The dropping of the atomic bombs ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’[1] over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 respectively, represent a turning point in human history, as it was the culmination of science and war coming together as one. While the dropping of the bomb eventually saw the ending of World War II with the defeat of Imperial Japan, it is the decision to drop them that have come in for much criticism years after the event.



The main criticism of the use of the bombs is that the actual target was not Japan but much rather the Soviet Union.[2] Many revisionists see their use as a method of forestalling Soviet ambition in both the Far East and in Western Europe and as one historian notes: ‘The shock of the bombs…would not only be felt in Tokyo, American leaders calculated that it would be noted in Moscow.’[3] The main basis for this thesis has been the re-examination of the primary sources from the period. Many of which have opened holes in the original claims of the US government and orthodox historians.



The orthodox argument is based in the idea that the bombs were dropped in order to end the war as quickly as possible with as few casualties as possible. One historian, Alonzo Hamby, has even gone as far as suggesting it was Harry Truman’s experience with the AEF[4] as an artillery officer that led to his decision over the bombs. As Hamby has commented, ‘Truman, the old artilleryman…understood…the hopes and fears of the…young combat officers dreaming of families and futures…’[5]



Therefore, the argument comes down to a case of military expediency, the saving of American lives, the orthodox view, against political realities, forestalling Soviet ambition, the revisionist view. This forms the reasons why the bombs were dropped. This essay will seek to analysis this decision with the aid of both primary and secondary sources. For example when analysing what has become known as the strange myth of a half a million American lives saved there is already the formation of myth around the reasons for the use of the bomb.[6] This is reference to the planned Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands, Operations Olympic and Coronet. In the reasoning for using the bomb it was explained that it would save countless American lives from a bloody campaign in Japan. This myth first gained credence in President Truman’s memoirs when he commented that the invasion could cost half a million lives.[7] Though this may have been the case it is now widely known that the Japanese, feeling the effects of bombing and blockade, did want peace, and were seeking it through their ambassador in Moscow.[8] Now the soviets my well have kept this from the Americans in the hope that they would be able to share in the spoils of the war in the Far East but it is now obvious that the Japanese were willing to seek peace and that the only obstacle in the way was unconditional surrender. This in its self would have save American lives. A comment revisionist historians are all too willing to make. As will be noted later a continued blockade and strategic bombing campaign may well have also saved American lives, but it is the invasion itself that must be analysed.[9] The estimates that had been given to the President related to casualties, that is to say wounded as well as dead, rather than deaths. In this respect the dropping of the bomb would not have saved half a million lives as they did not need saving but as one historians comment it would surely not have saved ‘…more than 20,000 and probably less than 15,000…’ [10] Thus the myth has been built up through the literature as saving half American death when in actual fact in terms of death it would have been significantly smaller.



The main argument that the bombs were dropped for military reason has become heavily steeped in mystery as one historian makes clear, ‘By the time historians were given access to…secret files…the myth…had achieved the status of accepted history.’[11] As commented earlier some historians see it as Truman’s disgust at seeing the countless lives of American soldiers being lost in an invasion of Japan. This may well have been born out of his own experience of WWI but does not give a realisation of the whole picture. For example when looking at the official bombing order there is no mention of the intended targets being military targets, the cities were to be targets themselves.[12] Therefore, it must be considered whether they were legitimate targets for such a weapon whose usage not based upon accurate bombing. In terms of Just War Theory it would appear that Truman and his administration were acting outside the confines of morality but given the overall nature of the Second World War this could have been considered justified, for example see the treatment by the Japanese of Allied Prisoners of War and the infamous Rape of Nanking.[13] Truman does however comment in his diary for the 25th July that the targets were to be, ‘…military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children.’[14] Therefore, touching on the moral aspects, which in civilized war must always exist if it is to exist within the domain of human behaviour, we must consider the Presidents actions, was the intended targets military or another possible target, the Soviet Union. This feeds well into the revisionist argument as if the intended target, as seen by the bombing order, was the cities it could well be seen as a show of force possibly to scare the Soviet Union.



