and Dutch were beaten easily by the Japanese, but that is not the point. You claimed they were out of the way at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and they were not. So at the moment of the attack, they were stil a uncertain gamble for the Japanese.
About the carriers: I don't say the Japanese would have won the war if they were sunk at Pearl Harbor, only that the US could fight back immediately, thus having the Japanese not being ready with creating ring of island fortresses they planned to stop the US.
@ Finch,
Sure, the US was lucky at Midway, but the fact that there was a carrierbattle was good intelligence work. For the Japanese also attacked the Aleutian Islands at the same moment, which they deliberity leaked to the US, just to have the US carrierfleet away.
As for the Battle of the Bulge, Hitler insisted on using telephone in stead of radio for this attack. Must agree on your other points though.
Makes me think of Isaac Asimov's "The Machine That Won the War" story. It's about a supercomputer that makes all the decisions to be taken in the war against an extraterrestrial race and the leading general just flipping a coin to decide whether or not to follow the advise.
Guess that Napoleon was right when he exclaimed: I know he is a great general, but is he lucky?
So should the real turning point be: Luck?
Doesn't give a lot of honour to all those who died in war, but does "explain" how some battles are won against the odds.
Peter
Hohenstaufen

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Posted: Monday, November 17, 2008 - 06:16 PM UTC
The Germans themselves thought that the Battle of Britain was significant. When von Rundstedt was interviewed by the Russians after the war, he was asked which was the turning point. To their great disappointment (they expected him to say Stalingrad) he said the BoB. His justification was that without it what other battles would there have been?
With the UK out of the war, the USA would not have bothered with Europe at all, they would have dealt with Japan first if or when the attack came. It is not impossible that the US could have come to terms with Hitler, what if they had been supplying him with what he needed to defeat Russia? Many western politicians (Churchill included) were deeply suspicious of Russian motives, even after Hitler invaded Russia. Nor is it impossible that Britain having been invaded, could have supplied men & arms to help the fight against Bolshevism as did so many countries on the Continent. The main factor is that without Britain there would have been no "aircraft carrier" off the coast of France to launch an invasion from. There would have been no campaign in North Africa, so Hitler's oil supplies would have been ensured. No Greek campaign to slow him down in the summer of 1941. If Barbarossa had been launched 2 months earlier, as planned, it is almost certain that the Germans would have captured Moscow. With the capital gone, & also a major road & rail junction, Stalin may have been forced to sue for peace.
To turn to the Pacific, what if the Japanese had invaded Malaya, the Dutch East Indies etc, but NOT attacked Pearl Harbor? Would America still have fought in the Pacific?
Appeasement was a bit of a red herring, I don't believe that Chamberlain thought for a minute he was buying time to build up to fight Hitler; it would be a nice thought,but unlikely. Hitler's war was running to a timetable - Germany was virtually bankrupt in 1939, by overspending on rearmements. The Nazi "revolution" depended on continuous expansion, for only by seizing the assets of his neighbours could Hitlers economy continue to run. Indeed, Schacht, the head of the Reichsbank had resigned in protest at governments reckless spending. Hitler also knew that time was running out in the East. If he intended to invade Russia, as he made no secret of in Mein Kampf, he had to start by 1941. If he waited until 1942, the Russian army would be re-equipped, & over the disasterous effects of the purges of the late 30s.
No, if you want a turning point, the BoB does fine for me...
With the UK out of the war, the USA would not have bothered with Europe at all, they would have dealt with Japan first if or when the attack came. It is not impossible that the US could have come to terms with Hitler, what if they had been supplying him with what he needed to defeat Russia? Many western politicians (Churchill included) were deeply suspicious of Russian motives, even after Hitler invaded Russia. Nor is it impossible that Britain having been invaded, could have supplied men & arms to help the fight against Bolshevism as did so many countries on the Continent. The main factor is that without Britain there would have been no "aircraft carrier" off the coast of France to launch an invasion from. There would have been no campaign in North Africa, so Hitler's oil supplies would have been ensured. No Greek campaign to slow him down in the summer of 1941. If Barbarossa had been launched 2 months earlier, as planned, it is almost certain that the Germans would have captured Moscow. With the capital gone, & also a major road & rail junction, Stalin may have been forced to sue for peace.
To turn to the Pacific, what if the Japanese had invaded Malaya, the Dutch East Indies etc, but NOT attacked Pearl Harbor? Would America still have fought in the Pacific?
Appeasement was a bit of a red herring, I don't believe that Chamberlain thought for a minute he was buying time to build up to fight Hitler; it would be a nice thought,but unlikely. Hitler's war was running to a timetable - Germany was virtually bankrupt in 1939, by overspending on rearmements. The Nazi "revolution" depended on continuous expansion, for only by seizing the assets of his neighbours could Hitlers economy continue to run. Indeed, Schacht, the head of the Reichsbank had resigned in protest at governments reckless spending. Hitler also knew that time was running out in the East. If he intended to invade Russia, as he made no secret of in Mein Kampf, he had to start by 1941. If he waited until 1942, the Russian army would be re-equipped, & over the disasterous effects of the purges of the late 30s.
No, if you want a turning point, the BoB does fine for me...
RobinNilsson

