I wonder how he thought he could defend the Philippines from Japan. Its either arrogance or vanity, I can't decide... maybe both.

I would agree that the Macarthur mystique was largely manufactured, at least as far as the Philippines era is concerned. I personally was taken back by the almost god-like regard that he commands there with many of the locals, even to this day.
Upon visiting the island of Corriegedor, one is almost immediately confronted with a 15 foot statue of him waving goodbye ( placed at the location where he stepped into the PT-Boat and was evacuated from the islands )
His performance during the invasion: spotty at least. As for his plan to utilize his long-range air assets to counter the projected invasion force in Formosa, that had a flaw in that it's execution would have required real-time approval from the upper echelon, perhaps even the White House. Unlikely to occur in a timely fashion, even without the temporary Pearl Harbor paralysis. He never would have been given the authority to carry this out - before the fact. This left him with "Plan Orange" a combination of the "Alamo" and the "Maginot Line". Hopeless without eventual naval support and re-supply. While it is true he did accurately predict Lingayen Gulf as the opposing force point of entry, no capital assets were deployed to counter this. This left Manila defences to the fixed fortifications, idle "sitting duck" air assets and soon to be starving infantry. Interestingly, the most effective defensive measure was decades old, the Fort Drum "Concrete Battleship" sitting in Manila Bay, it continued it's fire up until 5 minutes before the ordered surrender.,,, As for his constant obsession with returning to the Philippines ? Well, it's widely believed down there that he did own a large part of the San Miguel Beer Company.

Hello -

Yes, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was a contraversial figure of the 20th Cent. There was no in between with him. You either loved him, or hated him. As far as Generals go - they all have egos to one degree or another, otherwise they wouldn't be there. They're paid to win.
Years ago, I tried to read Manchester's book "American Ceasar" , but just couldn't get past the 2nd chapter. I found a more balanced account of MacArthur when I picked up the book written by Geoffrey Perret "Old Soldiers Never Die" (1996). It's a warts & all type book which I found to be fascinating read, which also provides more in-depth backround of other famous figures around him as well. One gets a better picture of him, the times and others around him without 'devolving' into a demonography. I try to search out books, DVD's where the author, producer does not have an ax to grind or a left-right wing agenda.

I'd also recomend picking up any book regarding Gen. Kenney. He was responsible not only for winning MacArthur over to the virtues of airpower, but helped form the S.W. Pacifics version of 'island hopping' using airpower in lieu of ships.

Yes, both the Japanese & Phillipinos have a high regard for Gen. MacArthur. In both cases he successfully argued their case for either rescue or rehabilitation.

Tom, as it happens I received a copy of The coldest winter this past Christmas. I haven't done much more than flip through it yet. My library is like my stash of kits, always something I want to do but life gets in the way. Michael, I think you're right about Patton being a good subordinate and I think that trait makes for a good boss. Also the fact that Patton worked with what he was given, both in terms of people and assignments is evidence that Patton put winning the war ahead of his own (not inconsiderable) goals. Patrick, a brewery? I never heard that before. I know that as a monday morning quarterback I now have the advantage of hindsight but something still says that to have your fall-back supply dumps over-run before you can fall back on them is not something a good commander allows to happen.

OK, Macarthur was a brilliant politician but as a general only produced one memorable military result and that was the gamble to attack Inchon in the Korean war.
He was inept in the handling of the Phillipines campaign and used the press to set himself up (Dugout Doug) so that they had to safely whisk him away when in reality he should have gone down with his troops.
He was a Chateau General in the truest sense and his behaviour during the New Guinea campaign is unforgiveable (as is the Australian General Blamey). He had no idea of the situation (a bit hard to gather from brisbane a few thousand Kilometeres and anoth country away but still felt he could dictate tactics to the men on the ground based on a false assumption that there was a narrow gap in the Owen Stanleys that could not be bypassed and easily defended.
He berated and denigrated the Brave Australians who fought a brilliant rearguard across the Owen Stanleys and at Milne bay where they inflicted the first campaign defeat on the Japanese on land in the war. When he actually did get off his shiny 5 sar (Hotel - not rank) backside and actuially visit the war he rarely left the most luxurious accomodation although carefully manipulated the press coverage to indicate he was leading from the front.
He deliberately kept seasoned and elite Australian Troops out of the Phillipines and the planned invasion of Japan due to his ego which was reinforced later in the Korean War where he pulled the Commonwealth Brigade back afterthey entered Pongyang after being the Vanguard of the UN advance so that he could put US troops in.
Macarthur carefully controlled the media so that only HIS press releases were ever issued and always portraying HIM in a great light leading from the front. If the press critiscised him they had their credentials removed or in the case of Chester Wilmott the famous and highly regarded Australian Correspondent were removed to another theatre becasue he wrote a letter to the Australian PM informing of the REAL situation.
Macarthur then went on to repeat most of this in Korea and tried (unsuccessfully to remove naysayers in the Commonwelath Command who were extremely critical of his performance. He had no coherant strategy to withdraw back down the Korean Penninsula and relied on the Commonwealth Brigade to conduct a valuable fighting rearguard whilst his command "Bugged Out"
I would recommend reading any of the Australian Titles on Kokoda / New Guinea and particularly Paul ham and Lex Macauleys titles. Also the book "Last Call of the Bugle " about Korea. They portray macarthur in his true light.
I believe it was Eisenhower who commented that Macarthur should not have been promoted but court martialled for his conduct in the Phillipines for dereliction of duty.
He didn't even follow the orders he was given

Rant over
Al

I suggest.

Hind sight being twenty-twenty and all that, There was a lotta reasons why Marshall and FDR kept him on the job. We needed a general at the time who knew the region better then anyone else we had. After the war he helped put the world together. Look into that part of history and the Japanese were in debt to him, he was a demi-god to them.

I have read that the defence of the Philippene Islands didn't actually start until after MacArthur was removed and Wainwright was put in charge. His "reaching for the bible" instead of getting his defences ready was a pr statement. He was kept in the Pacific because he was high in the favors of the Republican party, and a threat to FDR. I don't know if he knew how to work the press, or if it was the press working him. Maybe both. You don't just toss a general of his stature aside like you would a Short or an admiral Kimmel.

The island hopping strategy was a compromise. FDR determined that the war in the Pacific was big enough to allow for separate Army and Navy plans to attack the Japanese. As a face saving gesture, the Philippenes had to be retaken. As a tactical threat, they also had to be eliminated. They were too valuable to Japan for resources, and too important as a staging area for the anticipated invasion of Japan.

A simple but enlightening insight into the issues in the PI can be had in "They were expendable." Japan's victory in the Philippenes was a foregone conclusion, but the defence could have been managed much better. Lack of communication, lack of coordination, loss of critical supplies, Japanese intelligence of the military installations all played a major factor in how the battle shaped out.

After WWI British general Haig was a hero, one of the greatest military minds. Now, his tactics are condemned and he is considered incompetent. The perspective of time changes the view of a lot of generals. Was Monty good or just fortunate to take over when the fortunes of war were changing overall? Was Bradley capable as a general or just politically correct? There are many others to consider. Some subjects are far more sensitive than others. Who would you rather fight under? MacArthur? Holland Smith? Alexander? Rommel? I can only hope and wish that the lessons that needed to be learned have been learned and won't be repeated again.