In December of 1944, the Army manned the Belgium/Luxembourg border with several depleted divisions. Due to the lack of enemy action this became known as the Ghost Front. The area is about 28 straight line miles long. On 16 December the Germans attacked through this area. From North to South, we had the 99th Infantry Division, 14 Cavalry Group, 106th Infantry Division, 28th Infantry Division and 4th Infantry Division manning the line. Now, the questions are if you were in command "would you have placed more troops in line prior to the actions of mid-December 1944?" and "what would you have done after the attack of December 1944 to repel the invaders and continue the attack?"
DJ

use an elastic defense, blow bridges to slow the Germans down, use recon-in-force and hit the flanks when possible. should try to temporarily shorten the lines, use the recon- in force to stage local counterattacks and the rivers as natural barriers. sacrifice any remaining armor to slow panzer spearheads and blunt the advance of the following grenadieres. artillery should be used just to keep the Germans off balance and in an indirect mode, to let them know you are their.

"and he didn't know he was in the twilight zone........................ :-)

From What I have read on the subject there is not much that we could do given the rapid type of advance and total disorganazation that followed the attack by the German Forces. Yes, I believe that more troops should have been put in the line at the time prior to the fatal day. BUT given the mind set of the leaders of our Armed Forces at the time, Even if you had wanted to place additional troops in the line, You would have been denied the request. Better attention being payed to the intell coming in from scouts and the resistance
members and better Armor pieces would have prevented the loss of so many soldiers, And a quicker end to the advancing German units.

DAGGER-1 "When Science Fails, Brute Force Wins"

There are several factors to remember about war:

You can't defend everything all the time. The Ardennes was an "economy-of-force" mission for VIII Corps. To be able to consolidate sufficient combat power elsewhere on the front, other areas had to be weakened. This is a standard practice. The problem was the failure of senior allied commanders and intelligence personnel to believe that the Germans could launch a massive counter offensive, they refused to believe the intell they received.

PAK40 recounted exactly the allied response to the German attack. The key is to delay the penetration, hold the shoulders and counterattack into the flanks. A problem was that the allied response was too conservative and allowed the Germans to withdraw a lot of their resources, when they should have tried to cut off the entire bulge similiar to what was tried with the Falaise pocket.

The initial defense, minus the surrender of 2/3 of the 106th INF DIV was a masterful fight by elements of the 28th INF DIV, 9th AR DIV and 10th AR DIV, and several cavalry squadrons that allowed the 7th AR DIV to occupy St. Vith and the 101st ABN into Bastogne. The part played by the numerous engineer units was a key in stopping KG Peiper.

What could be done differently. Do not assume a cornered and wounded tiger can't bite. Bradley took a calculated risk in the Ardennes. If he and Eisenhower and their intell officers had listened to the VIII Corps intell estimates and taken some steps to prepare something might have happened different, but, "Home before Christmas" mindset had taken hold. Patton saw the counter offensive coming and had his staff working on a contingency before the Germans struck, allowing for 3rd Army's rapid response.

On the other side, Hilter miscalculated worse than the Allies: He believed the US/-Commonwealth coalition would collapse under his attack; and he brought his infantry out of their prepared defenses and his mobile counter attack units into the open where they could be destroyed in mass. He ended up shortening the war.

Just a few ramblings.

Jeff

Jeff--interesting points. While Patton's attack from the south certainly dents the German attack, it is not the action which causes the Germans to retire to their borders. We slugged it out with the German until almost February to regain what we previously held. Patton's concept for continuing the attack north from the Bastogne area to the forces holding the northern shoulder was not implemented. Why? Any penetration is repelled by holding the shoulders with friendly forces, blunting the nose with more elements then sealing the base of the penetration. Why did not Bradley accept this tactical employment?
DJ

210 CAV,

I fully concur with your understanding of defeating a penetration and so did Patton. The problem was that the Bulge was divided by Eisnehower with Bradley on the south and Montgomery (I forgot about him in my first note, you tend to forget unpleasant people and events) on the north. Bradley supported a more conservative move through Bastogne and Montgomery, in typical fashion, could never get his offensive coordinated fast enough.

