The year is 1939, German U-Boats are pillaging the British lifeline to North America. They really have a field day after December of 1941 with our shipping lanes. By 1943, the U-Boats are a threat that we are adequately handling. Why do the Germans eventually lose the Battle of the Atlantic?
DJ
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Submarine Warfare
210cav
Member Since: February 05, 2002
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 03:58 AM UTC
m60a3
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 04:08 AM UTC
Sonar, radar, improvements in convoy tactics, the use of hunter-killer groups, better and more productive shipbuilding program by the allied nations, lack of surface support for U-boats (after '43, realistically the German navy possessed a single threat) and the allies' ability to compromise the German codes.
bodhi75
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 04:25 AM UTC
I agree with Bob, all his facts are pretty much right. There's one thing that comes to my mind too, and that was the losses of u-boat aces and crews. After the "happy days" in the early war, germans lost the majority of their greatest u-boat aces with their highly experienced crews (mainly for the reasons Bob listed). I guess these huge losses of experience were never replaced with the new crews and young captains..
Personally, I think that the german sub-crews were the most underrated soldiers of WW 2. They fought a losing battle nearly right from the start with huge losses.. for example the netsite
www.uboat.net is pretty sad sight to watch. Nearly every u-boat has a text "sunk by depth charges".
Oh well, I'm losing the point here. Good topic anyways.
Marko N.
Personally, I think that the german sub-crews were the most underrated soldiers of WW 2. They fought a losing battle nearly right from the start with huge losses.. for example the netsite
www.uboat.net is pretty sad sight to watch. Nearly every u-boat has a text "sunk by depth charges".
Oh well, I'm losing the point here. Good topic anyways.
Marko N.
shiryon
Member Since: April 26, 2002
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 04:50 AM UTC
I gotta go with Bob. Just like tanks can't go it alone neither can subs. Warfare whether on land,sea or air is combined arms needing all facets to work together to win. If the Germans hadn't piddled away their surface forces early on the story of the atlantic may have been diffferent.
Josh Weingarten
aKa shiryon
Josh Weingarten
aKa shiryon
Folgore
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 04:57 AM UTC
Bob's points cover the main reasons the Allies gained the upper hand in the U-boat war. I have recently read a book that covered Canada's role in this, however, so I can enlighten you a little on what happened with us.
Before the war, there was such a lack of spending on the military that everything went into decline. Canada's navy was pitifully small and ill-equipped when it entered the war. At the outbreak of war, our navy consisted of six destroyers (four of which were on the west coast) and eleven smaller ships, like minesweepers and corvettes. These six destroyers had not been entirely equipped with submarine detection devices (asdic) and the officers and crew were not well trained in convoy protection. Canada built a large force of corvettes during the war, as we did not have the resources to build new destroyers. Corvettes were not meant for midocean convoy escort, but that's what they were used for in the end. Much of the Germans' success at the beginning of the war, then, was do to Allied unpreparedness.
The British requested the RCN to cover the territory between Newfoundland and Iceland. This was too large a job for this fledgling navy. The Germans had such success against the Canadians, that for a short time, we were pulled out of the North Atlantic altogether.
So, how did the Germans lose? Because slowly, appalingly slowly, the RCN modernized its equipment and became very good at what they did. With the arrival of the Americans, Canada finally had some help in their half of the North Atlantic. Though we were very low on the priority list, we even eventually recieved a couple squadrons of Liberator bombers equipped for anti-submarine duties. I believe Canada even had one of its own hunter-killer groups which proved so effective against the U-boats.
Looking at the grand Allied strategy, we see similar cases. At the onset of war, the British feared the German surface fleet was a major threat and planned their strategy around fighting it. There were, of course, the famous battles against the Scharnhorst, Bismarck, and the Battle of the River Plate, but it was to be the U-boats that would pose the real threat. As the war went on, Allied strategy improved and, while the Germans adjusted theirs, U-boat losses mounted. It took a few years, but eventually the air gap was closed, with the help of escort carriers, and U-boats were not safe anywhere. The Germans could definitely not win a battle of atrition here and that is what they got.
