Artillery in Perimeter Defense

The U.S. IX Corps, near the center of the Korean peninsula, renewed an attack on 21 April 1951 to seize a line running generally from Kumhwa to Hwachon Reservoir. The corps included only two divisions at the time the U.S. 1st Marine Division and a ROK division. The attack went well. Both divisions, meeting no enemy opposition, gained about three miles. They encountered only scant resistance after they jumped off again on the morning of 22 April.

Front-line units advanced two more miles on the 22d. The enemy made little effort to interfere although, late in the afternoon, artillery and air observers reported an unusual amount of enemy movement north of the line.

That night the Chinese struck back with their own 1951 spring offensive, a full-scale attack, which they labeled the "First Step, Fifth Phase Offensive." The Chinese limited their offensive to the western half of the front lines, the eastern prong of which pointed directly at the IX Corps' ROK division. It appeared that the Chinese had made it easy for IX Corps troops to advance so that they, in turn, could launch their own attack when friendly forces were extended and before they had a chance to dig in securely again. By 2000 enemy soldiers were several thousand yards behind friendly lines and were firing on artillery units that had displaced forward only that afternoon. Front lines crumbled within an hour or two. Infantrymen poured back on the double. Artillery units were forced to withdraw.

The liaison officer from the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion to one of the ROK regiments (Capt. Floyd C. Hines) radioed his battalion. "Someone's pushed the panic button up here," he warned.

The battalion commander (Lt.Col. Leon F. Lavoie) received this message on his jeep radio as he was on the way to Corps Artillery headquarters where he intended to seek immediate engineer help to repair and maintain the precariously narrow supply road. From other messages it was soon evident to Colonel Lavoie that the Chinese had made a serious penetration of the lines. Stopping at the first military installation he came to, he called IX Corps Artillery to report the information he had on the front-line situation, and then, because the emphasis had suddenly shifted from repairing the supply road to defending it, he turned back to his own battalion.

The 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing the fires of both divisions of the corps, had moved forward that afternoon to a point near the boundary between the ROKs and marines, a little less than half way from Chichon-ni to Sachang-ni. The road between these two villages, following a deep river gorge, was exceedingly narrow. By 2130, when Colonel Lavoie got back to his battalion, the road was jammed with vehicles and ROK infantrymen were moving back pell-mell along both sides of it. Putting his entire battalion on a man-battle-stations basis, Colonel Lavoie and his staff officers tried desperately to collect stragglers and stop the withdrawal, but the momentum was too great by the time the soldiers reached Colonel Lavoie's battalion and most of them continued determinedly on.

When morning came on 23 April the Chinese, in possession of a threemile-deep corridor west of the 1st Marine Division, turned to attack the Marine left flank. They completely overran one ROK artillery battalion and the 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery, both of which lost all equipment. The 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, partially overrun, lost some.

Colonel Lavoie's 92d Field Artillery Battalion (a self-propelled 155-mm howitzer unit) moved back battery by battery to a new position near the Pukhan River south of Chichon-ni. Batteries registered as soon as they were laid.

Battery C, in position north of a trail-size road through the new battalion position, placed its howitzers on the reverse slope of an incline that offered defilade. Battery A and Headquarters Battery were in a rice paddy south of the road with Battery A, 17th Field Artillery Battalion. Battery A of the 17th was an 8-inch howitzer outfit temporarily attached to the 92d Field Artillery Battalion to replace its own Battery B which, in turn, was attached to the 17th Field Artillery Battalion. (The lower half of the map on page 165 shows the batteries' positions in detail.)

Late in the afternoon the last howitzer was laid and ready to fire. The general military situation was tense. The artillerymen, having had little sleep during the past thirty-six hours, were tired, but immediately went to work establishing their usual perimeter for the night. Colonel Lavoie tall,
and gentle almost to the point of shyness insisted upon always having a well-fortified perimeter. Even when smiling, as he usually was, he had a way of being obdurately firm about the condition of the battalion perimeter, as he also was about standards of performance. Convinced that his responsibility as an artillery commander was to insure continuous artillery support to the infantry, he also reasoned that the very time when the infantrymen would most urgently need supporting artillery might well coincide with an enemy attack on his own perimeter. Colonel Lavoie had therefore developed a standard defensive perimeter that, from the outside toward the gun batteries in the center, consisted of patrols covering neighboring terrain; outposts, usually centered around a halftrack, for warning and delaying; a dug-in and fully manned main battle line just beyond grenade range of the battalion's critical installations; and a highly mobile reserve in the center. This reserve force usually was made up of two or three halftracks with 8 or 10 men for each vehicle.

Colonel Lavoie's acting executive officer (Major Roy A. Tucker) set up the perimeter on the afternoon of 23 April. Because of the limited time before darkness, which came about 1745, the perimeter was not as elaborately developed as usual, nor was there time to patrol nearby terrain. However, Major Tucker did establish a complete system of security outposts with trip flares ahead of the outposts, a complete telephone communication system, and a radio net as an alternate means of communication. He had laid out the main battle line but only a few positions were dug in at darkness. There was no defensive wire, demolitions were not out, nor had the men dug in and sandbagged such critical installations as the fire direction center and the communications center. These tasks had a lower priority and usually waited until the second or third day of the process of developing the battalion perimeter.

Members of outpost detachments ate chow early and went to their halftracks or ground-mounted machine-gun positions before dusk in order to be familiar with their sectors of responsibility, fields of fire, and to check their communications. Thereafter, except for relief detachments, no traffic was allowed to the outposts or beyond the battalion perimeter. Colonel Lavoie wanted security guards to heed and challenge all movement or activity. Four to eight men manned each security outpost, half of them being on duty at a time. Colonel Lavoie inspected the perimeter defenses just before dark, pointing out to his men the Marine positions on the hill to the front.

That night the battalion reinforced the fires of the 1st Marine Division. Corps Artillery headquarters called about 2100 with instructions for the 92d Field Artillery Battalion to prepare to remain in its present positions for several days. Colonel Lavoie promptly called the 11th Marine Regiment (an artillery unit) he was to reinforce and asked for further instructions. Wire sections laid telephone lines to the 11th Marines, completing the job at 2300. Midnight passed and all was quiet. At 0115 the Marine regiment telephoned asking Colonel Lavoie to report immediately to its headquarters. When Lavoie arrived there, the Marine commander outlined a new plan. The 1st Marine Division, its entire left flank exposed, planned to withdraw soon after daylight on 24 April. Colonel Lavoie was to keep his howitzers in firing position until the last moment, but to be prepared to move at 0530. Battery A, 17th Field Artillery Battalion, with its heavy, towed howitzers, was to leave at 0400.

At 0230 Colonel Lavoie returned to his command post. Although he was very tired, he could not sleep and scarcely had time for it anyway. He reviewed the displacement plan, being particularly concerned about getting the 8-inch howitzers on the road at 0400. Battery commanders were called at 0315, and Colonel Lavoie gave them the complete plan and order for the move. He instructed his commanders to serve a hot breakfast.

The heavy howitzers moved out on schedule. At the same time guards were going through the battalion area waking all personnel. Within a few minutes there was the sound of trucks moving about and the usual commotion that goes with the job of getting up, packing equipment, striking tents, and loading trucks all in the dark.

Gun sections still manned the howitzers, firing harassing and interdiction missions. The range had decreased during the night and the cannoneers were aware of increased machine-gun activity on the hill mass in front of the battalion.

Breakfast was ready at 0445. Chow lines formed in all batteries.

First sign of daylight appeared ten or fifteen minutes after 0500. Most of the men had finished breakfast. Most of the pyramidal tents, used because of cool weather, were down. In Headquarters Battery only the command post and kitchen tents were standing. In Battery A the kitchen tent was still up. The communications system was still intact but commanders had pulled in most of their outlying security installations. Equipment and personnel were just about ready for march order.

Colonel Lavoie, having eaten an early breakfast, had just returned to the mess tent where an attendant was pouring him a cup of coffee. Major Raymond F. Hotopp (battalion S-3) prepared to leave on reconnaissance at 0530, placed his personal belongings in his jeep and walked over to see whether the battalion commander was ready. Capt. John F. Gerrity (commanding Battery A) was getting into his jeep to join Colonel Lavoie on reconnaissance.

An unidentified artilleryman from Battery C, with a roll of toilet paper in his hand, walked toward the cemetery in front of the howitzers. As he approached the mounds in the graveyard, he saw several Chinese crawling on their bellies toward his battery. Startled, he yelled, threw the toilet paper at an enemy soldier, turned, and ran. The Chinese soldier ducked involuntarily. At that moment, someone tripped a flare outside the perimeter. Capt. Bernard G. Raftery (commanding Battery C) looked at his watch. It was 0520.

Machine guns opened fire. At first many thought someone had accidentally tripped a machine gun, since the marines were supposed to be in front of the artillery positions. But when the firing increased there was no more doubt. Men in the mess line scattered for cover. Major Hotopp dropped to the ground and dived under a halftrack. SFC Charles R. Linder (chief of section), warming his feet over the running "tank" motor, jumped off and took cover behind the vehicle. Most of the men took cover wherever it was most quickly available.

Colonel Lavoie saw a bullet hole suddenly appear in the side of the mess tent. He ran outside. "Man battle stations!" he yelled, "Man battle stations!" and headed for his command post tent to get into communication with his battery commanders.

Captain Raftery looked at Lt. Joseph N. Hearin (Battery C executive). "This is it!" he said, scrambling to his feet. "Let's go!" He and Hearin got out of their command post tent at the same time.

SFC George T. Powell (Battery C chief of detail), anxious about some new men who had never seen combat, took off toward their section of the main battle line. When he arrived at the nearest halftracks, he found his men already manning the machine guns. Several others were setting up a machine gun on a ground mount. No longer anxious, Powell relaxed and began to enjoy the battle. Several other friendly machine guns were already in action.

SFC Willis V. Ruble, Jr. (Headquarters Battery motor sergeant), who at first thought the noise was caused by someone throwing wads of ammunition into the fire, ran for a halftrack and unzipped the canvas cover on a caliber .50 machine gun while several slugs whistled past, and he then looked about for a target. He saw four or five persons in the field in front of Battery A's positions. They were wearing dirty white civilian clothes and Ruble thought they were South Koreans until he saw one of them carrying a rifle. He fired three short bursts, knocked one of them down, spun another one around. Just then he noticed flashes on the hill in front. Figuring that the small-arms fire could take care of the enemy troops close in, Ruble turned his machine gun toward the distant flashes.

SFC James R. White (Battery A) remembered only being at a machine gun on a halftrack but did not know how he got there. By this time, a minute or two after the first shot had been fired, enemy fire was so intense that tracer bullets formed a thin red arch between the battalion's position and Hill 200, from which most of the enemy long-range fire came. The ammunition belt in White's machine gun was crossed. White was shaking so badly that he could not get it straightened, and he was afraid to expose himself above the ring mount. After a bit, he stood up, straightened the belt, and began firing.

The battalion executive officer (Major Tucker), who had started out to inspect the perimeter soon after the firing commenced, opened the rear door of White's halftrack and cautioned him and several other men in the vehicle to pick targets before firing. White then waited until he saw the location of the enemy machine guns before he fired. Visually following the tracers back toward the hill, White was able to locate an enemy emplacement. He opened fire again. He could see his own tracers hitting the hill, so he walked his fire in on the enemy position, then held it there until his belt gave out. White then reloaded his gun with a fresh belt (105 rounds) but did not fire at once. The man firing the caliber .30 machine gun on the same halftrack was playing it cool; he was firing in short bursts at enemy in a field across the road.

Within ten minutes or less the exchange of fire had become a noisy roar. Enemy bullets cut up the telephone wires that were strung overhead, forcing the battalion to rely on its radios.

Captain Raftery stood in the middle of Battery C's area trying to determine enemy intentions. The bulk of enemy fire against the battery appeared to be coming from Hill 200, where Raftery estimated there were six machine-gun emplacements, which the Chinese had reached by old communication trenches. As these entrenched troops acted as a base of fire, enemy riflemen took concealed positions in the cemetery while others, armed only with hand grenades, crawled toward the howitzers. Captain Raftery thought the Chinese were concentrating on his No. 5 howitzer the most vulnerable because of its forward position. Enemy fire in that area was so intense that the artillerymen could not man the machine guns on the nearest halftrack. Deciding that the enemy was trying to knock out one howitzer and blow up the powder and ammunition for psychological effect, he called the chief of No. 5 howitzer section and instructed him to pull his "tank" back into defilade and on line with Nos. 4 and 6.

Behind the No. 4 howitzer, Lieutenant Hearin tried to see what the men were shooting at. Flashes on the hill were 600 to 1,000 yards away, and it seemed unusual that the enemy would attack from so far. He looked for enemy elements coming in under the base of fire. Suddenly he noticed men of the battery running from the No. 5 to the No. 6 howitzer. Several feet behind them, grenades were bursting.

Jumping on a halftrack, Hearin swung the caliber .so machine gun around and shot a Chinese grenadier who was crawling up on the No. 5 piece. A couple of other machine-gunners swung their guns to help Hearin and, among them, they shot a half dozen enemy attempting to destroy the No. 5 howitzer.

Under cover of this fire, Sgt. Theral J. Hatley (chief of section) ran forward and backed his vehicle out of immediate reach of the enemy grenadiers, crushing one who lay concealed underneath.

After the initial scramble to their positions, Colonel Lavoie's men settled down to returning the fire with enthusiasm. Having staged so many "dry runs," the battalion commander was pleased to see the results of the practice. The firing, however, was getting out of hand and although there was plenty of ammunition and more at Service Battery's position three miles away, Colonel Lavoie feared that they were experiencing only an initial attack calculated to pin them down while a larger force maneuvered from the west to seal the river defile and destroy the only bridge over the Pukhan. As soon as his executive officer returned from checking defensive positions, Colonel Lavoie changed places with him and set out to inspect the battle line. He wanted to see for himself the positions and the trend of the action, to be seen by the men for whatever effect that might have upon their morale, and to persuade the men to stop aimless and unnecessary firing. He sought out his three battery commanders.

"You must control and limit your fire to specific targets," Lavoie told them. "Make every bullet count."

Captain Raftery, who thought his Battery C was under the heaviest enemy fire, defended his men and their volume of fire. "Sir," he answered, "Battery C has Chinks all through its area"

"Are they dead or alive?"

"Both," said Raftery.

"Well, don't worry about the dead ones," Colonel Lavoie told him; "just take care of the live ones and make every bullet count."

Lavoie continued around the perimeter. He opened the rear doors on the halftracks and crawled up to talk with the machine gunners to ask them to cooperate in firing only at specific targets, and to tell them how successfully the battalion was holding off the Chinese.

One man told him he'd better get down. "It's dangerous up here," he explained. Others, reassured, only grinned.

On two occasions Lavoie found groups of two or three men huddled in the bed of a halftrack. He told them to get out and help: "I'm scared too. There's nothing wrong with being scared as long as you do your part." Ashamed, they promptly returned to their proper positions.

In Battery A's area, enemy fire was coming in from Hill 454 on the leftfront as well as from Hill 200. Enemy snipers behind piles of rubble and rock were also firing from the field directly in front of Battery A. There was no haze and the artillerymen could clearly see enemy soldiers on the hills a thousand yards away.

Returning to his command post, Colonel Lavoie received a radio message from the Marine regimental headquarters objecting to excessive firing and ordering the artillerymen to cease fire.

"You're firing on friendly troops," the officer complained.

"Those friendly troops," Colonel Lavoie argued, "are inflicting casualties on my battalion."

While Lavoie was explaining the situation to the Marine commander, Major Tucker made another round of the defensive position, rallying the men. The exchange of fire was still brisk, but the artillerymen appeared to be holding their own well and had recovered from their impulse to fire just to make noise.

Having persuaded the marines that his artillerymen had not been seized by panic, Colonel Lavoie called Battery A by radio and said he wanted to talk with Captain Gerrity. When the latter reached the command post tent, Colonel Lavoie instructed him to shift his battery howitzer by howitzer several hundred yards to the east, thereby reducing the size of the perimeter. When the battery of 8-inch howitzers had pulled out at 0400 it left a gap in the perimeter and also left Gerrity's battery vulnerable to an attack from the west, from which direction the battalion commander still thought the Chinese would probably make a larger attack designed to overrun his position. Gerrity called his battery by radio and gave it the code word for "close station and march order."

While the two officers, both of them lying on the ground near the radio and in front of the tent, were still talking, Colonel Lavoie spotted two enemy machine guns that were firing a high ratio of tracer bullets into the battalion's position. Pointing them out to Captain Gerrity, he asked him to take them under direct fire with his 155-mm howitzers. Gerrity took off toward his battery position.

Bullets were still ricocheting against the "tanks" and halftracks when the close-station order reached Battery A. Captain Gerrity had given the order only to alert his men for the 300- or 400-yard shift. The artillerymen were reluctant to move and expose themselves to enemy fire while they cranked up the spades and prepared to move. Sergeant White, firing a machine gun from a halftrack, stood up, exposing himself completely, and shouted instructions at the men. Every man jumped to his job, and within a few minutes the battery was ready to move. It was about 0545 twenty-five minutes after the enemy first attacked.

Captain Gerrity, out of breath from running, returned to his battery just as the vehicles were ready to move. He shouted orders for the firing mission, the artillerymen dropped trails again and opened fire on the machine guns Colonel Lavoie had seen. The range was a thousand yards or less. After a few rounds one howitzer made a direct hit. Colonel Lavoie saw fragments of Chinese soldiers thrown twenty feet or higher in the air. Eight or ten Chinese soldiers suddenly appeared running from a trench about a hundred yards away from the last explosion. Several machine guns immediately swung toward them and killed three or four. Having destroyed the two machine guns, Battery A completed its displacement, tightening up the perimeter.

MSgt. John D. Elder appeared at the command post tent to get instructions for moving ammunition trucks from Service Battery. He wanted to know if Colonel Lavoie still planned to move.

"We were going to move," answered the Colonel, "but now we'll wait until we secure this position."

Colonel Lavoie set out to make another round of his defensive positions. His indifference to the enemy fire was a steadying influence. As he walked through the area, talking with the men and cautioning them to conserve ammunition, he noticed a great change in his troops. Over their initial scare, they now appeared to be enjoying themselves. A great deal of enemy fire continued to come into the area even though Chinese machine guns seemed subdued by this time, but the men no longer hesitated to expose themselves in order to fire their weapons effectively. Realizing that they were holding their own and winning, they had lost the fear and uneasiness Colonel Lavoie had seen on his first trip around the area. It had been replaced by a cocky sort of confidence.

A young artilleryman, usually shy, spotted a small group of Chinese crawling through weeds toward the fire direction center tent. "Look at them sons of ladyes," he said. "They think they're going to make it." Standing up he aimed and fired. "I got one!" he exclaimed. Several other men began firing at the same group and soon destroyed it.

Several Marine tanks rumbled down the road. No one had asked for help but the Marine commander sent them over to clean out the area in front of the battalion. Taking up positions north of the road and in front of Battery A, they blasted the hills and raked the field with machine-gun fire. Several artillerymen left their positions and set out "looking for Chinks."

