I have been reading a lot about the tanks of WWII lately and also had the chance to check out a huge collection of Russian armor in Hungary (mostly modern, but those T-34...)
Anyway, it got me thinking . The Germans did make a mistake to produce complicated, "over-the-top" tanks which were really the most developed tanks of their age, but were also hard and expensive to produce and also prone to breakdown in actual use. (Not mentioning being way too heavy.)
Many authors swear by the superiority of the Tiger, TigerII, but others say that the best tank of the war was the T-34. Easy to produce, cheap, fast, small and with a good armament - no wonder it surprised the Germans when they first saw it.
The T-34 was clearly not the winner just because of its superior numbers over the German armor. (The IL-2, on the other hand was a crapy airplane -but their sheer number made them effective.)

So the questions are the following: how could have the Germans design tanks differently? Did they have any other choice? After all, their resources were limited, so in the quality vs quantity game they needed to go for quality. But it did doom their little war. Is it possible at all to put quality aginst such overwhelming odds? (Forget about for the minute about the excellent characteristics of the opponent's armor.) How else can you succed if you are badly outnumbered? But 88s onto trucks? Airpower only?

How about the Russians? They did not just produce a tank that can be mass-produced - they really did build an excellent weapon, right? It was good, they had the upper hand in numbers -what else you need?

So: was there any other possible outcome for this fight between factories?

Well I think it really depends on the mission as well. Every move there is a countermove. I mean the Germans were interested in killers. They were successful at making killers (Tiger, Panther, KT, etc.)

In order to counter the massive killing power of the German tanks the US went with large numbers of the easily serviceable and widely adaptable Sherman. It may have not been the "better" tank but it was the perfect tank for the swarm strategy used to counter Hitler's monsters.

The Russians did the same thing. They outnumbered against the Germans with quantity that also turned out to be quality (although the T34 had a number of superior innovations the quality control of the T34 had much to be desired.) Using the same swarm tactic they Russian too were able to simply overwhelm the Germans

So depending on your viewpoint either tank can be superior. One on one the German tanks can do well. On the other hand the ease of construction, maintainence and quantity of the T34 and Shermans suited the gameplan that won.

In my opinion, the IL2, was one of the finest air to ground attack aircraft in the world, the mix of armament and armour plating was a god send to any crew put up to air. The crews loved them and the Germans feared them....

As far as the T-34, this tank was such a shock to the Germans, that they came close to simply copying the whole shebang! Indeed, the Panther tank is a direct result of the T-34.

Frank

I don't know why they didnt put an 88 into a captured T-34 and then mass produce that. Of course they kind of did, with the Panther.

~Chip

There are two weapons which stand out it in the last 75 years, the Kalahnikov and the T34. Both are an example of something that had never been previously done before - produce a weapons system which was cheap, low (or minimum) maintenance and importantly, could be used by a 'peasant' army who had the minimum of training.

This, in my opinion, is precisely why the T34 was infinitely superior (en masse) than anything produced by the Germans. That said, the losses were totally disproportionate to the numerical superiority enjoyed by the Sovs. There were many other factors in play, obviously, but that would be my firsy consideration...Jim

One thing people seem to never pick up on is that all the german heavies (tiger 1/2, panther) etc were designed as a direct result of the germans being terrified of an allied tank.

In the case of the tiger 1, the arras counter-attack in 1940 caused great distress to Hitler. British matilda tanks had penetrated german lines with impunity, as no german anti tank weapon could even dent their armour . If it wasnt for Rommel deploying AA units with 88s to engage them over open sights then they would have cut the german drive through France in half. Hitler ordered the design of a tank with massively thick armour as a result, and adding the 88 to ensure it could deal with any tank then in service.

As has already been said, the panther was a result of the T34.

The Germans were not as innovative in tank warfare as many would have people think, the Soviets were more innovative than people give them credit for.

One thing i always find interesting about WW2 armour debates is to consider the influence of WW2 designs on post war ones.

All post war Soviet designs are a continuation of the T34/IS series.

95% of non soviet designs are influenced by the US/British cruiser/medium tank designs.

How many modern tanks have multiple interlocking road wheels etc? Not many.