Nic
PS--This information is from David Bercuson's Maple Leaf Against the Axis, a book which covers Canada's role on land, in the sea, and in the air during World War II.
Before the war, there was such a lack of spending on the military that everything went into decline. Canada's navy was pitifully small and ill-equipped when it entered the war. At the outbreak of war, our navy consisted of six destroyers (four of which were on the west coast) and eleven smaller ships, like minesweepers and corvettes. These six destroyers had not been entirely equipped with submarine detection devices (asdic) and the officers and crew were not well trained in convoy protection. Canada built a large force of corvettes during the war, as we did not have the resources to build new destroyers. Corvettes were not meant for midocean convoy escort, but that's what they were used for in the end. Much of the Germans' success at the beginning of the war, then, was do to Allied unpreparedness.
The British requested the RCN to cover the territory between Newfoundland and Iceland. This was too large a job for this fledgling navy. The Germans had such success against the Canadians, that for a short time, we were pulled out of the North Atlantic altogether.
So, how did the Germans lose? Because slowly, appalingly slowly, the RCN modernized its equipment and became very good at what they did. With the arrival of the Americans, Canada finally had some help in their half of the North Atlantic. Though we were very low on the priority list, we even eventually recieved a couple squadrons of Liberator bombers equipped for anti-submarine duties. I believe Canada even had one of its own hunter-killer groups which proved so effective against the U-boats.
Looking at the grand Allied strategy, we see similar cases. At the onset of war, the British feared the German surface fleet was a major threat and planned their strategy around fighting it. There were, of course, the famous battles against the Scharnhorst, Bismarck, and the Battle of the River Plate, but it was to be the U-boats that would pose the real threat. As the war went on, Allied strategy improved and, while the Germans adjusted theirs, U-boat losses mounted. It took a few years, but eventually the air gap was closed, with the help of escort carriers, and U-boats were not safe anywhere. The Germans could definitely not win a battle of atrition here and that is what they got.
Nic
PS--This information is from David Bercuson's Maple Leaf Against the Axis, a book which covers Canada's role on land, in the sea, and in the air during World War II.
Tin_Can
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 05:12 AM UTC
I concur with all points made above and would like to throw one more into the mix. I believe the American shipbuilding industry played a vital role as well. The shipbuilding industry was able to mass produce ships to make up for the savage losses inflicted by the German U-boats. Once the industry was in full swing, they were able to produce more raw tonnage than the Germans were sinking.
Sabot
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 06:08 AM UTC
I agree with the above and add that the Germans did not adapt their tactics enough to meet the evolution of Allied anti-submarine warfare (convoys, "hedge hogs", etc.). With the addition of improved sonar, radar and long range anti-submarine aircraft (Catalinas, Privateers, Liberators, etc.), the U-boats were hunted mercilessly. And remember, the Allies had cracked their enigma codes and knew where and when they were positioning themselves.
sniper
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 06:31 AM UTC
Quoted Text
The year is 1939, German U-Boats are pillaging the British lifeline to North America. They really have a field day after December of 1941 with our shipping lanes. By 1943, the U-Boats are a threat that we are adequately handling. Why do the Germans eventually lose the Battle of the Atlantic?
DJ
Why do the German's lose the Battle of the Atlantic?
We'll, the Germans had no navy. No, honest.
The Allies were able to build thousands of merchant and war vessels. The were able to protect convoys. They had better technology that stayed a step ahead of the Germans. (Radar, sonar, etc. already mentioned.)
The Germans aren't able to build u-boats fast enough to keep up with losses.
Steve
210cav
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 09:23 AM UTC
Give me a brain check here, I believe the major points presented are:
Initial German techical and materiel superiority
General lack of Allied pre-war preparedness in terms of training and acquisition to deal with the potential submarine threat (nice rundown by the way Nic)
Allied resources in terms of technologically superior detection gear, tactical improvements, code breaking, and ship building capability
Employment of CVEs, DE, Corvettes and Hunter Killer groups
Failure of Germans to maintain technological advantage or bring technological improvements on too late (snorkel)
Does this summarize the points or did I miss something?
