I've heard it said that the loss ratio of the Panther vs the Sherman was 5 to 1, 5 Shermans lost for every Panther. I doubt the Pz IV would have as high a loss ratio. Without digging out the stats it seems the Panther has the edge in every category, except possibly number built.

The suspension was just fine and basically the only one that could do the job back then. The germans actually tried others but if you want a huge travel (> 500mm) and a low nick rate (< 30) than this is basically the only way to go. And many "claims" on the Internet about the maintenance problems of the torsion bars are blarney. The suspension was within the hull and therefor quite well protected and the suspension bars where good for > 10.000km

The gear reducer (Vorgelege) was the one weak point that could not be fixed without a new gearbox or switching to the one used in the Tiger. The latter was stopped by decree of the lil Painter since it would have required a production stop. The former was under way in late 1944 and prototypes where tested.

The engine had teething problems but the switch to the HL230 fixed those. These problems where due to the rushed introduction. The problem was solved and the HL234 was looking quite good

@Spongya:

Well your sources seem to be rather second rate when you claim a few museum pieces was all the French operated. Actually a few BATALLIONS are more correct.

And AMX-30 / Leopard I (There's not much difference since they are both MBT-60 derivates) where quite successful during their days.

But stick to your sources. I won't take them too serious.

Apples and oranges. You can't take a single tank (M4 Ronson) and compare it to a decade worth of tank series. How big is the chance to swap parts between an M3 and M4 and M24 and a T26? THAT would be the equivalent of swapping parts between a PIV and a PV.

Your M4 example was swapping between a Panther D and a Panther G or between a PIV-D and a PIV-H. That could be done in the german army as well.


As for the rest: The tanks where as complex as they needed to be. Germany could not afford to waste 70 man to take out three enemy tanks holding a village so they had to build complex tanks that could survive. Other nations could wast the man so they could build simple tanks that died. In the end "quantity had a quality of it's own" but the germans never had enough crew to take that approach.

I would definately treat the "kill ratio" thing with a giant grain of salt. I hear people say all the time it took X number of Sherman's to kill a Tiger or a Panther. But then I look at the actual loss records and find the German's lost more tanks than the western allies did. How does that compute? And it is not too hard to find records of engagements where Panther's and Tiger's were absolutely trounced by Sherman's too so it is all so much nonsense. Way too much fuss is made about tanks fighting other tanks. I know people like to fixate on hot tank-on-tank action because its sexy and fun, but in reality, it just wasn't that common. Just recently a German Panzer veteran from WW2 attended a model convention as a speaker and the transcript was posted on this site. As I recall in 2 years on the Eastern Front in P III's and IV's he only shot at Soviet tanks twice! I would argue that was not atypical.

The basic point is, the German's utterly failed to meet the needs of wartime design and production on a fundamental level and tried to design gee-whiz wonder machines instead of the more pragmatic products that could have won them the war.

Quoted Text

---

I would definately treat the "kill ratio" thing with a giant grain of salt. I hear people say all the time it took X number of Sherman's to kill a Tiger or a Panther. But then I look at the actual loss records and find the German's lost more tanks than the western allies did. How does that compute? And it is not too hard to find records of engagements where Panther's and Tiger's were absolutely trounced by Sherman's too so it is all so much nonsense. Way too much fuss is made about tanks fighting other tanks. I know people like to fixate on hot tank-on-tank action because its sexy and fun, but in reality, it just wasn't that common. Just recently a German Panzer veteran from WW2 attended a model convention as a speaker and the transcript was posted on this site. As I recall in 2 years on the Eastern Front in P III's and IV's he only shot at Soviet tanks twice! I would argue that was not atypical.

---

How is the number of losses possible? Well, for some units over 50% of losses was not combat related. Either mechanical breakdown or lack of fuel, and then destroyed by their own crews.
This of course is a major difference with all of the allies.

Quoted Text

---

The basic point is, the German's utterly failed to meet the needs of wartime design and production on a fundamental level and tried to design gee-whiz wonder machines instead of the more pragmatic products that could have won them the war.

---

This might sound harsh, but neither did the Germans have the soldiers to spare that would get killed in the less inferior designs, unlike the Americans and Russians. The difference in that regard and the impact it had on the combattants is often overlooked, hence much undeserved criticism towards the British and Commonwealth (who had to deal with the same problem).

The Germans still could have designed cutting edge armor that was designed for mass production. It almost seems like they have an innate need to build complicated machinery. They could have used a PZKW IV chassis with sloped armor instead of the complicated, expensive Panther.

Quoted Text

---

The Germans still could have designed cutting edge armor that was designed for mass production. It almost seems like they have an innate need to build complicated machinery. They could have used a PZKW IV chassis with sloped armor instead of the complicated, expensive Panther.

---

I don't think the Panzer IV was necessarily a less complicated, simpler design to produce than the Panther so simply slapping sloped armor on it (not as easy as it sounds) was not an answer. Neither tank was in the category of the M4 Medium or T-34 on the mass-producability scale. It is clear to me from watching the decline of the Panzer force, which coincided with the decline of German war fortunes that something truly mass-producable yet significantly (but not orders-of-magnitude) better than the competition was required. What was needed was a fundamentally different design than what the Germans got but I suspect they simply were not up to doing things any differently.