Sgt. Austin E. Roberts (machine-gun sergeant) organized ten men and walked across the road toward the northwest. After they had gone only a few yards, a Chinese jumped up in front of them. One of Roberts's men fired, hitting an American Thompson submachine gun the enemy was carrying. The Chinese dropped it and held up his hand.

Roberts shouted "Don't shoot! Don't shoot!" and then sent his prisoner, guarded by two artillerymen, to battalion headquarters.

The remaining eight men, working with the tanks, went on across the field examining each hole and clearing the area for four hundred yards. They found no more enemy soldiers.

In the meantime, the Marine regiment that the 92d Field Artillery Battalion was supporting called a fire mission. Colonel Lavoie assigned it to Battery C, instructing the battery to transfer its radio to the Marine channel so it could receive the mission direct.

Captain Raftery's howitzers were engaged in delivering direct fire against nearby hills. Leaving one to continue with that mission, he relaid the other five howitzers to support the marines. This was the first "live" mission that morning, although the entire battalion had been firing harassing and interdiction missions before the enemy attack. Raftery then organized about twenty men into a skirmish line to cross the battery front. Moving through the cemetery and beyond, the force killed seven Chinese and captured one who had to be pulled out of his hole. The Marine tanks killed several others who attempted to escape back to the high ground.

Capt. Albert D. Bessler (S-2), annoyed by persistent small-arms fire striking near the fire direction center tent, decided a sniper with scope must be firing from behind a pile of stones in a nearby field. He took a halftrack and investigated. Several minutes later he returned with two M1 rifles fitted with scopes. "Got two of them," he boasted.

A light aircraft overhead reported into the battalion radio net and asked if it could be of assistance. Colonel Lavoie, still apprehensive of an enemy attack from the west, requested the pilot to check the valley in that direction. The aircraft pilot reported that he saw no enemy build-up, but that two groups of 25 or 30 enemy each were in a draw near the base of the hills. Lavoie destroyed these groups with artillery fire.

By 0730 the situation permitted displacement of the batteries. The battalion suffered 4 men killed and 11 wounded during the action. It lost no equipment. Marine units later reported finding 179 enemy dead in the area around the battalion perimeter, all presumedly killed during the attack.

Colonel Lavoie was pleased with the performance of his men. The artillerymen shared a new feeling of confidence and pride. They had proved they could defend themselves.

"Artillery," the Colonel said, "if it makes up its mind, will set itself up so that it can defend itself from enemy infantry action."

Hill 800 (Bunker Hill)

On the night of 16 May 1951 Chinese and North Korean Communists launched another major attack against United Nations forces. To the enemy, it was "Second Step, Fifth Phase Offensive." To soldiers of the United Nations it became known as "Second Spring Offensive," or, especially to members of U.S. X Corps, "The Battle of the Soyang River."

The First Step of the enemy's Fifth Phase Offensive had been at the west end of Eighth Army's line on 22 April. Its mission was the capture of Seoul and the encirclement of UN troops in that area. Although this offensive failed to gain its announced objective, it did force a major withdrawal at the west end of the UN line and, because of the necessity of shifting troops for the defense of Seoul, a readjustment of front lines everywhere. Near the center of the peninsula, X Corps gave up a little ground, dropping back to dominating ground just beyond, and protecting, the southwest-northeast main supply road between Hongchon and Inje.

The First Step lasted eight days. By the night of 30 April, with the force of the attack exhausted, enemy troops turned north, and activity across the Korean front dropped sharply. At once the Chinese turned to preparations for the Second Step. Eighth Army, nevertheless, continued in a defensive role. In the center, X Corps proceeded to organize, occupy, and defend its new position along what it called "Noname Line."

From the beginning of May Americans had reason to expect another attack, but it was several days before movement of enemy troops and supplies, reported by aerial observers, indicated the attack would be aimed at X Corps' center. Intelligence officers accumulated other substantiating evidence including information from a captured Chinese officer who stated the next offensive would strike the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the ROK divisions to the east.

The 2d Infantry Division (Maj.Gen. Clark L. Ruffner) occupied the center position on X Corps' Noname Line, generally situated along the crest of a great, rugged hill mass separating two rivers the Hongchon and the Soyang. The air-line distance across General Ruffner's sector was about sixteen miles. However, following barbed wire stretched from one bunker to another along the front, up and down the steep hills, and around the bends in the ridges, the distance was twice as great. Within his division, General Ruffner assigned the right half of his sector to a tank-infantry task force; the left (southwest) end, to the 38th Infantry Regiment. In turn, the commander of the 38th Infantry (Col. John C. Coughlin) stationed his 1st and 3d Battalions on Noname Line, the 3d Battalion being on the left. Each of these battalions anchored its defense to a prominent hill mass: the 1st Battalion to Hill 1051 on the right of the regimental sector and, later, the 3d Battalion (on the left), to Hill 800. The initial defense sector given the 3d Battalion was about five and a half miles wide, later reduced to approximately four miles when the 9th Infantry was committed to a defense sector to the left of the 38th Infantry.

Hill 800 was typical of the terrain selected as a battle site by units of X Corps. It was ten miles or more from the main supply road and was accessible only by a single-lane dirt road that followed the curves of a small tributary of the Hongchon River. At the base of the sprawling hill mass, where the stream narrowed to a foot or two even during the spring rains, the road ended abruptly. The pointed peak of the hill was 1,600 feet above the end of the road and, for the average infantryman, more than an hour's climb away. All the tools, supplies, and equipment of war had to be carried over footpaths to the top of Hill 800.

The commander of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry (Lt.Col. Wallace M. Hanes) committed all three of his rifle companies to front-line defense, with Company K on the bald top of Hill 800 in the center of the battalion sector. Both horizontally and vertically, Hill 800 was the apex of the battalion's line. Having a defensive mission, Colonel Hanes gave first priority to clearing fields of fire and constructing bunkers, ordering all companies to build covered positions, one for every two or three men. Most of the men, thinking in terms of concealment and protection from heavy spring rains, dug their holes in the usual fashion, covering them with branches and ponchos, and then quit.

Colonel Hanes returned next day to inspect the positions. "That's concealment?" he complained to his company officers. "Dammit, I want bunkers with cover to protect you from artillery fire!"

Each day he returned and climbed the ridgelines to supervise the job of building fortifications. He made the men cut down more trees, dig more
trenches, and pile more dirt on the bunkers. One company commander, when Colonel Hanes insisted on more earth over the bunkers in his area, asked for sand bags, saying he would need about five thousand.

"Five thousand!" stormed Hanes. "My God, man! You don't want five thousand sand bags. You want twenty thousand!" Even that number was later found to be inadequate. After a number of shifts in the battalion's sector and after laboring for a week to get the infantrymen to strengthen their positions with heavy logs and bags of earth, Colonel Hanes explained to his company commanders that if the enemy attacked in the numbers he expected, it might be necessary to fire friendly artillery on their (the Americans') own positions, using proximity fuze for air-burst effect. "If it is necessary," he said, "I don't want you to worry about calling in the fire. I'll do that. All you have to do is fix up your bunkers so that you will have a clear field of fire to your front and to your neighbors' bunkers and won't get hit by your own shell fragments when I call down the fire."

After that, men of the 3d Battalion worked diligently. When the bunkers were completed to Hanes's satisfaction, he planned to string barbed wire and sow mines across the battalion's front. Because of the distance and the difficult terrain over which all supplies had to be carried, the infantrymen at first thought he was only joking when he talked of putting in wire. They believed him only when the Korean civilians began carrying rolls of barbed wire onto the hill and the men from the battalion's Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon arrived to supervise the work.

Seven hundred of these civilians carried supplies to the 3d Battalion. During the period of preparation, they moved 237,000 sand bags to the top of the hill; 385 rolls of barbed wire; almost 2,000 long steel pickets for installing wire aprons, and nearly 4,000 short ones; and 39 55-gallon fougasse drums. (A fougasse is a sort of dug-in, improved flame-thrower made with a drum of napalm-thickened gasoline, an explosive charge of a couple of pounds of TNT or white phosphorus mortar shells, and a detonator. When detonated, the fougasse bursts into a mass of flame about 10 yards wide and 25 to 40 yards long.) This equipment was in addition to the normal supplies rations, cans of water, and ammunition. It required eight Korean men to carry one fougasse drum up the hill; one man could carry a roll of barbed wire or a box of rations. A round trip took three or four hours. At the base of the hill were several buildings where members of the carrying parties were fed.

In addition to the laborers, the battalion used a herd of thirty-two oxen to transport a section of the heavy 4.2-inch mortars and to stockpile mortar ammunition. Because of dominant terrain features to the front of the battalion's positions, a special mountain trail was cut in the reverse slope of a mountain finger of the north-south ridgeline of which Hill 800 was a part, so as to permit the uninterrupted supply of Companies K and L and the heavy 4.2-inch mortars.

The most probable routes of enemy attack were blocked by two or more double-apron wire barriers; most of the battalion's front had at least one. As the wire situation improved, Colonel Hanes stressed other improvements antipersonnel mine fields, trip flares, fougasse drums, buried telephone wires, and communication trenches.

On 10 May the commander of Eighth Army (Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet) and the commander of X Corps (Lt. Gen. E. M. Almond) landed by helicopter on Hill 800 and declared the 3d Battalion's preparations to be the most formidable in X Corps' sector.

By 12 May, when the bunkers were completed and most of the front wired in, there were many indications that the enemy also had nearly completed preparations for his own attack.

While Colonel Hanes's battalion constructed its defenses, other units of the 2d Division sent out patrols daily to locate and engage the enemy. At the beginning of the month, patrols had made few contacts with the enemy, and none of the Chinese encountered displayed an inclination to stay and fight. Accordingly, General Ruffner ordered units to establish patrol bases several thousand yards to the front. From these bases they pushed patrols as far north as the Soyang River a line distance of six or more miles away and parallel to the main line of resistance. Eighth Army directed that patrols be large enough to face a major attack and still fight their way back to the patrol base. Within the sector of the 38th Infantry, the 2d Battalion established a patrol base in front of Hanes's 3d Battalion.

After 8 May stronger enemy patrols appeared, showing a sudden reluctance to withdraw. It became apparent that the enemy had set up a counterreconnaissance screen and was becoming as assiduous in his attempts to locate 2d Division defensive strongpoints as were the friendly patrols in their search for enemy strength. By 10 May the enemy's build-up was in full swing. Enemy vehicular traffic was heavier, patrols more numerous and more aggressive, new bridges appeared on the enemy's side, and there was a sudden flow of civilian refugees from the enemy's area.

By 14 May men of Colonel Hanes's battalion had the strongest positions they had ever occupied, although they had taken a few enemy positions they considered as good. The confidence the men had in their ability to withstand an enemy attack confidence that had increased with each log and sand bag, antipersonnel mine and roll of wire that had gone into their structure for defense was equally strong.

General Ruffner lent his helicopter to Colonel Hanes so he could inspect the positions from the air.

"There's only one thing that worries me now, General," said Hanes when he returned. "I'm afraid those bastards won't hit us. If they've seen what I've seen today, and if they are smart, they won't even give us a nibble."

General Ruffner agreed.

If the enemy was going to attack the 3d Battalion, however, it appeared that one of his most suitable routes of approach would lead him squarely into Company K on the top of Hill 800 (by now the men who held Hill 800 had styled it Bunker Hill) . Twelve hundred yards in front of Company K, and three hundred feet higher, was Hill 916. Instead of the usual steep ravine, a smooth saddle connected the two hills.

Hill 916 was a squat mass covered with patches of grass and scattered clumps of trees. There were enough trees on the south slopes to conceal the movement and assembly of enemy troops, especially at dusk. They would then be within easy range having only to cross the connecting saddle before making the final assault on Company K's dome-shaped hill, or move down the ridge to attack Company L, which was holding the right flank of the battalion and was astride a ridge similarly connected to Hill 916.

Company K put two barbed-wire aprons across its end of the saddle. One stretched along three sides at the base of Hill 800. The other was approximately two hundred yards beyond. Members of Company K fastened trip flares and explosive charges to the wire, and planted antipersonnel mines between the aprons. This, they figured, would slow the attack when it came.

Twenty-three bunkers were located on the small but prominent top of Hill 800. Other positions of Company K were stretched along the ridgelines that slanted down to the southwest and southeast. The only apparent weakness in the defense position of Company K was its extensive front and the uncompleted prearranged close-support artillery concentrations conditions that applied equally to the remainder of the 3d Battalion. Because of the 2d Battalion's patrol base located in front of Hanes's battalion, and because of the extensive patrolling conducted during the build-up period, firing of desired prearranged artillery concentrations was exceedingly difficult. Later, because of the numerous patrols and long-range observation posts dispatched and maintained by the 3d Battalion, artillery forward observers were unable to register all close-support fires.

The first fifteen days of May had passed without an enemy offensive. On the 16th there was a low, heavy overcast that prevented the use of observation or fighter aircraft. The Second Step of the Fifth Phase Offensive commenced that afternoon when probing patrols opened fire on United Nations positions. Stronger attacks struck both the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 38th Infantry that night. Before daylight on 17 May, the 2d Battalion was ordered to withdraw from its patrol base to positions in rear of the regimental main line of resistance. To the northeast, Chinese penetrated the lines of the 1st Battalion and seized the top of Hill 1051.

Colonel Hanes's 3d Battalion, however, spent an uneventful night. The next day (17 May) men of that battalion strung more wire and prepared additional fougasses that they emplaced along probable enemy avenues of approach. They were to be set off by plunger-type detonator during the attack that everyone expected would come that night. A final adjustment was made on the left of the battalion's sector when its area was reduced by moving a unit of the 9th Infantry into line. After the long period of waiting and planning for the big attack, the suspense was over. Most of the men, confident of their positions, welcomed the attack. Morale was high. The day was hot and sultry.

Late in the afternoon, Company K's support platoon patrolled to Hill 916. It met heavy opposition where there had been no enemy before. From Hill 800 the commander of Company K (Capt. George R. Brownell) watched the progress of the patrol. He could see some Chinese troops following it back and others moving on the forward slope of Hill 916. He placed artillery and mortar fire on the enemy. The Chinese began registering their mortar and artillery fire. Enemy troops crowded against the front line across the battalion's entire sector. The battalion had numerous artillery missions fired and a number of effective air strikes were made. All patrols of the battalion were actively engaged.

With the attack imminent, Company K squared away. Captain Brownell, having previously located his command post too far to the rear, took his position at the very point of the defense in a bunker that was the battalion's observation post. His runner, an observer for the 81-mm mortars, and two intelligence observers from the battalion's Headquarters Company, shared the bunker with him. Through error, his artillery forward observer was not with him. In other bunkers men rechecked their rifles and grenades each man had twenty grenades and waited quietly as the dusk deepened into darkness. A light fog formed and the air became damp and noticeably cold after the sultry day.

Everyone expected the attack to commence with a rapid succession of explosions from trip flares and mines. The mines would kill a lot of the enemy, they thought, and slacken the attack. But it didn't work out that way.

At about 2130 there was the sound of whistles and of a bugle or two. Nothing else happened for half an hour until the enemy troops reached the first wire barrier a hundred yards away. A flare or two appeared. Several minutes later a few of the antipersonnel mines exploded. At the same time, the Chinese opened fire. Captain Brownell's men could see none of the enemy yet, but from the steady sound of the enemy's fire, Brownell could measure the Chinese advance. Another half hour passed. The enemy's fire increased gradually. Finally the Americans could hear the Chinese soldiers talking, although they could see none of them. They wondered why more of the antipersonnel mines had not exploded.

Company K held its fire until the enemy reached the second wire barrier. Instead of moving frontally, the leading Chinese had slipped around to the west, cut the barbed wire in front of the 1st Platoon, and crawled up the steep part of the hill. At the point of first contact, the Americans opened fire with rifles and machine guns, and tossed grenades down the hill. Quickly Company K came to life, the action spreading in both directions like a grass fire.

Captain Brownell tried to get artillery fire. The artillery forward observer, however, was at a different observation post and, within a few minutes after the firing began, the telephone line went out between Captain Brownell's command post and the artillery observer's bunker. Unable to reach the observer, Brownell relayed his request to battalion headquarters, experiencing difficulties with communications in the process. In rapid succession, the lines to the 1st Platoon and to the battalion failed, apparently having been cut either by the Chinese or by their mortar and artillery fire. Company K had failed to bury all of its telephone lines.

Attached to and integrated with the defense of Company K were men from Company M manning machine guns and recoilless rifles. The lieutenant in charge was a replacement who had been recalled to active duty recently without a refresher course. He and some of his men occupied several bunkers near the point of first enemy contact. By the time the exchange of fire had increased to thunderous volume, the platoon leader left his bunker and ran a short distance to an adjoining one.

"It's getting pretty hot here," he said as he entered. After a few moments, he added, "It's getting too hot around here for me! Let's get out!"

He left and, in the darkness and through heavy enemy fire, headed toward the rear. Between 15 and 20 men followed him those from the bunker he had just left and other men from several nearby positions.

This original break occurred near the limiting point between the two platoons on line the 1st and the 3d. Cpl. James H. Kantner (runner from the 1st Platoon) ran to the point of the hill to tell Captain Brownell that the line's broken." Captain Brownell gave up his attempt to adjust artillery fire and tried to get in touch with the 1st Platoon in order to determine the extent of the break. The line to the 1st Platoon was out. He sent Corporal Kantner back with instructions to tell everyone to hold where he was until Brownell had a chance to find out what happened. The runner left.

Within a minute or two, an enemy shell landed squarely on top of the command-post bunker. The explosion damaged the radio by which Captain Brownell had communicated with battalion headquarters. Thus, within fifteen minutes or less, Captain Brownell had lost communication with his platoons, his artillery forward observer, and battalion headquarters.

Leaving the battalion personnel in the bunker, Captain Brownell started toward the bunkers the men of Company M had occupied on the top of the hill. Chinese soldiers were wandering freely over the 200-yard-long point of Hill 800 the key terrain in Company K's defense. Without communication, Brownell's positions on this important part of Hill 800 crumbled quickly. Hearing the firing from the adjoining position suddenly end, the men from one bunker after another learned that the line was falling back. Chinese and Americans walked around together in the darkness.

PFC George C. Hipp, PFC Clarence E. Ricki and PFC Rodney R. Rowe occupied the northernmost bunker, guarding the approach to the hill. Not realizing the adjoining positions were abandoned, these men remained until it was too late to leave. Meanwhile, the battalion intelligence men, left in the bunker that Captain Brownell had recently occupied, moved to the bunker recently vacated by the lieutenant from Company M, and got in telephone communication with Colonel Hanes. Hanes immediately instructed his artillery liaison officer to place artillery fire in front of Company K. The first half hour of the enemy attack had created complete confusion at the very top of Hill 800.

Two men manning a 75-mm recoilless-rifle position on the left side of the high point of the hill and just left of the steep ridge along which the Chinese had crawled up to Company K's position were miraculously able to make contact with the battalion's forward relay switchboard by sound-powered telephone. From their bunker they calmly reported the situation as they saw it to Colonel Hanes who, in turn, informed them of the situation known to the battalion. Hanes asked them if they could adjust artillery where they knew or suspected the enemy to be, bearing in mind that because of the confused situation and conflicting reports great care must be used so that no rounds fell on the battle positions. For a considerable time these men effectively adjusted fire as close to their bunker as was possible. Communications to this position remained effective during the entire night. With no previous experience in the adjustment of artillery, the two men helped seal off the battle position from further enemy reinforcements.