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Posted: Monday, November 17, 2008 - 08:34 PM UTC
Quoted Text
@ Robin,
I admit that the British, French and Dutch were beaten easily by the Japanese, but that is not the point. You claimed they were out of the way at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and they were not. So at the moment of the attack, they were stil a uncertain gamble for the Japanese.
About the carriers: I don't say the Japanese would have won the war if they were sunk at Pearl Harbor, only that the US could fight back immediately, thus having the Japanese not being ready with creating ring of island fortresses they planned to stop the US.
Peter
The Dutch forces would most likely not be re-inforced since the homeland was overrun,
I don't believe there was much uncertainty in that gamble for the Japanese. I don't know
the status of the equipment available to the Dutch forces but I do not think they were on
such a scale as to be any real threat.
The British forces might be re-inforced but I believe that the Japanese gamble was fairly
safe in this repsect as well. Britain didn't have much to send since it was urgently needed
in Europe. Singapore was the only real obstacle but since it was built on the assumption
that the jungle in Malaya was impossible to penetrate with any force strong enough to attack Singapore and the Japanese generals knew that they could attack though the jungle I think that the gamble was fairly certain here as well.
The British Mediterranean fleet had shown the world (including Japan) what a bunch of rickety torpedo bombers could achieve against battleships (Taranto) so I think that Japan
was fairly certain of being able to handle the British fleet.
Taranto can be seen as the role model for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
What the Japanese war planners forgot to consider was the US capability of rearming, Taranto took the Italian fleet out of the war for quite some time, Italy wasn't able to replace lost ships quickly so the Italian fleet became a lot more cautious.
Looking at the Dutch East Indies fleet it can be argued that replacement of lost units was
virtually impossible.
/ Robin
RobinNilsson

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Posted: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 03:25 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Quoted Text
Chinese tactics in North Korea: Run straight ahead and yell, hoping that the enemy will
run out of bullets before he has killed all of the attackers.
Unless I have managed to completely misunderstand something I read somewhere ...
/ Robin
I wasn't there, but most of what I've read suggests Chinese tactics in Korea were primarily infiltration-based.
I was thinking of something I read somewhere.
Maybe this:
http://www.2id.org/may-massacre.htm
There is some interesting bits and pieces here as well:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=65904
/ Robin
Finch

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Posted: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 10:02 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Sure, the US was lucky at Midway, but the fact that there was a carrierbattle was good intelligence work. For the Japanese also attacked the Aleutian Islands at the same moment, which they deliberity leaked to the US, just to have the US carrierfleet away.
But the Japanese feint at the Aleutians was an obvious diversion. It didn't take intel geniuses to figure that out. I don't think the US Navy even considered sending carriers up that way. Why bother? We could afford to lose a few arctic islands.
It's also a good example of the muddled thinking going on in the Japanese command. If they wanted to lure major US units into a great fleet action - in order to eliminate them - then staging a diversion doesn't make a whole lot of sense. I am no naval expert (obviously) but it seems to me that the Japanese navy stepped on their own d*cks over and over because they had such overly-complex plans.
Stoottroeper

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Posted: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 11:39 AM UTC
Quoted Text
But the Japanese feint at the Aleutians was an obvious diversion. It didn't take intel geniuses to figure that out. I don't think the US Navy even considered sending carriers up that way. Why bother? We could afford to lose a few arctic islands.
It's also a good example of the muddled thinking going on in the Japanese command. If they wanted to lure major US units into a great fleet action - in order to eliminate them - then staging a diversion doesn't make a whole lot of sense. I am no naval expert (obviously) but it seems to me that the Japanese navy stepped on their own d*cks over and over because they had such overly-complex plans.
The attack on the Aleutians was indeed a obvious diversion, but the US leaked false infiormation about a broken watersupply at Midway, suggesting that Midway was easy prey as the defenders would die of dehydration in less then a week during a attack.
They not only had overly complex plans, they also had the problem of eager commanders who, in true samuraistyle, only thought of their own glory and ignored everything in the plan, and national strategy, whenever they thought it could earn them a moment of glory.RobinNilsson

