This is a corollary to the Allied "Germany first" strategy. The Casablanca Conference between US & British, as extensively discussed in "An Army at Dawn", concerned the Allied concept of future operations for ETO. The US chiefs of staff wanted to land on France's northwest coast as soon as possible and move on Berlin -"Go straight for the jugular" They were also concerned about the "Second Front" to relieve pressure on the Soviets. The British chiefs of staff, supported completely by Churchill, wanted to work around the periphery of the German empire and wear down the Wehrmacht. Churchill was also very wary of Stalin and the Soviets and concerned with dwindling Commonwealth manpower.

Several threads can start here (Please feel free to expand on any of these or add your own):
1. Were the allies ready to strike NW France in 42 or 43?
2. Was the Mediterranean coast really the soft underbelly of Europe?
3. Churchill was trying to maintain the pre-war British empire and prestige. The US was obviously the emerging superpower and ironically, former colony of Britain. Was there a conflict here?
4. The US came into preeminence in North Africa and the British were now moving to second chair - Who was better qualified to lead the coalition? The side with the most men (and industrial might) or the side with the most experience (but also a fading global power)?
5. Did the periphery strategy of the British just divert coalition power or did it also divert and thin-out German defenses. Would it also cause German allies to desert to allies?

Just some starters to try and overthrow the onvious turkey-enduced nap after Thanksgiving weekend (at least for we Americans)

Jeff

Jeff---I want to hit the "soft underbelly" strategy to start off. To appreciate why the British are pushing this strategy, you have to review their experiences in WW I. They and their Common Wealth partners suffer horrendous personnel losses during that conflict. In the interim years, the survivors search for an alternative if war comes again. One of the wounded while recovering writes an interesting article. He is BH Liddell-Hart. His theory is that Britian can not afford to waste manpower and does not possess the ability to maintain a large standing army. As a result, the best strategy for Britian is to use an "indirect approach." Today we call that asymmetrical warfare. In short, this strategic theory advocates that military action takes place where the opponent is at the greatest disadvantage. Churchill picks up on this line of thought. Thus, we see the British conceiving the "Operation Fortitude" deception plan that worked so well in the Normandy Operations and literally hundreds of others incidents then and now. As the Allies push the Germans out of North Africa in 1942-43, the British advocate a Mediterranean offensive through Italy. Not a bad idea. The Allies get to the continent, knock Italy out of tthe war, and tie down troops from getting to other fronts. The downside is that by the time the Allies invade Italy in September of 1943, American forces and strategy is being felt. And, the US strategy is to land in France and move against Germany. I trust we can get our fellow historians to expand on their insights and views regarding the Italian campaine and its utility.
Good questions.

Good post Jeff, lots to think about. Although Italy did not turn out to be the soft underbelly of Fortress Europe (I believe that they were resisting right up to VE day) the invasion did put pressure on and eventually led to the collapse of El DUCE's regime and Italy's flip flop to the allied side. As far as diverting manpower weren't there upwards of 15-20 german divisions in Italy when they could have been changing the situation in the Eastern front? It may not have been the best solution and use of manpower, but it was one that that did accomplish many of the "second front now!!!" demands.

As far as invading in 43, I don't think there was enough landing craft to land the 3 divisions in France that the original plan called for, let alone the 5+ divisions in the initial assault (plus aircraft to land the airborne divions). That is one thing that has always bothered me, it seems like in the Pacific there were lots of Higgins boats to go around, doesn't that kind of conflict with the Germany first strategy? Any experts on landing craft chime in.

Bison---my recollection is the Americans proposed two operations to the British. Operation Bolero was the actually invasion of an unspecified location in France and Operation Round Up was an invasion that followed the collapse of Germany from internal strife. Both were terribly naive as subsequent actions in North Africa proved. We were in no way or shape prepared for a continental invasion in 1942-43. I also think that the little publicized but tragic Dieppe Raid of 1942 vividly demonstrated just how tough and well entrenched the German were in France. I assume the former members of the 1st Canadian Divison have some rather distinct recollections of the Dieepe Raid. What do you think?

As a Canadian I remember Dieppe, I also had an Uncle in the First Division. He doesn't have much good to say about the planners of Dieppe (he wasn't in a unit that was involved on the beach) but he does have alot of respect for the German paratroops in Italy. Its too bad it took that raid to learn some lessons that should have been obvious in the first place. Although the fear of another disaster did put enough fear into the planners of Normandy that they didn't attempt another half hearted ill planned and unprepared attack on the main land. But I am still curious about the landing craft. Did they even have enough in 42-43 to land 3-5 divisions like they did in 44? Was Roundup even possible?