Unable to find the men of Company M at their bunkers, Captain Brownell hurried on back to the command post of the 3d Platoon. This platoon had telephone communication with battalion headquarters. He called Colonel Hanes to report the loss of the point of his hill, to request permission to use his support platoon in a counterattack (Colonel Hanes had placed restrictions on the use of this platoon), and to ask for artillery fire.

A few of the men who had abandoned their positions walked on down the trail that led south to Colonel Hanes's battalion headquarters. Most of them went back only a short distance where the leader of the 3d Platoon (Lt. Blair W. Price) stopped them and began forming a new line between the open flanks of Company K's line. Although this was soon done, Captain Brownell's defense was vulnerable since he had lost the highest and most important area of his sector, and about a third of his line was hastily formed and lacked protection of even a foxhole. Fortunately, enemy activity temporarily dropped off.

Having obtained permission to use the 2d Platoon and having moved it into position for the attack, Captain Brownell tried to precede his counter-attack by placing artillery fire on his former position. A long delay followed, partly because of faulty communications, partly because Brownell was out of touch with his forward observer and was unable to adjust the desired fire properly, but primarily because Captain Brownell's situation report was in conflict with the information Hanes was receiving from the battalion's intelligence men and from the 75-mm recoilless-rifle team who were adjusting artillery fire for him. Until a more accurate picture could be received, Colonel Hanes considered it advisable to seal the penetration with available artillery fire while the remainder of the 38th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the 3d Battalion, supported Company L, which was under tremendous pressure at the time.

Meanwhile, Lieutenants Price and Herbert E. Clark (leader of the 2d Platoon) and SFC Thomas K. Whitten lined up approximately thirty-five men who were to make the counterattack. They also arranged for 2 machine-gun crews, 2 BAR men, and 6 riflemen to fire onto the point of the hill when Clark's platoon moved forward.

At the same time, a few of the men including the lieutenant from Company M who started the movement to abandon the position had reached the bottom of the hill. Colonel Hanes met them.

"Get back on the hill," he told them. "We don't give up a position until we're beaten. And dammit, we're not beaten and won't be if every man does his share!"

They turned around and started the long climb up the hill. The lieutenant from Company M returned to his unit in due time although he was wounded in the side, arms, and leg before again reaching the protection of his bunker.

After waiting more than an hour for artillery fire, which could not be properly adjusted because of his faulty communications, Captain Brownell and his platoon leaders decided to launch the attack without support.

"To hell with it!" said Lieutenant Price. "We can take the damned hill ourselves."

Although he expected considerable trouble, Captain Brownell was afraid that if he delayed the attack any longer the Chinese would discover the weakly held gap in his line, break through in force, and threaten or possibly destroy the battalion's entire defensive position.

With Captain Brownell, two platoon leaders, and Sergeant Whitten guiding, the 35-man skirmish line started forward, the men firing steadily and walking erect under the supporting rifle and machine-gun fire. The enemy fired back with two machine guns one of their own and one Company K had abandoned on the top of the hill. Both sides used American white phosphorus grenades of which there was an abundant supply on the hill. As Company K's attack progressed, the men threw one or two grenades into each bunker they passed; otherwise they and the Chinese used them for illumination. At the moment of a grenade burst the hill and the line of infantrymen stood out prominently in the eerie white light. In the alternate periods of darkness, the men could see nothing. The first white phosphorus grenade thrown by the enemy landed at one end of the skirmish line. The entire line stopped momentarily. One man fell dead with a bullet through his neck. A burning streamer from another grenade hit Cpl. Virgil J. Penwell's rifle, setting the stock on fire and burning Penwell's sleeve.

Captain Brownell's counterattack progressed steadily, moving a yard or two with each grenade-burst. As the line reached the highest part of the
hill, a grenade-burst revealed See Chinese 15 or 20 feet ahead, kneeling side by side in firing position.

Sgt. Virgil E. Butler, who had thrown the grenade, yelled, "Get them where you can see them!"

Half a dozen men fired at once. At the same time, a Chinese whistle sounded and when the next grenade exploded two of the Chinese had disappeared. The third, still kneeling, was dead. A rifle left by one of his comrades leaned against his body. Enemy opposition diminished suddenly and then, except for a few rifle shots, ended.

By 0130, 18 May, Captain Brownell's counterattacking force had spread out to occupy the rest of Hill 800. Eight men had been wounded during the attack; only one had been killed. It had been easier than any of the men expected. Captain Brownell immediately reorganized the highest portion of his company's sector. The men set up machine guns again, reallocated the supply of ammunition and grenades, and reoccupied all of the bunkers except the one farthest north. This bunker was still occupied by Hipp, Ricki and Rowe, who had remained in it throughout the enemy occupancy of the hill. They had heard enemy soldiers talking and moving nearby, but did nothing to cause a disturbance. Nor did anyone bother them. They heard the American counterattack approaching, saw the Chinese soldiers falling back, and then one of them commenced to fire a BAR to let the other men of Company K know they were still there. Men in the nearby bunkers, however, assuming that these three men were dead and taking no unnecessary chances, fired upon the bunker the rest of the night. It was not until daylight that Hipp, Ricki and Rowe were able to identify themselves.

Communications were restored, and artillery and 4.2-inch mortar fire was concentrated on the saddle leading to Hill 916. Nothing else happened on Hill 800 for the rest of the night. The men pulled blankets around themselves and sat shivering in the cold, damp bunkers while the night dragged out. About two hundred enemy had infiltrated Company K's positions through and around the battalion's right flank, and had sniped at supply and communications personnel.

While Hill 800 was secure for the rest of the night, increasing pressure was placed on the extreme left flank of Company K's front and on Company I, to its left. Preceded by heavy artillery and mortar fire, at 0415 the Chinese overran Company I's right flank and the left flank of Company K.

The reserve platoon of Company I, which had been given the mission of clearing enemy snipers from the ridge recently occupied by the reserve platoon of Company K, was immediately withdrawn in order to seal the gap between the two companies and restore the line. The reserve platoon of Company K was ordered to continue its screening mission from Hill 800 south along the ridge to Hill 754.

When morning came on 18 May, the men on Hill 800 scouted the area. They found 2 live Chinese, 28 bodies on top of the hill and in bunkers, and 40 or so more along the barbed wire in front of the position. Besides bodies, the enemy had left a previously captured American machine gun, fourteen burp guns, rifles, packs, and food. There were also many unexploded American grenades scattered over the hill. The Chinese had failed to pull the pins and had thrown them after only bending the handles.

Company K went to work rebuilding its defenses, replacing barbed wire the enemy had cut the night before, repairing telephone wires andequally important burying the wire under eight inches of earth as the men had originally been told to do. The forward observer from the 38th Field Artillery Battalion registered in artillery in a solid semicircle around the area in front of Company K.

Colonel Hanes set out to make a personal reconnaissance and inspect his defenses. He found the line intact with the exception of the one penetration between Companies K and I, and this break was larger than previously reported. He estimated that several hundred Chinese had crowded into bunkers formerly occupied by members of the two companies. With such a large break in his line, Hanes realized he would have to restore these positions before dark or his battalion would be unable to prevent a major breakthrough the next night.

Assembling the support platoons from both companies, Hanes organized a counterattacking force and quickly briefed the men on the situation. Although they were exhausted from their arduous activity during the previous night, Hanes exhorted them to make every effort to restore the line before darkness fell again. He prepared for the attack by firing more than a thousand 4.2-inch mortar shells.

As the counterattack got under way Colonel Hanes intensified the mortar fire. Under this fire the heaviest ever observed by members of the attacking platoons the Chinese abandoned the bunkers and broke in full retreat. Before launching his attack Colonel Hanes had instructed the mortar observers to register concentrations along the only route by which the enemy could escape. When the enemy "bugout" started, the observers yelled for more fire, shifting the concentrations to keep up with the retreating Chinese. There were two halftracks near the bottom of the hill in Company I's sector, and crews manning the quad caliber .50 machine guns on these halftracks poured enfilade fire into the Chinese as they scrambled through the double-apron wire fences through which they had crawled during the night. The mortar men fired so rapidly that they burned their tubes and bent the base plates. The attacking infantrymen, moving closely behind the well-coordinated mortar and machine-gun fire, shouted jubilantly. It was a most successful attack. Enemy losses were high and Colonel Hanes's force restored the 3d Battalion's positions without suffering any casualties.

By the end of the day, Company K had rebuilt its defenses and corrected the weaknesses of the previous night. Artillery observers had fired on suspected enemy movement and assembly areas throughout the day and the regimental commander had given Hanes's battalion priority on air support. Planes made several strikes against Hill 916. Nevertheless, toward evening Chinese began moving on the southern slope of Hill 916, indicating that another attack was in the making.

East of the 3d Battalion, the enemy had dislodged two ROK divisions and parts of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division from the Noname Line. The entire right flank of X Corps was in process of falling back and turning its line to prevent an enemy envelopment. The new line, anchored on Company L, extended in a southeast direction to the town of Hangye on the Hongchon River.

When darkness came on 18 May, Captain Brownell and his men crawled into their bunkers to wait. An hour or two passed. Beyond the barbed wire there were the sounds of whistles and horns, and the usual commotion as the enemy formed to attack. After waiting and listening for several minutes, Brownell requested artillery fire. It came promptly, interrupting the enemy attack, or at least delaying it for twenty or thirty minutes. When it was re-formed, the forward observer signaled for another concentration.

Several attacks were held off in this fashion before any enemy succeeded in reaching Company K's line. When they did, the company commander warned his platoon leaders of what he was going to do, and then asked for the artillery to drop proximity-fuzed shells squarely on top of his company. The first shell burst overhead within a minute. Two thousand 105-mm shells fell during the next eight minutes. It was the heaviest concentration of artillery fire any of his men had experienced. They sat in the rear of their bunkers, staying well clear of the openings.

"You think we'll ever get out of this alive?" one of the men asked his bunker companion. At the time few men thought they would.

The artillery fire ended and a sudden quiet settled over the area. It remained quiet for twenty minutes or longer before more shells this time from the enemy fell in preparation for the next enemy attack. Again Company K waited until the Chinese were upon its position, then asked for another concentration. In the midst of the firing, Captain Brownell reported to Colonel Hanes.

"The position is completely covered with fire," he told his battalion commander. "Nothing could live above ground in this."

Men of Company K did little fighting themselves that night. They just sat in their earth-covered bunkers and waited for the enemy. When they heard enemy activity the men would notify Captain Brownell of the location, and the forward observer would shift the artillery's airbursts to that area. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion alone fired more than ten thousand rounds in support of the 3d Battalion during the night. It was a record for that artillery battalion. Most of the shells fell between 2200 and 0400 the following morning (19 May) when the Chinese abruptly broke off their attack.

When daylight came the enemy had disappeared, this time taking all supplies and equipment from his side of the barbed wire. Emerging from their bunkers, men of Company K were in full possession of the hill. The left-wing company of the battalion (Company I) was also in its original position, but Colonel Hanes had withdrawn Company L a short distance during the night in order to refuse his right flank.

Across the Korean peninsula Hanes's battalion was the northernmost unit on the United Nations' line. Before the enemy attack, the United Nations' front lines had extended northeast from a point just north of Seoul. The east end of this line, turning on Company K's Hill 800, had fallen back during the three-day battle to a defense line that slanted southeast and became known as Modified Noname Line. Situation maps at X Corps and 2d Division headquarters, on the morning of 19 May, showed the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, holding the northern point of a deep bulge in the front lines.

The commanding generals of X Corps (General Almond) and the 2d Division (General Ruffner) met in mid-morning and decided it would be necessary to abandon this bulge and withdraw the 38th Infantry in order to straighten and consolidate the corps' line.

When advised of this decision, Colonel Hanes protested. His defensive position, he argued, was still solid and could withstand any attack the enemy could throw against him. He preferred to stay where he was. General Ruffner ordered him to take up new positions to the south.

Colonel Hanes passed the order down to his commanders who, like himself, hated to give up a position upon which they had worked hard. Hanes told his commanders to explain to all members of their companies that they were giving up their positions not because they had been beaten by the enemy, but because they had been ordered to withdraw. He ordered them to gather up all equipment and supplies in their company sectors, and march down by companies.

The regimental commander (Col. John C. Coughlin) was at the bottom of the hill when the 3d Battalion came down that afternoon. He watched the infantrymen march past. Their horseshoe packs were rolled tight, their heads were high, their shoulders were thrown back. They had proved they could beat an all-out enemy attack, and they looked proud and cocky and confident.

Task Force Gerhardt

Beginning on 16 May, the Chinese launched their second spring offensive, aiming the main effort at U.S. X Corps. They made impressive gains at first, especially on the east flank of the corps' sector, but the vigor of the attack slackened noticeably after several days. At the end of a week, the enemy units were overextended, short of supplies, and weakened by serious personnel losses. While his troops were absorbing this enemy thrust, General Almond (X Corps commander) successfully bargained with Eighth Army for an additional infantry division as well as for the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. Having thus reinforced his corps, General Almond laid plans for a counteroffensive.

On the evening of 22 May, realizing that his corps had contained the enemy force and that opportunity for exploitation was at hand, General Almond attached the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment to the 2d Infantry Division. At the same time, he ordered the division commander to send the 187th on a rapid and strong thrust north along the road running from Hongchon to Inje. Attacking on 23 May with two battalions, the 187th Airborne gained four miles while, across the corps front, the initiative passed to the United Nations forces as they shifted from defensive to offensive warfare. Anxious to speed up his offensive operation, General Almond at 0940, 24 May, ordered the 2d Division to send a task force from the 187th Airborne to seize the bridge site on the Soyang River and, incidentally, to kill as many Chinese as possible. He ordered the task force, not yet formed, to jump off at 1200 two hours twenty minutes later.

Col. William Gerhardt (executive officer of the 187th Airborne),

Colonel Brubaker turned over to Major Spann with instructions to wait for the rest of the tank battalion and guide it forward to the starting point at Puchaetul. With Major Newman, Brubaker started forward in the other jeep to meet Captain Ross at the initial point.

"I want you to organize this point," he told Newman, "and you'll probably have to go with it."

About 1230 the two officers reached Puchaetul, where the task force was forming. Colonel Gerhardt arrived soon afterward and gave his final instructions. He already had sent the engineer platoon and the I&R squad forward to search for mines on the road, and he had obtained from the 3d Infantry Division a company of tanks that would be ready to move out with the main body of the task force. After reviewing the mission, the general situation, and advising all commanders that they could get air support simply by firing white phosphorus shells at any target, he ordered the lead tanks to get under way. It was about 1300.

The four tanks started north with the platoon leader (Lt. Douglas L. Gardiner) riding in the first tank and Major Newman in the second tank. Each of the medium tanks (M4A3E8) was armed with a 76-mm cannon, a caliber .30 bow machine gun, and a caliber .50 antiaircraft machine gun. In addition to 71 rounds of ammunition for its cannon, each tank carried 49 boxes of caliber .30 ammunition and 31 boxes for its antiaircraft machine gun.

Two miles beyond the point of departure the tanks came upon the other two elements of the point the engineer platoon and the 187th Airborne's I&R Platoon. The latter unit consisted of eleven men riding in three jeeps. Each jeep mounted a caliber .30 machine gun. The engineer platoon had two 2 1/2-ton trucks. Major Newman re-formed his column in the following order: two tanks, a jeep, two tanks, a jeep, and then the two trucks, followed by the third jeep. In this order the column advanced another mile to a friendly advance outpost at Koritwi-ri, where it halted while engineer mine detector squads went forward to probe the road.

A helicopter descended and from it stepped General Almond (X Corps commander). He asked Major Newman the cause of the halt. Newman explained that the column had stopped temporarily to permit a check of the road by mine detectors, and to establish communications between the tanks and the squad from the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon. General Almond was impatient.

"I don't care about communications!" he said, emphasizing this assertion by shaking his swagger stick at Major Newman. "You get those tanks on the road and keep going until you hit a mine. I want you to keep going at twenty miles an hour."

Newman ordered the column to move forward, instructing the tank commanders to shift to fifth gear, which would be equal to about twentytwo miles an hour.

General Almond flew back to the command post of the 187th Airborne. Standing in front of the command-post tent was Major Spann (the 72d Tank Battalion's S-3) whom Colonel Brubaker had left behind to contact and guide forward the rest of the battalion. Spann reported to General Almond who, in rapid succession, asked to what outfit he belonged, why the tanks weren't moving, and the name of the commander of the 72d Tank Battalion.

"You tell Brubaker," General Almond replied when Spann had answered these questions, "to get that tank column moving whether the tanks have infantry support or not."

At this moment the 187th Airborne's S-3 emerged from the tent. While General Almond was repeating his instructions to this officer, Spann left to deliver the general's message to Colonel Brubaker.

Colonel Gerhardt, in the meantime, had formed the elements of his task force in their relative positions in the column and had moved the column onto the road. Before Major Spann could relay General Almond's order through Colonel Brubaker, it had reached Colonel Gerhardt through his own staff. Gerhardt rushed up to the commander of Company B, 72d Tank Battalion, and told him to disregard the organization of Task Force Gerhardt and to get the tanks up the road to the Sovang River as fast as possible. The tank platoons, however, were intermingled with the task force column, the road was clogged with supply trucks, and it was not possible to immediately separate the tanks from the rest of the column.

After spending considerable time jockeying tanks and other vehicles around in the column, Ross succeeded in separating the tanks of the 1st Platoon which he sent along to join the leading platoon. As these tanks left the point of departure, Newman reported that he and the 3d Platoon were more than halfway to the Sovang River, having just cleared Oron-ni. He asked to have more tanks join him as quickly as possible.

When the point of the column moved out in fifth gear after encountering General Almond, the tanks reconnoitered four or five suspected enemy positions by firing at them either with the turret machine guns or the tank cannons. After advancing about a mile, the tank-platoon commander noticed two men manning a 3.5-inch bazooka near a destroyed bridge. As the tanks rolled forward, the men dropped their weapon and ran up the river bed to the northwest. Lieutenant Gardiner killed both of them with the caliber .50 machine gun. There was some enemy fire in response from rifles and from a light machine gun which fired short bursts from about seven hundred yards away.

In the second tank in the column, the mechanic had his cap knocked off by a bullet from the machine gun. SFC Roy Goff (commander of the tank) turned his caliber .50 machine gun toward the Chinese, the other tank commanders Joined him, and together they killed the enemy gunner as he attempted to change firing positions.

Since the tanks were still attracting light small-arms fire, the tankers directed the fire from all their weapons at suspected positions within a range of three hundred to five hundred yards. Eight or ten enemy soldiers then jumped out of foxholes near the bank of the Hongchon River which paralleled the road. The tankers killed 5 or 6 of them, but several escaped. The entire action lasted about five minutes.