Another document, which sheds light on the military aspect for the reason to use the bomb, is the Franck Report of June 11 1945.[15] In this report a panel of seven member of the Manhattan project suggested a demonstration of the bomb on a remote island. They believed America should take a moral high ground, as the report comments, ‘…America would be able to say to the world, "You see what weapon we had but did not use.’[16] They suggested this as in their own words the use of the bombs could, ‘…precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.’[17] This is of course the situation that occurred when the Soviet Union finally tested their own bomb in 1949. While the majority of the report was rejected it was agreed that the Soviets should be informed of it. Though this did not happen due to a conversation between Winston Churchill, Stimson and Truman in which details should be kept secret. Therefore, this report can be seen in two distinct lights. Firstly, there did seem to be an intention to tell the Soviets of its existence. When viewed from this point of view it may well be considered that the bomb had a military purpose, most notably Truman’s wish to use it to save lives. Though secondly, the fact that Churchill and Stimson easily swayed Truman shows both theirs and Truman’s fear of the Soviets and their intention in the Far East. Therefore, when Stalin was informed of the weapons nothing was mentioned about the words ‘atomic’ or ‘nuclear’ and as Gar Alperovitz comments this was in order to strengthen, ‘…American diplomacy only after it was demonstrated in combat’[18]



The incident of when Truman mentioned a weapon of immense power to Stalin is extremely interesting in the history of the use of the bomb. As pointed out above the words ‘nuclear’ or ‘atomic’ were not used and when Truman casually mentioned it on July 24 at the Potsdam Conference, Stalin is remarked to have been unimpressed but based on the recollections of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgi Zhukov this was not the case;

‘In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. "Let them. We'll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up."’[19]

This obviously refers to the Soviet Union’s own effort at developing an atomic weapon, much of which was based upon espionage of the Manhattan project which Stalin had been well aware off due to the projects infiltration by the NKVD. This event has often been interpretated by revisionists as an attempt to intimidate Stalin, an attempt which based on contemporary recollections was unsuccessful. As James Byrnes, US Secretary of State commented;

‘Stalin's only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it. I was surprised at Stalin's lack of interest. I concluded that he had not grasped the importance of the discovery.’[20]

If it was to be an attempt to intimidate the Soviets it was an attempt that was made against the advice of several of his senior Generals, in particular General Marshall and Admiral Leahy. Both of who believed that the war with Japan was over and that an attempt to outsmart the Soviets with ‘atomic diplomacy’ would fail to check Stalin ambitions.[21]



One of the most interesting documents relating the use of the bomb is the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.[22] The report was written early after the end of the war in an attempt to assess the success of the strategic bombing campaign which the US Army Air Forces had conducted over Germany and Japan. The report has often been used in an attempt to argue that the war could have been ended by conventional means and as such the Atomic Bombs were not a necessary measure. As such the maritime blockade and aerial campaign over the Japanese home islands have been considered one of the most successful campaigns of military coercion in history as the report comments,

‘General Takashima, when asked by the Survey as to his reaction to the Imperial Rescript, stated that surrender had become unavoidable; the Army, even should it repel invasion, could no longer protect the Japanese people from extermination.’[23]

Thus the argument that has been given by some historians is that the atomic bombs were not needed to force Japan’s surrender as the conventional campaign would have done this by November possibly December by the latest. Thus the decision to use the bombs early and hope to end the war can be seen as supporting the revisionists claim as Alperovitz, the chief revisionist claims the USSBS concluded ‘…that Japan would likely have surrendered in 1945 without atomic bombing, without a Soviet declaration of war…’[24] Though but as the report goes on to comment the atomic bombs did have a role in Japan’s surrender and thus did save the spilling of anymore blood both on the allied side as well as the Japanese side, both military and civilian, as the report comments, ‘The role of the atomic bomb in the surrender must be considered along with all the other forces which bore upon that question with Japan.’[25]Though in reading the survey it does lend credence to the argument that the both the dropping of the atomic bombs and the planned invasions of the home islands were not necessary. As such one of the most important reasons for the use of the bomb, saving of American lives, was not needed as the report concludes that this would have been possible by the application of strategic air power alone and would have forced Japan’s surrender by November 1945 at the latest. Thus why was the bomb used early, well as commented before it may well have been used to forestall Soviet ambition in the Far East and prevent a divided Japan and a similar situation to which was building up in central Europe.