What about the US use of submarines in comparison?
thanks
DJ
Ps--where is COB?
Initial German techical and materiel superiority
General lack of Allied pre-war preparedness in terms of training and acquisition to deal with the potential submarine threat (nice rundown by the way Nic)
Allied resources in terms of technologically superior detection gear, tactical improvements, code breaking, and ship building capability
Employment of CVEs, DE, Corvettes and Hunter Killer groups
Failure of Germans to maintain technological advantage or bring technological improvements on too late (snorkel)
Does this summarize the points or did I miss something?
What about the US use of submarines in comparison?
thanks
DJ
Ps--where is COB?
Sabot
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 10:34 AM UTC
Although the US started out with obsolete pig boats, they ended the war with long range patrol boats that could survive the vastness of the Pacific with little problem. Add to that the improved torpedos, and the Japanese convoys never had a chance after Midway.
Cob
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 11:47 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Although the US started out with obsolete pig boats, they ended the war with long range patrol boats that could survive the vastness of the Pacific with little problem. Add to that the improved torpedos, and the Japanese convoys never had a chance after Midway
Good points Rob, I would add that many of our Sub Skippers were not, frankly up to the task at the beginning of the war . During peacetime, the guys who did the best job following the book and passing the inspection (with all the peacetime artificialities) got promoted. Luckily, we had guys like Charlie Lockwood who weren't afraid to relieve the guys who wern't performing. The guys who won the sub war for us in the pacific were innovative, not afraid to take risks, and weren't bashful about telling the boss that the torpedos sucked etc.
The Japanese were as dependant on open sea lanes as any Nation I can think of and yet they underestimated our ability and determination to take the fight to them with our subs. Maybe because their doctrine envisioned subs as fleet escorts rather than a strategic weapon. From the beginning of the war we waged unrestricted submarine warfare against both Naval and merchant targets.
Our ability to read some of the German and Japanese mail (Ultra and Magic) were instrumental in our victory at sea.
The German Navy did not have the support or attention of Hitler. The Allies had the industrial capacity to launch more tonnage than Donitz's U-boats could sink. Once we geared up our shipbuilding industry, It was all over. I believe Kaiser routinely built a Liberty ship in a week or two if not less.
As with their armor, the Germans were innovative and technologically advanced. My first submarine was a direct decendant of the German type XXI which was produced in very small numbers towards the end of the war.But they didn't have either the numbers of boats, nor the crews to man them. The German losses were difficult if not impossible to replace. I believe the Germans lost 70 - 80 % of their Sub Sailors something like 30,000 men. We lost 52 boats in the Pacific - 3,000-4,000 men.
v/r,
Cob
by the way- best submarine movie ever made - Das Boot. I won't even watch any of the others.
210cav
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Posted: Thursday, September 05, 2002 - 07:13 PM UTC
COB---Das Boot is so well done when viewed with the English sub titles, I still find it an amazing picture. At what point does US submarine employment doctrine change? For example, why didn't the small Cavite based submarine force disrupt the Japanese landings in Luzon in early 1942?
DJ
DJ
bison44
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 12:49 AM UTC
I think that some shipyards were putting out a liberty ship (during peak production) in only 80hours. That is almost impossible to fathom. Make u think about what we can do when we put our minds to it.
Cob
Member Since: May 23, 2002
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 12:58 AM UTC
Quoted Text
COB---Das Boot is so well done when viewed with the English sub titles, I still find it an amazing picture. At what point does US submarine employment doctrine change? For example, why didn't the small Cavite based submarine force disrupt the Japanese landings in Luzon in early 1942?
DJ
The Navy yard in Cavite was attacked on Dec 8th. The USS Sealion was hit by aerial bombs causing quite a bit of damage. The first US Submarine casualty of the war was an Ensign on Seadragon, which was outboard of Sealion. There was no real opposition to the landings because we were in pretty sad shape at the type.