The point of the task force column moved forward, again firing on all suspected enemy positions. (A soldier, hunting for souvenirs on the morning of 25 May, found seven dead Chinese in a cave into which the tanks had fired.) About a mile farther north, the crew of the lead tank noticed a group of 15 or 20 enemy soldiers on the road ahead. The Chinese waved their hands in a friendly manner at the tanks. Opening fire with the caliber .30 bow machine gun, the tank crew dispersed the enemy soldiers, but at the same time other groups of 4 or 5 men appeared on hills to the left of the road. These soldiers, drawing fire from all of the tanks, scampered first one way and then another as though they were uncertain about the direction in which to go.

Ahead was a mountain pass where Major Newman and the other tankers expected trouble. When Lieutenant Gardiner's lead tank reached the foot of the pass, he could see two houses at a bend commanding the road. Halting his tank, he reported this on the intertank radio. Newman told him to fire into the houses. Gardiner's fire set them ablaze, but he saw no one leave the houses.

The column continued through the pass unmolested until the last two tanks were emerging. Then two enemy machine guns, located on a fiftyfoot-high knoll on the east side of the road, opened fire on the rear of the column. The machine gunner in the jeep at the end of the column returned the fire, and the last two tanks commenced firing their machine guns and cannons. Just then a liaison plane came overhead and dropped a green smoke bomb to attract attention and then a grenade container with a message. A member of the I&R Platoon recovered the message, which said there was a large number of enemy troops on a hill east of the road, and instructed the tankers to fire several rounds of white phosphorus if they wanted an air strike placed on the enemy. Major Newman did not want to wait for an air strike. After silencing the two machine guns, the column moved forward to Oron-ni a shabby huddle of houses at the bottom of the pass where there was another brief exchange of fire between enemy automatic weapons and the tanks. Four Chinese surrendered. The tank crews motioned them to the rear of the column where they could ride on one of the trucks.

After reporting to Colonel Gerhardt by radio that the point of the task force column had cleared Oron-ni, Newman ordered the tanks forward again. Several small groups of Chinese appeared on a ridge west of the road, but this time the tanks did not stop although the tank commanders

fired the antiaircraft machine guns at the enemy soldiers. After advancing another half mile, the lead tank crossed a culvert.

"You'd better watch the draw on the right," Gardiner radioed back to Major Newman. "There's a lot of stuff in it."

Newman had transferred from the second tank to the third in the column because the radio in the second tank had failed. Lieutenant Gardiner and Sergeant Goff (in the second tank) continued a short distance to bridge across a four-foot-wide stream where the tanks stopped again Gardiner had his tank crew fire the machine guns and the 76-mm cannon toward the front and both flanks.

In the meantime, Newman had the tank in which he was riding (the third in the column) go just beyond the culvert so that he could see the draw about which Lieutenant Gardiner had cautioned him. He noticed several log-covered dugouts and, at about the same time, saw a platoon sized group of Chinese run from the east side of the road into the culvert. Major Newman told the leader of the I&R squad to take his men into the draw and fire on any enemy positions there in order to stop the smallarms fire coming from that direction.

While the I&R squad deployed and moved on foot into the draw east of the road culvert, Newman and the bow gunner from his tank got out and walked back to the end of the culvert and motioned for the Chinese to come out. Enemy bullets whistled past the two men and struck the road nearby, stirring up small patches of dust. Thirty-seven Chinese soldiers came out of the culvert, hands over their heads, and surrendered. All enemy fire from the draw east of the road stopped suddenly. Newman sent the prisoners to the rear of the column, where they could ride with their four comrades in the custody of the engineers.

During all these events. The I&R squad was firing rifles, BARs, and a light machine gun at a rapid rate against what appeared to be a large enemy force at the head of the draw. The squad leader ran back to tell Major Newman that several hundred enemy soldiers were escaping at the east end of the draw. The first two tanks in the column were too far away to help, but the last two tanks fired 12 to 15 rounds of 76-mm high-explosive shells into the draw. Although it was impossible to determine the results, all enemy fire ceased. The I&R squad returned to its vehicles, and the column moved off, rejoining the two tanks which were waiting at the small bridge. The fire fight lasted only about twenty minutes.

After renewing the plea for the rest of Company B's tanks, the column moved forward another mile or mile and a half to Sachi-ri, where about two hundred Chinese opened fire from both sides of the road and from hills beyond the village. The tanks stopped outside of the little village and returned the fire while the I&R squad deployed again and moved into the group of houses where thirty more enemy surrendered. At this point, Newman had to decide between mounting the prisoners on the rear decks of the tanks or leaving them on the road under guard. He chose to leave them, and placed four guards selected from the engineer platoon over all the prisoners captured thus far.

A short distance beyond Sachi-ri, the tanks came upon a group of 80 to 100 enemy foot soldiers armed with rifles and burp guns marching toward foothills on the left side of the road. They were leading about twenty pack animals. As the tanks approached them, the enemy soldiers stopped and stared as though they were in doubt as to whether the tanks were friendly or enemy. The tanks also stopped and opened fire from a range of two hundred yards with machine guns and cannons. While men from the jeeps and trucks took cover from some enemy small-arms fire, the tankers fired about twenty 76-mm rounds and ten boxes of machine-gun ammunition, scattering and partly destroying the enemy group.

After ten minutes the column again moved out, this time going three quarters of a mile before meeting another group of enemy soldiers, this one about twice as large as the last one. They were marching toward the road from the northwest and were leading pack animals. After firing into this enemy column for ten or fifteen minutes and scattering it completely, the tankers believed they had killed or wounded at least half of the Chinese.

Now seven or eight miles in front of the main body, the point of Task Force Gerhardt went another mile without meeting further enemy resistance. It rounded a sharp bend in the road and approached a small hill, and minutes later, when the lead tank reached the top of the hill, Lieutenant Gardiner's men saw another enemy column marching southward toward their tank. Some of the enemy soldiers were walking in a creek bed on the west side of the road, while the others followed the road. Like the other enemy columns, this one included pack animals.

A liaison plane appeared overhead and dropped a message saving that about four thousand enemy soldiers were on the road about a mile farther north, and that two flights of jet planes were on the way to make an air strike against them. The message warned the tankers to wait until the planes had finished their napalm run before continuing forward. Gardiner, who retrieved the message, took it back to Major Newman.

"What are we going to do now?" he asked.

"We're going to attack the Chinks!" Newman answered without hesitation. "If we turn back we'll run into General Almond."

Deploying off the road in a skirmish line, the tanks opened fire on the enemy column, which was not more than five hundred yards away After a few minutes (at about 1600) the jets arrived They dropped napalm bombs well to the front, then circled to strafe the enemy column, flying so low that the tankers could feel the heat from the engines.

Anxious to reach the enemy column while it was still suffering from disorganization caused by the air strike, Gardiner started forward and all tanks followed. The planes were still strafing the Chinese who, scattered
now and in flight, had abandoned supplies, pack animals, and some vehicles a which they had previously captured from American forces. The point of the task force, now not more than a mile and a half from the Soyang River, moved into the confusion with the tanks firing all weapons. Several houses near the road were burning; along the road were dead animals and bodies of enemy soldiers killed either by the napalm strike or the advancing tanks. The tankers saw and fired at Chinese soldiers scrambling off the road trying to escape into the steep hills on both sides.

At about 1630 the tanks, still firing, reached an open area from which the members of the task force point could see the Soyang River. Besides scattered enemy soldiers south of the river, the tankers could see and fire upon enemy groups moving along a road that followed the north bank of the river.

The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company B, which Colonel Gerhardt had dispatched separately, joined Major Newman's force soon after it reached the river. The main body of Task Force Gerhardt arrived at 1830. It had also encountered some opposition on the way. That night the complete task force formed its defensive perimeter on the banks of the Soyang River.

Million Dollar Hill

Million Dollar Hill was one of the limited objectives of U.S. Eighth Army. It was several miles north of the northernmost line along which United Nations troops built and manned fortified positions during the summer months of 1951. Its name was an indication of the cost rather than the value of the hill. Lt.Gen. James A. Van Fleet (commander of Eighth Army) did not want to occupy and hold the hill since to do so would form a large bulge in the army's defensive line. But Million Dollar Hill was valuable terrain to the enemy, and it was chosen as the objective of one of several attempts to keep the enemy off balance, obtain information, capture prisoners, and prevent the Chinese from crowding too close against the United Nations' main line of resistance.

Accordingly, Eighth Army directed that the hill be captured. The order went to IX Corps, to the z4th Infantry Division, and then down to the 3d Battalion of the 5th Infantry. The attack was scheduled for the second day of August.

The 24th Division had made similar attacks against the same hill, had occupied it and then had abandoned it earlier that summer. From the main fortified defense line (Line Wyoming), Million Dollar Hill was prominent, not because it was higher than the ridges around it, but because artillery and air strikes had burned and blasted away all vegetation on the thousand-yard-long ridge, and it stood bare and brown among the other hills, which were green from heavy summer rains. Members of the 3d Battalion had named it Million Dollar Hill because they realized that ammunition worth at least that much had burst in flame and flash upon its crest. To the Chinese, Million Dollar Hill afforded good observation of the 24th Division's line. In American hands, it dominated the main enemy supply route to the north.

As a terrain feature it was like other Korean ridgelines. It was so steep-sided that a grenade falling anywhere except along the trail-wide spine would probably roll on downhill. Its bare clay top, seven hundred feet above the stream at the bottom, was an hour's steady climb for an infantryman loaded with supplies. The ridgeline was broken up into five mounds, each shaped like the hump on a camel's back. There was one large hump that was the main part of the hill and four others that became successively smaller toward the east. A few shaggy and splintered stumps remained on these humps, but the earth on the south side of the hill, where the bulk of our artillery shells had fallen, was as bare as though it had been plowed.

The attack against Million Dollar Hill commenced on the morning of 2 August and lasted for two days. Companies I and L made the assault and seized the hill. This story is the account of the defense of the hill by Company K, which relieved the attacking companies after the hill was secure.

The relief of the assault companies was scheduled to begin on the evening of 3 August. It was still light when men of Company K started up the trail at 2100. Darkness during the Korean summer would not come for half an hour yet. The 2d Platoon was first in the column. Lt. Wilbur C. Schaeffner a replacement officer who had joined the company three days before was in command of the platoon.

The infantrymen moved slowly and quietly. Within a few minutes their fatigue jackets were wet with perspiration, and drops of sweat ran down their foreheads. An hour later Lieutenant Schaeffner and the thirty-one men of his platoon reached the crest of the hill and moved on out to take up positions on the east end of the ridgeline. Schaeffner split his platoon between two of the smaller mounds, leaving the smallest one the mound at the eastern tip of the ridge unoccupied.

The company commander (Lt. Robert H. Hight) brought up the remainder of the company and posted it along the two larger mounds at the west end of the ridge. This move, and the relief of the other companies, was an allnight process, and the last men were not in place until after first light the next day. As quickly as they were relieved, men from Companies I and L picked up their equipment and started down the trail and then moved back to reserve positions on the ridgeline just south of Million Dollar Hill.

Meanwhile, before dawn, the enemy was harassing Schaeffner's 2d Platoon. These men had to prepare their own positions, since neither Company L nor Company I had constructed defenses on the eastern humps of the line. Because the sides of the hill were so steep, the only good approach left to the enemy was over the eastern tip of the ridge. Schaeffner put a machine gun on top of his east mound and pointed it toward the saddle between this and the tip of the ridge and then placed two BAR men to protect the gun. Before the men finished digging in the gun or their own foxholes, several mortar rounds fell on the area. These tended to speed up the process of digging holes. Then one Chinese soldier walked up and threw a grenade at the machine-gun emplacement. The gunner and the two BAR men opened fire together and hit the Chinese, who dropped the gun he was carrying, fell, and rolled down the ridge side, apparently dead.

This action immediately drew fire from an enemy machine gun firing from the easternmost tip of the ridge not more than sixty yards away. The two machine guns traded short bursts for about forty minutes enough action to worry the men since their positions were not well organized and they had only the ammunition they had carried up themselves. The carrying parties of Korean civilians had not yet reached the top of the hill with a resupply of ammunition.

When it became light again on the morning of 4 August, the commander of Company K (Lieutenant Hight) started organizing his defensive positions. After the 2d Platoon's experience during the night, Hight decided that if the Chinese were going to get that close he should have a tight perimeter rather than outposts that might become isolated and surrounded. He arranged his men around a slender perimeter that followed the thin ridgeline so that the foxholes were just a few feet below the top of the ridge, the men almost back to back. He insisted that all men dig their holes deep.

Lieutenant Hight and his artillery forward observer (Lt. Mack E. Magnum, from Battery C, 555th Field Artillery Battalion) then planned and registered their protective concentrations around their position. Altogether they could call for supporting fire from two batteries of 105-mm howitzers, two batteries of 155-mm howitzers, and two companies of 4.2-inch heavy mortars.

The men put out trip flares and other warning devices around their area. Throughout the day the Korean carrying parties brought up smallarms ammunition, grenades, and other supplies. In addition to forming a solid defense for the night, Lieutenant Hight made up a reserve squad of eight men, which he planned to hold at his command post near the center of the perimeter, from which point he could rush it to any spot on the line that might need help quickly during the night. Hight considered this squad an important element of his defense. It gave the men confidence to know that if any break in the line occurred, it would soon be plugged by the reserve squad.

For night illumination there were on call artillery and mortar flares that were adjusted to illuminate the northern slope of the ridge. The south side was to be illuminated by three 60-inch air-warning searchlights that were placed several miles away on the main defensive lines. One of these was pointed directly at the hill and two were aimed up so that the clouds over the area reflected the artificial moonlight.

During the afternoon and evening the men slept when they could. There were dark clouds across the sky that evening and dusk came early. Just before it got dark one of the squad leaders from the 2d Platoon (SFC Raymond M. Deckard) registered the company's 60-mm mortars on the eastern tip of the ridge. The three mortars were emplaced within shouting distance of the company's command post on the highest part of the ridge so that the range was about three hundred yards.

Just as the last light left the sky it began to rain, and the searchlights came on. Lieutenant Hight set out to make the 2100 check of his positions, walking just below the rim of the ridge on the slippery clay mud. There was no enemy activity. The men were sitting quietly in the rain, waiting. Hight returned to his trench just as two flares went up in the valley between him and Companies I and L. He looked at his watch. It was 2115.

"Christ! " he said. "They're starting this thing early tonight."

The Chinese were several hundred yards away and nearer the reserve units of the 3d Battalion, which fired toward the area from which the trip flares came. Hight suspected that other groups would probe his lines soon.

Within a few minutes the machine gun at the east end of the ridge opened fire and, at about the same time, a group of Chinese came up the steep side of the ridge against the center of the company's perimeter. Hight watched the fire fights develop and decided the enemy had planned a three-pronged attack against him but that one of the groups the one that set off the trip flares had gone too far south and had not reached its objective at the right time.

The main action occurred at the eastern end of the perimeter in the sector of Lieutenant Schaeffner's 2d Platoon. A group of Chinese crawled up and threw about sixty grenades at Schaeffner's men. One of the grenades cut the wire on the sound-powered telephone that joined the opposite ends of the platoon. The Chinese were so close, and the ridge so narrow, that most of the grenades went over the men and exploded harmlessly farther down the side of the hill.

Since it appeared that the enemy might follow the grenade attack with an attempt to overrun the platoon positions, Sergeant Deckard and the two BAR men who were protecting the machine gun (Cpl. Philip B. Brumenshenkel and PFC Herman W. McKinney) gathered up their grenades and crawled a few feet up to the ridgeline where they knelt side by side like three crows on a limb peering at the Chinese below them. In the heavy rain it was difficult to see more than a few yards but, as one of them explained, "There were so many enemy on the hill we couldn't waste ammunition that night." The three men stayed there, their rumps prominent in silhouette, dropping grenades on the Chinese whom they could see or hear crawling through the brush below them.

At the same time, the machine-gunners and riflemen were aiming a heavy volume of fire across the tip of the ridge to keep the enemy from occupying that area The fire fight lasted about twenty minutes before the enemy moved back. The activity gradually subsided and the close action ended, although the enemy kept up steady rifle fire and longrange supporting fire from machine guns located directly to the north. It was now close to 2200. There was loud, rumbling thunder and the noises from the fighting reverberated from the low clouds. The rain fell steadily, slanted by a hard wind.

Except for long-range firing there was a lull for half an hour or more. The second burst of activity started when one enemy soldier sneaked up to within twenty feet of the machine gun manned by Cpl. Gilbert L. Constant and PFC Robert J. Thomas. It was raining very hard at the time and the wind and rain and thunder made it difficult for the men to see or hear anything.

PFC Walter Jeter, Jr., saw the enemy first and yelled, "Look out on your left!"

Instead of a rifle or a grenade the Chinese had a signal-flare gun. From it he fired a red flare that landed on the ground directly in front of the machine-gun emplacement and bulged up in a blinding red light. Thomas a Negro who was considered an expert infantryman by the other members of the platoon stood up to look over the light of the flare and saw several enemy directly in front. He had unhooked the elevating and traversing mechanism so that the gun swung free on the pintle. He set off a long burst from his machine gun, then stopped long enough to shout, "Now go back and count your goddam noncoms!" Thomas killed the enemy soldier who fired the red flare, but while he was firing to the front another Chinese worked up on the left and pitched a grenade in the machine-gun pit. This seriously wounded both Thomas and Constant, who called out that they were hit. The squad leader (Sergeant Deckard) told them to come on out if they could, and sent his assistant (Cpl. John W. Diamond) to take over the gun. Just as Diamond was getting out of his hole, however, a grenade burst wounded him in the face and arm. Deckard hurried over and manned the machine gun himself since it held the critical point on the line and had to be kept in action.

At about the same time both members of one of the BAR teams with the machine gun were wounded, the BAR belonging to the other team jammed, and something went wrong with the machine gun that slowed up its rate of fire. Deckard called for the reserve squad to plug his line. By this time there were five men, a BAR, and the machine gun missing from his line just at the time the action was beginning to reach the most furious pitch of the night.

The rain and the fighting increased in intensity at the same time. At the top of the ridge, Lieutenant Hight stood in his trench watching the action which, he thought, for wild fury exceeded anything he had experienced against the Japanese during three and a half years in the Pacific during World War II. There were four heavy machine guns on the enemy's main position 400 or 500 yards to the north which were firing into the area of the 2d Platoon. They left four red lines, only slightly arched, drawn across the narrow valley between the two ridges. Another enemy machine gun the one on the eastern tip of the ridge kept up a heavy and steady fire, trading tracers with the machine gun which Deckard was now operating. The lines of tracers from the two guns passed each other so closely that Hight kept expecting them to collide.

Added to the noise of this fire were about forty enemy riflemen firing at close range at the 2d Platoon, and grenade and mortar explosions which, like the other sounds, were magnified by low clouds and the rain. Searchlights against the clouds made areas of luminous white light over the ridge, and there were flares in the sky two thirds of the time during the heavy fighting. They made a hazy sort of light, like lanterns hanging out in the fog. Even in the heavy rain, which accumulated more than five inches during the night, there was light enough so that Hight could see the men slogging through the mud or occasionally standing on the ridgeline firing down at the enemy. Their helmets and wet clothing glistened in the white light. In addition to being one of the heaviest fire fights Lieutenant Hight had seen, he considered this one handled as coolly as any in which he participated. None of the men got excited, because each had confidence in the others and knew that when morning came, unless wounded, the man in the next hole would still be there.