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Posted: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 07:55 PM UTC
Quoted Text
Quoted Text
But the Japanese feint at the Aleutians was an obvious diversion. It didn't take intel geniuses to figure that out. I don't think the US Navy even considered sending carriers up that way. Why bother? We could afford to lose a few arctic islands.
It's also a good example of the muddled thinking going on in the Japanese command. If they wanted to lure major US units into a great fleet action - in order to eliminate them - then staging a diversion doesn't make a whole lot of sense. I am no naval expert (obviously) but it seems to me that the Japanese navy stepped on their own d*cks over and over because they had such overly-complex plans.
The attack on the Aleutians was indeed a obvious diversion, but the US leaked false infiormation about a broken watersupply at Midway, suggesting that Midway was easy prey as the defenders would die of dehydration in less then a week during a attack.
They not only had overly complex plans, they also had the problem of eager commanders who, in true samuraistyle, only thought of their own glory and ignored everything in the plan, and national strategy, whenever they thought it could earn them a moment of glory.
The misinformation about the water supply was leaked in order to be able to determine if Midway was indeed the target hiding behind the alias name used in the intercepted and deciphered Japanese signals. The US intelligence knew most of the important bits EXCEPT the target. Planting the misinformation about the water supply was only intended to lure the Japanese planners into confirming that the secret target had a water supply problem. It was probably not intended to lure the Japanese planners into thinking that Midway was an easy target, they already knew that it was if only the US fleet could be decoyed into being somewhere else. A screen of Japanese submarines was deployed to
detect if the US fleet moved towards Midway but I think the subs were forced to stay submerged by US aircraft patrolling the area.
Maybe the Japanese notion that they were superior to westerners tricked them into not keeping their eyes open for possible counter intelligence decoys. Isn't it suspicious that the intended target suddenly reports a problem at such a convenient time?
/ Robin
RobinNilsson

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Posted: Tuesday, November 18, 2008 - 08:00 PM UTC
Quoted Text
It's also a good example of the muddled thinking going on in the Japanese command. If they wanted to lure major US units into a great fleet action - in order to eliminate them - then staging a diversion doesn't make a whole lot of sense. I am no naval expert (obviously) but it seems to me that the Japanese navy stepped on their own d*cks over and over because they had such overly-complex plans.
Maybe they wanted to take Midway and be able to use it BEFORE the intended annihilation battle with the US fleet. I don't remember if it was Midway or some other operation where the Japanese plan was to have their aircraft shuttling between their carriers and some airfield on some island (or was it shuttling between two carrier groups ??).
It could still be that the Japanese planning was indeed overcomplicated.
/ Robin
Hohenstaufen

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Posted: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 05:59 PM UTC
At Singapore, the Japanese were on their last legs by the time the British surrendered, this is why Yamashita pressed Percival so hard on the point at the surrender talks. If Percival had not surrendered, the Japanese would have had to retreat. They could not believe their luck when a numerically superior force surrendered to them.
I'm not sure how important Midway is as a turning point, for the first time the Japanese were outfought, & it became clear that in the long run they wouldn't win, but that was never on the cards anyway. Yamamato knew this even while he was planning the Pearl Harbor attack. It could be argued that the tirning point was Pearl Harbor, because by bringing the US into the war, it ensured the Axis powers would be defeated eventually.
Henk's point about the Battle of the Atlantic is well taken, but it didn't really start in earnest until after the Battle of britain was won, because Germany was chronically short of U boats. When you consider that when the war started in 1939, Donitz stated that he had only about half a dozen boats that could sustain the Atlantic conditions, the others were too small with too short a range, it would take Germany over a year before they could mount a sustained attack on British shipping. In addition it was the acquisition of the French naval bases on the Atlantic coast, particularly in the Bay of Biscay that made such an offensive possible.
The "victory" of the battle of Britain was not that the British shot down more planes than the Germans (this wasn't true anyway, losses in aircraft were much closer than is generally realised, & both sides overstated enemy losses, although British claims were not as fantastical as Luftwaffe ones), but simply that the RAF survived the onslaught, denying the Luftwaffe even localised air superiority over southern England, without which the invasion was impossible. Had the RAF been destroyed in the air, I'm not sure how effective the RN would have been in the narrow Channel, the lessons of Taranto, Pearl Harbor & Force Z show that air power was the way of the future.
I'm not sure how important Midway is as a turning point, for the first time the Japanese were outfought, & it became clear that in the long run they wouldn't win, but that was never on the cards anyway. Yamamato knew this even while he was planning the Pearl Harbor attack. It could be argued that the tirning point was Pearl Harbor, because by bringing the US into the war, it ensured the Axis powers would be defeated eventually.
Henk's point about the Battle of the Atlantic is well taken, but it didn't really start in earnest until after the Battle of britain was won, because Germany was chronically short of U boats. When you consider that when the war started in 1939, Donitz stated that he had only about half a dozen boats that could sustain the Atlantic conditions, the others were too small with too short a range, it would take Germany over a year before they could mount a sustained attack on British shipping. In addition it was the acquisition of the French naval bases on the Atlantic coast, particularly in the Bay of Biscay that made such an offensive possible.
The "victory" of the battle of Britain was not that the British shot down more planes than the Germans (this wasn't true anyway, losses in aircraft were much closer than is generally realised, & both sides overstated enemy losses, although British claims were not as fantastical as Luftwaffe ones), but simply that the RAF survived the onslaught, denying the Luftwaffe even localised air superiority over southern England, without which the invasion was impossible. Had the RAF been destroyed in the air, I'm not sure how effective the RN would have been in the narrow Channel, the lessons of Taranto, Pearl Harbor & Force Z show that air power was the way of the future.
RobinNilsson