It appears when looking at the many primary sources that exist that there were many people who wished to see that the bomb was not use. That Truman and his advisors did use it can be taken as an act of, as Alperovitz called it, atomic diplomacy. For example, the Bard memorandum[26] that was written by the Undersecretary for the Navy Ralph Bard and given to Stimson. In this memorandum Bard suggest that the bomb did not need to be used and that the Japanese themselves are looking for a way out of the war, as commented earlier the Japanese were attempting to use their ambassador in Moscow in order to help seek favourable terms with the allies. As he comments the Japanese were seeking surrender and that this was the, ‘…the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.’[27] The major stumbling block to Japanese surrender was the role of the Emperor but if this could be solved peace could have been attained and the bomb would not have been necessary. The comments made by Bard were supported by several other top officers, as commented above both Marshall and Leahy had their reservations over its use. While they all believed it may have forced Japanese surrender, though Bard argued that this was not even needed, it would have no effect on Soviet ambitions if that was its intended target as has been supposed. So then it must be considered what was its point, if Japan would surrender with some negotiations over the Emperors role and it would not forestall Soviet ambition then the dropping of these to weapons must be seen as one of the greatest misjudgements in history as it precipitated an arms race with the Soviet Union that was to have huge consequences for the twentieth century.



Therefore, in conclusion, the decision to use the atomic bomb appear to be complex, and indeed sometimes a muddled, decision that had concerns over ending the war quickly, with as few casualties as possible and forestalling Soviet ambitions in the region. All the primary documents that have been used in this analysis lend themselves to both interpretations of the event. A historian could accept what has been written by Truman, Stimson et al and agree that it was used for purely military reasons or they could be sceptical and argue that there must be something more to it and that, for example, Truman would not possibly write about it in his memoirs.[28] In analysing the primary sources, such as the USSBS, we see that again these lend themselves to both interpretations. While the USSBS states that Japan could have been defeated as quickly as possible without the bomb, thus supporting the ideas of revisionist historians, it does concede that it forced Japan to end the war quicker than had been anticipated, thus supporting the writings of orthodox historians. Whether a historian chooses to believe one argument or another comes down to their outlook on international affairs. By accepting the revisionist reasoning, that the US Government was acting to forestall Soviet ambition, they are accepting that government acted with some other intent in the arena international affairs. While this may be true it relies on assumptions and the possible release of documents that have been classified and may well never be released in our lifetime and as one historian has commented about the use of the bombs and its political considerations, ‘This is not to argue that political considerations did not flow from that decision, but there is no effective evidence to support the contention that it prompted it.’[29] Thus while there may have been considerations the overriding aim based on sources must be the saving of American lives. The orthodox reasoning is heavily based upon what has been given to the public and assumes the infallibility of that nation’s government in its policies. Therefore, there must be some middle ground and in reality the use of the bombs was quite possibly related to both aspects of the reason given and that Truman wished to end the war quickly for whichever reason. Thus the argument over the use of the bomb may well be one that will probably never be reconciled and will go on for years to come. One thing is agreed upon though, the use of the bomb launched the world into a new and uncertain world in mutually assured destruction (MAD) became a byword and a worry for all concerned in the later half of the twentieth century.

[1] ‘Little Boy’, a Uranium based weapon, was dropped over Hiroshima by the B-29 ‘Enola Gay’ commanded by Colonel Paul Tibbets on the 6th. ‘Fat Man’, a Plutonium based weapon, was dropped on Nagasaki three days later by a B-29 by the name ‘Boxcar’.

[2] The most important historian to have suggested this was Gar Alperovitz in his book Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam.

[3] Martin J. Sherwin ‘Atomic Bomb’ in Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II, p. 59

[4] American Expeditionary Force – This was America’s contribution to the Great War 1914-1918 and was commanded by General ‘Black Jack’ Pershing.

[5] Hamby A L ‘Truman and the Bomb’, History Today (45:8) August 1995, Pg. 25

[6] Miles Jr R E, ‘Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved’, International Security (10:2) Fall 1985 pp. 121-140

[7] Truman H S (1955) The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman Volume One: Year of Decisions 1945, p.347. It also occurred in an article by Henry Stimson ‘The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb’ Harpers Magazine, February 1947

[8] Miles Jr R E International Security (10:2) Fall 1985, p. 127

[9] For an interesting look at the alternate possibilities of the war with Japan see: Richard B. Frank ‘No Bomb: No End’ in Cowley R (Ed.) (2002) More What If? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been pp. 366-381

[10] Miles Jr R E International Security (10:2) Fall 1985, p. 135

[11] Miles Jr R E International Security (10:2) Fall 1985, p. 121

[12] Issued on July 25, accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/handy.html

[13] For an introduction to Just War Theory see: Coates A J (1997) The Ethics of War. For the story of the Rape of Nanking see Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking

[14] Ferrell R H (Ed.) (1996) Harry S. Truman & the Bomb: A Documentary History, p. 31

[15] The Franck Report, June 11, 1945, accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/franck.html its full title is Report of the Committee on Political and Social Problems Manhattan Project "Metallurgical Laboratory"
University of Chicago, June 11, 1945 (The Franck Report).

