here's one for you .what do you think would have been necessary to hold on to malaya and singapore?and what kind of impact would it have had on the war if it had repelled the japanese invasion?or say Slim instead of Percival ?

From what little I've read of Singapore I doubt it could have been held for long. Certainly another commander might have made a closer battle out of it, and perhaps held on as long as the Americans did in the P.I., but I doubt it could have laster much longer than Wainright did in Corigadore. It was just too close to Japan, and their naval strength too great, to last too long.

The Commonwealth troops defending Malaya were not prepared to fight against a foe willing to go into the jungle and fight without a supply line. The Japanese were able to get inside the Commonwealth decision cycle. Could Slim have changed this? Slim could have made a difference only if he was there soon enough to change the mindset of the unit commanders and soldiers that they were not fighting another European foe.

The British had insufficient naval and air presence to stop the Japanese from conducting additonal amphibious landings behind the british lines. The British just did not have enough assets to defend all areas around the world to teh level needed.

As far as Singapore, it could have been defended much longer, but the British were not going to sacrifice the civilian population, plus, I believe they thought they would be treated as POWs per the Geneva Conventions. The Japanese knew of teh significant coastal defenses on the seaward approaches to Singapore and avoided them by attacking from the Malay (land) side. The British failed to consider the possibility of an enemy moving thru Malaya to reach Singapore.

ok.let's say instead of sending hurricanes and spitfires to russia they sent a few squadrons to with some more up to date armour.(one of the things i remember about my uncle was that he was absolutely disgusted with the aussies.his battery was rotated out the line for some rest only to find that the aussies had drunk all the beer.i'm not sure what town in malaya.)

That's ironic, one of the few things I've heard about the fall of Singapore was on another, history, website where some guy was blaming it all on the Irish and Commonwealth troops and saying they hadn't fought hard enough.

I seem to remember the Brits did send some Hurricanes to Singapore. From what little I recall the RAF pilots seemed to think that since they stood up well to the Luftwaffe the Hurricanes would make mincemeat of the Japanese planes. Then they found out about the Zero. The few Hurris there did far better than the Buffaloes but really couldn't go toe to toe with Zeros. I think it all comes down to air support. Force Z, the Prince of Wales and Repulse, was doomed without proper air support and the entire campaign was doomed unless the navy could stop the Japanese from landing wherever and however they wanted.

On a related note I'd like to discuss "Defeat Disease." We've probably all heard of "Victory Disease" and how the Japanese over extended themselves because they got too cocky. I think the Briish in Malaya, the Americans in the P.I., and the ABDA afloat in Indonesia, all suffered from "defeat disease." They lost a few early battles, they saw the Japanese win a few early major battles, and they kind of gave up before they needed to. That isn't to say they could have held out forever, they just probably could have done so longer than they did.

Halfyank,

Your comments on "Defeat Disease" are significant. It was the results of the early campaign in SE Asia and the SW Pacific, particularly the vistoroes in Malaya and Burma that led to the myth that the Japanese were unbeatable in the jungle. This was later disproved on Guadalcanal, on New Guinea and in Burma. The Commonwealth was defeated as much by "defeatism" as my superior Japanese tactics in the jungle.

Ranger74

i've always thought that force Z should have withdrawn to either colombo or Australiaor even pearl harbour.colombo would be easier but i always would have been best.

That would have saved the ships, like the Warpsite and the R class battleships did under Cunningham when the Japanese raided the Indian ocean. The thing is you couldn't stop the landings, which it what Force Z was for, from Colombo.