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Posted: Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 08:33 PM UTC
Quoted Text
.
The "victory" of the battle of Britain was not that the British shot down more planes than the Germans (this wasn't true anyway, losses in aircraft were much closer than is generally realised, & both sides overstated enemy losses, although British claims were not as fantastical as Luftwaffe ones), but simply that the RAF survived the onslaught, denying the Luftwaffe even localised air superiority over southern England, without which the invasion was impossible. Had the RAF been destroyed in the air, I'm not sure how effective the RN would have been in the narrow Channel, the lessons of Taranto, Pearl Harbor & Force Z show that air power was the way of the future.
One major advantage for RAF was that the battle was fought "near" their airfields while Luftwaffe had to cross the Channel. A shot down plane where the pilot survived in a "re-usable" state still meant a lost pilot to the Luftwaffe while it "only" meant a lost aircraft for the RAF. A plane forced down to an emergency landing was a lost aircraft and lost pilot for Luftwaffe while it was a recovery job for RAF.
Another , ahem, "turning point" in the Battle of Britain was when Hitler (Göring??) ordered
the Luftwaffe to switch from hitting airfields and radar installations to bombing cities.
It makes a huge difference if your airfields are being attacked or not.
As for turning points in general: I maintain my intial view that I don't really beleive in the concept. For a single battle yes, for a whole war no.
/ Robin
LuckyBlunder

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Posted: Tuesday, December 02, 2008 - 09:53 PM UTC
This is indeed a very interesting discussion.
I used to believe in a turning point description of WW 2. Battle of Britain, Stalingrad/Kursk, El Alamein, Midway/Guadalcanal.
I have revised my thinking somewhat as my studies progressed. The Battle of Britain brought on two things: Hitler's turn to the east and Japan's eventual attack on Pearl Harbor. He was now facing a nation with virtually unlimited manpower and a nation that had the largest industrial capacity in history. Once the Red Army began to organize and operate on a sound military basis (Stalin listened to his generals and stopped trying to defend every foot) and the US industrial engine was geared up, Hitler's war was over. Only a colossal set of blunders on the part of the Allies could have allowed an Axis victory.
So, I have reached, not a conclusion but a basis for opinion. The two key points in the war were The Battle of Britain because it bought time and secured the strategic British Isles for later offensive against Germany, and the attack on Pearl Harbor which so enraged the US that complete military and industrial mobilization was easily, and rather quickly, accomplished. It also allowed the ready acceptance of the doctrine of unconditional surrender.
One other battle that might be mentioned is Moscow. The first time the German Army had been stopped in a major offensive. This was before significant aid had reached Russia and proved that the Russians could stop the Germans.
I prefer the word "key battle" to "turning point".
Just my thoughts.
I used to believe in a turning point description of WW 2. Battle of Britain, Stalingrad/Kursk, El Alamein, Midway/Guadalcanal.
I have revised my thinking somewhat as my studies progressed. The Battle of Britain brought on two things: Hitler's turn to the east and Japan's eventual attack on Pearl Harbor. He was now facing a nation with virtually unlimited manpower and a nation that had the largest industrial capacity in history. Once the Red Army began to organize and operate on a sound military basis (Stalin listened to his generals and stopped trying to defend every foot) and the US industrial engine was geared up, Hitler's war was over. Only a colossal set of blunders on the part of the Allies could have allowed an Axis victory.
So, I have reached, not a conclusion but a basis for opinion. The two key points in the war were The Battle of Britain because it bought time and secured the strategic British Isles for later offensive against Germany, and the attack on Pearl Harbor which so enraged the US that complete military and industrial mobilization was easily, and rather quickly, accomplished. It also allowed the ready acceptance of the doctrine of unconditional surrender.
One other battle that might be mentioned is Moscow. The first time the German Army had been stopped in a major offensive. This was before significant aid had reached Russia and proved that the Russians could stop the Germans.
I prefer the word "key battle" to "turning point".
Just my thoughts.
youngc

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Posted: Tuesday, December 02, 2008 - 11:02 PM UTC
Quoted Text
At Singapore, the Japanese were on their last legs by the time the British surrendered, this is why Yamashita pressed Percival so hard on the point at the surrender talks. If Percival had not surrendered, the Japanese would have had to retreat. They could not believe their luck when a numerically superior force surrendered to them.
From the start I believe that the Japanese disregarded Percival's numerical superiority. Throughout the whole campaign, the disciplined, well led, well trained Japanese had outfought the British, Australian and Indian troops.
Once the Type 95 tanks had penetrated the Bukit Timah road I don't think the allies had any chance of holding Singapore. The level of confusion, desertion, lack of water, intensity of Japanese bombings etc. was simply too great for any allied victory to be possible. Sure, there were some units that fought to keep the Japanese at bay, and at best, Singapore may have been able to hold out for an extra week or two had surrender not occurred when it did.
I don't want to turn this into a huge debate about Singapore, as that would deviate from the original topic. I just felt this needed to be said
Steve, thanks for the input, I agree with the points you have made.
Drader