[16] Franck Report, http://dannen.com/decision/franck.html

[17] Franck Report, http://dannen.com/decision/franck.html

[18] Alperovitz G (1994) Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, Pg. 205

[19] Zhukov G K (1971) The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, pp. 674-675

[20] Byrnes J F (1947) Speaking Frankly, p. 263

[21] Leffler M P (1992) A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War, P. 37

[22] United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War), 1 July 1946 – Accessed at http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm

[23] USSBS, The Health and Morale of the Japanese Civilian Population under Assault, p. 22

[24] Alperovitz G (1995) The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p. 4

[25] USSBS, The Effects of the Atomic Bombs, p. 25

[26] Bard Memorandum, June 27, 1945, Accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/bardmemo.html

[27] Bard, http://dannen.com/decision/bardmemo.html

[28] For the military reasons that appear in Truman’s memoirs see: Truman H S (1955) Op Cit, pp. 347-350

[29] Buckley J (1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War, p. 196

Lets not forget the war in Mancuria in 1939 between Japan and the Soviet Union that culminated in the tank battle at Khalkin Gol, with the Soviets under the command of a certain Zhukov...

I think one of the points Mahross was trying to make was that the use of two bombs may have been to show the USSR that the US had a 'stock' of these weapons and they would be used if the USSR tried to 'conquer' further territory in Europe or the Far East, a kinda thinly veiled warning to the USSR to respect the boundaries that were agreed upon.

Whatever the reason the dropping of the bombs ended the war without the need to launch operation Olympic that would certainly involved heavier loss of life, not only to the US but also to the Japanese. So it maybe that the bombs saved lives. Not much consolation to those killed in Horoshima and Nagasaki, but it undoubtedly saved the lives of many US servicemen who would have been killed or maimed in the invasion of the Japanese Homelands. A nation at war has a responsibility to limit the casualties amongst its own men as much as it can and in this respect that seems a good enough reason to me to drop the weapons.

"Following on that success 334 B-29s raided on the night of March 9-10, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Around 16 square miles (41 km²) of the city were destroyed and over 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the fire storm. It was the most destructive conventional raid of the war against Japan."

Stolen from this website.

Estimates vary on the deaths caused by the two atomic bombs but they aren't over 100,000. (About 80,000 to 100,000 in each of the two cases.)

I guess my point is this: Massive civilian casualties from conventional weapons were not going to compel the Japanese military to surrender. Truman knew that and when the A bomb tested successfully he decided to use it.

As an aside, the first four atomic bombs cost about 5 billion (1944) dollars each. (This figure includes the cost of all the R&D) I don't think they were going to spent that kind of money on a weapon and then not use it. At its height the Manhattan Project employed 130,000 people and was bigger than the entire US automotive industry...

Shaun

I found this an interesting and thought provoking essay, however I believe in common with many modern historians (and filmmakers) Ross has failed to take into account the gut feelings of people at the time.
Firstly, the Allies had liberated many Japanese prison camps, both military and civil by this time and become aware of the disgraceful conditions under which Japanese captives were held.
Secondly, the Japanese appeared to hold human life to be of no value, either their own or anyone elses. They had not signed the Geneva Convention, but this was hardly an excuse for the barbaric practices that they considered the norm.
Thirdly there were many thousands of Allied POWs still being worked to death in Japan itself, indeed there are eyewitness accounts of prisoners being beheaded the very day the bombs were dropped.
These factors, taken with the perceived underhand way the Japanese began the war with America, led the mass of the Allied populations to consider the Japanese to be little more than savage and untrustworthy animals, who they would be unmoved to see exterminated (obviously they would not be brought face-to-face with this).
The post-war angst about the bomb dropping is I feel that of those who did not have to face Tarawa, Iwo Jima and Okinawa (neither did I, but I hope you can see my point).
I apologise in advance to anyone of Japanese descent who may read this note, I stress these are not my personal views, but an attempt to analyse the "emotional" reasons for using the bomb at the time. I know people who even now will avoid buying Japanese goods if at all possible, and am mindful of the reaction of British Far East veterans to the visit to the UK of the Japanese Emperor.