Overall in the German war effort you see a fundamental lack of long-term thinking and planning and that extended to tank production as much as anything else. Germany didn't think the war was going to go on very long so there was no need for a next-generation, mass-production design. The American's and the Soviet's were coming at it from a different direction and ended up with vehicles that IMHO were more appropriate for a long war of attrition, even if they did not compare well in dubious one-on-one comparisons. But those supposedly inferior designs allowed the allies to go on and maintain the offensive, something the supposedly superior German armor did not allow the German's to do.

Quoted Text

---

Quoted Text

---

The Germans still could have designed cutting edge armor that was designed for mass production. It almost seems like they have an innate need to build complicated machinery. They could have used a PZKW IV chassis with sloped armor instead of the complicated, expensive Panther.

---

I don't think the Panzer IV was necessarily a less complicated, simpler design to produce than the Panther so simply slapping sloped armor on it (not as easy as it sounds) was not an answer. Neither tank was in the category of the M4 Medium or T-34 on the mass-producability scale. It is clear to me from watching the decline of the Panzer force, which coincided with the decline of German war fortunes that something truly mass-producable yet significantly (but not orders-of-magnitude) better than the competition was required. What was needed was a fundamentally different design than what the Germans got but I suspect they simply were not up to doing things any differently.

---

What is more, the Pz. IV chassis was not even capable carrying the additional armor or the gun required to have a significant advantage over either the American or the Soviet designs. Evidence for this is the fact that the gun needed (like the Panther 75mm gun) could only be mounted in a turretless vehicle and was in fact even then too heavy (see the issues with the Pz. J. IV design).

Quoted Text

---

Overall in the German war effort you see a fundamental lack of long-term thinking and planning and that extended to tank production as much as anything else. Germany didn't think the war was going to go on very long so there was no need for a next-generation, mass-production design. The American's and the Soviet's were coming at it from a different direction and ended up with vehicles that IMHO were more appropriate for a long war of attrition, even if they did not compare well in dubious one-on-one comparisons. But those supposedly inferior designs allowed the allies to go on and maintain the offensive, something the supposedly superior German armor did not allow the German's to do.

---

I think you are only partially correct here. You are probably correct in thinking that the Germans did not expect the war to last long (or at least Hitler did not think so). You are probably incorrect in thinking that the Germans were not thinking about upgrading their forces or mass production. The Germans were already looking into upgrades before the war even started (The problems were probably caused other factors:

1) The too rapid expansion of the German army. The Germans had a hard enough time equipping the army with tanks in general and needed the input of the Chech produced tanks to fill the numbers required (and barely at that). Many smaller infantry units started the war using requisitioned civilian vehicles, and pressing captured allied equipment into service just to motorize themselves. Producing the tanks and other vehicles for the newly raised motorized units came at the expense of the speed of development of new designs. It was as much if not more a case of inability than unwillingness or lack of foresight.

2) The whole planning of production (and design) was based on the assumption that Germany would go to war years later than it actually did (IIRC the naval planning assumed a start of hostilities in 1944!). To my understanding the completely obsolete Pz. I and Pz. II were not even supposed to be in service anymore by 1940 or 1941. Yet the rapid expansion of the army and the early start of the war prevented this from happening.

3) The trauma of WW I, where the German population came close to starvation. As a consequence the political decision was made to not go to a state of total war - and thus maximum production of weaponry - until very late. This was one of the reasons why the Germans were capable to increase arms production almost to the very end, as gradually the Germans were forced to go to a state of total war. This is not to be confused with designs not being capable for mass production.

4) Unlike the US or the Soviet Union it was virtually impossible to relocate or develop from scratch new mass production facilities. The Germans had to make use of the existing infrastructure and facilities. Again this was a limit on mass production that did neither exist in the US or the Soviet Union.


In stark contrast, the US was completely safe from invasion, could start from scratch designing new equipment, and apply the early lessons of the war into the design. Almost similar was the situation for the British, especially when the US started producing their tanks. Likewise they were in a situation that allowed them to rebuild their army almost from scratch. Both in organisation and equipment - the US pretty much had no army before the war started, and the British lost almost all their equipment in May 1940.
Under less ideal circumstances - there was much more pressure to institute the reforms and reorganisation for them, for obvious reasons - the same can be said for the Soviets.

This was a major advantage over the Germans who were never in a position to do the same the moment the war had started.

T-34... need I remind you of the T-34 and it's effect on German morale? (Not to mention German equipment?) How about the IS-2, that was capable to take on the heaviest German tanks, while being effective against other targets than tanks, as well? I know we don't like the Russians, I know we secretly think they're inferior, but they are not. Give them the credit they deserve. The Sherman -in any version- does not go close to the quality of the T-34.

As for the previous quality vs quantity argument, it does not ring true. In a battlefield tank vs tank combat was not very common; and when your tanks can be destroyed by cheaper AT guns, hand-held rockets, or airplanes, regardless if they're a mighty King Tiger, or a pak mounted on a Citroen chassis, then you end up spending a lot on equipment that will be destroyed by other forces, than tanks.