At 0445[i] on 19 August 1942, the first forces landed on the French coast at Berneval approximately six miles from Dieppe. This was the first wave of a raid in force on the French town of Dieppe. As the Operational Orders for Jubilee states the purpose of the operation was:

‘Operation Jubilee is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an eardrum near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour’.[ii]



Operation Jubilee was the culmination of two years of raiding by the COHQ and was largest attempted to date. The major part of the raiding force was comprised of troops from the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. The British provided additional troops in the form of No. 3 and 4 Commando from the Army and ‘A’ Commando from the RM. There were also small detachments of French and US personnel, the most prominent of which were the fifty US Rangers attached to Lieutenant Colonel The Lord Lovat’s 4 Commando. The military forces involved in the operation came under the ground force commander Major General J H Roberts, the GOC of the 2nd Canadian Division. Roberts was a curious choice for such a prestigious and difficult mission, as he had not actually seen battlefield command in the war and therefore, like most of his soldiers were untrained and untested in combat.



The RAF supplied substantial forces in the ‘support’ of Jubilee. In total sixty-one fighter squadrons were involved as well as nine further squadrons in various other roles.[iii] As will be discussed in a further chapter this force was inadequate to meet the needs of the operation and was actually there for another reasons that will become apparent. The air commander on the day was Air vice Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, a man who would go on and command the Allied air forces during Operation Overlord.



The Navy, whose military head, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, was deeply suspicious of such operations, only provided paltry forces for the support of the operations. The heaviest ships involved in the operation were destroyers of which eight were used. In total, there were two hundred thirty seven vessels in various roles for the operation.[iv] All of these ships came under the command of Captain J Hughes Hallett.



The operation began, as it was to go on. No. 3 Commando, the first unit to land, at Berneval came under intense fire and of their twenty-three landing craft, only six made it to shore. Most of these men themselves became casualties, but despite this, the commando managed to keep the battery quite though they did not actually take it out as the plan called for.



The next units to land were the Royal Regiment of Canada and the Black Watch of Canada. Of the approximately five hundred men who landed, only six returned unscathed. The reason for this was that they landed fifteen minutes behind schedule and eight after the Germans had sounded the alarm.



Next to come was the frontal assault on Dieppe itself, White and Red beaches. This was led Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, White beach, and the Essex Scottish, Red beach. Initially things looked good for the unit as fighter-bombers had attacked German position and the defenders appeared dazed. This eventually passed and the defenders started pouring machine gun and mortar fire into the area. As Lieutenant Fred Woodcock of the Royal Hamilton’s, who was caught in a landing craft that was filled with Bangalore torpedoes and hit by a mortar bomb, comments he could ‘...only remember the sound, because I was blinded. The boat filled with water and I was soon up to my neck.’[v]



The assault on Dieppe was supposed to be supported by twenty-nine[vi] Churchill MkIII tanks from Calgary Tank Regiment[vii]. However, from the start of the operation things deteriorated. The LCT’s were fifteen minutes late arriving at the beaches and as has been commented this had ‘…unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches.’[viii] Eventually all of the tanks were destroyed and by all accounts only three make it onto the esplanade.[ix]


At 0630, approximately an hour and half after the main landing, Major-General Roberts decided that the situation was ready to land his floating reserve. This consisted on the Fusiliers Mont Royal. Roberts gives his reasons as follows:

“About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that "Red" Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve.”[x]

In this decision Roberts was wrong as Red Beach had not been cleared and was not ready, the RHLI were pinned against the beach wall. In addition, the FMR were landed at the wrong place.



The RM ‘A’ Commando had initially been intended to land in the harbour and cut out enemy craft. It was soon found that this was not possible. Therefore, they became part of the floating reserve. At 0800, Roberts, having been deceived by intelligence again, decided to commit them to White beach to force a breakthrough. This necessitated a quick rethink on the way into the beach and as Lieutenant M. Buist, RN comments it soon became clear that this was to be a ‘…sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade.’[xi] The commando came under a hail of artillery fire and its intended effect became negligible.