Like DJ said in his first post, the British plan for the war was one designed for forces with very limited numbers of manpower and equipment. The British had never in their history played a large role as far as a continental army was considered. Her strength had always been her navy and now the Royal Air Force as well. Remember that in the First World War the British and Commonwealth forces did not fight alone before the US arrived. In that war the French provided masses of troops. With France knocked out of World War II and the BEF expelled from the continent it was not possible for the British to plan a cross-channel invasion by themselves. Thus, the British plan, after defending the British Isles of course, was to nip around the edges of the Axis forces. After Rommel arrived in North Africa and began driving the British back, American President Roosevelt actually made it known to Churchill (though they were not allied at the time) that the US felt it would be wisest to abandon North Africa altogether in order to focus on the defense of Britain itself. Churchill would hear none of it, however, and made that theatre a major one in the war for three years.

With the American entry into the war, things changed dramatically. America's manpower and industry allowed a more agressive war plan. Rather naturally, the British wanted to continue with their current method of fighting. After all, it was beginning to work. The American plan, though, really was the best for actually winning the war, rather than simply holding on against the Germans, and for winning it fairly quickly. The British had hoped to defeat Germany through air bombardment using heavy bombers. We know now that this probably would not have led to Germany's capitulation.

In the end though, what we really see is the convergence of two plans, British and American. The British plan had been the one followed for the first half of the war. It created the environment for the American strategy. North Africa had been conquered. With the American landings in Morocco and Algeria, her troops gained experience. With the near fiasco that followed, it was probably a good thing for the Americans too that they did not jump right into Fortress Europe in 1942 or 1943, even if it was logistically possible. The Italian Army and people were also highly demoralized (they had supplied most of the manpower in North Africa, after all) and Mussolini's fascist state was now threatened directly. The British strategy had opened up the South of Europe to invasion and whether or not the underbelly was soft or not really makes little difference. The main attack would come from across the English Channel, but merely the ability to land forces in the South would hold at least some Axis forces there (and later in the war, "some" would prove vital to the Germans). By landing in Italy, the Allies were able to completely knock that country out of the war (and even get Italians fighting on their side), preventing any chance for a rebound and forcing more Germans away from Normandy and Russia. With the landings in Sicily, Italy, and the South of France, the Germans would also have to fear landings elsewhere, somewhat similar to the Island Hopping campaigns of the US Marines in the Pacific. Greece and the Balkans would require German garrisons in addition to the ones there because of partisan activity. What I am basically trying to say is that it was impossible to all of a sudden make a complete change in strategy. The results of the British plan, after three years of fighting, directly affected the course of the war under American strategic control.

Nic

Looks like target effect repeat fire mission

I cannot disagree with anything stated above. In fact many I had forgotten many of the events you all mention.

DJ - Yes, both the French and the British were extremely afraid of another war in the trenches (much the same reaction as that of GENs Schwartzkof, Powell and party reference the Vietnam War and the Gulf War). However, Churchill, in my personal opinion, made a poor choice concerning Montgomery when it came to avoiding high casualities. Most of the innovative British commanders were sent to (or in some cases exiled to) India/Burma in the persons of Wavell, Slim, and the commander of the Chindits (temporary brain fart on the name- I'm trying to do this all from memory #:-) ) or were captured in the Western Desert (Connors and Ritchie), because of early success of Rommel (yes I know Slim and the Chindit commander did not face Rommel). The victory in North Africa had a major impact on the China/Burma/India theater and the support of Australia - It opened the Suez Canal to sea traffic from England and eastern US ports to the Far East and SW Pacific. It also gave the Allies another army - the Free French, which was critical for several reasons: 1) The Australian Corps had been released after El Alamein and returned to the Pacific, 2) the Free French forces, although of mixed quality, did have some colonial forces with excellent mountain fighting experience. As a side bar - the French either left in North Africa or sent home their Sengalese troops. It was believed that they would not survive the winters on the european continent.