The T34 was without doubt IMHO the best tank to see service in WW2, however if the centurion had been ready in time there would be no contest

Best tank design of WW2, I would lean towards the Joseph Stalin 2. It had sloped / curved turret armor and packed a wallop of a main gun (122mm) I think it became one of the basis for modern designs such as the T55,T-62, T-72, AMX 30, Chieftan,and Leopard 1 I think the Pershing and Centurion were more thick armor big bruiser type beasts. They only had a minimal amount of sloping more like the Tigers and depended on thickness to prevent penetration. Not trying to say that is a bad idea because todays armor designs have gone back to angles rather than curves (M1, Challenger, Leclerc, Leopard A 4 onward. The t-34 changed the compexion of tank warfare. The Germans had evisioned them as infantry support / cavalry. They packed low velocity guns shooting HE rounds and going very fast to route the enemy. The Russians T-34 caused the Germans to totally reasses their tactics hence the long barrel AP guns put on the Pnzr IV and the followup Tigers and Panthers. So I would put the T-34 right near the top as the greatest tank ever.

I think there is more to this discussion than merely comparing armour & weapons. The German & Russian tanks expressed the tactical doctrines of their respective countries. The Germans tended to go for quality because they just can't help building quality goods, but their tactical doctrine assigned tank destruction initially to the Panzerjager or "tankhunter" (as opposed to the more reactive "anti-tank") units. The German tanks were supposed to lure enemy tanks onto a dug in prepared Pakfront. They did this successfully many times to the British in the Desert. The Panzer concept was seen as an all-arms "Kampfgruppe", the tanks were supposed to carve through the enemy front, avoiding slugging it out with enemy armour. German tanks were all intended to be fitted with radio, to facilitate command & control.
The Russians saw thing differently to begin with. Despite having arguably the best tank in the world in 1941, they still saw tanks as infantry support. Russian tactics were still relatively crude, relying on strength of numbers, most tanks didn't have radio, so were forced to slavishly follow a pre-conceived plan. As the war progressed, the Russians learnt the "Blitzkrieg" concept, while the Germans, hamstrung by Hitlers meddling, moved away from the tactics that had worked so well for them. A good illustration of this was Kursk. The panzers were thrown full-tilt at the strongest Russian positions. This was closer to a WW1 concept than Blitzkrieg.
Similarly, Hitlers insistence on not giving ground, removed a most effective tactic from the German generals, that of the "backhanded blow". By giving ground, an enemy was lured into overreaching himself, when he would be vulnerable to encirclement followed by piecemeal destruction (an example of this is the cauldron battles of "Barbarossa" in 1941, or Kharkov in 1943).
Had the German generals been allowed to fight the war the way they wished in the East, Russia could have been defeated. The Russians knew that their strength was numbers & space. They could afford to trade space to avoid destruction. With his early seizures in Russia, Hitler could have afforded to do the same, his failure to appreciate this was a major blunder.
The Germans came very close to defeating Russia in 1941, it is not generally realised how close. The fact that the Russians had a high-level "mole" in the Nazi echelons (Sorg), who informed them that the Japanese were striking South rather than West into Russian territory allowed them to denude their far-Eastern holdings of the Siberian troops who turned the tide in front of Moscow. Had they not been there, Moscow could well have fallen, & the whole history changed - that's how fine run it was.
In the scheme of things, tank designs were not a major factor.

Actually Jim, the Kalashnikov was based strongly on the German MP44!

Steve, having fired both weapons and having had both painstakingly explained to me by an armorer, the difference is, that only the Sovs were capable of 'back-engineering' the MP44 and producing it as a 'mass' weapon. The MP44 was developed along the lines of an 'elite' weapon. The denial of Kalashnikov that the original MP44 was the inspiration for the AK47 is patent nonsense and should be seen as such, takes nothing away from the ability the Soviet Union had in taking a 'system' and applying it to the lowest common denominator. ...Jim

Thanks for the input As a matter of fact I know little of the details of armored warfare, so all this discussion is really informative and interesting.

So tactics I forgot about, that's true. Could that few Tigers and other tanks be used effectively against the overwhelming number of enemy tanks somehow? Do you need tanks to defeat them, anyway? (Anti-tank platoons, anti-tank mobile platforms...)

I think this is a great discussion. As a few people have indicated here in one way or another, the Germans weren't simply overwhelmed, but outgeneraled, and indeed, probably outengineered.