Firstly, thank you all for you replies. Now to clarfy a few points. We are not dealing with people emotions. I hate to point this out but most government operate for there own reasons. Trumn and his advisors may well have sincerley wished to save allied lives, a point i make clear, but also they had political considerations with which to take into account.

With reference of the point of Japanese approaching the Soiviet, this is historical fact. The reason it took time to find this out was because of something called the Cold War and after the end of it we saw the release of the soviet state archives to western historians. It is know that Ambassador Sato had a meeting with Molotov on the 7 August in an attempt to seek terms. It must be remebered that the only thing stopping terms being sought was the position of the Emporer. If a position could have been agreed a peace settlement could well have been founded, based on the position of unconditional surrender, without the use of the bomb or the invasion of japan. These details were not forwarded to the american due to the fact that the Soviets, as per the Yalta Agreement, were due to enter the war and as we all now Stalin was not a man to miss out on his share of the spoils. We are talking about one of the most ruthless dictators of the 20th century. He would doubtless have minded about the use of the bomb, a point he made to Truman at Potsdam when he was told of its existence. He simply stated that he hoped that American would use it. This was a thinly veiled threat by Truman. As to soviet ambition against the west i suggest you read R C Raack's 'Stalins Drive to the West', as he quite righlt argues stalins was ambition to the point of overkill.

As to the point about Soviet development of the bomb it was yes in a nascent stage, a threat the US was not worried about, but most of the Soviets knowledge was from the Manhatten project not the germans, who it must be noted were years of the development of the bomb aswell. Soviet knowledge was due to NKVD infiltration of the project, a case of industrial espionage. Something the Soviets were to become masters of in the Cold War. For a discussion of the Soviet bomb and the extent of Soviet infiltration of the Manhatten project i suggest you read David Holloway excellent 'Stalin and the bomb'.

As a point it was not soviet nuclear capability which worried the US it was their massive conventional forces, the largest at the end of the war, in terms of ground forces, these posed a serious threat to western europe and it was this that Tru,man was attempting to threaten. Remeber Patton was sacked by Eisenhower for commenting that they should finsh of the ruskies while they had the chance. Perhaps he was voicing the thought of the political administartion. who knows?

If anyone is interested i can post a bibliography on which this piece was based upon. some very interesting works.

The Japanese approaches to the Soviets to some extent mirror the crude attempts by Doenitz to split the Allied alliance when he was negotiating surrender terms after the death of Hitler. The Germans and the Japanese seemed to be unable to understand that their regimes were anathema to their enemies (notwithstanding the fact that Stalin's setup was virtually identical to theirs). I don't think any government in a democracy can ignore the feelings of the electorate indefinitely, especially with an election in the offing as was the case of Britain in 1945, so I'm sure popular feeling would have shaped Trumans thinking to some extent. As is mentioned above, the Germans and the Soviets were years away from an atomic bomb, the Germans particularly were heading down a blind alley; had it not been for traitors in the Western democracies, they would have continued to be.

After Pearl Harbor, FDR was quoted as saying that by the time America had finished with them, the Japanese language would be spoken only in Hell. You can't get more emotional than that, but of course he was just putting it on for the press, wasn't he?!

I must disagree i think all governments are not altruistic by their very nature but then again i take a very neo-realist approach to international affairs and believe no government tells the complete truth. As to taking the peoples feeling into account, maybe, but as only a very small portion of trumans decision making. As to the soviet effect on the war in the pacific, one historian has commetned that they ‘…had a greater effect on the decision by Japanese leaders to end the Pacific war…than the…atomic bombs…' That is from a japanese historian.

Ross

For those interested here is the bibliography used for the essay.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:
Bard Memorandum, June 27, 1945, Accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/bardmemo.html
Official Bombing Order, July 25, 1945, Accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/handy.html
The Franck Report, June 11, 1945 Accessed at http://dannen.com/decision/franck.html
United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War), 1 July 1946 – Accessed at http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm

Memoirs and Edited Contemporary Works:

Byrnes J F (1947) Speaking Frankly Harper and Brothers, New York
Eden A (1965) The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Houghton Mifflin, Boston
Ferrell R H (Ed.) (1996) Harry S. Truman & the Bomb: A Documentary History, High Plains Publishing, Worland
Ferrell R H (Ed.) (1998) Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman, 1910-1959, University of Missouri Press, Columbia
Truman H S (1955) The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman Volume One: Year of Decisions 1945, Hodder and Stoughton, London
Zhukov G K (1971) The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, Delacorte Press, New York