Bison44 - The invasion of Sicily did cause the withdrawal of the German's main reserves from the eastern front, severely impacting their ability to defend against the Russian's counter offensive. Also aircraft loses, particularly of transports during the German/Italian air bridge to Tunisa made it all but impossible to provide aerial supply to surrounded German forces in the east. As far as assault shipping, it was so tight in ETO, that the Anzio reinforcement tables and ability to keep the beach head supplied were impacted by OVERLORD requirements. Then the invasion of southern France was delayed awaiting return of shipping from Normandy (and high losses of assault craft on the beaches). As far as the Pacific having more Higgins boats - it may be an illusion: There were few amphibious invasions of more than division size until Leyte, Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Then they were usually only regimental combat team sized waves. Plus a lot of the smaller landings were made from destroyer-transports and even PT boats (The 1st CAV DIV in the Admiralties used very few assault transports, all subsequent ops being by destroyer-transports and/or PT boats. Don't forget all the AMTRACS - The invasion of Saipan from Tinian (or the reverse, another brain fart), was made entirely by AMTRAC (Can you spell sea sickness?)

Foigore - You are definitely correct - Churchill planned to knock Italy out of the war, by invading that country (he was right). The Germans were forced to keep Army Group F in the Balkans to protect against the eventuality of a landing in Greece. What is ironic is the fact that what ended up forcing the Germans out of the Balkans was the Russians along with the defection of Rumania.

OK - we have settled that the Churchill doctrine for ETO was the only viable alternative in 1942-43. It freed the Mediterranean, brought the French back into the war, relieved some pressure on the Russians, and blooded the Americans and some new British units. It also forged teamwork between the armies and navies similiar to what happened in the Pacific, there were still five more major amphib ops after Tunisa was liberated.

Now to further this discussion (please feel free to continue any previous threads), should the western allies gone into the Balkans - beyond the bombing programs and assistance of Tito?

It appears we have a hard core group of history students - we need to try to get more recruits.

I don't think so. I don't think the Balkans would have provided a much better base for invasion than Italy. The Allies also accomplished little with their force there in the First World War. With part of Italy in Allied hands, the purpose had been served. The Germans still had to divert forces there while the Allies didn't have to open up another beachead.

Looking at it from another standpoint, but with complete hindsight (so it would not have affected much the thinking of the time), though Tito did establish a communist government in Yugoslavia, that country never became a satellite of the Soviet Union and would remain on fairly friendly terms with the West during the Cold War. Greece, of course, also remained outside of the Iron Curtain, despite Communist revolution after the war.

Nic

Jeff--the Chindit leader you refer to is Orde Wingate. He died in a plane crash during the invasion of Burma in '44. Let me shift to the Mediterranean strategy. Once they took Sicily, the Allies move into Italy. They get Naples relatively quickly. Foggia is the largest airbase in Italy and the British took it early on. We then used the base to conduct the bombing of many spots within the range of the bomber force. Now, here is where I say not necessarily in hindsight the Allies should have clearly seen and taken advantage of several opportunities. First, the soft underbelly of Europe actually existed. it is not in the Balkan where the mountains and roads are impossible. It is Southern France. Here's my thought. Italy capitulated in 1943. End of story. The Italian Campaign should have just stopped at the line above Naples. Why take Rome? Instead of extending the Italian Campaign, the Allies should have massed troops and supplies on Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and North Africa and invaded Southern France. The Germans never fortified the South as they did the Channel area. When the Allies eventually invade that area they push further and faster up the Rhone Valley than anticipated. In my two cent opinion that would have been the wiser course of action in late 1943- early 1944.
Your thoughts?
DJ

210Cav, Just a couple of logistical points. If the drive up the "boot" stopped around Naples and the invasion was to come in southern france what sort of supply problems would that cause? In hindsight even with the Mulberry's, close proximity to England, close air support and good sea lane control of the channel in 44 it wasn't all that easy to keep the invasion force supplied as it drove inland. Plus with the initial landings, britain made a wonderful marshalling area for the 1000's of vehicles and troops. And it was possible to organize them in secret and get them cross channel relatively unobstructed. Would this have been possible in the Med in late 43 early 44?
Where would they have marshalled/embarked? How long of a sea voyage before the landings and how safe would that route have been? If the landings were in Southern france somewere did the Allies have enough air bases and air power to support the beachhead? (As much as they had in southern england??) We have to remember that some of the Typhoon Pilots made 4-5 sorties that day, not to mention the 10000's of sorties to soften up the landing zone, cut communications raillines etc etc. It seems like an invasion from Britain with all the logistical advantages would have been more feasible than a southern france landing only.

Wasn't there talk of a southern frnace invasion at the same time as overlord? (ANVIL) And when it did finally come was't it called Dragoon? How many divisions were involved and where did they embark from? Sorry if my facts are incorrect, this is off the top of my head.