Lieutenant Schaeffner, whose platoon was in the midst of the heavy fighting, called by telephone and asked for the special support squad, explaining that his machine gun was not working well. Lieutenant Hight dispatched the eight men at once, asked for an increase in the 4.2-inch mortar fire, and called down to his own mortar section to plaster the tip of the ridge. He also arranged to replace the machine gun with the one from the 3d Platoon. Within a short time the fire power of the 2 d Platoon was restored and, as soon as the danger was past, Hight called off his supporting fire. The 2d Platoon's fire fight continued almost without abatement until half an hour past midnight. This rate of fire had used up the original basic load of ammunition and much of the reserve supply that Hight had stored by his command post near the center of the perimeter. SFC William T. Akerley was busy taking extra bandoleers from the 1st and 3d Platoons and redistributing them to the 2d. Deckard's machine gun had already fired twelve boxes of ammunition.

Lieutenant Hight called his battalion commander (Major Ernest H. Davis) to tell him that he had the situation under control but that he needed more ammunition. Davis told him to stretch the ammunition as far as he could but to hold the hill.

"Don't worry about the real estate," answered Hight. "Just get some ammunition up here."

Davis promised to have the carrying party on the way soon. Meanwhile, Hight sent out instructions for the men to conserve ammunition. They observed this to some extent, but since it was difficult to see, there were few aimed shots and the volume of fire remained high.

The enemy's second heavy assault ended before 0100. The volume of rain also slackened a little by this time but was coming down steadily. Enemy machine guns, mortars, and some small arms continued firing from a distance. But there were no assaults, although the men expected another one soon and were concerned about their lack of ammunition. They waited, but at the end of two hours they had received neither the enemy's next assault nor the ammunition.

Finally, an officer with several tanks stationed down near the road called Lieutenant Hight to tell him that the Koreans carrying the ammunition had returned to the base of the hill after having been fired upon during the trip up. This information made the ammunition scarcity a serious problem, and Hight again called his platoon leaders to say that there would be no more ammunition available until morning. One of the men explained that they were almost out as it was, and some of them had their last ammunition in their guns.

"What are we going to do when this is gone?" he wanted to know.

"Well, by God," answered Hight, "we'll just wrestle them when we run out of ammunition."

To save the ammunition he had on the hill, Lieutenant Hight again called for the artillery and the heavy mortars to lay down his final protective lines. The fire continued for an hour and a half until 0430, when Hight called it off because the enemy's fire had almost ceased. During this time the 4.2-inch mortars alone fired 2,l65 rounds. There had been a couple of light, probing attacks during that time, but neither had the verve or force of the first two.

The rain ended soon after it began to get light on the morning of 5 August. The enemy activity was also over except for several groups that attempted to get back apparently to recover some of their equipment. The men counted 26 Chinese in these groups and fired upon them with machine guns and mortars, killing 7 and wounding others. They also counted 39 bodies in front of their perimeter, and believed they had killed or wounded others. Company K had suffered five men wounded from the action, but the morale and pride of the men were high.

Late that afternoon Lieutenant Hight received orders to abandon the hill at dusk that evening. The men fixed demolition charges and booby traps over it and marched off just as it began to get dark.

Bloody Ridge

Bloody Ridge was so named by Stars and Stripes. Men of the 9th Infantry Regiment (2d Infantry Division), fighting there, read stories of the action which, for security reasons, Stars and Stripes did not clearly identify and wondered in what sector this bloody battle was raging.

Bloody Ridge consists of three hills 983, 940 and 773 and their connecting ridges. Four razor-back ridges converge on the western extremity of Bloody Ridge to form Hill 983, a sharp and well-defined point and the highest peak of the ridgeline. To the east, and separated from 983 by a steep draw, the 1,100-yard-long center section of Bloody Ridge comes to a peak at Hill 940. Another thousand yards east of this peak is Hill 773.

The maze of enemy trenches on the ridges made it appear to air observers that Bloody Ridge had been plowed. The trenches connected many bunkers which the enemy had built strong enough to withstand artillery fire and air strikes. The larger ones sheltered as many as sixty men. Some protected small artillery pieces or mortars. Detection of enemy positions from the ground was difficult because the hills were partially wooded and enemy soldiers had been skillful with camouflage.

The planning and fighting for Bloody Ridge took place while cease-fire negotiations droned on at the Kaesong armistice conferences. This eastwest ridgeline was considered a desirable terrain feature for purposes of observation, but from Eighth Army's over-all point of view it had little value. The battle for Bloody Ridge was one of several limitedobjective attacks by which Eighth Army leaned against the enemy in order to prevent the enemy from leaning against it.

Fighting for Bloody Ridge had been going on for twelve days when the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, made its first attack against the hill mass. During that time an ROK division had seized the three hills, only to lose them the next day. It was a bloody ridge for the South Koreans also. In ten days the ROK regiment that had made the main attack suffered more than a thousand casualties. About one fourth of these were listed as killed or missing.

Supporting units were numerous during the entire Bloody Ridge battle. Included were the four artillery battalions of the 2d Division; two additional battalions of medium artillery; one additional 105-mm battalion; two heavy-mortar companies; two regimental tank companies; and one company from a medium tank battalion. The fires of ail these units were coordinated by 2d Division Artillery.

Beginning on the foggy morning of 17 August 1951, ROK troops launched their attack against Bloody Ridge. They secured it, finally, on 25 August. They lost it again the next day. On 27 August, the 9th Infantry, which had placed its 2d Battalion in supporting positions on Hill 940, attempted without success to seize Hill 983. The 2d Battalion withdrew that evening, going all the way back to Worun-ni. On the 28th, the 3d Battalion, attacking the long ridge from the east, failed to reach even the first objective (Hill 773). Faced with a surprise attack that night, it also fell back to Worun-ni. Thus, before the 1st Battalion made its first attack against the Bloody Ridge hill mass, UN forces had captured the long ridgeline only to lose it again, hill by hill.

On 30 August, the 9th Infantry made a frontal assault, sending its 1st and 2d Battalions straight north against Hill 940. Both battalions got within a few hundred yards of the top of the ridgeline before enemy fire halted the advance. Casualties were heavy. Company A was reduced to half strength. The three aid men with the company became casualties, one platoon leader was killed, the company commander and another platoon leader were wounded. Lt. John H. Dunn took charge of the company.

When it became apparent that neither battalion would reach the objective before dark, the regimental commander ordered both to withdraw.

As an artillery forward observer (Lt. Edwin C. Morrow) crawled toward a knob in Company A's area, he heard a voice behind him.

"Lieutenant, it looks like you'll have to take over."

Turning around, Morrow recognized one of the sergeants from Company A. "Where's Lieutenant Dunn?" he asked.

"Dead."

"How many men are left?"

"Twenty-two."

"What were your last orders?"

"Withdraw and reorganize at last night's position."

While the sergeant told the men to pull back, Lieutenant Morrow arranged for fire to cover the movement.

"This is the fastest transfer of an Artillery officer to the Infantry that I've ever seen," he thought.

Seven artillery battalions fired a smoke mission as the remaining infantrymen carried the wounded men down the hill. They had to leave the dead and much equipment behind.

Not until about 0400 on 31 August did the entire 1st Battalion reassemble in the area it had occupied before the attack. Even then the men were not allowed to sleep. The battalion commander (Lt.Col. Gaylord M. Bishop) notified his company commanders that, because of an expected enemy attack, it would be necessary for all men to stay on the alert. They received rations, however the first that many of them had eaten since the previous morning. When the expected attack had not materialized, after a two- or three-hour wait the battalion moved by trucks to an assembly area south of Worun-ni where the companies were to have two hours in which to reorganize before attacking another hill. Morale was low, the weather depressing. It was foggy and unseasonably cold.

At the assembly area the men received dry socks, hot coffee, and ammunition. There was a supply of oil, cleaning rods, and patches. There was also mail. More replacements joined the rifle companies.

Before noon on 31 August the 1st Battalion loaded on trucks again and rode two miles forward. Its mission was to attack Hill 773 this time from the east. At the detrucking point the infantrymen formed company columns and continued forward, Company C in the lead. There were dead North Korean soldiers all along the road.

At the eastern tip of the ridgeline, where Bloody Ridge ended at the road pass between Worun-ni and the Pia-ri Valley, Company C turned left and climbed toward the first knoll on the ridgeline leading toward Hill 773. The knoll was already in friendly hands, since the 38th Infantry Regiment had maintained an outpost there for several days. The main positions of the 38th were across the road on the high ground immediately east of Bloody Ridge. Since the 38th Infantry's high ground afforded the best observation of Hill 773, Colonel Bishop had established his observation post on that hill east of the road. He and his S-2 (Lt. Charles W. Mallard) were already at the observation post when Company C left the road and started up the ridgeline in the attack.

Colonel Bishop watched the infantrymen, climbing slowly in single file, as they passed the outpost on the first knoll, but beyond that the attacking infantrymen were obscured by the morning fog and haze. Low clouds, as though tethered to the mountain peaks, hung over Hills 773 and 940, hiding them completely.

Beyond the outpost position Company C proceeded haltingly, the scouts setting the pace. There were frequent delays in the long column and it was easy for the infantrymen, even at the rear of the column, to guess that they would soon make contact with the enemy. Those toward the rear sat down and waited quietly.

An enemy machine gun suddenly commenced firing from a knoll 100 to 200 yards beyond the front of the column, setting off a blazing, ten-minute fire fight. Striking the forward elements of Company G the machine-gun fire wounded several men, including the company commander (Lt. Orlando Campisi) and one of the platoon leaders. Although other men returned the fire, it had little effect since the enemy gun's crew had the advantage of a substantially constructed bunker.

Because of the fog Colonel Bishop could not see the action clearly, but the radio operator with the attacking company (Cpl. John J. Truax) notified him by radio that the two remaining officers of Company C were wounded and that the attack had halted. Colonel Bishop ordered Company B to attack through the stalled Company C and continue up the ridge. At the same time he sent Lieutenant Mallard to take command of Company C and provide as much supporting fire as possible for the attacking company. Fog prevented the use of artillery.

Up on the ridgeline the commander of Company B called to Lt. Joseph W. Burkett and told him to take his 1st Platoon forward. The other two companies both with attachments from Company D would furnish covering fire for Burkett's platoon. The top of the hill was still obscured by fog, and Burkett could not see the route he was to follow. After telling his platoon sergeant (SFC Floyd Larney) to assemble the squad leaders, Burkett went off to question men of Company C in order to get a description of the terrain ahead and the location of enemy bunkers and automatic weapons. According to men of Company C, the approach to the first knoll ahead marked the trouble line.

Occasionally the fog lifted. During one of these breaks Lieutenant Burkett planned his supporting fires, then quickly briefed his squad leaders.

"Saddle up!" he called out to his men when he had completed his preparations, and started up the ridgeline.

Under the supporting fire of four machine guns, the platoon advanced without incident and against negligible enemy fire. Burkett's main concern was to maintain control over his platoon. Sixteen of his twentytwo men were replacements who had joined the company within the last two days. Although willing to do their part, they were obviously tense and had a tendency to lag or to bunch a tendency common even among seasoned troops when attacking along a narrow ridge spine that limited maneuverability.

After moving about seventy-five yards, or halfway to the first knoll, Burkett stopped to check his walkie-talkie radio his only contact with his company and his only means of shifting the supporting machine-gun fire. His radio was working.

At the base of the knoll, which was actually only a small hump on the ridgeline, Burkett and his men expected enemy grenades. None came down. Enemy small-arms fire had picked up but the knoll itself protected the platoon grouped at its base, and the men could not tell whether the fire originated at the crest of the knoll or came from farther up the ridgeline. Burkett, with three men, started toward the top of the knoll, about thirty feet from the base. After asking the others to watch the top and cover him, Burkett crawled forward until he was near the crest, raised up on his knees, pulled the pin from a grenade, leaned back slightly for more leverage, and threw the grenade to the opposite side of the knoll. In so doing he leaned back so far that his helmet fell off. He watched it roll down the side of the ridge. Even before the grenade exploded, the other three men started forward, and all four went over the crest together. They found only unoccupied holes.

Fifty yards or less ahead there was another knoll. Before the platoon had gone far, Lieutenant Burkett noticed that the supporting machine guns had quit firing. He called for his platoon runner who carried the radio. At this critical time, the radio failed. Burkett tried for several minutes to get in touch with his company, but the radio was dead.

Enemy fire had increased in volume and effectiveness, and Burkett was bitterly disappointed that his only fire support had stopped. The mortars, like the artillery, had been silent all morning because of the fog. As Lieutenant Burkett later learned, the machine-gunners quit firing because the fog completely obscured the attacking platoon, which was getting too close to the line of fire as it moved higher on the ridgeline. Because he had neither visual nor radio contact, Burkett now found himself without supporting fire as well. He dropped the radio in disgust.'

Lieutenant Burkett tried moving his platoon forward, but as the fire increased his men strung out until not more than ten remained in a forward group with their platoon leader. About twenty yards from the crest of the second knoll Burkett and the men with him saw several grenades come over the knoll. The riflemen dropped to the ground as the grenades rolled downhill toward them. The explosions caused no damage except to blow particles of loose dirt into Burkett's bare head. More grenades followed, but the North Koreans threw them so hard they landed among the rear elements of the platoon. Burkett spotted several enemy soldiers in a well-camouflaged bunker from which the grenades were coming, and directed his men to keep the bunker under fire. Despite the fire, grenades and an occasional burst of machine-gun fire continued to come from the bunker. Although able to see each grenade as it fell, the replacements made no effort to scramble to one side and avoid them. Several men were wounded. One man was lying prone in the path of a grenade and made no apparent effort to get out of its way. The explosion picked him up and rolled him down the ridge. He was still screaming as he rolled out of sight.

The commander of Company B (Capt. Edward G. Krzyzowski) sent three BAR teams from another platoon to help Lieutenant Burkett's platoon and to compensate for the loss of the machine-gun support. One of these BAR men (PFC Domingo Trujillo) walked up to Burkett, explained why he was there, and asked what he should do. He was grinning, and perfectly calm. Burkett pointed out the enemy bunker that blocked his platoon's advance. Trujillo, standing erect, fired one burst into the bunker and then lowered the gun to his waist. Behind Trujillo was another BAR man (PFC Robert L. Spain). As Trujillo lowered his weapon, Spain sighted into the opening of the same bunker just as a North Korean rose to return the fire. Spain pulled the trigger on his automatic rifle but it misfired. The burst from the enemy gun struck Trujillo in the neck and chest, killing him instantly.

Several men threw grenades in the direction of the bunker, but none was close. Lieutenant Burkett told the men near him to continue firing at it while he tried to get close enough to use grenades effectively. Both the assault platoon and the bunker were on the right (north) side of the ridgeline, the bunker being just below the crest. To avoid the enemy machinegun fire, Burkett crawled over the ridgeline to the south side, then crawled west toward the top of the knoll. He moved slowly since he could not see far in the fog and he did not want to run head-on into another bunker. When he estimated that he was about even with the bunker on the opposite side of the ridge, he crawled back to the ridgeline where he could see the top, pulled the pin and let the safety lever pop before giving the grenade a gentle toss. It exploded right on top of the covered bunker. Gaining confidence, Burkett pitched a second grenade, which exploded in the same area. He called down to a squad leader (Sgt. Charles Hartman) for more grenades in a hurry. Hartman got three and tossed them to Burkett, who pulled the pins and threw all of them. Burkett began to feel like a man who had just won a fight.

About thirty seconds after the last explosion, the North Koreans opened a door at the rear of the bunker and threw five or six grenades at Lieutenant Burkett. Seeing them, Burkett slid down the ridge to get away from the explosions. He stopped by Sergeant Hartman and told him to watch out for the grenades. Just then another landed about six feet above the two men and rolled toward them. The explosion wounded both men. Lieutenant Burkett told his men to move back and establish a line beyond grenade range and hold there until he could return and get help from Captain Krzyzowski.

It was now late in the afternoon. Colonel Bishop ordered Company B to pull back and establish a perimeter for the night with the other two rifle companies. Captain Krzyzowski sent another platoon forward to help evacuate the wounded men from Lieutenant Burkett's platoon.

The fog disappeared at dawn on 1 September. The sky was clear and
the morning bright. Colonel Bishop shifted Company A into the lead position for the attack and called for artillery fire to cover the ridgeline between Hills 773 and 940. Lieutenant Ma]lard's Company C, in supporting positions, adjusted mortar fire on Hill 773 and set up two heavy machine guns to fire at the objective.

Advancing by marching fire under this protection, the assault platoon went as far as Company B had gone the previous evening before the enemy, firing from the same bunker that had caused trouble on the 31st, again halted the advance. When the leader and several other members of the forward platoon were wounded, the company commander (Lt. Elden K. Foulk) started forward, leading another platoon to bolster the assault. Machine-gun bullets struck his leg, wounding him seriously. Several other men were wounded at about the same time. Lieutenant Foulk dragged himself back to Company C's position, explained to Lieutenant Mallard that Company A needed help, and then collapsed from shock. When information of this situation reached Colonel Bishop, he decided to commit Company B again, as he had done the day before when Company C needed help.

Captain Krzyzowski led his company through the remaining men of Company A. As two machine-gun crews and four BAR men from Company C fired on the bunker, the assault platoon of Company B worked up close enough to get grenades into it. After a five-minute grenade fight, these men seized the knoll and the bunker that had been blocking the battalion's advance. One of the platoon leaders a replacement officer who had joined the company only fifteen minutes before it moved out was wounded in the attack.

The action was all over by 1000. The 1st Battalion now held the three prominent knolls on the ridgeline leading to the top of the hill. The highest point on the ridge Hill 773 was the next prominent knoll. It was about 250 yards away at the hook end of a narrow ridgeline shaped like a question mark.

At about 1400, Company B, now down to about fifty men, resumed the advance on the ridgeline. Under the control of Lieutenant Mallard, the 60-mm mortar sections from the three rifle companies supported the advance by firing from positions to the rear of Company C. Mallard fired the three sections together, like artillery.

After advancing about a hundred yards along the question mark ridgeline, the lead elements of Company B came upon three enemy bunkers. Immediately, the North Koreans threw grenades which exploded and wounded five of Captain Krzyzowski's men. An enemy machine gun opened fire from a position on Hill 940.

Captain Krzyzowski ordered his company back and called Company A, asking for a bazooka and several rounds of ammunition for it. He also got in touch with Company C and adjusted the 60-mm mortars so that the shells fell directly on the crest of Hill 773. This fire kept the enemy at least

partly neutralized while two of Company B's new men, carrying the borrowed bazooka and ammunition, crawled forward and silenced the first bunker.

Crossing to the south side of the ridge, PFC Edward K. Jenkins crawled on his belly until he was above the second bunker, then crossed back and dropped three grenades into it. While Jenkins was knocking out this bunker, an enemy soldier in the third bunker threw a grenade into the group, wounding two men. One of the men tossed three more grenades up to Jenkins; he lobbed two of these into the third bunker and ended the interference from that enemy position.