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Posted: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 - 12:44 AM UTC
Quoted Text
At Singapore, the Japanese were on their last legs by the time the British surrendered, this is why Yamashita pressed Percival so hard on the point at the surrender talks. If Percival had not surrendered, the Japanese would have had to retreat. They could not believe their luck when a numerically superior force surrendered to them.
Not true, Yamashita would simply have waited for reinforcements in the way that Homma had to in the Philippines. This would have been a personal embarrassment for him, but wouldn't have changed the outcome in any way. Evaluating the numbers on either side is tricky, but even if we did have numerical superiority it meant nothing in the face of the fact that the Japanese deployed the equivalent of an armoured division and had total control of the air. If this isn't enough, fighting through Singapore would have led to civilian casualties on the level of Stalingrad, and no British general would have gone for that option.
Of course the Japanese massacred tens of thousands of Chinese after the surrender, but that was standard business with them.
David
Posted: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 - 01:34 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Had the RAF been destroyed in the air, I'm not sure how effective the RN would have been in the narrow Channel, the lessons of Taranto, Pearl Harbor & Force Z show that air power was the way of the future.
Whilst air power was of course the way of the future, the Channel would have been a different type of battle from the ones mentioned. The channel would not have been a naval battle per se, as the RN could have simply attacked the German Invasion Fleet with raiding MTB's and such. It would not be nesseccary to fight a decisive battle with Battle ships and such, as the only objective would have been the disruption of the Invasion. Without a reliable means to supply the troops that the German Army might have brought across, no invasion could have succeeded. Air lift would have had to rely on airfields, which could have been sabotaged by the home guard, and air drops can not support a full scale invasion.
look at the troubles that the Allies had supplying the Beach head in Normandy. The Allies had air and naval supperiority, in numbers that the Germans could have only dreamed of. But when the Mulberry Harbour was damaged in the storm, it put the invasion under serious stress.
The invading Allies were aided by the local populace, and the Germans sabotaged. This made defending France (and eventually Belgium and Holland) much more difficult and resource sapping. Unless the British population, as well as the Government and Army, would have capitulated as a whole, the German Army would have had to fight for, and heavily defend, every inch of British soil. Without an undisputed supply route, this would have been untenable.
The Normandy invasion, and the enormous logistical effort following it (try to organise a 'Red Ball Express' today...) illustrate perfectly why, in many ways, Pearl Harbour was a 'turning point'. It brought the United States Industrial power into the war, plus a determination to fight till the end, not just regaining a few pacific islands... Not withstanding the enormous sacrifices of the Red Army, without the industrial might of the US, the Second World War would have lasted a lot longer.
LuckyBlunder

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Posted: Wednesday, December 03, 2008 - 09:31 PM UTC
Henk -
Your points are well made.
It seems to be accepted thought that the invasion of England would have been a forgone conclusion if the RAF had been forced to withdraw from the southeast area.
What little I've been able to learn about the plans for Sea Lion indicate that they intended to transport troops on barges towed by tugboats and small transports. You mention the Brits attacking with MTB's. I think the Royal Navy would have sent destroyers. It's true that the Luftwaffe would have established local air superiority but that wouldn't have been very effective at night. Could you imagine what a destroyer would have done in the middle of a convoy of barges - at night??
I believe the British would have launched one of the most savage attacks in history. It would have been a blood bath. And if the Germans did succeed in establishing themselves ashore, their supply would have been a nightmare.
It is a situation similiar to the attempts of the Japanese to keep their troops on Guadalcanal supplied and reinforced, although in a much more compact area and against a more powerfull navy.
I'm not certain what the effect would have been on the US. At that time there was still a large, vocal, and politically powerful isolationist movement, although Roosevelt would certainly have done everything he could to aid Britain. And what would Stalin have thought? Would he have forseen that it was possible he was going to face Hitler alone on the continent, or would he have aided Britain in some way in order to keep the German wolf occupied?
Interesting questions.
Your points are well made.
It seems to be accepted thought that the invasion of England would have been a forgone conclusion if the RAF had been forced to withdraw from the southeast area.
What little I've been able to learn about the plans for Sea Lion indicate that they intended to transport troops on barges towed by tugboats and small transports. You mention the Brits attacking with MTB's. I think the Royal Navy would have sent destroyers. It's true that the Luftwaffe would have established local air superiority but that wouldn't have been very effective at night. Could you imagine what a destroyer would have done in the middle of a convoy of barges - at night??
I believe the British would have launched one of the most savage attacks in history. It would have been a blood bath. And if the Germans did succeed in establishing themselves ashore, their supply would have been a nightmare.
It is a situation similiar to the attempts of the Japanese to keep their troops on Guadalcanal supplied and reinforced, although in a much more compact area and against a more powerfull navy.
I'm not certain what the effect would have been on the US. At that time there was still a large, vocal, and politically powerful isolationist movement, although Roosevelt would certainly have done everything he could to aid Britain. And what would Stalin have thought? Would he have forseen that it was possible he was going to face Hitler alone on the continent, or would he have aided Britain in some way in order to keep the German wolf occupied?
Interesting questions.
russamotto