I'm not sure what you mean by submarine doctrine change. Roosevelt signed an executive order authorizing "unrestricted submarine warfare" against the empire of Japan on 8 Dec. This was a big deal because we had been all over the Germans for attacking and sinking merchants in violation of the rules of the day. Subs were supposed to surface, hail the merchant they wanted to attack and give the crew time to get off. Sounds rather quaint by todays standards. Anyway, we decided to justify our policy by declaring all Japanese ships (Naval and merchant) part of the Imperial Navy and thus fair game for a submerged attack. The tactics we began the war with were cast aside as we gained experience on war patrols.
Cob
Ranger74
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 02:19 AM UTC
Here are what I see as main points, most, if not all already covered in some form:
1 - BIG ONE: Breaking of German Naval Code - gave Allies heads up on concentrations of U-boats, allowing Allies to send Hunter-killer teams to area. This was such an important advantage that the Allies had to let convoys running to Murmansk get attacked by German surface units, to keep from giving away the secret.
2 - Convoy system - lesson intially forgotten from WW1. This allowed allies (Britain, US, Canada (even some Free - French, Dutch, Polish crews) to allocate their initially meager escort assets. Forced the U-boat skippers to confront the escorts if they wanted a kill. Except for the faster luxury liners (Queen Elizabeth, Queen Mary, etc.) that had the speed to stay out of harms way, everything was convoyed staring in late early 42.
3 - Air Power - The British, Canadians and Americans developed and employed long range bombers and naval patrol aircraft - Catalinas, Hudsons, Venturas, Sunderlands, B17s (early models used by British) and variations of the B-24, plus many other aircraft. The US quickly shut off the Gulf of Mexico and the Carribean, using British bases and US territories in the area. The Atlantic, I believe was closed by 1943 with aircraft flying from NE Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, Northern Ireland, SW England and the Azores. Eventually every part of the North Atlantic could be patrolled by air.
4 - Hunter-Killer Teams - Formed around an escort carrier with a number of specialized anti-sub ships patrolled the Atlantic and sweeping the areas near the convoy routes. This and the ground-based aircraft kept the subs under water, making it more and more hazardous to operate on the surface.
The massive output of Liberty Ships weren't a direct player in winning the Battle of the Atlantic, but were essential in keeping Britain and the anti-sub forces operating from there in the fight.
1 - BIG ONE: Breaking of German Naval Code - gave Allies heads up on concentrations of U-boats, allowing Allies to send Hunter-killer teams to area. This was such an important advantage that the Allies had to let convoys running to Murmansk get attacked by German surface units, to keep from giving away the secret.
2 - Convoy system - lesson intially forgotten from WW1. This allowed allies (Britain, US, Canada (even some Free - French, Dutch, Polish crews) to allocate their initially meager escort assets. Forced the U-boat skippers to confront the escorts if they wanted a kill. Except for the faster luxury liners (Queen Elizabeth, Queen Mary, etc.) that had the speed to stay out of harms way, everything was convoyed staring in late early 42.
3 - Air Power - The British, Canadians and Americans developed and employed long range bombers and naval patrol aircraft - Catalinas, Hudsons, Venturas, Sunderlands, B17s (early models used by British) and variations of the B-24, plus many other aircraft. The US quickly shut off the Gulf of Mexico and the Carribean, using British bases and US territories in the area. The Atlantic, I believe was closed by 1943 with aircraft flying from NE Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, Northern Ireland, SW England and the Azores. Eventually every part of the North Atlantic could be patrolled by air.
4 - Hunter-Killer Teams - Formed around an escort carrier with a number of specialized anti-sub ships patrolled the Atlantic and sweeping the areas near the convoy routes. This and the ground-based aircraft kept the subs under water, making it more and more hazardous to operate on the surface.
The massive output of Liberty Ships weren't a direct player in winning the Battle of the Atlantic, but were essential in keeping Britain and the anti-sub forces operating from there in the fight.
Arthur
Member Since: March 13, 2002
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 02:41 AM UTC
The beginning of the end of the so called "happy time"was when the US got the message
and started to take things seriosly,ie. turning off the lights on the Atlantic seaboard,and ended the turky shoot.
Arthur
Am Alba Mannich
and started to take things seriosly,ie. turning off the lights on the Atlantic seaboard,and ended the turky shoot.