Bison - You raise many good points on Mediterannean versus English Channel. Here are some thoughts on pros & cons for both:

NOTE: This may ramble as I added to each section as something entered my head-

England - cross channel assault:
Pros - England was a secure base (there were no active German spies remaining in England), and the citizens were supportive, port for most of Royal Navy, close enough to act as huge airbase for airborne, fighter, and bomber ops, plenty of beaches and other terrain on which to train. Key weather forecasting sites were in Allied hands (Iceland, Greenland - the weather coming out of NW), plenty of ports from which to stage invasion, only one days steaming, close enough to allow for good deception ops (German air recon was constant and radio intercepts were easy from France), and there were several options along NW and west coasts of France for landings. Once invasion force gets out of beach head the available usable manuever space is extensive. Loire River secured right flank of allies once out of beach head and left flank rests on Channel & North Sea. Routes across NW France lead directly to liberation of Paris (allied capitol), and Luxembourg, Belgium and eventually The Netherlands, and lead directly to Ruhr Basin - key German industrial area. Port of Antwerp availabe as allies advance

Cons - Weather sucks year around, the Channel has notorious currents and the North Sea can be extremely violent. The weather also frequently grounds airpower. The Normandy hedgerows, and lack of major port beyond Cherbourg along French Channel coast (see comment about notoriously bad weather), lots of south to north running rivers to cross en route to Germany. Expansion of beach head must go in two directions to guarantee secure rear area.

Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, Algeria, Tunisa - landing at southern France

Pros - Air fields built on Sardinia are within easy reach of southern France, plenty of ports in southern Italy, Algeria and Tunis, plenty of space for staging equipment, better weather and surf conditions during Summer, better terrain behind beaches, beaches closer to Marseilles than Normandy Beaches are to Cherbourg with minimal fortifications. Fewer river crossings heading toward German border. Right flank easily secureable with French Maritime Alps and Switzerland. Better weather to maintain resupply and build up. Planty of good terrain to build bases behind beach head. Be less British troops (just a joke!!!), there were none in original landing in southern France.

Cons - The North coast of Africa was semi-secure, the French started cleaning out collaborators immediately after Algeria, then Tunisa were liberated (but it was never as clear of spies as England) More than one days sailing from Algeria/Naples to reach beaches (although same situation faced eventual ANVIL/DRAGOON operation). Fewer exit routes north toward Germany, Rhone River valley was major exit and was fairly easy to defend, if Germans did not have also to defend against breakout from Normandy. The Allies left flank would be open and would grow longer as they moved north. Terrain was excellent for German armored counter attacks, unlike the bocage in Normandy. The southern approaches to Germany lead to nothing of value, left Paris occupied, ran into Vosges Mountains and then Rhine RIver backed by Black Forest and no key industrial areas along Swiss border. Occupied area (Italy) remains on right flank of sea routes to Marseilles, would require continued supression of air and sea raiders from northern Italy. The French would demand liberation of Paris. Could not get to V-1 launch sites in NW France - highly sensitive issue for British.


These are just some, I sure you all can come up with more or refute/counter the ones I have developed. Locating good books on the campaign by what eventually became 6th Army Group is difficult.

Jeff

I still have to wonder where are they going to build up all those troops and equipment? In Sardinia/Corsica, way down at Naples, Africa? With facist sympathisers still around in Italy there would have been few secrets of that magnitude there. No way they could have pulled a deception like they did with overlord. And if they did put a couple hundred thousand extra men down there wouldn't the germans have gotten wind of it and beefed up the southern french defenses. Wasn't it a self fufilling prophecy, wherever you built up the massive amounts of men and material the germans were going to expect an invasion there and strengthen the defences to check your invasion.
You do have lots of very good points Ranger (the bad weather in the channel damn near messed up the whole thing). Excellent discussion!!

You are most correct with the short loiter time of Allied aircraft. As I recall, the force that goes into Southern France has several French Divisions, the 3rd and 45th US, and a make shift airborne force. Not a whole heck of a lot of people as compared to Normandy. You are absolutely correct about England's store house capabilities, my argument would be that an Operation Anvil (simultaneous landing in Northern and Southern France) more than Operation Dragoon held in August of 1944 would have really caused a panic with the Germans. Why didn't this happen?

DJ - You are quite correct with simultaneous landings freaking out the Germans #:-) . Many Normandy reinforcements were stripped from forces in west and south of France. But that boogey man, shortage of assault shipping put a stop to that plan.

This may go back to other discussions about the impact of the US putting so much into the Pacific Theater before the Nazis were defeated.