Hohenstaufen, I agree that Germany's successes had much to do with initiative, and established tactical and operational skill (German generals forfeited their strategic skill to Hitler; Rundstedt's suggestion to OKW to "end the war, you fools!" in 1944 is colorful, but criminally too late--if his character had matched his strategic insight, he perhaps would have been bold enough to suggest peace in 1939). When these were matched, and when the Allies superior grasp of strategy came to the fore, Germany was finished. The irony is that Stalin had this school within his army in the 20s and 30s: Marshals Tuchachevsky and Triandafillov were designing a 'new way of war,' with maneuver, mobility, and technology, and had a school developing around them. Their students would have shut the Germans down, had the Red Army been led by these people by 1939. With a few exceptions (Zhukov, for one), Stalin had them shot before the war.

Incidently, Hohenstaufen, your 'backhand blow:" There's a whole school of thought surrounding warfare as an excercise in classical physics. They say that when one force strikes another, velocity is as important (or more) than mass. So if you counterattack a moving enemy while (s)he's still moving toward you, but running out of steam, the blow is all the worse, because the relative velocity is higher. A wacky way of describing the concept, and it can get wackier; you can start to use vectors, and even 'levers and fulcrums,' from mechanics to teach the operational art. In any event, with such a premium on velocity, it makes the Tiger series seem all the more inappropriate. No wonder it appealed to a World War I veteran like Hitler; it was a crawling pillbox.

Greatbrit, your point about tank design is right on as well. Take for example the Soviet engineers' following naval designers' advice, and moving the transmission to the rear, so as to even out the CG toward the center of the tank. Makes for better cross-country mobility over soft ground. Of course, it was on British Cruiser tanks as well at the time. Now it's the rule on MBTs.

But couldn't the Russians have pulled a move on the Germans when they entered the city, much like when Nepolean entered, and desserted it? Also, the Germans should of institued the use of long range bombers to effectivly hit Soviet war production where it really hurt, behind the Urals.

The Germans didnt have that many long range bombers, certainly not enough to hit behind the urals.

Also if they did, the soviets would have moved further into the interior of into siberia.

Even if they took Moscow and the Soviet regime collapsed the Germans would have been totally unable to occupy Russia, and the inevitable partisans etc.

Might have delayed the way several years, Allies would still have won. It would probably just meant berlin would have been black glass in late 1945.

"What-if" questions have come up recently (well, last few months, anyway) on this site, and I've been rhuminating since. It's really, really complicated, because of the same factors that contribute to a discussion of armor engineer, ethos, and doctrine.

For one, the Germans didn't gear up for total war all at once. Indeed, Blitzkrieg-style war was so appealing to Nazi leadership because it promised (to them, anyway) war on the cheap. Germany geared up gradually, and most of the really important steps weren't until 1942-3, particularly after Stalingrad. (Goebbels rhetorically asked a Berlin crowd if they would do all that it took to defeat the "Jewish-Bolshevik Beast." They dutifully bellowed "yes" on cue). The Wehrmacht, while having conscription since the mid-30s, was not really maximizing Germany's manpower or industrial potential. This also accounts for the old saw about German tank production going up during 1944, as a demonstration of the futility of Allied Strategic Bombing. (of course, had the bombing not occurred, how much more would Germany have produced?)

Meanwhile, Guderian bitterly lamented in his memoirs the dubiousness of Dr. Ferdinand Porsche's skill in armor design, and that this charlatan had a hold on Hitler's already childish judgement. Of his 'Ferdinand/Elephant," Guderian wrote that “I had to find some use for it, even though I could not, on tactical grounds, share Hitler’s enthusiasm for this product of his beloved Porsche.” Further, he pointed out the futility of trying to supply such a diverse population of armored vehicles with spare parts. So it's safe to say that part of Germany's quantity problems were not simply industrial or economic fate; they were self-inflicted, even in the short term.

This leaves me continually wondering: what happened to the high Prussian General Staff tradition of speaking one's mind, even to superiors? Von Moltke's ghost must have shed bitter tears, watching his lamentable, obsequious descendants, Rommel, Guderian, Rundstedt, Von Manstein, etc., as they declined to force Hitler to face the strategic realities opposing his dubious plans. If they took an oath to Hitler, they took an earlier oath to Germany and the Germans. If and when they remembered this, it was (conveniently) too little, too late.