The next attack was at Green beach by the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queens Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada on the inner western flank. Initially there was success but eventually things started to go wrong. It was intended for the SSR to land at zero hour, 0450, and the QOCHC to land an hour and a half later and pass through them capture the high ground and proceed to Dieppe. The SSR quickly entered Pourville and became involved in fire fights with groups of Germans. The SSR attempted to subdue them with fire from the supporting destroyers and 3-inch mortars, but to no avail and they became bogged down. The QOCHC then landed at 0520 and were to link up with the tanks of the Calgary and capture a nearby airfield. This proved fruitless as the tanks were destroyed mostly on the beaches. By this time, everything was going wrong and both regiments attempted form a cordon until ordered to withdrawal.



The furthest unit to the west, 4 Commando, landed at 0454 and their objectives was to take out the German battery at Vasterival. This was Operation Cauldron and was the only successful operation during the raid. As an official report comments this operation was ‘…a model of bold action and successful synchronization.’[xii] Its success will be covered later.



By 0930, it became clear to everyone that the operation was a failure and landing craft started taking the wounded off the beach. At the same time both the Military Commander, Roberts, and the Naval Force Commander, Hughes-Hallet, contended that withdrawal was necessary and that it should begin at 1100.[xiii] By 1250, all troops that could be evacuated had been removed from the beaches. Thus ended one of the bloodiest days in Commonwealth military history. The casualty rate for the ground force reached almost sixty percent. As one historian has commented, it was a cruel fate for a country, Canada, who had waited:

‘…over two and a half years for combat and be killed, maimed, or captured within a single morning one of the undeniable tragedies of the Second World War’[xiv]


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[i] All times given are in British Summer Time. In the German War Diaries, all times were given in Continental time, which is one hour ahead.

[ii] Quoted in Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 ‘Preliminary Report on Operation “Jubilee” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42’ 19 Sept 1942, p. A-1. From here on this report will be referred to as CMHQ No. 83. The reoccurrence of the word Jubilee is in reference to Dieppe and was used in an attempt to keep the target from German agents. However, in an accident of war on the final page of the Operational Orders the map reference for the target, Dieppe, was given, so much for protecting the target.

[iii] Terraine J (1997) The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945, p. 560. Though the Official History quotes fifty six squadrons of fighter: Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume 2: The Fight Avails, p. 143

[iv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) History of the Second World War: The War at Sea Volume II, p. 243

[v] Quoted in Atkin R (1980) Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, p. 153

[vi] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 108 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches.’ 17 Dec 43 Amended on 12 Jul 1950. Paragraph 137 From here on CMHQ 108

[vii] This unit was official known in the Canadian organisation as the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (The Calgary Regiment)

[viii] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraph 80.

[ix] See CMHQ 108 Op Cit Paragraph 84-88

[x] CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 142

[xi] Quoted in CMHQ 108 Op Cit Para 174

[xii] Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 101 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks.’ 11 Aug 1943 p. 21. From here on CMHQ 101

[xiii] CMHQ 108 Op Cit, Paragraphs 225-230

[xiv] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. p. 2

thanks for the read

Good report, Ross, thanks for the details...Do you have anymore??

Gunny

I do have more. that is the first part of a paper i have been writing at university.

Ross,
Thanks for the reminder. I had the opportunity to walk the ground at Dieppe, Pourville and Puys this Spring during my Staff College battlefield tour. Dieppe is, of course, a mandatory pilgrimage for members of the Canadian Army.
Having stood on the beach at Puys where the Royal Regiment of Canada was decimated, I would suggest that the major factor in the failure here was that there was absolutely no cover anywhere on the beach, even at the sea wall. Had there been, it may have been possible to phase a withdrawal or even supress fire from the bunkers.
I would sugggest a book by Ronald Atkin entitled Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, published in 1980 by Macmillan. ISBN 0 333 19187 0.
What are you taking at University?

Paul,

Already have that book. if your interested a could post the bibliography for my work. it is a working progress. there is a surprising amount of info out there for what was a 9 hour operation.

I'm at the University of Wolverhampton studying War Studies.

Ross,
That would be interesting. By the way I am doing an MA in War Studies at the Royal Military College through distance learning.

