Time to start a new thread -

Just reading an article in a compendium of papers published by the US Army Chief, Military History, titled, "Command Decisions". The particular article discussed GEN Bradley's (CDR, 12th Army Group) decision to stop the US XV Corps at Argentan along the Army Group Boundary with 21 Army GP. The Corps CDR (MG Haislip) and the 3rd Army CDR (LTG Patton) wanted to close the gap to Falaise, as the Canadian 1st Army was meeting stiffning resistance along the north side of the gap. If the gap had been closed in time the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army would have been destroyed. As it was, most of the equipment was destroyed, but many highly-trained soldiers escaped. The delay at Argentan also resulted in the Allies not reaching the River Seine in time to trap the German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais, part of the original Allied plan.


My question for the forum is: How do you think the war in Europe would have gone if the 3rd Army had been allowed to sweep to the Seine then turn left to the coast, trapping not only the 7th and 5th PZ Armies in Normandy, but also the 15th Army in the PdC?

Jeff

DOHHH!!!

I made a major faux pax - The Seine RIver runs south of the Pas de Calais, and so the 15th Army can't be trapped. However, all forces west of the Seine were the target.

Jeff Back to the book!

Jeff-- thought provoking question. Short answer, the destruction of the German forces in the pocket would have decidedly shorten the war. The skeleton of the two armies came back to haunt the Allies during the Battle of the Bulge. Killing them in Falaise obviously would have saved many Allied lives. I always see here the hand of Bradley. He is a conservative, cautious field commander. Allowing Patton's Third Army to close the Gap was disallowed because of a fear of fratricide. Understandable concern that could have been mitigated through the employment of liaison officers and radio communications. I read Blumeson's (I think) "Battle of the Generals" and as I recall he believes that Monty and Patton were in total agreement on closing the Gap. Bradley held them in place. A shame.
DJ

DJ -
Based on the article I referenced above, Eisenhower also has some responsibility. Bradley knew the Army Group boundary needed to be shifted north, but he did not want to ask Montgomery, apparently for fear of upsetting him. Eisenhower could have forced the issue, he was "on the beach" at this point, but did not believe in overruling the commander on the ground and closer to the action.

There was an interesting comment by either Hailsap or Patton, questioning Montgomery's tactics. Dempsey's British Second Army, which was located on the north side of the pocket, between the Canadian First Army and the US forces, was driving southeast. The comment was that Dempsey's army was "squezzing the Germans out of the pocket like toothpaste out of a tube!"

Jeff--once again, a true tragedy. Looks like I lost the battle to renew the Current Forum. I am amazed by some of the comments posted. None of the positive ones appear. Look at the commentary, one guys says that he doesn't want it back because it was so inflammatory (my term) then he states "at least that's what I heard." Marvelous leap of logic.
DJ

In reality the effect would have been negligable because as it is aonly a small amount of forces escape. The germans also barely escape with any major equipment anyway. the major problem that would have occured would have been friendly fire engagements. You have to remeber that the allied TACAir was playing havoc in the area and this would have caused numerous friendl fire clahses and possibly more casualties than if the gp was closed. Then you have to also remeber the amount of allied artillery involved. to sum this up there is one incident in Op Totalise where the 1st Polish Armoured Div is actually cut off and counterattacked by the II SS Panzer Corps. this counter attack is repulsed by sheer weight of firepower from the poles and canadians. As a commander you would not want to expose your troops to this. So bradley made a good decision to overule his brash army commander, Patton, as if it had been allowed the problems that would have been incurred would probably been worse than the benefits.

My first thought was no Battle of the Bulge. Would the war have ended earlier. Possiblly, it all would have been based on the Russians taking Berlin. How would they reacted if we crossed the Rhine in December of 44? Would we have blasted to Berlin and the Hell with the Russians?

Blaster--- my hip shot response is that I agree with your analysis....Battle of the Bulge may well have happened, but with a greatly diminished force. Closing the Gap was a calcutlated risk that the Allies should have boldly taken. Fratricide is horrible, but even the possibility should have not have so cautioned the Allies as to avoid the attempt. Boldnees in war is not gambling.
DJ