Arthur
Am Alba Mannich
210cav
Member Since: February 05, 2002
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 02:49 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Quoted TextCOB---Das Boot is so well done when viewed with the English sub titles, I still find it an amazing picture. At what point does US submarine employment doctrine change? For example, why didn't the small Cavite based submarine force disrupt the Japanese landings in Luzon in early 1942?
DJ
The Navy yard in Cavite was attacked on Dec 8th. The USS Sealion was hit by aerial bombs causing quite a bit of damage. The first US Submarine casualty of the war was an Ensign on Seadragon, which was outboard of Sealion. There was no real opposition to the landings because we were in pretty sad shape at the type.
I'm not sure what you mean by submarine doctrine change. Roosevelt signed an executive order authorizing "unrestricted submarine warfare" against the empire of Japan on 8 Dec. This was a big deal because we had been all over the Germans for attacking and sinking merchants in violation of the rules of the day. Subs were supposed to surface, hail the merchant they wanted to attack and give the crew time to get off. Sounds rather quaint by todays standards. Anyway, we decided to justify our policy by declaring all Japanese ships (Naval and merchant) part of the Imperial Navy and thus fair game for a submerged attack. The tactics we began the war with were cast aside as we gained experience on war patrols.
Cob
COB--as I understood pre war employment (I am citing Beach's work on the USN in WW II here) subs were purely used as scouts for the fleet. I believed up until your post that we could have interfered with the Japanese landing but no one ordered the subs to attack the Japanese invasion shipping. Can you expand on your "tactics we began the war with..." point? Generally speaking what did we alter? Attacking civilian shipping?
thanks
DJ
Cob
Member Since: May 23, 2002
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 03:01 AM UTC
DJ,
You are correct about the scouting mission. In fact, the term "fleet boat" comes from the primary mission of the pre-war subs to be the eyes of the fleet. I think some people realized before the war that our subs would have to concentrate on the marus, but I don't believe it was policy. I will dig around and see what I can find to prove or disprove that idea.
Cob
You are correct about the scouting mission. In fact, the term "fleet boat" comes from the primary mission of the pre-war subs to be the eyes of the fleet. I think some people realized before the war that our subs would have to concentrate on the marus, but I don't believe it was policy. I will dig around and see what I can find to prove or disprove that idea.
Cob
210cav
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 03:14 AM UTC
Quoted Text
DJ,
You are correct about the scouting mission. In fact, the term "fleet boat" comes from the primary mission of the pre-war subs to be the eyes of the fleet. I think some people realized before the war that our subs would have to concentrate on the marus, but I don't believe it was policy. I will dig around and see what I can find to prove or disprove that idea.
Cob
COB--appreciate your staying with this topic. I learnt a great deal about the invasion of Formosa from our previous discussion and trust I can expand my databank on this one too.
thanks again
DJ
Cob
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 03:32 AM UTC
OK, I've checked agood reference, War Beneath the Sea by Peter Padfield. His take is that Although US planners knew that Japan imported over 50% of the raw materials it needed to fight, we never made the leap (pre-war) to attacking merchants. The Admirals were fixated on the Battleships and putting a blockade around Japan. We were signatories to a treaty which outlawed the use of submarines as I described earlier and we were naive enough to think that they would continue to follow it even after hostilities commenced.
The night surface attack using radar that was so successful during the war was forbidden during peacetime exercises because it was "too hard" to pull off and potentially dangerous. Besides we might lose an expensive torpedo in the dark!
The average age of our COs pre-war was around 40. By '44-45' they were about 30. The Germans were even younger. They actually gave command of a U-boat to a 21 year old.
v/r,
Cob
The night surface attack using radar that was so successful during the war was forbidden during peacetime exercises because it was "too hard" to pull off and potentially dangerous. Besides we might lose an expensive torpedo in the dark!