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Posted: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 - 02:56 AM UTC
This is an interesting topic. All kinds of room for issues to be brought up. As far as Pearl Harbor being the turning point, there was a British naval officer (sorry, I lost his name and the specific reference, it was in an American Heritage magazine) who in the late 1920s wrote a fictional work on the predicted war between Japan and the United States. It described a Japaneese attack on the American Pacific Fleet which was predicted to be station in the Phillipines, using a new weapon, the aircraft carrier. He even predicted a torpedo plane attack. He did expect that Japaneese battleships would finish off the American ships in Manila Bay.
He then anticipated the other Japaneese attacks. Guam would fall after the water supply was disabled. Wake would be overwhelmed. Japan would set up an extended defensive ring around the Pacif by occupying most of the island groups. But in the end, the industrial capacity of the United States would win the war.
The book was not very popular and did not sell well at all. Except in Japan, where it was printed (without copyright), minus the last chapter, and used as a military textbook. Japaneese fighting spirit expected that humiliation brought by defeat would lead to the United States conceding its losses to Japan, similar to the war with Russia.
The turning point of WWII could therefore be said to have occurred at the moment Japan decided to begin planning an attack on the United States, over 10 years before it occurred, because it set Japan on the course of a war it could not win.
Revisionist history takes over at this point, asking to many "what if" questions. What if Hitler had ordered the Luftwaffe to continue to concentrate on British airfields during the BOB? As already mentioned, it was the decistion to bomb cities that allowed the RAF to recover enought to continue the fight and win the battle. What if Hitler had allowed his generals to conduct the war themselves instead of micromanaging their battles and being so inflexible? And what if Russian winters had been mild? It was the cold weather that stopped the German army oustide of Moscow more than Russian guns. What would just a few more weeks of good weather have allowed? Luck (or providence) turned the tide of battle on many occasions as well, such as already mentioned in the BOB and Midway. I think that in WWII, the end was determined more by the beginning than any thing else. Both Germany and Japan took on more than they could master. They were both destined to lose.
He then anticipated the other Japaneese attacks. Guam would fall after the water supply was disabled. Wake would be overwhelmed. Japan would set up an extended defensive ring around the Pacif by occupying most of the island groups. But in the end, the industrial capacity of the United States would win the war.
The book was not very popular and did not sell well at all. Except in Japan, where it was printed (without copyright), minus the last chapter, and used as a military textbook. Japaneese fighting spirit expected that humiliation brought by defeat would lead to the United States conceding its losses to Japan, similar to the war with Russia.
The turning point of WWII could therefore be said to have occurred at the moment Japan decided to begin planning an attack on the United States, over 10 years before it occurred, because it set Japan on the course of a war it could not win.
Revisionist history takes over at this point, asking to many "what if" questions. What if Hitler had ordered the Luftwaffe to continue to concentrate on British airfields during the BOB? As already mentioned, it was the decistion to bomb cities that allowed the RAF to recover enought to continue the fight and win the battle. What if Hitler had allowed his generals to conduct the war themselves instead of micromanaging their battles and being so inflexible? And what if Russian winters had been mild? It was the cold weather that stopped the German army oustide of Moscow more than Russian guns. What would just a few more weeks of good weather have allowed? Luck (or providence) turned the tide of battle on many occasions as well, such as already mentioned in the BOB and Midway. I think that in WWII, the end was determined more by the beginning than any thing else. Both Germany and Japan took on more than they could master. They were both destined to lose.
telsono