Chip, you may have a point. I was theorising that Moscow in 1941 was a much more important route (road & rail) centre than in 1812. With it's loss, it would have been far more difficult for the Russians to move troops & supplies the length of the Front. This may have had an effect on the siege of Leningrad, & that city may also have fallen (I stress this is a theoretical discussion). With virtually all of European Russia in German hands, & the effect on morale of the loss of Moscow (& also the loss of the centralised state control Stalin exercised from there), the Russians may have sued for peace or the war descended into stalemate.

Indeed, if ever there is a "Germans could have won" argument, this is it's strongest point. The Soviets (and Stalin, specifically) had a mania for centralisation, both for efficiency as well as internal security. Also, as was mentioned in the previous thread on this, the Soviet government had sued for peace with the Germans on very unfavorable terms before (Brest-Litovsk, 1917). But the ideological basis for Germany's invasion was altogether different this time around, and their grand strategy, even after the fact, remains unclear. Under what terms, if any, would Hitler accept a peace with a Soviet Union still partially intact? I speculate that he might have considered a series of 'non-red' puppet states to the east, and may have even 'threw a bone' to the Japanese in Siberia. But all this is speculation of course.

BTW, so as not to completely hijack the post with what is really another topic, and because I cannot seem to locate this statistic anywhere: Does anyone know what the ratio of medium and heavy tanks was to assault guns, tank destroyers, and non-turreted vehicles in the German army at different points. Obviously, I'm looking for ball-parkish figures, but it is another indicator of the deterioration of German armor forces.

Professor, what exactly did the generals fail to do?
(By the way, the points you raised answered a lot of my questions about the German philosophy of armor: why have so many types that need different parts, service, etc, in the middle of awar when interchangebility should be a requirement? Also those strange monsters might have had more armor than an entire T-34 division, but what use does a Maus or any other slow moving behemoth have in a modern, dynamic battlefield?)
The only possible explanation is that they kept the interests of future model builders in mind by providing a diverse set of armored vehicles...

I have just read a review of the actions of Tiger II tank battalions in Hungary and read some interesting figures: they lost (completely lost, meaning vehicles without the hope of repair) about 25 tanks (not exact figures, I can check them if interested) while knocked out Russian tanks (mainly T-34/85. and the IS tanks) in the numbers of 200. (No info about the repairability.) Many times they made contact with the enemy and killed about 20-30 tanks without suffering losts.
How does it fit to the "T-34 was the best construction of the war" statement? Firepower is not the sole factor, I know, but these figures are very persuasive...


About the Il-2... I did some further reading (keep in mind that I'm not a historian), and every source agrees: the Il-2 was a rugged, easy to produce ground-attack airplane with a big punch, but was not particulary good construction. The gunner was not protected, the plane was not very manouverable - it was only effective if used in a huge numbers with air superiority being a must. It was compared to the Stuka, not the Jug. (Which was also a very efficient ground-attack plane)

I do not wish to sound too harsh toward the German Generals, because A) it is largely a moot point now and B) it's almost as fashionable as lionizing them.

Much of the intellectual and ethical ancestry of the Wehrmacht's officer corps was founded in the eighteenth century, in Prussia. There, officers famously wore the same uniform, regardless of rank, below the King (who was considered part of the corps himself). While they swore undying fealty and loyalty to the King, Prussian officers were encouraged, especially after the Scharnhorst reforms of the early 19th century, to SPEAK THEIR MINDS. Indeed, Scharnhorst required some college education for entry into the corps. Hence why Clausewitz appears in Prussia, not in Britain, France, Russia, or the USA. This is the beginnings of a culture of taking the initiative even at the most junior levels, a legacy other militaries have since adopted and celebrate.

But with a few exceptions (Ludwig Beck comes to mind), the German Generals in the 1930s refused to stand toe-to-toe with Hitler, to point out the strategic deficiencies of his plans. In effect, they abrogated any involvement in German strategic thinking from the late '30s on. Those officers at the top, Halder, Keitel, Jodl, etc., were particularly obsequious. Note that I am not discussing the immorality of his plans (which we all essentially agree upon), but the clear disregard for military good sense. Indeed, many officers wrote memoirs in which they claim to have deplored this, and yet despite accounts of Hitler's bluster at them, there is no evidence that many forcefully vocalized such concerns, or, as Beck did, resigned his commission. Admittedly in Nazi Germany there were dangers involved, although Beck survived as an example until involved in the Von Stauffenberg plot.