Here is the bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Canadian Army Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 10 ‘Operation “Jubilee”, The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Information from German War Diaries’

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 83 ‘Preliminary Report on Operation “Jubilee” (The Raid on Dieppe), 19 Aug 42’ 19 Sept 1942

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 89 ‘The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants.’ 31 Dec 1942

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 90 ‘The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of Participants.’ 18 Feb 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 93 ‘Combined Operations Training, 1st Canadian Corps’ 29 Apr 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 98 ‘Article Dealing with the Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42’ 15 Jul 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 100 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42 Part I: The Preliminaries of the Operation’ 16 Jul 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 101 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks.’ 11 Aug 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section Report No. 108 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation.
Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches.’ 17 Dec 1943 Amended on 12 Jul 1950

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 109 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part III: Some Special Aspects.’ 14 Dec 1943

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer Report No. 116 ‘Operation "Jubilee" the Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Additional Information from German Sources’ 10 May 1944

Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officers Report No. 142 ‘Operation "Jubilee": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Further New Information.’ 18 Jul 1945

Notes from the Theatres of War No.11 ‘Destruction of a German Battery by No.4 Commando during the Dieppe Raid’, HMSO, 1943

Official Works:

Butler J R M (Ed.) (1964) History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy Volume III Part II, HMSO, London

Hinsley F H (Ed.) (1983) History of the Second World War: British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, HMSO, London

Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Volume 2: The Fight Avails, HMSO, London

Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) History of the Second World War: The War at Sea Volume II, HMSO, London

Secondary Sources:

Books:

Atkin R (1980) Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster, Macmillan, London

Bartlett M L Lieutenant Colonel USMC (Retired) (Ed.) (1983) Assault From The Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis

Bond B and Taylor M (Eds.) (2001) The Battle for France and Flanders Sixty Years On, Leo & Cooper, London

D’Este C (1994) Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign, Penguin Press, London

Fowler W (2003) The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day, Harper Collins, London

Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support 1943-45, Frank Cass, London

Keegan J (1992) Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, Pimlico, London

Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, Oxford University Press, London

Murray W (1999) War in the Air 1914-45, Cassell, London

Neillands R (2002) The Battle of Normandy 1944, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London

Shirer W (1991) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Arrow Books, London

Terraine J (1997) The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945, Wordsworth, London

Thompson J (2000) The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force, Sedgewick & Jackson, London

Seeing as all those doing War Studies have landed here, thought I may as well join in too...

Im just finishing my MA in War Studies...

Here is another section of my Dieppe project which deal with the failure of Inter-Service co-operation.

One of the oft-cited reasons for the failure of Operation Jubilee is the failure by the three services, the RAF, RN and the Army, to co-operate effectively on the day. It has often been argued that each of the services had their own agenda when going into the operation. This so-called agenda can be best represented by the role of the RAF during the operation; therefore, this is what shall be looked at first.



The RAF’s central agenda for engaging in the Dieppe operations was the need to bring the Luftwaffe to battle. This is shown in the composition of the RAF forces that were committed to the battle. Leigh-Mallory’s forces consisted of approximately sixty fighter squadrons and nine other squadrons. The nine other squadrons comprised of four Army Co-Operation Command squadrons equipped with the new North American Mustang tactical reconnaissance aircraft. The remaining five were equipped with Douglas Boston and Bristol Blenheim light bombers form No. 2 Group. The structure of this forces show that the RAF was more intent on dog fighting with the Luftwaffe over the battle area than providing support for the troops on the beach. The most notable feature missing from the force structure are any medium or heavy bombers. As Loring Villa comments

‘The role of the RAF in Dieppe appears…to have been a strange combination of heavy investment in fighter effort with…indifference to the necessity for bombardment.’[i]



Much of the failure to employ the right force structure at Dieppe lay in the failure of inter-war planning. The RAF was still by this time deep rooted in its’ Trenchrdian ethos that the bomber would always get through and that it alone would win the war. This ethos was developed during a period in the RAF’s history were it was struggling to survive. In order to survive the RAF searched for its raison d’etre. For the Air Staff this was strategic bombing and as Williamson Murray has commented ‘…senior [RAF] air leaders held fast to Trenchard’s ideological belief in the bomber. This approach rejected co-operation with the other services.’[ii] Also as has been commented elsewhere the Air Staff’s hostility to the development of Close Air Support doctrine lay in it’s ‘…confidence that a fully-developed strategic bomber offensive could win the war on its own account.’[iii]



Thus by the outbreak of war the RAF found itself unable to deal with CAS operations for the army. Many of these failures were shown up during the Battle for France in 1940. The RAF’s experience in France can be summed as ‘…that it had neither the aircraft, doctrine nor training to be effective’[iv] because ‘…the RAF had spent the previous twenty years planning to fight a war quite different…’[v]