Jeff

Jeff--I am of the opinion that the invasion of Southern France has to do with the Anzio beachhead's stripping the envision force of landing craft more than anything else. What say you?

210, I agree with you about the Anzio/loss of landing craft. I'm sure all the anzio boats were earmarked for ANVIL/DRAGOON. It took a long time to assemble the boats for Normandy, but to land another 2-4 dviisons in southern france at the same time, I just don't think the boats were there. I would be curious to know if alot of the boats used in normandy were later used in DRAGOON.
If I am not mistaken wasn't the navy in charge of their production? Was this a case of the left hand (navy) not knowing what the right (army needing twice as many boats)was doing?

Bison--good point about the production process. I had not considered that when we began this discussion. I now reflect that it is a linchpin and a half. As I recall, the US had a War Time Production Planning Board. I believe that was name of it. Regardless, we had a group of service and industry representatives that allocated resources and production requirements based on operational needs. In turn, the services had their own boards which formulated the operational requirements. I am spit balling here, but I seem to recall the Navy's extreme reluctance to divert/devote resources to making assault type shipping (LST, AP, and below). The consolidated board obviously saw things differently. However, the lag time between the decision making and the start of production caused many a ripple problem. For example, the lack of sufficient landing craft postphoned the Normandy operation from May to June of 1944. During WW II, the linkage between " what you want and what we can supply" caused so many problems, it's a wonder anything got done. Just think of the competing requirements, the bomber offensive, landing craft, ship construction, submarines, tanks, trucks, etc...it'll blow your mind. I'd like to hear more from you on this issue.
Good point.

One other problem with making two invasions at the same time is that you would need to have the right weather conditions in two bodies of water (the English Channel and the Mediterranean Sea). It was hard enough to get a day to launch the invasion from England. If they had to coincide it with a southern invasion at the same time, luck would play an even greater factor.

Nic

Oh, yeah! There is always the unpredictable fog of war to consider....

DJ - Let me see if I understand your point on Anzio shipping vs. ANVIL shipping. The first deprived the second? I would say the with your strategy of turning southern Italy into a base, after knocking Italy out of the war, would have negated the Anzio landing altogether. Then that shipping would have been available for ANVIL. Second the US Joint Chiefs had offered sufficient shipping from the Pacific allocation to make ANVIL a three division assault, sometime around June-July. Churchill and the British Chiefs had the superior staying power and won their aurgument, intially at least, to increase size of OVERLORD, with ANVIL shipping assets and take troops allocated for ANVIL and use to push to the Po River in Italy. Eisenhower finally got ANVIL, now changed to DRAGOON put back in for August, luckily, just as the allies were breaking out of Normandy.

SO the big issue is not shipping, as the US was willing to provide sufficient assest from there allocations to make ANVIL a three-division landing in June-July time frame. The big issue is the contest between operational plans of the two allies.

Realistically, if SHINGLE (Anzio) had not happened, as it would be unnecessary, a three division landing could have been made if US had won the political battle. Based on information I have read, the allies could generate a major amphibious landing in the MED every six months. Even if Shingle had happened in JAN 44, ANVIL could have still gone in in July, after OVERLORD, but early enough to maybe still influence German deployments against Normandy.

DJ - as the Supreme Allied Commander, if you could get the President and JCS to support you against Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, then yes I believe your plan is feasible.

Yes it is now time for MGD

Jeff--I always considered myself fortunate if the Alpha Troop Commander did what I asked so I can imagine the tremendous difficult anyone would have in proposing an "out of the box" solution to the Mediterranean strategy.
DJ

DJ - Be gald you were dealing with CAV troopers, as they generally understand the being in the Army. I have have to deal with a Medical Brigade in my civilian job. Most of the military medical community has not even the slightest understanding of what it means to be in the Army. The Medical Service Corps officers generally understand, but the "professionals" are lost! Got to sit down an have a beer as soon as I get home

Ah, booze! Gods answer to every prayer....

Would it be out of line to ask everyone what their favorite beer may be - what you drink while reading, modeling, cursing your boss, etc. I have found that I can keep my wife out of my beer my drinking micro brews or other similar concoctions with REAL taste. She only drinks lite beers Three trips to Germany, including a four year tour changed my beer drinking habits forever (and for the better!!!!!!)| |) I thought a chaange of pace from all this serious history talk was in order.

Nach ein bier, bitte.

Jeff-ain't touched a drop in 17 years. Too many good years gone early in life....try it, you'll like it.