Am I being unfair? Perhaps. But I think that Von Scharnhorst, Von Geniesenau, Von Blucker, Von Moltkes Elder and Younger, and Von Schlieffen would have been as appalled as any allied tribunal. Military officers do not share the moral burden of the state's decisions--theirs is to follow orders, and not kill precious time rhuminating over the political, diplomatic, and social implications of those orders. But with regard to military capability, those officers should, at their level of their command be forthright as to military capabilities and the chance of success. As any military person currently on Armorama will probably attest, taking the King's, Queen's, Presidental or Republic's commission, warrant, or enlistment oath has with it enormous resposibility, to do the hard right instead of the easy wrong, even when facing those who administered the commission, warrant, or enlistment oath. Unlike paychecks, "honor" is not simply bestowed from above.

As for the relative merits of the T-34, here is where the German genius lay, less in technology, more in proficiency at the tactical and operational levels. The German army (also from Prussian tradition) had a long history of spending a good deal of time training people, and encouraging initiative at the most local of levels. The Russians (and Americans) were still struggling, even in 1944, with trying to create this level of 'professional excellence' among their armies. Bear in mind, for example, that despite losses by 1944-5, Germany was conscripting since 1935, meaning that the average Seargent-Major in German service in '44, provided he was a survivor, might have been goose-stepping since 1937, when his American counterpart was quaffing beer and peanuts at a ball game (or still looking for a job in the ongoing depression). The Russians in the late '30s were training men and women to drive farm tractors, not tanks. I think Ambrose commented even on the somewhat amatuerish nature of US Airborne leadership after D-day, with a bayonett charge. (My memory is hazy, here, however. Long time since I looked at Citizen-Soldiers).

Back in my college days I did a final paper in upper division History on the difference between German and Russian Tanks. If I remember my conclusions they were as follows:

The Germans had an obsession with what could be called mobile pill boxes. 60-70 ton tanks although armed with killer guns, really were handicapped by terrain, or lack of air support. Also, the one and two of a kind tanks did not help. Once the Panther was designed ALL tank production should have been directed to building one tank design. But the Germans had about a dozen lines running throughout the war.

The Russians built smaller lighter tanks in higher number that although inferior in many ways made up for it by being able to overwhelm an enemy.

The Germans had a poor recovery program in place. Tanks knocked out in Russia typically had to be destroyed in place by their crews or be captured. Moving a disabled 60-70 ton tank to a repair depot was extremely difficult.

The Russians had no recovery system, but due to the high production rates - they did not care.

By the end of the war, as all crumbled around them the Germans wasted material and time on 'Uber' tanks like the Maus and E-100.

The number of Russian T-34/85's was greater than all of the working tanks in the German Army.

In the final analysis, although the Tiger II represented the ultimate in amour and fireposer in 1945, the Germans had lost air superiority, were crippled with fuel and material shortages and many were lost simply because they ran out of fuel.

... In my humble opinion.

This has been a facinating discussion. The merits of German vs. Russian armor will always be discussed, often with passion for one side or the other. My focus in much of my modeling had been Russian armor, so I have studied everything I can. Some years back there was a book by a German officer who asked his Soviet captors how they had managed to move so quickly, and resupply, concidering the destroyed rail and road systems.

They showed him an American made 6 x 6 truck. As Patton pointed out, tanks are useless with out gas.

Something that has not been mentioned so far, unless i missed it in which case i apologise. The later German tanks were tested on the battlefield. The Tiger 1, Panther, and the Tiger 2 were all rushed into production without any time ot iron out any problems. By the time the Panther G came out, many modern experts think this was the best tank of any nation at that time. But, the biggest problem that the Germans could never over come was quantities. The Alllies out performed them in every area and this was always going to be the death knell for the Third Reich.

Tactically, i think one of the biggest mistakes was when Hitler insisted on taking all the armour away from AGC and sending it on campaigns that really did nothing to further the end of the war. If, and i know it is a big if, he had not done this, but had conctines on to Moscow, with the full force of AGC, the Russians would have been seriously hard pressed to hold onto Moscow. What hapopened after this i think is the only result there could have been.

In 42 they missed another chance when they split AGS and divided their objectives, neither of which they were able to achieve.

Regards from the Swamp

Hawkeye