Books:
Alperovitz G (1994) Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, Pluto Press, London
Alperovitz G (1995) The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Alfred A. Knopf, New York
Buckley J (1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War, UCL Press, London
Cowley R (Ed.) (2002) More What If? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been, Macmillan, London
Dear I C B (General Ed.) (2001) The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gaddis J L et al (Ed.) (1999) Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Hamby A (1995) A Life of Harry S. Truman: Man of the People, Oxford University Press, Oxford
Holloway D (1994) Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956, Yale University Press, New Haven
Leffler M P (1992) A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, Stanford
Walker J S (1997) Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill
Weintraub S (1995) The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945, Penguin, London

Journals:
Alperovitz G, ‘Hiroshima: Historians Reassess’, Foreign Policy (99) Summer 1995.
Bernstein B J, ‘Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record: President Truman’s Letter on His Atomic Bomb Decision’, Diplomatic History (16:1) Winter 1992
Bernstein B J, ‘Seizing the Contested Terrain of Early Nuclear History: Stimson, Conant, and Their Allies Explain the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Diplomatic History (17:1) Winter 1993
Hamby A, ‘Truman and the Bomb’, History Today, (45:8) August 1995
Miles Jr R E, ‘Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved’, International Security (10:2) Fall 1985
Pape R A, ‘Why Japan Surrendered’, International Security (18:2) Fall 1993

I only want to add a couple of things about the American POV of the situation at the time. The first is the belief that using the bomb would save lives on both sides. One has to keep in mind the effect the battles for Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and both the invasion of Okinawa and the Kamikazi attacks off of Okinawa( I list these particular examples for the well known bloodiness of their campaigns ) had on the mindset of the Allied political and military leadership and of the American public and common serviceman alike. The picture of the Japanese fightingman and of the civil population in the act of defending their homeland was of a fanatical, brutal savage who would stop at nothing to repel the invaders. One estimate had American casualties at over 500,000, and Japanese casualties at over 4,000,000. Thus the decision to drop the bomb was at least in part to save lives on both sides.
As for the idea that using the bomb was as much to intimidate the Soviets as end the war quickly , so what? Just one good look at the brutality of the system in the Soviet Union and another good look at Stalin's paranoia and ambition, would show why we would want to do that.
Although the need to intimidate the USSR by itself is not a good reason to vaporize the populations of two cities the combination of the need to end the war quickly, the need to save lives AND the desire to keep Stalin's ambition in check could be. And in my view it was.

A short narative by Paul Fussell "Thank God For The Atom Bomb" States if it saved one Allied life it would have been worth it. He had served as a infantry officer in the European theater of operations. Was wounded, recovered, and then sent to the Pacific. He states that seven thousand Allied troops were losing their lives a week. A difference of 2-3 weeks before surrender would have been 14-21 thousand Allied troops lives. If it is your life you are talking about I guess dropping the bomb would be worth it.
brian

While I agree that history is generally much more complicated than portrayed by historians, the revisionist case here is constructed from an odd assortment of standpoints. And doesn't really provide a smoking gun.

Truman (or his advisors) might have been trying to wave a big stick in front of the Soviets, but winning the war as quickly (and as cheaply in soldier's lives) must have been been somewhere near the top of their agenda. Besides occupying Japan before the Russians got there would be a much more effective deterrent.

And the policy of appeasing Stalin carried on well after the war's finish. Non-Soviet parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine (among others) were all suppressed without too much action from the west. There was plenty of sympathy for the Soviet cause in western governments long after the end of the war, Perhaps Truman and co should have started at home.

I also don't believe that the USSBS reflects anything more than the belief that more and heavier bombing would have won the war. Just like it didn't in Europe. Their projection of the end of the war is nothing more than a guess - then wars are always over by Christmas aren't they?

We should carry on questioning received wisdom, but not by replacing it with elaborate scenarios based on equivocal evidence. This reduces debate to the level of a parlour game.

Finally, what if the bomb had been dropped on Germany, if they hadn't already unconditionally surrendered? Truman had in his hands a powerful weapon, how could he not have used it? Of course if he hadn't we would now be playing the 'Did he not drop the bomb to influence the Soviets game?'

Stalin was well aware of the Manhattan projects thanks to extensive penetration by the NKVD and GRU. He didn't need Roosevelt to tell him about it. And why should Stalin's comment to Zhukov be taken seriously, Stalin was paranoid enough to keep secrets from everyone, and Zhukov's autobiography is Soviet historiography personified, and hardly to be trusted either.