Member Since: March 27, 2007
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Posted: Wednesday, December 24, 2008 - 11:51 AM UTC
There are many factors to consider that can be attributed to making turning points. I'll throw some comments below on facts that need to be seen alongside the outcomes of battles.
The 300,000 troops saved at Dunkirk were massively important. Even with those troops, at the time of Normandy the British started to dismantle divisions to supply reinforcements. That little island was not rich in population, especially with operations in North Africa/Med, the CBI and the Pacific.
As to Seelowe, one study in the 1970's suggested that the Germans would have to strip the whole of occupied western Europe of motorized transport (civilian and military) to supply this force. Even with an less than effective RAF, the RN could have held the Germans back. An effective invasion would not a great quantity of motorized transport that the Germans did not possess. Most German leg units depended alot on horses for transport needs. WWII is noted as the war that horses where used in the greatest numbers for military service, Mostly in the transport mode. Air control by the British because of BoB just empasized the disaster that would occur because of these other factors. Even if the Salisbury Plains were occupied by the Germans Devon/Cornwall, Wales and the Scotish Low and Highlands would be idea areas to hold out. Remember what Macchiaveli said about fighting mountiain people in their homes, "Don't!".
One side effect of the Battles of Midway, Coral Sea and Guadalcanal besides the loss of the aircraft carriers was the destruction of the core trained pilots in the Japanese Navy. Their training practices was overly selective resulting with not enough trained pilots in the replacement pipeline. Allied pilots became more and more effective asthey held the training edge and eventually the equipment edge.
Barbarossa was delayed so that the Yugoslavia intrigues and Italian bumbled campaign in Greece could be rectified. Giving a solid shoulder to the upcoming campaign, but at the same time delaying it so that "General Winter" came to the aid of the Soviets.
The early losses in the Pacific may have been a blessing in disguise for the Allies, spreading out Japanese troops more thinly to hold occupied territory while the Allies could plan and concentrate their forces for the retaking of these territores. With the Japanese Imperial Army pinned in China with occupation duties, the ineffectiveness of the two Chinese armies has already been discussed, less troops were available to serve in other theaters.
Italy was resource poor, unless they didn't try to expand but send competent geologist to Libya to discover the oil potential there. Mussolini's vanity was his own downfall with an army tired of almost a decade of constant warfare and an industrial complex not able to fulfill the needs of its military with modern and effective equipment. Mussloini was more of a help to the Allies than he was a help to Hitler with his ill planned campaigns and military adventures.
Mike T.
The 300,000 troops saved at Dunkirk were massively important. Even with those troops, at the time of Normandy the British started to dismantle divisions to supply reinforcements. That little island was not rich in population, especially with operations in North Africa/Med, the CBI and the Pacific.
As to Seelowe, one study in the 1970's suggested that the Germans would have to strip the whole of occupied western Europe of motorized transport (civilian and military) to supply this force. Even with an less than effective RAF, the RN could have held the Germans back. An effective invasion would not a great quantity of motorized transport that the Germans did not possess. Most German leg units depended alot on horses for transport needs. WWII is noted as the war that horses where used in the greatest numbers for military service, Mostly in the transport mode. Air control by the British because of BoB just empasized the disaster that would occur because of these other factors. Even if the Salisbury Plains were occupied by the Germans Devon/Cornwall, Wales and the Scotish Low and Highlands would be idea areas to hold out. Remember what Macchiaveli said about fighting mountiain people in their homes, "Don't!".
One side effect of the Battles of Midway, Coral Sea and Guadalcanal besides the loss of the aircraft carriers was the destruction of the core trained pilots in the Japanese Navy. Their training practices was overly selective resulting with not enough trained pilots in the replacement pipeline. Allied pilots became more and more effective asthey held the training edge and eventually the equipment edge.
Barbarossa was delayed so that the Yugoslavia intrigues and Italian bumbled campaign in Greece could be rectified. Giving a solid shoulder to the upcoming campaign, but at the same time delaying it so that "General Winter" came to the aid of the Soviets.
The early losses in the Pacific may have been a blessing in disguise for the Allies, spreading out Japanese troops more thinly to hold occupied territory while the Allies could plan and concentrate their forces for the retaking of these territores. With the Japanese Imperial Army pinned in China with occupation duties, the ineffectiveness of the two Chinese armies has already been discussed, less troops were available to serve in other theaters.
Italy was resource poor, unless they didn't try to expand but send competent geologist to Libya to discover the oil potential there. Mussolini's vanity was his own downfall with an army tired of almost a decade of constant warfare and an industrial complex not able to fulfill the needs of its military with modern and effective equipment. Mussloini was more of a help to the Allies than he was a help to Hitler with his ill planned campaigns and military adventures.
Mike T.
B24Liberator

Member Since: November 07, 2008
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Posted: Thursday, January 15, 2009 - 02:24 PM UTC
Interesting topic with many Theatres of war & campaigns used as examples. Chas, would the phrase "hIgh water mark" be more appropriate? For example, the high water mark of the Russian campaign was Stalingrad, afterwhich the Germans steadily withdrew.
Certainly, there were several more battles to fight and campaigns to be won, but from that point onward, the Germans fought a defensive battle. The same goes for the Japanese at Midway.
Interesting angle on the BoB. My take on the Germans was that El Alamein was their tipping point (or high water mark) against the U.K., after which the U.K. was able to take comand of the battlefield and go on the offensive for good. The U.K. prevented the Germans from invading Great Britian, but could not stop the German advance elswhere until 1942.
Thanks for bringing up an intersting subject and allowing the sharing of ideas!
youngc

Member Since: June 05, 2007
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Posted: Friday, January 16, 2009 - 01:47 PM UTC
Hi Johannes,
Glad you are finding the thread enjoyable.
As you all know, I started it in response to the over-used statement "This was a turning point of the war..." by both amateur and professional historians. I find it particularly annoying when newspaper reporters use it. Coupled with clinches and other weak sayings, it makes me cringe! (A few days ago there was a brief TV news report on the HMAS Sydney, they showed digital reproduction footage of the sinking. Their conclusion was that "they didn't stand a chance", wow, how obvious).
"High water mark" or "tipping points" sounds better, both reflect that every battle flows and effects the next, determining an outcome.
Chas
Glad you are finding the thread enjoyable.
As you all know, I started it in response to the over-used statement "This was a turning point of the war..." by both amateur and professional historians. I find it particularly annoying when newspaper reporters use it. Coupled with clinches and other weak sayings, it makes me cringe! (A few days ago there was a brief TV news report on the HMAS Sydney, they showed digital reproduction footage of the sinking. Their conclusion was that "they didn't stand a chance", wow, how obvious).
"High water mark" or "tipping points" sounds better, both reflect that every battle flows and effects the next, determining an outcome.
Chas
Eaglewatch