At this point, enemy soldiers began firing at Company B from another bunker about twenty-five yards farther up the ridgeline. One of the men fired several rifle grenades at the bunker, but could not tell what damage, if any, he caused. Fire from the bunker prevented movement on the north side of the sharp ridgeline, and as men of Company B moved to the south of the question mark ridge to flank the bunker, they were exposed to machine-gun fire from Hill 773 at the top of the question mark, and from the slope of Hill 940, six hundred or seven hundred yards away.

Because of approaching darkness, Colonel Bishop ordered Captain Krzyzowski to pull his company back to the last knoll captured and, with the two other companies, establish a perimeter for the night. Only 22 men were left in Company A that evening; about 20 in Company B.

Early next morning (2 September), 156 replacements, including 6 officers, joined the 1st Battalion. Companies A and B each received 2 officers and 65 men. Company C received 2 officers and 20 men. While the rifle companies distributed these replacements into their platoons, Colonel Bishop moved a tank and a quad .50 flakwagon into a position on the Worun-ni road from where they could fire at enemy positions on Hill 940.

Lieutenant Mallard, acting as the eyes and ears for the battalion commander, established an observation post on the crest of the last knoll captured and from there directed the tank fire by radio and for the first time during the attack made effective use of the heavy mortars. While Mallard plastered Hill 773 with massed mortar fire, an artillery forward observer covered Hill 940 and planes made strikes against the west end of Bloody Ridge.

There was no attack on 2 September. Twice during the day a platoon from Company C probed the approaches to Hill 773, but each time the enemy, armed with an abundant supply of hand grenades, made a spirited defense of his dug-up hilltop and forced the patrols back. The defensive perimeter remained unchanged.

At 0900, 3 September, Lieutenant Mallard alerted one of his platoon leaders (Lt. Arnold C. Jones), a replacement officer who had joined the company the day before. Jones's platoon was to lead the next assault. But before this attack could get under way, Colonel Bishop radioed instructions to hold up until after an air strike that he had arranged for could take place. Colonel Bishop further stated that Lieutenant Mallard was to be prepared to direct the strike by radio. Since Mallard was already directing the fires of the 60-mm and 81-mm mortars by telephone, and tank fire by radio, he asked the commander of Company A to direct the air strike. This was Lt. Robert D. Lacaze, a battalion staff officer who had taken command of Company A after Lieutenant Foulk was wounded on the previous day.

Four fighter planes appeared over the hill at 1030. They dropped eight napalm bombs, only one of which hit the very top of the hill. But the others fell on the reverse slope and close enough to be effective. Lieutenant Lacaze directed the strike to within 150 yards of the battalion's positions so close the men could feel the heat from the burning napalm. The infantrymen, watching the fire mushroom and turn from orange to black, cheered and shouted. A second flight followed, and this time the planes dropped eight antipersonnel bombs equipped with proximity fuze. Then the planes returned and made several strafing runs on the objective. As the planes cleared the area, Lieutenant Mallard called in the artillery and mortar fires again, some on Hill 773 and some on Hill 940.

Between 1300 and 1400, when the air strikes were over, Colonel Bishop radioed instructions for Mallard to resume the attack. Company C's strength on 3 September was about 85 men. The riflemen were divided into two platoons of experienced men and one platoon having a large proportion of replacements. Lieutenant Jones, leading one of the experienced platoons, started forward, attacking around the neck of the question mark. Although enemy bunkers blocked this route, it was still better than trying to take the direct route over the ridge in the face of machine-gun fire from Hill 940. The assault platoon reduced the first two bunkers but suffered so many casualties that the attack stalled in front of the third one. Most of the casualties were caused by grenades that came, not from the bunkers, but from enemy soldiers entrenched on the opposite side of the sharp-edged ridge, only a few yards away. Mallard committed his other experienced platoon, but by the time it had moved up even with Jones's it had lost so many men it was no longer effective. At about the same time, Jones was wounded. Although this was only his second day with the company, he had more combat experience than the other platoon leaders of Company C.

Earlier that day Colonel Bishop had sent several replacements to the rear for a quick course in the use of the flame thrower. Six of these men, carrying three flame throwers, returned in the middle of the afternoon, arriving at Company C at the same time Mallard's second platoon became stalled. Lieutenant Mallard called Colonel Bishop to explain what had happened so far and to ask for permission to commit his third platoon and the three flame-thrower teams. He also wanted a platoon from Company A in order to have a reserve unit within his company. The battalion commander agreed.

The flame-thrower teams and Mallard's third platoon moved out at once. An enemy bullet pierced the pressure tank on one flame thrower, making it useless. The other two operators, however, succeeded in reaching the area controlled by the North Korean grenadiers. Crawling almost to the crest of the ridge, the two operators pointed the flame-thrower nozzles up and discharged the tanks so that the burning jelly fell on the reverse slope of the ridge, forcing the enemy out.

At the same time, the rest of Company C continued around the curve of the question mark and, after destroying two more bunkers, finally seized the very top of Hill 773. Lieutenant Mallard immediately sent the attached platoon of Company A to the hilltop with instructions to prepare to repel a possible counterattack from the direction of Hill 940. The commander of Company A (Lieutenant Lacaze) stationed his men in enemy trenches on the west side of the hill. Thus Company A held Hill 773 facing the enemy on Hill 940, a thousand yards to the west.

Company C, which numbered about 85 men at noon before the action commenced, now had only about 30. Before organizing the defenses for the night, Mallard asked and received permission from the battalion commander to consolidate his company with Company A. Most of the remaining men in his own unit were experienced in combat, whereas most of the men of Company A were recent replacements. By intermingling the men, Mallard hoped to increase the effectiveness of the two companies. As he moved up to Hill 773 to accomplish the planned reorganization, a friendly artillery shell fell short, wounding him. He sent a runner forward to tell Lieutenant Lacaze to take command.

Mallard started back to the aid station. On the way he met Captain Krzyzowski, who was in the process of moving Company B into the positions vacated that afternoon by the other two companies. Krzyzowski had barely completed this move when he was killed by bullets from the machine gun on Hill 940. This left Lieutenant Lacaze and one other officer in charge of all the men who remained in the three rifle companies.

Two days later, Colonel Bishop's battalion occupied Hills 940 and 983 without opposition. The enemy had apparently moved north to strengthen positions on the next prominent terrain feature in that area Heartbreak Ridge.

Heartbreak Ridge

In the complex structure of enemy defensive positions protecting the seven-mile-long hill mass that became known as Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 520 was only a small, subsidiary position a hump at the western end of a spur from the Heartbreak ridgeline.

Fighting for Hill 520 came near the end of the month-old battle for Heartbreak Ridge. On 10 October 1951, United Nations troops, holding the main north-south ridgeline, had already secured the steep part of the spur ridge that slanted down toward Hill 520. That part of the 520 ridge still in enemy hands consisted of several humps, the last and highest of which was Hill 520 at the blunt tip of the ridge. Responsibility for seizing this hump had passed from Eighth Army to X Corps, to the 2d Infantry Division, and finally to its 23d Infantry Regiment and to Company G, whose battalion commander selected it to make the attack.

Fighting had been so severe on Heartbreak Ridge that at one time Company G numbered only twenty-three men. By 10 October, however, enough replacements had joined to build the strength of each of its platoons up to about twenty men. The commander of Company G had gone to Japan for the five-day rest and rehabilitation tour. Accordingly, Lt. Raymond W. Riddle, a combat-experienced executive officer, was in command for the attack. He decided to commit his 3d Platoon (under Cpl. David W. Lamb, acting platoon leader) to make the first move.

The other two rifle companies from the 2d Battalion were in positions to support the attack. Company F, located on the same ridge just behind Lieutenant Riddle's men, was prepared to pass through Company G and
continue the attack, if necessary. Company E was to support the attack by firing from a parallel ridge five hundred yards to the south.

The flat top of Hill 520 was not more than two hundred yards beyond Company G's line of departure. On the ridgeline, about halfway between these two points, there was a small knoll. After considering an envelopment of the enemy position by sending Corporal Lamb's platoon into the Fluor Spar Valley a narrow strip of flat land between his position and Company E on the next ridge to the south, and so named because of fluor spar (the mineral fluorite) mines in the valley Riddle decided to make a direct assault along the ridgeline. There were enemy minefields in the valley. He could see some enemy movement on the objective. Hoping to draw fire so he could estimate the enemy strength there, Lieutenant Riddle ordered everyone in the company including the mortarmen to fire on the objective for thirty seconds. The enemy, however, did not return the fire.

When this ruse failed, Lieutenant Riddle called for supporting fires from the artillery, heavy machine guns, and Company E's 57-mm recoilless rifles. At about 1300, after ten or fifteen minutes of preparation, he stopped the artillery and instructed Corporal Lamb to double-time his platoon to the intermediate knoll under cover of fire from the machine guns, the recoilless rifles, and the other riflemen in Company G. Once there, he was to set up a platoon base of fire and make the final assault on the objective.

Moving out quickly, Lamb's platoon reached the knoll without difficulty. The machine-gun crew set up its weapon and opened fire on the main objective. After deploying his platoon around the base of the knoll, Lamb reported back to Lieutenant Riddle: "No casualties yet, but receiving plenty of fire." In response to Lamb's request, Riddle instructed the support elements to intensify their fire, especially on the south side of the objective.

PFC Harry E. Schmidt, who was with Corporal Lamb's platoon, had a yellow panel wrapped around his waist. His mission was to stay with the lead assault elements so that the supporting elements would know where the platoon was. Although conspicuous himself, Schmidt made it easy for the rest of his company and for men of Company E to identify the most forward position of the attacking platoon.

While the rest of the platoon fired at bunkers on the east end of the hill, Corporal Lamb sent one squad around the left side of the objective. Brisk enemy fire drove the squad back to the platoon base, proving that both the preparatory and supporting fires had been ineffective against the enemy bunkers. Several men from the attacking squad were wounded, ands enemy fire, reaching back to the intermediate knob, had caused several other casualties there. Corporal Lamb radioed to Lieutenant Riddle for reinforcements.

Loading the 1st Platoon with ammunition, Riddle committed it to assist in the attack. Lt. Jay M Gano, a recent replacement, commanded the 1st Platoon. Since he was inexperienced in combat, he had instructed Pvt. Cliff R. High, who had been running the platoon, to continue to do so for the time being.

As the 1st Platoon crawled toward Lamb's position, two men were wounded not far beyond the line of departure. One of them, seriously wounded in the face and neck by a machine-gun bullet, became hysterical, and it was necessary for High to hold him down. Farther forward, Lieutenant Gano, with the lead elements of his platoon, had almost reached the intermediate knoll when he was killed on this, his first, attack. The platoon halted, pinned down by hostile fire.

Just at this time Corporal Lamb's machine gun ceased firing. "I'm out of ammo!" the gunner shouted.

Seven or eight enemy soldiers came out of their bunkers and suddenly appeared on the slope of Hill 520 descending toward Lamb's platoon. He reported that he was being counterattacked. Supporting machine-gun fire was too high to be effective. Lamb's riflemen opened fire, the ammunition bearers fired their carbines, and even the machine-gunner began firing his pistol. Part way down the slope the enemy soldiers stopped, then turned back.

A brush fire had started in the area between Lamb and the company's original position. The haze and smoke from the fire drifted north over High's immobilized platoon, making it impossible for Lieutenant Riddle to see the objective. Taking a chance, Riddle ordered his machine guns at the line of departure to fire on Hill 520. Lamb reported back that the machine-gun fire was "just right."

Under cover of the machine-gun fire and the smoke from the brush fire, High, having calmed the wounded man, sent him and another casualty to the rear and then worked his platoon forward, meeting eight or ten wounded men from Lamb's platoon who were making their way back to the company.

Corporal Lamb needed more machine-gun ammunition, and Lieutenant Riddle sent a squad from the 2d Platoon up-with eight boxes. In the meantime, Lamb and High planned their assault.

Several enemy mortar shells now fell among High's platoon, wounding six more men. High sent them to the rear. He now had 11 men besides himself; Lamb had about 12. After the ammunition arrived, the two platoon leaders, leaving six men to man the machine gun and fire rifles from the intermediate knoll, called off their long-range supporting fire and then assaulted with the remaining men deployed in a skirmish line, firing as they moved forward.

Sixty yards of open ground lay between the jump-off point and enemy trenches on the slope of the objective. All went well until, halfway across, the enemy commenced firing automatic weapons. This fire was not effective, however, and did not stop the advance. When the skirmish line reached the base of the knoll, enemy soldiers stopped firing; and began throwing fragmentation and concussion grenades. These caused trouble. One of the grenades wounded Lamb. Cpl. Arne Severson, seeing the skirmish line falter, picked up his machine gun and walked forward, firing as he advanced. When he reached the base of the hill an enemy grenade exploded at his feet and broke both of his legs. But he set up his gun and continued to fire until the attack stalled. Two men dragged him back.

High moved the remaining members of both platoons back to a covered position and radioed Lieutenant Riddle to bring in the machinegun fire again and to send help, if possible. North Korean soldiers in bunkers on the objective began to taunt High and his men with phrases such as, "American, you die!"

Deciding to make a second attempt this time a close-in envelopment of the objective High called off the supporting fire again and led about a dozen of his men downhill toward the south, where they could move without being seen or fired upon by the enemy. They then climbed the hill, moving north to the top of Hill 520. When the men broke defilade, the enemy opened fire and began throwing grenades again. A concussion grenade knocked High down. The rest of his men, believing him dead, straggled back to the platoon base. Within a minute or two, however, High regained consciousness and returned to the platoon base where he reorganized the remaining men about twenty in all.

In the meantime, regimental headquarters had sent three flame-thrower operators to the 2d Battalion, two of them designated for Company G and one for Company F. Lieutenant Riddle sent all three men, their flame throwers strapped to their backs, forward to help High. One operator was wounded almost immediately upon leaving the line of departure; the other two reached High as he was preparing to make another assault. He sent one flame-thrower operator and two riflemen directly to the front.

Under cover of fire, the men crawled into positions from where they could place flame on the foremost (eastern) bunker on Hill 520. As soon as this bunker was destroyed, High led the rest of his platoon around to the left and formed a skirmish line facing another enemy bunker on the south side of the hill. In position, he signaled the flame thrower to open up. As soon as the flame thrower commenced operating, High was to signal for the assault. This time the flame thrower failed to work.

By then only two enemy bunkers were interfering with the attack. A machine gun was firing from each. High decided to make the assault without the flame thrower. He sent a BAR team to knock out one bunker while he, with a rifleman and the third flame-thrower operator, walked
toward another. Firing as they walked, the men exposed themselves because High feared that if they tried to crawl they would be pinned down. Ten yards from the bunker, the second flame thrower failed to work. Standing exposed to enemy fire, the operator took it apart but was unable to repair it. Finally, High told him to get out of the way because he was too conspicuous.

High stationed one of his riflemen in front of the bunker. Unable to hit anyone in it, he nevertheless prevented the North Koreans from firing and thus neutralized the position. Just about that time an automatic weapon began firing from another bunker on the left, and High told Pvt. Joe Golinda to get it. Golinda approached it from one side, High from another, while a third man covered them. Golinda threw a grenade into the bunker, and the gun stopped firing.

With only a few men firing rifles and BARs for support, High and four or five other men made the final assault on the top of Hill 520. Private Schmidt, still wearing the yellow panel wrapped around his waist, stayed up with the foremost men as he had throughout the attack. The group moved on around the hill, firing into the apertures of three other bunkers. All were empty. Once they reached the top of the hill the men saw eight enemy soldiers running over the hill toward the northwest, and opened fire on them. On the north side of the hill High came upon a bunker that had been the enemy's command post. Eight enemy soldiers, still holding their weapons, were huddled in front of the bunker. When High's men fired into the group the North Koreans threw up their hands and surrendered themselves. A few minutes later, four enemy soldiers came out of another bunker that had been bypassed and surrendered. Some of the North Koreans were carrying United Nations safe-conduct passes in their hands. During this final assault, other enemy soldiers were bugging out off the hill.

The knoll was secure at 1600. Company G had incurred slightly over thirty casualties, most of which were due to minor grenade wounds. Several other casualties were sustained by the mortar men as a result of enemy counter-mortar fire.

Jan, Thanks for the wonderful read, I have just got myself DML's Korean war USMC in winter gear and was wondering If you had any photos of them at Chosin?
TIA

Outpost Eerie

Outpost Eerie was about ten miles west of the rubble piles of Chorwon. It was a mile north of the United Nations' main line of resistance and a mile and a half south of the enemy's outpost line of resistance.

In the zone of the 45th Infantry Division during March 1952, Outpost Eerie became the responsibility of Company K, 179th Infantry. Besides defending 1,400 yards of the main line, Company K kept two rifle squads, usually reinforced with a light machine gun and a light mortar, at the Eerie position. The squads had the mission of furnishing security for the main line of resistance and maintaining a base from which patrols could operate. Capt. Max Clark commanded Company K. He rotated among his rifle platoons the responsibility for manning the outpost, letting each occupy the position for a five-day period.

On the afternoon of 21 March 1952 twenty-six men of the 3d Platoon set out to take over Outpost Eerie for the next five days. These men made up two rifle squads, a light-machine-gun squad and a 60-mm mortar squad. Sleet, mixed with heavy, slanting rain, began falling as the men started down toward the valley that separated the main line of resistance and the outpost line of resistance. Once across the valley floor, which was laid out in the usual pattern of rice paddies, the single-file column started up the southern tip of a two-mile-long ridge. Outpost Eerie consisted of defensive installations encircling the point peak of this ridge tip, which rose about 120 feet above the rice paddies. A rocky hill dug up by shell bursts, it had a few scrub trees and bushes and patches of thin grass.

Fifty yards below the peak of the hill were three separate barbed-wire obstacles: first a coiled entanglement, then two double-apron fences all of which circled the hilltop. Passing through the wire entanglements by a gate entrance built across the trail, the riflemen continued to the top of the hill. It was a bald hilltop, dug up from the construction of bunkers and trenches. The yellow soil uncovered during the digging was prominent in contrast to the surrounding hills.

There were nine bunkers around the top. Constructed to accommodate two or three men each, they were made with a double layer of sandbags and logs on the sides and a triple layer of logs and sandbags on top. All were but a few yards below the peak of the hill, and were for shelter only. The firing positions were in a trench that encircled the hilltop adjacent to the bunkers. The egg-shaped area circumscribed by the communication trench was about 40 by 20 yards, with the longer axis extending from southeast to northwest. The trench ran through two of the nine bunkers and just in front of, or below, the others.

At the very southern tip of a T-shaped, two-mile-long ridge, Outpost Eerie was on ground that was lower than several other high points along the same ridgeline. The crossbar of the T, upon which the enemy had established his outpost line of resistance, was higher than the shank, and dominated the entire ridgeline.

Lt. Omer Manley commanded the 3d Platoon, which effected the relief. The men who were relieved after five days on the outpost started back toward their front lines.

Most of the men in Manley's group had been on Outpost Eerie before, and each already knew to which bunker he was assigned. The most important bunkers in the Outpost Eerie defenses were three that guarded the north end of the hill. To each of these Lieutenant Manley had assigned a three-man team armed with a light machine gun and two automatic rifles. Two of these bunkers were built so that they straddled the communication, or firing, trench. The command post bunker was immediately behind the three key positions. In three of the five bunkers on the southern end of the oval there were two-man teams, three men in another, and the five man 60-mm mortar squad in the southernmost bunker.