Here is a "what if" for you. What if Force Z had retired to the Java Sea. How long could they have held out there as part of ABADA? Of another "what if." What if Foce Z had retired to Pearl. How much easier would Midway and Guadalcanal have been with two pretty decent capital ships along.

thats a good point rodger,

if force z had withdrawn to pearl harbour, and gone on to operate in the pacific in conjunction with the US fleets, then the naval battles would have almost certainly very different.

two capital class ships allied with the existing US naval forces, carriers and all could have dramatically changed the sea battles.

and assisted the numerous landings by pummeling shore defences etc

interesting idea

cheers

joe

Your comments on Force Z are interesting. I used to play a board game called "USN" that fought the Pacific Campaign from DEC 41 thru late 43. My usual strategy, based on lessons learnedfrom teh real thing, was to withdraw Force Z and the ABDA forces to Darwin, as Japanese airpower and surface forces are just too strong. Sacrificing the surface ships, which make a small, but powerful force, only slow than the Japanese player by a few weeks. Stationing a force with Prince of Wales, Repulse, USS Houston, and the other British, Australian, Dutch and American Heavy and Light Crusiers out of Aurstralia provides some protection for Australia and gives a raiding force in the SW Pacific that ties down a sizeable Japanese force of either surface ships and/or airpowere to counter.

Moving Force Z and/or ABDA surface units to Pearl strips the SW PAcific of any naval forces.

Hmmm... that does sound like an interesting strategy. Weren't some Australian ports in range of the Japanese. I'm thinking of Darwin that had Australias little Pearl Harbor. A while back I read a book about the US asiatic fleet, can't think of the name right now. The guy who wrote it was pretty inaccurate in some things but sure could spin a yarn.

I don't think given the amount of prep time that the Brits had they could have done anything to prevent the fall of Singapore. Given a few more months, they could have set up some hardpoints to defend against a land attack. Almost every battle /defensive plan was for a sea invasion. They were ill supplied. prepared and (yes) ill led.

Halfyank,

Somewhere, I have a book by an author named Hoyt that covers the US Asiatic Fleet in 1941-42. I will have to locate it so that I can get the title. It is an excellent read on the US fleet and on the ABDA actions around the Dutch Jndies.

That's the guy. Hoyt. A while back I was in a reading group on this book. He writes well, but sometimes he let's his talent for narative get in the way of the facts. Like when he describes the destroyer attack at Balikipan he makes them sound like they were coal fired, which they weren't. I really did like the chapter where the one ship was being attacked and the radio operator kept signaling all through the attack. It read kind of like Shakespear. I remember the last words from the radio opperator was "mother said there'd be days like this." I also have another book by Hoyt, Sunk by the Bismarck, about the Hood and the search for the Bismarck. He's a pretty good writer though he sometimes gets carried away and lets accuracy suffer.

I've got the book at home, I just couldn't remember the name of it. I was thinking it was The Fleet the Gods Forgot but I think that is by another guy.

well if force Z had gone on to become part of ABDA there is no guarentee that they would have come thru unscathed ,remember the long lance ?

You most correct concerning the Japanese torpedo. It wrecked havoc on the American/Australian naval units in the several suface battles for Guadacanal

Also ABDA in the Jave sea. It was an superb weapon, only our radar helped to overcome it, along with improved tactics.

another thing to remember about ABDA was that it was a force thrown together very hastily and had'nt had time to work together as a unit.i'm not even sure if the Dutch commander spoke english.could force Z as part of ABDA have changed the outcome?we'll never know except for computer simulations.

That would have disrupted the Japanese timetable of their conquest of Asia and Australia. Each region is assigned to a General (for the Philippines, with was Gen. M. Homma, for Malaya it was T. Yamashita). Each of them was given a timetable on how long must they run their campaign. This is because when their campaign is done, their troops will be used for the invasion of Australia.

If I may add on the Philippine campaign, MacArthur knew his troops are not in shape to repel the invading Japanese Imperial Army so he designed a strategy that intends to blunt or delay Japanese advance. Needless to say, he was saving his forces for one big stand at Bataan and Corregidor.(this is how it's actually spelled). The idea is to hold out as long as they could until reinforcements from the US arrives (until MacArthur later found out they won't be coming at all).

Hence the slogan of the Bataan vets... No Mommas, No Poppas, No Uncle Sam... we are the Fighting Bastards of Bataan.

The Brits in Singapore were more likely ill led. Postwar japanese accounts said that if they held a few weeks longer the Japanese would have to re-write their timetables and divert troops and resources from other areas to finish the campaign. The Brits were allegedly better supplied than their attackers.