The average age of our COs pre-war was around 40. By '44-45' they were about 30. The Germans were even younger. They actually gave command of a U-boat to a 21 year old.
v/r,
Cob
Greg
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 04:34 AM UTC
Excellent analysis all around, and I don't have much to add that is new. I will point out--not to the detriment of the USsub force, please note--that Japanese ASW was rather pathetic compared to what we put together. Their sonar and radar wer much less capable, yielding yet another advantage to US submarines. One area where I think we fell down a bit is on depth capability. Our boats couldn't dive nearly as deep as the German ones, so the task of an attacking escort was somewhat easier--fewer potential settings for the depth charges, so your odds of guessing right are a bit better.
Greg
Greg
Cob
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 04:43 AM UTC
Quoted Text
Excellent analysis all around, and I don't have much to add that is new. I will point out--not to the detriment of the USsub force, please note--that Japanese ASW was rather pathetic compared to what we put together. Their sonar and radar wer much less capable, yielding yet another advantage to US submarines. One area where I think we fell down a bit is on depth capability. Our boats couldn't dive nearly as deep as the German ones, so the task of an attacking escort was somewhat easier--fewer potential settings for the depth charges, so your odds of guessing right are a bit better.
Greg
I've talked to quite a few Sub force vets. Our boats routinely dove several hundred feet deeper than test depth. Test depth is the depth the engineers and builders say you reach repeatedly without any problems. Crush depth is the depth where the hull fails. The difference between the two is what we exploited during the war. Problem is if you guess wrong, you don't come back up. The IJN were aware of our boats test depth and therefore set their depth charges to go off too shallow. This worked until some Congressman who knew the secret blabbed to the press which printed the story. The Japanese picked up on it and changed depth settings. No telling how many lost their lives because of that. One more reason we continue to be the silent service.
Cob
210cav
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Posted: Friday, September 06, 2002 - 09:20 PM UTC
This worked until some Congressman who knew the secret blabbed to the press which printed the story. The Japanese picked up on it and changed depth settings. No telling how many lost their lives because of that. One more reason we continue to be the silent service.
Cob[/quote]
COB---another reason to never miss the golden opportunity to keep your mouth shut. Even today, loose lips can still sink ships. How close to a WW II boat does depth charge have to come to do damage? Seems to me that the test or crush depth of the vessel and the explosive force would imperil any boat.
DJ
Cob[/quote]
COB---another reason to never miss the golden opportunity to keep your mouth shut. Even today, loose lips can still sink ships. How close to a WW II boat does depth charge have to come to do damage? Seems to me that the test or crush depth of the vessel and the explosive force would imperil any boat.
DJ
Cob
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Posted: Saturday, September 07, 2002 - 01:14 AM UTC
Quoted Text
COB---another reason to never miss the golden opportunity to keep your mouth shut. Even today, loose lips can still sink ships. How close to a WW II boat does depth charge have to come to do damage? Seems to me that the test or crush depth of the vessel and the explosive force would imperil any boat.
DJ
Good question. Obviously the closer the explosion and the deeper the depth, the more damage can be done. I have seen films of testing done post-war where a boat was suspended on cables in a stationary position and explosive charges were set off at various distances to see what would happen. From what I could see, even if the explosion was relatively far away (several hundred yards or more) extensive internal damage occured. Equipment that weighed over a ton, bolted to the deck was thrown across the compartment when the mounting boltys were sheared. You can imagine what would happen to the crew in that situation. Kind of like the spalling that occurs inside a tank.
You didn't have to get a hit or near miss with a depth charge either. Just by keeping the boat under until the battery was drained and/or the oxygen was depleted would work too. Up until Nuclear power, Submarines were really just submersibles, that is, a ship that could submerge for a limited time.
Cob
SS-74
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Posted: Saturday, September 07, 2002 - 01:55 AM UTC
And correct me if I am wrong, I think I read from somewhere that it's till a very late stage in the war that the IJN started to organize convoy systems, and by that time it was already too late, right?
By the way, in my high school years while I was still very good at Maths stuff, I used to play silent hunter and tune all the automatic ranging and computing thing down in the simulation to mannually calculate the spread for torpedos, man it was fun!
By the way, in my high school years while I was still very good at Maths stuff, I used to play silent hunter and tune all the automatic ranging and computing thing down in the simulation to mannually calculate the spread for torpedos, man it was fun!
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