A sound-powered telephone system connected the nine bunkers. Communication with company and battalion headquarters was by SCR-300 radio and the regular telephone; both were in the command post bunker. There were four separate telephone wires between the MLR and the outpost, thus reducing the possibility of communications failure due to cut lines.

Using Eerie as a base, the 3d Battalion maintained nightly patrols on each side of the shank of the T, covering the most likely routes by which the enemy could approach the outpost. The battalion had scheduled two such patrols on the night of 21-22 March.

One of these, identified as Raider Patrol, was made up of volunteers who were operating with other battalions while their own 1st Battalion was in reserve. Raider, with the mission of capturing a prisoner, left Outpost Eerie at 1900 to establish an ambush point on the east side of the long ridge, six hundred yards north of Eerie. Raider had orders to remain at its ambush site until 0130 on the morning of 22 March, and then return to Eerie at 0200.

A second patrol of nine men from Company K's 2d Platoon, and known as King Company Patrol, left Eerie at the same time to establish its ambush point in the vicinity of Hill 191 a spur ridge on the west side of the shank of the T. Hill 191 was about six hundred yards northwest of and slightly higher than Outpost Eerie. King was scheduled to man its position until 0215 the following morning and then return directly to Company K without passing through the outpost position.

Both patrols were to maintain communications by means of a sound-powered telephone tied into the outpost system.

Soon after arriving in its position, Lieutenant Manley's force test fired all its weapons. At about 1900, Korean Service Corps personnel brought rations, water, and fuel for the small stoves in the bunkers. At dusk the men took their guard positions one man from each bunker remaining in the trench while the others waited or slept in the bunker.

Darkness came early on the night of 21 March. It stopped raining at about 2000, soon after the two patrols had established their ambush points, but the night remained dark, misty, and cold. Since enemy patrols had probed Outpost Eerie on the two previous nights, Lieutenant Manley considered some enemy activity probable.

The infantrymen sat quietly, waiting until almost 2300 before anything unusual happened. Then King, which had set up its ambush on the western tip of the Hill 191 ridge finger, sighted and reported six enemy soldiers setting up a machine gun. The friendly patrol wanted to return to the outpost but could not because of the size and location of the enemy group.

At about the same time Raider, on the east side of the long ridge, sighted what appeared to be a platoon-sized enemy force moving south. As this column came within 150 yards of the friendly ambush point, men of Raider opened fire. The enemy group chose to ignore them, and without returning the fire continued on toward Lantern City the name given to a small burned-out village in which the Chinese frequently used lanterns to identify themselves and to light their way among the ruins. The patrol leader called the outpost by sound-powered telephone, informed Manley of the enemy contact, and said he was withdrawing his patrol.

Lieutenant Manley immediately called the commander of Company K (Captain Clark). "The Raiders have made contact with a large group
of Chinks on their front, left, and right, but did not stop them," he reported. "The patrol has broken contact and is withdrawing to the MLR. We're cocked and primed and ready for anything."

The Raider leader, however, did not inform Manley of the route by which he planned to return to the MLR. Ten or fifteen minutes later, when men in Eerie's front bunkers heard movement outside the wire below them, they passed the information on to the outpost commander.

Lieutenant Manley telephoned Captain Clark of new developments and remarked, "I'd sure like to know where the hell they [the Raiders] are!"

Manley was uncertain whether the sounds at the wire were made by the friendly patrol, or by Chinese.

The attack came at 2330. Two trip flares went off beyond the lowest barbed-wire entanglement. Seconds later, two red flares appeared. Men at the outpost interpreted the latter as a Chinese signal to notify their outpost line that they had made contact, although on that night a single red-star cluster was a United Nations sign for the return of friendly elements to the line. SFC Calvin P. Jones (platoon sergeant of the 3d Platoon) and the other men at the northern end of the outpost opened fire with automatic weapons and small arms.

Lieutenant Manley, still in doubt about the identity of the men outside the wire, rushed over from the command post bunker, yelling not to fire.

"It's the Raider Patrol returning!" he shouted.

"Like hell it is!" answered Sergeant Jones. "They're not talking English. It's the Chinese! Come on, let's get it on!"

It was then that two enemy machine guns opened fire and began sweeping the outpost position. The two weapons, emplaced about eighty yards apart on the highest ground seven hundred yards northwest of Eerie, were just a few yards above Manley's position and hence able to place grazing fire across the Eerie position. Cpl. Nick J. Masiello, manning the machine gun, alternated his bursts between these weapons and the Chinese who were attempting to breach the wire below him. The enemy gunners replied by concentrating fire on Masiello's gun. Meanwhile, the Chinese opened fire with at least one more machine gun and several 50-mm grenade dischargers emplaced on the ridge to the north.

From his observation post atop Hill 418 on the MLR, Captain Clark watched the machine-gun duel. He could see tracers from Masiello's weapon apparently ricochet from the shields that protected the Chinese guns, and it appeared to him that tracers from both guns were hitting each other. When the fight broke out, he immediately signaled for prearranged supporting machine-gun and mortar concentrations. A caliber .50 machine gun, from a position on the forward slope of Hill 418 a few yards in front of Clark's observation post, fired directly over the heads of the defenders and forced one of the enemy machine guns to displace.

The mortar fire was not accurate until Lieutenant Manley made corrections by telephone to Captain Clark.

"They're giving us a hell of a battle out here, but we're OK so far," Manley reported "Bring the mortars in closer.... That's too close! Move 'em out a little.... Now leave them right where they are."

With the first adjustment some rounds fell inside the wire, but were not close enough to the communication trench to harm the defenders.

Lieutenant Manley then headed out of the bunker to consult with Sergeant Jones, but as he started for the entrance, several machine-gun bullets ripped through the shelter half covering it. They were high and hit no one in the command post bunker, but Lieutenant Manley ducked down and crawled out into the communication trench.

Fifteen minutes after the fire fight began, a burst from one of the enemy heavy machine guns hit Corporal Masiello. PFC Theodore Garvin (Masiello's ammunition bearer) picked up the sound-powered telephone at the position and shouted, "Medic!"

Though he was manning the telephone at the command post bunker, Cpl. Herman Godwin heard the loud cry without it. Corporal Godwin was a rifleman who doubled as platoon aid man since he preferred to carry arms rather than to carry or wear any of the insignia or cards by which some medical aid men are identified as protected persons. He hurried down the communication trench to the machine-gun position, where he did what he could to stop the flow of blood and administered morphine.

PFC William F. Kunz (assistant machine gunner), markedly affected by the sight of Corporal Masiello's wounds, continuously lamented, "Poor Nick, poor Nick! "

As the machine gunner died, Corporal Godwin tried to comfort his assistant, saying, "He's not feeling anything."

Kunz went to the bunker; Godwin remained at the machine-gun position to help Garvin get the weapon in action again. The two men rapidly straightened a twisted belt, and Garvin, as gunner, resumed firing. Corporal Godwin assisted him, and at the same time kept the soundpowered telephone near him in case anyone should call for aid. When only one belt of ammunition remained, Garvin told Godwin to take over the gun while he went for more. After calling for Kunz to come back and help him, Corporal Godwin took over the machine gun.

As far as anyone in the perimeter could determine, the Chinese were trying to break through the barbed wire at only two places, the attacks coming from the north and the northeast. For another three quarters of an hour the defenders held off both attacks without further casualties. Lieutenant Manley called the company's command post and asked the artillery forward observer to fire artillery concentration No. 304, which was plotted on the Hill 191 ridge finger. Harassing artillery fire had been falling on this area throughout the evening a few shells at intervals of about twenty minutes.

A little later, about half an hour after midnight, when Captain Clark telephoned to the outpost to ask how things were going, PFC Leroy Winans (platoon runner) replied, "Everything's OK, sir; they're not through the wire yet."

Meanwhile, both enemy assault groups steadily pressed their attempts to blow gaps in the circle of protective wire. At least one of the groups was using bangalore torpedoes.

Mortar and artillery illuminating flares contributed greatly to the defense, but whenever the illumination failed, the flash of the defenders' weapons betrayed-their positions to the enemy. When the supply of mortar illumination shells was exhausted, a 155-mm battery fired an illuminating mission. Most of these shells, however, burst too close to the ground to furnish effective light. Despite all efforts to adjust the height of burst, it was not corrected in time to help.

Effective illuminating fire ceased before 0100, 22 March. About this time PFC Robert L. Fiscus, an automatic rifleman in the bunker to the immediate right of the light machine gun, was wounded. Corporal Godwin, who had been assisting at the machine gun, crawled to his right through the communication trench and found Fiscus lying in the trench outside of the bunker. Carrying the wounded man inside, Godwin dressed the wound.

When Sergeant Jones learned that Fiscus was wounded, he sent Pvt. Elbert Goldston, Jr., to take the wounded man's place as automatic-rifle man. At the same time, he called over Pvt. Alphonso Gibbs, who had been Fiscus's assistant, to replace Goldston as assistant to Cpl. Carl F. Brittian, the automatic rifleman at Sergeant Jones's position the righthand one of the three key bunkers at the north end of the perimeter. Sergeant Jones made this shift because he considered Goldston to be the more experienced automatic-rifle man, and therefore of more value in the area closest to the threatened enemy breakthrough.

Pvt. Hugh Menzies, Jr. (A rifleman acting as Goldston's assistant) was the next man wounded. As Godwin came out of the bunker after dressing Fiscus's wound, he saw Menzies get hit by grenade fragments. Godwin pulled him into the bunker with Fiscus and administered first aid.

Officers at regimental headquarters were trying to obtain the use of a "firefly" a plane equipped to drop illuminating flares. None was immediately available. The only aircraft in the area at that time was a B-26, which later dropped its bombs on enemy positions at the north end of the ridgeline.

By 0100 the enemy had breached the wire in two places. Lieutenant Manley encouraged his men, calling out to them, "Get up and fight or we'll be wiped out! This isn't any movie!"

Goldston was the next man wounded. As the Chinese soldiers came through the breaks in the wire and up the hill toward the outpost, he was hit in both legs by burp-gun fire, and in the arm and head by shell fragments. Of the g men occupying the three bunkers facing the enemy attack, 4 were now out of action, 2 were dead.

Corporal Godwin dragged Goldston through the bunker where Fiscus and Menzies lay, into the trench on the other side. After Godwin administered first aid, Sergeant Jones and Private Gibbs carried Goldston over to their bunker the one on the right (east) which was empty. Corporal Brittian, the BAR man who had started out the night in Jones's bunker, had previously gone over to load BAR magazines for Goldston while he was firing at the Chinese making the attack on the left. When Goldston became a casualty, Brittian took over the BAR and fired it until the ammunition was gone.

Several minutes had elapsed since the enemy broke through the barbed wire and started crawling up toward the outpost defenses. Godwin now discovered that there were no grenades left in the center bunker. He grabbed his rifle and began firing into the advancing Chinese from a position in the communication trench. The enemy troops were very near the top. Godwin fired until his ammunition was gone, threw his rifle at the nearest Chinese and saw the butt hit him in the face, knocking him back down the hill. He then ducked into the bunker to look after the two wounded men and as he did so, noticed Corporal Brittian throwing BAR magazines at the approaching Chinese. Brittian was killed very soon afterward.

At this point, ten or fifteen minutes after 0100, Kunz and Garvin remained fighting in the easternmost of the three bunkers under the heaviest enemy fire. Corporal Godwin was the only able-bodied man in the center bunker. Jones, Gibbs and Goldston, in the next bunker to the right, heard the firing suddenly stop at the center bunker when Godwin ran out of ammunition, and decided that surely they were the only ones at that end of the perimeter still living. Then they spotted enemy soldiers on top of Godwin's bunker. The three men Jones and Gibbs helping the wounded Goldston climbed out of the trench and rolled down the eastern slope of the hill about halfway to the wire. Taking advantage of what cover was available, they lay quiet, and remained there without further trouble during the rest of the action.

Corporal Godwin, in the center bunker with Fiscus and Menzies, also had the feeling that he must be the only able-bodied man left. Stepping out of the bunker for a look, he spotted a Chinese soldier coming along the trench toward him. He stepped back against the bunker, waited until the Chinese was within point-blank range, and shot him in the head with a caliber .45 pistol. Knowing the report would attract attention, Godwin jumped back against the side of the trench. An enemy soldier standing on
the edge of the trench fired a burst from his burp gun, but then moved on without determining whether he had hit Godwin. With nothing but a dent in the lip of his helmet, Godwin went back into the bunker. Moments later an enemy soldier threw a concussion grenade through the entrance opposite the one by which Godwin had just entered, this being one of the bunkers straddling the communication trench. The explosion knocked Godwin unconscious and bent the metal cover of a small Bible which he carried in his left breast pocket.

While this action was taking place at the north end of the oval-shaped perimeter, other Chinese had moved around to the western side of the position. Sgt. Kenneth F. Ehlers (squad leader in a bunker in the leftrear sector of the perimeter) warned the platoon command post by telephone that the enemy was coming around to the west side and requested mortar fire from the outpost's one 60-mm mortar. However, there was only one round left, and it was decided to save it.

Ehlers then went to the bunker south of the one where Kunz and Garvin were still operating the machine gun. There Ehlers, Lieutenant Manley (who had also come over to that position), Cpl. Robert Hill and Cpl. Joel Ybarra, fought the Chinese with their automatic rifles, M1 rifles, and grenades. As the Chinese worked up close, both Ehlers and Hill were killed. At a critical moment Lieutenant Manley ran out of ammunition for his carbine, or it jammed. He threw it at the Chinese and then started throwing grenades at them. After only a few moments, however, all action at that bunker ended; the platoon leader and Corporal Ybarra disappeared.

From the firing position of the next bunker to the south, Pvt. Elmer Nock and Pvt. Edward Morrison moved to the rear through the communication trench when the enemy began coming into the trench toward their position. Cpl. Albert W. Hoog, covering their movement from his position in the next bunker southward, shot two Chinese who were following them.

Shortly after the Chinese broke through the wire, Private Winans (the platoon runner), who by this time was the only man left at the command post bunker, called Captain Clark.

"They're coming through the wire, and it looks like a thousand! " Winans said. "It looks like we're going to have to surrender!"

"No; don't surrender!" the company commander replied. "Go get Lieutenant Manley."

This happened at about the same time the Chinese were overrunning the bunker on the opposite side of the hill where Lieutenant Manley had been.

Right after this an enemy shell probably one from a 57-mm recoilless rifle made a direct hit on the command post bunker. It killed Winans and cut all telephone lines to Company K. There was no more communication within the rearmost automatic-rifle position, manned by Cpl. Robert Shoham (BAR man), PFC David Juarez, and PFC Francis Douglas, there was not much action until the enemy had broken through the wire and was in and upon the outpost position itself. Before that time these men had fired at a few enemy troops who were on the outside of the wire near their position but had received no return fire apparently because the Chinese below them carried grenades but not rifles. When the enemy soldiers came over the top of the outpost toward the rear positions, Shoham opened fire with his automatic rifle, Douglas with his rifle, and Juarez busied himself loading magazines for the BAR. An enemy mortar shell made a direct hit on Juarez, but it was dud. He was quick to throw the shell out of the trench. Except for a bruise and a numbed leg, he was unhurt.

With the enemy on top of Eerie, there was a lull in his supporting fire. The time was about 0120. Corporal Godwin, lying in the bunker where he had been knocked out by the concussion grenade, was beginning to regain consciousness. Hazily, he saw an enemy soldier reach into the bunker for two BARs which were standing in the corner. The barrel of the one he first touched was too hot to handle. After a few harsh Chinese words, he took the cool weapon away with him. When Godwin fully regained consciousness, he discovered his hunting knife was missing. By this time, Menzies was dead.

Back at the company's observation post, Captain Clark told his artillery liaison officer (Lt. Anthony Cotroneo) to shift his artillery fire from two concentrations being fired at the time and to place it squarely on Outpost Eerie itself. In a few minutes, 105-mm proximity-fuze shells began bursting over the position. There followed the sound of a horn blown three times, and within a few minutes enemy activity stopped. The artillery shells fell, and the enemy's recall signal sounded before the Chinese troops had covered the entire outpost area. They had reached but had not searched the 60-mm mortar position on the right and the bunker defended by Nock and Morrison on the left. Without further search of the area, the Chinese withdrew, assembling near the break in the wire they had made at the northwest part of the perimeter. They left two of their dead in the position.

At 0130 the regimental commander (Col. Frederick A. Daugherty) ordered Captain Clark to move the rest of Company K up to the relief of the outpost. Thirty-five minutes later, after a platoon from Company A took over its position on the main line of resistance, Company K moved out.

On the way to the outpost, members of Company K found three seriously wounded men from the outpost near the creek that flowed past the base of the outpost. The men were evacuated. Farther on, the relief men met Raider Patrol, all members of which were safe. The patrol had been caught in the open when the fighting commenced and had been unable to take an effective part in the action. Captain Clark instructed the leader to keep his patrol in its present location until further notice. Later, he patrol tapped in on a telephone line to the main line of resistance and asked to be cleared for return to the main line. Receiving it, the patrol returned and reached the front lines at 0500.

The Company K patrol returned to the main line by going southwest from the Hill 191 ridge finger. At about 0245 it arrived in front of the

unit holding the main line of resistance on the left of Company K's previous position; it fired one red flare the recognition signal. The friendly unit honored the signal, and the patrol entered the front lines at 0330. When the fight had begun at 2330, the patrol had withdrawn to the southwest, beyond the impact area of the falling mortar and artillery hells.

Company K reached Eerie at 0400, about two hours after leaving he main line. One platoon (the 2d) went around to the east side of the position, then climbed up to the peak. The 1st Platoon, followed by the headquarters group, took the direct route, using the gate through the wire at the southeastern edge. Once on top, the men searched the area for casualties, and evacuated them as they were located. After an hour's search, Captain Clark had accounted for all men except Lieutenant Manley and Corporal Ybarra, both of whom had disappeared from the same bunker.

Of the 26 men who had defended Outpost Eerie, 8 were dead, 4 wounded, and 2 were missing in action. With one exception, all men killed had suffered head and chest wounds the parts of their bodies exposed above the firing positions in the communication trench. To the regimental commander this was significant proof of the effectiveness of the wellplaced enemy machine guns. Nine of the twelve unharmed men had either manned the rear positions of the outpost, or had moved to them during the course of the action. It was Captain Clark's opinion that the artillery fire which fell on the outpost after the Chinese had entered it had prevented further casualties. He felt that the air-bursts forced the Chinese to withdraw before they were able to cover the entire outpost area in a thorough search.

The Division's artillery fired 2,614 rounds during the enemy attack. Of this number, 2,464 rounds were equipped with proximity fuzes for airburst effect; the remaining 150 rounds were 155-mm illuminating shells. Together, the regimental Mortar Company and the 3d Battalion's heavyweapons company (M) fired 914 mortar shells, of which all were highexplosive except 10 that were white phosphorus and one a 4.2-inch illuminating the only illuminating shell the company had ever had on hand.