On the 1 December 1940, the RAF formed the Army Co-operation Command. This was a belated attempt to rectify the failures found in France and under its aegis; many lessons were learned, but unfortunately not used during Operation Jubilee as seen by its force structure, which only consisted of nine squadrons from this Command. A Command that could have possibly added much to the operation because as has been commented this Command did ‘…some of the most significant theoretical work on battlefield cooperation between the two services…’[vi]



As commented before the failure to use heavy bombers in a fire support role needs to be addressed. The failure to use them does not come down to either Air Marshal Mountbatten[vii] or Leigh-Mallory, the air commander on the day, but much rather to the intervention of the chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Harris. When Leigh Mallory requested the use three hundred bombers for pre-bombardment, he was rebuked by Harris, who was acutely aware of the inadequacy of his command to currently achieve its primary goal, the bombing of Germany’s industrial heartland. Therefore, he was unwillingly to divert a sizable section of his command to a raid which he considered as hopeless as attacking U-Boat pens. His position can be understood when looking at the assault on Normandy because bombing patterns from heavy and medium bombers were found to be ‘…uneven, with some areas overhit and others relatively untouched.’[viii] Thus by looking at the example of Normandy it is hard to wonder whether they would have much of an effect.



Thus, the main burden for support of the operation fell the fighter squadrons that made up the bulk of Leigh-Mallory’s command and as the Official History of the RAF comments the ‘…squadrons did what was expected of them…’[ix] and that was in some way to seek air superiority over the beach areas. In this respect, Leigh-Mallory’s command did a valiant effort but as recent revelations has shown not as well as could have been hoped for. At the time, it was believed that the RAF had shot down ninety-one aircraft, forty-four probable and one hundred fifty one destroyed on the ground, but as later research has shown the figure is actually somewhere nearer forty-eight destroyed and twenty-four damaged.[x] When compared to RAF losses on the day of one hundred six aircraft this was a heavy price to pay. In terms of Close Air Support, the picture was also much worse. As so much of Leigh-Mallory’s command was made up of fighters, it was found to be very hard to support the troops on the beach as the cannon armed fighters could make little impression on the concrete casemates that made up the bulk of the German defences.



Thus to perceive whether the RAF had an agenda on Dieppe, as Loring Villa claims is top judge whether it was more a fault in its command and the force structure that was given to the operation. Loring Villa argues that aerial bombardment may have made a difference, but if the experience of Normandy two years later is examined then it is hard to see whether it would have made a difference, because as previously commented heavy bombers tended to be uneven and could often over hit their targets. In addition, the bombing of urban areas, which Dieppe was, can be a hindrance to attacking troops as was to be seen two years later in the rubble of Caen. Thus, it is doubtful whether three hundred bombers would have been of much help to the attackers. While the use of bombers was unlikely to help the operation, the miss-allocation of tactical air assets was the biggest failure and one of the greatest lessons of the operation. While the troops on the ground went unhindered by the Luftwaffe, they also faced a hard time attacking defensive positions. If the force structure had taken into account the many advances by the Army Co-operation Command and given more attention to CAS operations the operations may have been more of a success. Thus as the Official History comments;

‘…the close support…was not entirely effective…because the cannon of our fighters made little impression on concrete [and] because…the military commanders were unable to indicate…targets for attack.’[xi]



After the operation, one of the main criticisms and lessons was the need for massive fire support during the landing phase of any operation. To this end the RN provided both cruisers and battleships for all future amphibious landings, but the question was asked why none for the raid on Dieppe. The RN position during the raid on Dieppe can best be surmised by the attitude of the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound. Pound was weary of providing capital ships for any raid for fear of losing one in the English Channel; Pound viewed this as unacceptable to the RN at that time and as the papers of Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman comment, when he asked Mountbatten why there were no battleships Mountbatten told him that he had been that ‘…should the battleship be sunk, we could never claim Dieppe as a victory…’[xii]



Pounds position is understandable; to place a battleship of the coast of France in daylight and within reach of the Luftwaffe would have been asking for it to be attacked. 1942 was not 1944 and the allies yet had not achieved complete aerial supremacy, which gave them the advantage of doing virtually as they pleased during Operation Overlord. If Pound had acquiesced to the request he would have placed one of his most valuable ships within striking distant of an air force that had as yet not been crippled, as it would be by 1944 and as has been commented, ‘…perfect air cover was impossible until the Luftwaffe was decisively defeated.’ [xiii]