Member Since: December 19, 2008
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Posted: Friday, January 16, 2009 - 04:06 PM UTC
about turning points look at Dunkirk if the germans had come across the channal straight after us they'd have had no problem knocking us out but instead they didn't and that short respite allowed us time to mobilize
padawan_82

Member Since: December 10, 2008
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Posted: Saturday, January 17, 2009 - 01:15 PM UTC
hey chas have you ever read the books what if and more what if edited by Robert Cowley? they explore some turning points in history by saying what if such and such happened this way or some one did this etc... it's really interesting stuff.
youngc

Member Since: June 05, 2007
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Posted: Saturday, January 17, 2009 - 08:55 PM UTC
Quoted Text
about turning points look at Dunkirk if the germans had come across the channal straight after us they'd have had no problem knocking us out but instead they didn't and that short respite allowed us time to mobilize![]()
Did the Germans have the capacity to 'come across the channel' immediately after Dunkirk, without suffering heavy losses? I think most would agree the answer is no.
As I understand it, the Battle of Britain was fought to eliminate British airpower, and subsequently Royal Naval presence in the channel. Had the Germans came across straight after Dunkirk, chances are that British aircraft and naval power would've stopped them in their tracks.
However, the fact that the BEF was able to escape from France can certainly be considered a "tipping point" toward the final Allied victory.
Quoted Text
hey chas have you ever read the books what if and more what if edited by Robert Cowley? they explore some turning points in history by saying what if such and such happened this way or some one did this etc... it's really interesting stuff.
No, I haven't. Although I don't like speculative history, this could be interesting (could provide me with further arguments against the turning point theory!
)Thanks for telling me about it though, Ant.
Chas
B24Liberator

Member Since: November 07, 2008
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Posted: Sunday, January 18, 2009 - 01:40 AM UTC
Yes Chas is correct. Also, it must be noted that the Germans were surprised at their own success. I believe Rommel had over extended his supply lines by the time he reached Dunkirk, and had to stop.
In some book (can't remember the title), the author stated that Hitler had hope to negotiate with Britian after the fall of France, and create a seperate peace. He never fully intended to invade England, as his primary objective in his grand strategy was to invade the Soviet Union. Once he discovered Churchill's resolve in the matter, he ordered his staff to 'ramp up' for Operation Sea Lion. All this took time for redeployment of forces and figuring out logistics, etc.
The Battle of Britian was (and still is in my humble opinion) one of the most remarkable pages in 20th Century History. The western world should be forever gratefull for their courage and fortitude. They truly stood alone during the later part of 1940. Had Germany kept up the bombing of the airfields as well as a steady blockade, who knows what would have happened? It most certainly would have legnthened the war.
In some book (can't remember the title), the author stated that Hitler had hope to negotiate with Britian after the fall of France, and create a seperate peace. He never fully intended to invade England, as his primary objective in his grand strategy was to invade the Soviet Union. Once he discovered Churchill's resolve in the matter, he ordered his staff to 'ramp up' for Operation Sea Lion. All this took time for redeployment of forces and figuring out logistics, etc.
The Battle of Britian was (and still is in my humble opinion) one of the most remarkable pages in 20th Century History. The western world should be forever gratefull for their courage and fortitude. They truly stood alone during the later part of 1940. Had Germany kept up the bombing of the airfields as well as a steady blockade, who knows what would have happened? It most certainly would have legnthened the war.
Stoottroeper

Member Since: June 10, 2007
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Posted: Monday, January 19, 2009 - 01:06 PM UTC
Some years ago I read a book about the political backgrounds in WWII, I'll try to find the title(got the book somewhere).
In this book, it was suggested that Rudolf Hess was acting on Hitlers orders to go to Churchill and offer a peace. The conditions would be that Germany would give up all conquests in the West (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, Denmark and Norwayare not allways considered as "Western" but as "Scandinavian", so I'mnot sure whether these were included) in exchange for (a free hand in) Eastern Europe and Russia. Mr. Churchill was completely against this, for as an English politician (with a tradition of 300 years of balancing politics on the European continent) could not allow the creation of a continental superpower.
In this book, it was suggested that Rudolf Hess was acting on Hitlers orders to go to Churchill and offer a peace. The conditions would be that Germany would give up all conquests in the West (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France, Denmark and Norwayare not allways considered as "Western" but as "Scandinavian", so I'mnot sure whether these were included) in exchange for (a free hand in) Eastern Europe and Russia. Mr. Churchill was completely against this, for as an English politician (with a tradition of 300 years of balancing politics on the European continent) could not allow the creation of a continental superpower.
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