Company K searched the outpost area after daylight, going as far north along the ridgeline as possible in the face of enemy fire. The men found only 2 enemy dead within the barbed wire surrounding the outpost, but found 29 other bodies to the north and northwest along the enemy's route of withdrawal. Artillery fire had been placed along the probable withdrawal routes, and it is possible this fire caused additional casualties and also influenced the Chinese to abandon bodies which they had been attempting to carry away.

Captain Clark's men also found a wounded Chinese. He had been hit in both legs by his own supporting machine guns, he believed. This man later explained that he had been a member of the enemy force that had attacked along the west side of the long ridge a force that apparently consisted of two platoons. On the night of 21 March, the prisoner's squad had eaten the evening meal just before dark, as usual. He and the other men of his squad had then gone to sleep. Some time between 1900 and 2000, the squad leader awakened them and told them to prepare for a patrol. After "running" for an hour or longer along the west slope of the ridge, these enemy soldiers reached the foot of the first hill north of the Eerie peak. After standing in the dark for a short while, each squad present reported its strength. There were 3 rifle squads, 2 machine-gun squads, and 1 grenade-discharger squad, having a combined total of about 60 men, according to the count.

The Chinese patrol leader then delivered a pep talk, telling his men their mission was to capture some U.S. soldiers, and that they should go out and fight gallantly. When the talk was finished, the enemy soldiers moved out to emplace their supporting weapons and prepare to attack The three rifle squads, moving in a column with one and a half yards between men, followed their leader over the Hill 191 ridge toward the outpost position. A similar enemy force was moving along the opposite side : of the ridge. Thirty minutes later the fight began.

Lieutenant Manley's platoon lost some of its weapons during the fight. As the Chinese withdrew they apparently took with them a few M1 rifles and automatic rifles they had picked up as they searched the position. However, they left more American weapons than they took. A later check of these weapons proved nothing except that they did not belong to Company K.

After completing its search of the area, Captain Clark's entire company returned to the main line of resistance. And for several months, Outpost Eerie was not again permanently manned.

Combat Patrol

North of the 38th parallel and on the east side of the Korean peninsula is a large area crowded with steep-sided hills. Most of the valleys are wide enough for only a stream, a footpath, or a narrow road, and a few tiny rice paddies terraced in the draws like stair steps. There is not much land suitable for growing rice, and the houses are few, the settlements scattered.

Here, troops of the United Nations and the opposing Communist armies stabilized their lines during the Panmunjom truce talks. Among these wrinkled and half-barren hills, Noname Ridge was only an obscure finger ridge. Four or five miles straight east of Heartbreak Ridge and near the northwestern rim of a volcano-like crater called the Punchbowl, Noname Ridge was in the area between the friendly front lines and the main defensive position of a North Korean unit. The only prominent feature about it was a little fresh dirt left exposed by enemy soldiers who were constructing new bunkers and trenches there. The dirt was more noticeable because of the snow which, even in early April of 1952, still covered many of the hills, especially in the low and shaded places. Noname Ridge was about a thousand yards from the enemy's main lines, and from positions of the U.S. 35th Infantry (25th Infantry Division). It was within range of friendly patrols.

One of these patrols, scheduled for the night of 3 April 1952, fell to Company A, 35th Infantry, which at the time was manning reserve positions behind the front lines. If possible, battalion commanders assigned combat patrol missions to reserve units because they did not like to weaken their main defenses by using front-line companies for patrolling.

The regiment planned the patrol action on 28 March, naming Lt. John H. Chandler patrol leader. His mission was to conduct a combat patrol to Noname Ridge to kill or capture any enemy encountered. For the job, he was to take a force consisting of two reinforced rifle squads.

Chandler received the patrol plans on the afternoon of 2 April. He selected two squads from his 3d Platoon and several men from the other squads in order to have a total of twenty, including himself. The next afternoon (3 April) he took his nineteen men to a high point overlooking the planned route and briefed them on the patrol scheduled for that night. He pointed out the objective, one of the enemy construction sites on Noname Ridge, and explained that he hoped to surprise an enemy working party while it was digging and unarmed. If possible, the patrol would capture one or more North Koreans, or kill them if capture were impossible.

Using available maps, Lieutenant Chandler had constructed a sand model outlining the most prominent terrain features and the objective patrol. Aerial photographs were not available, and consequently, there were features of the ridges and the draws he did not include in the model. However, the model was good enough to plan the routes of advance and withdrawal and to show the known characteristics of the objective area. Just before the briefing ended, Lieutenant Chandler reminded the men of the battalion's rule concerning casualties.

"Casualties, dead or wounded," he said, "are never left by the rest of the patrol. If any man is left on the field, the entire unit will return to find him and bring him back."

When the patrol assembled after supper, Lieutenant Chandler divided the men into two sections: an assault squad of 8 men and himself, and a fire support squad of the other 11 men.

Two men of the assault squad carried automatic rifles. For mutual assistance and for protection, Chandler paired each BAR man with another man armed with a carbine. The other members of the assault squadChandler, an assistant patrol leader, the two scouts (one of whom was an ROK corporal serving with the 3d Platoon), and the radio operator also carried automatic carbines.

In the fire-support squad the leader (Cpl. David Mitchell) and the assistant squad leader (Cpl. Robert Kirschbaum) both carried Ml rifles, each with a grenade launcher and two flares. Two men carried light machine guns, two were armed with BARs, and the other five had carbines. In this squad also Chandler paired each of the automatic weapons with a carbine for mutual support.

One man in each squad carried an SCR-300 radio; a man in the support squad had a sound-powered telephone and two reels of light wire. Both
wire and radio were tied in with communications at an observation post of Company C on the main line of resistance. From this observation post
manned by Company C's commander, a liaison officer from Company A, and a forward observer from the 64th Field Artillery Battalion there was direct communication by both radio and telephone with the 1st Battalion's command post. The battalion commander (Lt. Col. Philip G. Walker) wanted to be able to direct the actions of both the patrol and the supporting artillery if it became necessary to do so.

After satisfying himself that all details of his patrol were in order, Lieutenant Chandler a man who was both careful and thorough waved his men forward. The patrol crossed the main line of resistance at 2100. As Chandler led his men down the finger toward the stream bed, the 105-mm howitzers of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion fired their usual harassing and interdiction missions. In planning the patrol, the regimental staff had timed the departure to coincide with this evening fire, hoping it would keep the enemy under cover until the patrol was in defilade.

In spite of the difficulty of moving on the steep, snow-covered slope, the men maintained an orderly open column as they worked their way toward the draw. At 2130 Lieutenant Chandler reported to Company C's observation post that he had reached the first check point, located about halfway down the slope. After this first descent the going was easier and the patrol reported from the second check point twenty minutes later. The patrol was now about halfway to its objective. The snow, which interfered with walking part of the time, also reflected enough light to make it easier for the men to see. The moon, in its first quarter, came up at about the time the patrol left the second check point and, since the night was clear, there was good visibility thereafter.

This second check point was near the base of a draw. From this point, the fingers leading up to Noname Ridge looked quite different from the way the terrain had been shown on the map used in planning. In spite of Lieutenant Chandler's careful planning, he was still in doubt as to which of two fingers he should follow. After studying the ground for a few minutes, he chose one and decided to follow it toward Noname Ridge. If this were the correct finger ridge, he would find his objective point close to the top of it. If it were not the correct one, the added elevation would enable him to check his position against known landmarks.

When the patrol reached the crest of the finger, Chandler led his men up the slope of the ridge, through old communication trenches and close to enemy bunkers. There was no sign of the enemy either sound or movement. The infantrymen knew the enemy had maintained an outpost line of resistance on the ridge and it seemed strange to them to be so close to enemy positions and yet to find nothing to indicate that anyone else was near. After going about ninety yards, Chandler concluded that he had chosen the wrong ridge. He turned down the steep side of one ridge, crossed a sharp draw at the bottom and, with the rest of the men following in single file, started up the face of the next ridge, which he now realized was his original objective Noname Ridge.

By the time the patrol reached the crest of the second finger ridge it was almost half an hour past midnight. Chandler reported his position to the observation post, using the radio because all wire for the soundpowered telephone had been used. The patrol, after traveling out of its way, had not backtracked to recover the wire. Moreover, the telephone had not worked satisfactorily after the patrol member carrying it had spliced the two reels of wire. Perhaps the splice was faulty, or perhaps the thin wire lacked sufficient insulation when the wire lay in wet snow.

By the time the patrol reached the objective, it had been out for about three and a half hours. When Chandler reported to the observation post, it had made no contact with the enemy, nor had it found any indications that there were enemy soldiers in the area. When this report reached Colonel Walker, he instructed Chandler to continue with his original mission.

"Get a prisoner if you can," the battalion commander told the patrol leader. "If you can't, shoot 'em up. Decide upon the route you are going to take to make contact, move forward a hundred yards, then report again."

When Chandler had made his decision, he called back to give it to Colonel Walker so the battalion commander could continue to plot the patrol's course. The patrol moved forward without incident. Colonel Walker told Chandler to go another hundred yards and report again.

After the second move, the patrol members saw and heard movement in the direction of the enemy's main defensive line. It appeared that enemy soldiers, still some distance away, were coming down toward Noname Ridge. Chandler called for artillery. In a few minutes, thirty-six 105mm shells fell in the area where the enemy movement had been. The movement stopped with the incoming rounds, but Lieutenant Chandler and his men could still hear voices from the vicinity of the impact area. Though the patrol had now made some contact, it had not yet accomplished its mission of capturing a prisoner. Cautiously, Chandler led his men another hundred yards upward to a point about fifty yards from the very top of the ridge.

Here the men stopped and listened. They could hear noise above them. There were bunkers near the top of the ridge, and the men could hear North Koreans talking and laughing. There were other noises which Chandler's men identified as the sounds made by men while eating. Lieutenant Chandler called back over the radio to Company C's observation post: "We're going on radio silence from here on, so there won't be any chance that the radio will give us away before we're ready."

Then he spent some time trying to determine the outline and construction of the enemy's position.

From the patrol's location below the crest of the ridge, the men could see a large bunker that would be a little to the left of the patrol's route of approach. On each side there were other smaller bunkers.

Lieutenant Chandler formed the patrol into two lines facing the enemy's position. The assault squad was disposed with an automatic-rifle man and another man with a carbine on each flank, and the other men quite close together in the center. Chandler and Cpl. Kim Bae were out in front; Sgt. William Schell (assistant patrol leader), Pvt. Johnnie R. Banks (scout), and Cpl. Anthony Darbonne (radio operator), were close behind them. The fire-support squad, with its weapons posted in about the same pattern, stayed about twenty yards behind the assault party.

In this formation the patrol moved stealthily ahead, the men walking upright but ready to start crawling when necessary. When the patrol had covered about twenty-five of the remaining yards to the enemy's position, PFC Van D. Randon, carrying the BAR on the right flank of the assault squad, turned to PFC Charles H. Baugher, who was walking behind him.

"There's wire right in front of you," Randon muttered. "Be careful."

Baugher stepped over the wire. There was an explosion that threw him to the ground, tipping him over on his right side. The other men of the patrol were not much later in hitting the ground. It was about 0210.

In the immediate silence that followed, Baugher, who had apparently stepped on a booby-trapped concussion grenade, felt for his foot and found it to be all right although numb. The rest of the patrol lay quietly, waiting for the enemy to come out of the bunkers to see what had tripped the grenade. Nothing happened. The sounds of laughing, talking, and eating continued.

After waiting several minutes to make certain the North Koreans had ignored the noise, Lieutenant Chandler crept forward with his assault squad. As Chandler and his South Korean interpreter (Cpl. Kim Bae) approached the large bunker in the center, they came upon a communication trench that joined at least the five bunkers the patrol members could see. Chandler and Kim Bae jumped into the trench. As they did so a North Korean came out of the big bunker a few feet away to their left. Chandler and Kim Bae climbed back out of the trench.

The North Korean muttered a few words in guttural Korean, apparently a challenge. Kim answered in Korean, but apparently the enemy was still suspicious. When he first spoke he had unslung the burp gun he carried on his shoulder; now he raised it to the ready position and fired. Several men from the assault squad opened fire at the same time. Kim Bae threw a grenade. The North Korean fell after he had fired about three rounds. No one there knew who had killed him. With the need for silence past, the men of the squad began shouting, breaking into a loud and profane argument about "who killed the son of a lady."

Back on the main line of resistance, half a mile away, men of Company C saw the tracers scratch the night, and heard the sudden shouting. The fire fight was on.

Six North Koreans came streaming out of the big bunker. The assault squad killed the first five with carbine and automatic-rifle fire; the sixth ducked back into the bunker. One of Chandler's men threw two grenades into the big bunker and after that no one came out, but for several minutes there was the sound of yelling and screaming from inside.

There were other bunkers, however two on each side of the large one and North Koreans from these soon appeared in the communication trench. But the BAR men on the flanks (Private Randon and Cpl. Wilbur Harris) either killed them or drove them back into protected positions. Maintaining a heavy rate of fire, the squad managed to hold the initiative.

The North Koreans began throwing grenades. A heavy machine gun opened fire from the patrol's left, from a position above the enemy's bunkers. But the gun had to fire upward and in clearing the ridge put its bursts three or four feet too high. In spite of the ineffectiveness of the enemy's gun, Cpl. James A. Byrd, operating the light machine gun on the support squad's left flank, fired back until his gun jammed. Corporal Mitchell moved over to help him clear the piece, then continued firing until it jammed again. Lieutenant Chandler, still in front, watched the tracers from both guns disappear harmlessly into the darkness.

"Stop firing the machine gun!" Chandler shouted to Mitchell. "You can't hit them!"

Mitchell and Byrd then threw grenades over the crest in the direction of the enemy gun, and the firing stopped.

A couple of North Koreans from the left bunkers attempted to work their way along the communication trench. Harris, firing the BAR at that end of the line, killed them. Chandler's men tossed several grenades in the trench and toward the bunkers. After a few minutes three or four North Koreans tried to get around the patrol's right flank. As they appeared silhouetted against the skyline, Cpl. Kim Soo turned his light machine gun in that direction and saw three of them drop. He had placed his gun so that he had grazing fire.

The North Koreans relied mainly on grenades. There had been some ineffective small-arms fire at the beginning of the action, but Chandler's men silenced these weapons. The enemy preferred to remain in defilade beyond the crest of the hill or around the edge, and throw grenades into the patrol. The assault squad had some protection from these missiles by its nearness to the enemy. Men of this squad were so close to the trench the front of the enemy's position that the enemy apparently hesitated to toss grenades into that area. Also, because of the short range between the assault squad and the North Koreans and because of the slope of the hill behind the squad, most of the grenades passed over it, to fall behind and below in the space between the two squads.

Nevertheless, concussion grenades wounded both radio operators and put their radios out of commission. This happened early in the action Neither man was seriously wounded. There were two other casualties, both in the support squad. A grenade seriously wounded the assistant leader of the support squad (Corporal Kirschbaum). Besides wounding him in both legs, the explosion blew off part of his right foot. Grenade fragments also wounded the BAR man on the left flank (PFC Emmett Hancock). Of these four men, all but Kirschbaum were able to walk.

After thirty minutes of brisk firing, Lieutenant Chandler's men began to run low on ammunition. The volume of fire dropped noticeably. At about the same time, friendly artillery fire began falling on the enemy's main defensive line several hundred yards from the patrol action.

At about 0245 Chandler decided to withdraw, but when he asked the radio operators to send back the message that the patrol was breaking contact and withdrawing, he discovered the casualties and the destruction of the radios. He ordered the assault squad and the casualties to move through the support squad and start back toward the rallying point at the foot of the hill in front of friendly front lines. Several men improvised a litter in which to carry Corporal Kirschbaum.

Throughout the fire fight Chandler's men shouted and yelled. When they started to withdraw, however, this noise and the noise of firing dwindled to such an extent it was noticeable to men watching the action from Company C's observation post on the main line of resistance. Although these observers had just discovered they had no radio contact with the patrol, they could see the fire fight moving toward them and realized the patrol had begun to withdraw. They relayed this information to Colonel Walker.

The battalion commander immediately called for artillery and mortar concentrations in the vicinity of Noname Ridge. As Chandler moved back, the commander of Company C gave Colonel Walker the patrol's position, so far as he could determine it by observing the small-arms fire from the patrol toward the enemy. By the same method, he traced the location of the North Koreans as they attempted to follow the patrol. From this information battalion headquarters plotted both friendly and enemy positions on a map showing all artillery and mortar concentrations.

As the engagement moved toward the main line of resistance, Colonel Walker moved the mortar and artillery concentrations along with it. He did not call for new concentrations closer in, but rather shifted the original concentrations to keep the impact area as close as possible to the patrol.

He telephoned his decisions to the forward observer, who relayed them to the artillery and mortar units. Colonel Walker handled the supporting fires, giving the corrections himself, because he did not wish to shift to his subordinate officers the responsibility for directing the fire at night when they had no communications with the patrol they were supporting.

Just before the patrol reached the rallying point at the foot of the hill, Lieutenant Chandler sent Corporal Mitchell and Pvt. George Wilson on ahead to bring back litters and bearers from Company C. On the slippery, snowy slope of the ridge, it took the two men more than an hour to reach the main line. Once there, they learned that Company C had already alerted a relief squad and had it ready to return with them with the required items. As Mitchell and Wilson led the squad down the ridge, an enemy mortar round landed in the group, wounding four men of Company C. Mitchell and Wilson helped take these wounded men back and waited for another squad. They finally rejoined the patrol at about 0530.

Meanwhile, after forming a defensive perimeter at the rallying point, Chandler threw an illuminating grenade in the direction of the enemy as a guide for the supporting mortars. Colonel Walker shifted the mortar fire closer to the patrol and kept it well protected from North Koreans who were following with considerable determination. Besides the artillery fire, several tanks dug in on the main line fired cannon and heavy machine guns.

By this time it had become light enough for the enemy on Noname Ridge to see the patrol perimeter. Lieutenant Chandler, using the radio the relief squad had brought down from Company C, called for smoke on Noname Ridge, south of the patrol. The bursting shells obscured the enemy's observation posts, and the smoke, drifting down the draw with a light breeze, screened the patrol after the smoke had cleared the hill.

In spite of this concealment, the enemy kept the patrol pinned down until about 0630. After this the men continued on back to their base, moving slowly.

The patrol had been out more than twelve hours. Although it had no prisoner, Chandler had most successfully raided the enemy's position. He had suffered ten casualties all from grenade fragments during the night's action, but he and his men believed they had killed at least as many North Koreans, and had wounded others.

The effective use of more than two thousand artillery rounds on known enemy positions and on the enemy troops following the friendly patrol back toward its base prevented further casualties. Patrol members gave full credit to the artillery support for their successful return. On a small scale, infantry and artillery had teamed up to make a successful operation.

Credits:

Army Historical Series Combat Actions in Korea,
by Russell A. Gugeler.
CMH Online.
Wikipedia.
The Korean War.
Naval Historical Center.
Korean War Project.
Korean War Educator.
Korean War Documentary.

Jan,
Wicked stuff, those photos well be very helpful, Thank you.

Cheers mate. Anytime. I'll see if can find some more about the Korean War, I've enjoyed chasing around for good info....good way of learning.