Stephen Roskill, the Official Historian of the RN, also offers another possible explanation why a capital ship was not used and that was as he comments, ‘…because our long experience of engaging coast defences…had not generally produced happy results.’[xiv] This is a possible reference to the failure of the assault on Gallipoli during the First World War. If this is the case, we have an instance of previous failure permeating into the mind of the head of the RN. By letting, this into his mind Pound obviously allowed a previous naval failure to cloud his judgement. Unfortunately though there is little evidence as to whether this is true because like the other service chiefs, Pound has left little detail as to his thoughts on the raid and why he may not have allowed the use of a battleship.



In addition, Pounds reason to not use a battleship can be seen by the deployment of his ships. The RN started the war with thirteen capital ships and by 1942 it was down to nine, and these were spread all over the globe. Two were in-home waters; four were temporarily in the Indian Ocean while the rest were in the Mediterranean. Thus, it can be seen why it was hard to deploy a major ship in support of what was in Pounds mind a minor operation. Pounds major concerns at this time were the protection of vital convoys and attempting to defeat or at least keep in check the forces of the Axis navies. As such, Pound’s fleets were already stretched to their limits, but also the commander was as, Churchill consistently harassed Pound for information on every aspect of the naval war and as such felt the pressure like all member of the COS.



The one area where lessons were learned from Dieppe was in the necessity to form permanent amphibious groups for future operation. By doing this mistakes such as those that happened at most of the beaches during the operation would not be repeated, and as such the Admiralty agreed after the raid to form ‘permanent naval assault forces’,[xv] in doing this many lives were probably saved in most of the subsequent combined operations of the war.


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[i] Loring Villa B (1994) Unauthorised Action, p. 128

[ii] Murray W (1999) War in the Air 1914 – 45¸ p. 88

[iii]Jacobs W A ‘Air Support for the British Army, 1939-1943’, Military Affairs, 46:4 (1982: Dec) p. 175

[iv] Lloyd Clark ‘War in the Air 1939-45’ in Trew S and Sheffield G (Eds.) (2000) 100 Years of Conflict 1900-2000, p. 225

[v] John Buckley ‘The Air War in France’ in Bond B and Taylor M (Eds.) (2001) The Battle for France and Flanders Sixty Years On, p. 117

[vi] Terraine J (1997) Op Cit, p. 351

[vii] Mountbatten on becoming the Chief of Combined Operations held titles in each of the three services; being Vice Admiral of the Navy, Lieutenant General of the Army and Air Marshal of the RAF.

[viii] Gooderson I (1998) Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support 1943-45, p. 240

[ix] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, p. 144

[x] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Ibid

[xi] Richards D and Saunders H St G (1953) Op Cit, pp. 144-145

[xii] Cited in Loring Villa B (1994) Op Cit, p. 95. This comes from the Baille-Grohman papers which are held in the National Maritime Museum Archives, Greenwich

[xiii] Loring Villa B (1994) Ibid

[xiv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 241

[xv] Roskill D.S.C Captain S W (1956) Op Cit, p. 251

Paul....don't forget the other pilgrimages.....Vimy, Ypres, Ortona (for the Royals among us), and for a lucky few....Kapyong.

Been to Vimy and Ypres. But not Kapyong or Ortona yet. Don't forget Normany and the road to Failaise, the Scheldt and for the Engineers, Arnhem. There are lots of pilgrimages, all to sacred ground.

The only one I haven't made it to is Kapyong.....my father did go there twice. My favorite was the Ypres area, followed by Normandy. (the benefits of a misspent youth in 4CMBG)

The only one I haven't made it to is Kapyong.....my father did go there twice. My favorite was the Ypres area, followed by Normandy. (the benefits of a misspent youth in 4CMBG)[/quote]

Lucky you! I don't duppose you have any photos of 4CMBG eqpt when it was at its height?

Unfortunately not...but you can try www.ruhrmemories.ca...it have links to the forts, pmqs, schools (i can't believe I was ever that young when I see those pics) and all sorts of stuff including the beaver newspaper w/ pictures.