Ok, this was another pretty short chapter, with no combat in it at all. It did include discussion on one of the most controversial decisions made by the Allies in World War II, that of the policy of "unconditional surrender." This policy really deserves a forum thread of it's own, but let's give it a try anyway.

Personally I can see how this policy could both insure a final end to the war, while at the same time make that end longer than it might have needed to be. The aim to make sure that World War II wouldn't directly lead to another world war, as World War I had, was the primary concern.

I was very interested to read about Roosevelt's views on the Jewish condition in North Africa, and by extension to the Jews in Europe. This was the section beginning on pg 287, paragraph that starts "A state dinner..." "Roosevelt jauntily replied, "The answer to that is very simple, name there just aren't going to bi any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting." FDR went on to say that by restricting Jewish participation in Law, Medicine and other professions so that it would "eliminate the specific and understandable complaints the Germans bore towards the Jews." That statement was absolutely incredible to me. Knowing now what we know about the horrors of the Holocaust it's hard to believe anybody could refer to German attitudes towards Jews as "understandable."

Rodger:

7 was OK, I kind of think the book is turning somewhat of a corner here in that there is less frivolous chit-chat.

Uncond-Surrender. I'm not sure why folks think this is controversial. Sorry, but defeat, pure pound-em-into-the-ground, then stomp-their-heads counts. Wishful thinking that maybe the bad guys will see the error of their ways, be saved, turn a new leaf, is just that - wishful thinking. In many ways, U-S, also steels your own side for the long haul. I think that they decided this, so "early", is a good thing to set the goal & focus for the long haul. Such a simple term, such an absolute condition, is worth thousands of words/speeches ....

Think of it -- Unconditional Surrender, Germany First, Cross-Channel, Island-Hop(Bypass) -- a very simple, focused overall plan.

As to the Roosevelt-Jews discussion, I noted that, but a lot went on in that conference and he was cherry-picking comments without follow on analysis or discussion. I tended to ignore much of it as not relevant to the focus/intent of the book.

John

I'm with John on the decision to pursue a policy of "unconditional surrender". Given the nature of the Nazis no other policy would have worked. While such a decision absolutely will lead to a prolonging of the conflict with all the additional death and destruction that entails, the ability to put a finality to the conflict was a lesson learned from the end of WW I.

Even though the victory was by no means certain at the time the policy was established, I believe that not only did it set the goal and focus as John said, but it sent a message. To the enemy, that we intend to prevail and to our own forces that we do not intend to lose. That's a strong motivator for soldiers who will fight when they believe they are in the right and will be "supported" by their governments.

An interesting thing to consider is what may have happened if the July 1944 plot to kill Hitler had been successful and the if theNazis removed from power. (And that's a HUGE if!)

How would the WESTERN allies (as opposed to the Soviet Union) responded to an initiative by a new government which sued for peace? Given where we were and where the Russians were, at that time, I suspect we would not have been too interested in any "conditions" on the part of Germany as a requirement to cease the fighting. The Soviets, with the Red Army rolling and the domination of most or all of Eastern Europe in reach, not to mention good old fashioned revenge, were probably in no mood to stop the fighting in "exchange" for anything.

While I don't believe that the "emotional" aspect to the combat between the US/British against the Germans ever got to the level that it did on the Eastern Front, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that the feeling on the US side in the Pacific Theater was a lot closer to the Russian/German hatred. I'm sure that part of that was racially motivated, after all, our society in the 1940s was very different in many ways than it is now.

But the nature of how the Pacific war was started, and the cultural differences that the Bushido warrior code caused in the concept of surrender and the treatment of POWs, all but ensured that an unconditional surrender was the only option in that Theater as well.

Tom

I personally tnink the "controversy" about U.S. is one created by modern "revisionist" authors. I suppose that there were some that disagreed with the policy at the time, but probably not as many as some might suggest. I can see one side of the issue, that by announcing the policy of U.S. it made the enemy more likely to resist to the very bitter end. I guess there can be some little truth to this. If for example the Germans decided early on, say 1942 or 1943, that they couldn't win, and they were somehow willing to kick Hitler out, along with the rest of his gang, they MAY have been willing to work out some kind of "deal" with the Allies to make a conditional peace. I think it was highly unlikely it would ever happen that way, so U.S. is really the best policy to have, for the reasons you mentioned.

I really would like to explore that Roosevelt quote more. He briefly mentions a source for this. I'd like to look it up and find out more.