Patton wanted, after the relief of Bastogne to attack along the base of the penetration from both sides. He plan was correct assessment, but too radical for Bradley or Eisenhower, and Montgomery could never react fast enough to support the southern pincer.

What happend was we squeezed the Germans out of the Bulge like toothpaste out of a tube, instead of cutting them off and killing them.

My opinion.

Jeff

German should have tried a faster, old-fashioned cavarly attack using the medium tanks like the late Mark IVs and Panthers to exploit their initial success. Instead they used the lumbering heavies in a supporting role, wasting the fuel their spearhead could of put to better use. Additionally, their troops still were not fully mechanized to keep up with the initial penetrating forces. They also got bogged down messing with the strong point defenses the allies used to hold them up with. The German offensive was doomed to fail before it began. The only question is "how far could they have gone?"

Rob--getting to the Meuse River is quite a feat when you consider the terrible shape the German Army found itself in that December. Having said that getting to the river and crossing it are two tough animals to tame. Did they have assault bridging--don't think so. So how were they to ford the waterways? They relied on opportunistic tactical advantages---seize existing bridges. As correctly pointed out, often times they were blown up in their faces by some brave Soldiers. This coupled with their complete lack of aerial presence (let alone superiority) doomed the attack. While Montgomery has his problems, at no time does Bradley let Patton seal the base. Tragic results follow. A series of short powerful thrust would have caused the Allies to reconsider the speed of their offensive, but would not have stopped it. As an aside the Luftwaffe makes an appearance around New Years' Day of '45. They destroy some ungodly number of Allied aircraft. What the Germans do not fathom is that this is not the same force structure they rolled over in 1940. As I recall, the aircraft are replaced rather quickly by the Allies.
DJ

Jeff's comments are right on. The counteroffensive was too timid, and limited in scope. I'll go out on a limb here and say I would not have sent 4th AD to rescue Bastogne at all. Instead, I would have attempted to supply by air as much as possible and counterattack through 4ID's positions at the base of the southern shoulder and up Skyline Drive. This would have punched into very thinly held German positions, largely those of the spent Volksgrenadier divisions holding the southern end of their penetration. An offensive move up Skyline Drive would hae very quickly cut off the German spearheads from their sources of supply across the Our river bridges, and would have also raised havoc with the largely immobile German corps and army level artillery.
Greg

Greg, You have just stated GEN Patton's concept, the same plan the Germans used numerous times on the eastern front.

210 CAV, As for the German air attack in JAN 45, they lost most of their aircraft returning to German airspace when they were shot down by their own air defenses. Hitler's policy of divide and conquer, within his own government, came back too roost.

The German's just did not have the logistical tail any more to support their plan. The 2nd Panzer DIvision was destroyed by the 2nd AR DIV after the panzers ran out of fuel almost in sight of the Meuse River. Also, unknwon to the Germans, XXX Corps (BR) was waiting at the Meuse. In fact, 29th AR BDE (BR), had some skirmishes with German recon elements.

The Germans would have done better to conserve their strength, fight from fortifications with mobile reserves, and leave the elements they withdrew from the east.

Luckily for some of our fathers & grandfathers, Hitler did not have sound military sense at this point in the war.

Jeff

Asbolutely , Jeff--my campaign idea is exactly what Patton wanted; I merely concur with his read of the situation--it begged for a larger vision. His quip about "hoping we'll have the courage to let the bas@#$%s go all the way to Paris" was a bit over the top; but then he wouldn't be Patton, would he?!?

I have long felt that the Ardennes offensive was remarkably successful given the severe handicaps under which it was launched--logistical, operational, Fuhrer directives, all of it. As a spoiling attack to drive about as far as Houffalize and absolutely shred everything we had in the sector it would have been even more spectacular. Chew us up with the SS divisions for three days, then pull out the armor and make a fighting withdrawal back to the West Wall before the weather breaks and our airplanes show up. I have little doubt that such a spoiling attack would have bagged the 106th, 99th, 28th, and 2nd IDs as well as severely chewed up both 7th and 9th AD and much of the supporting Corps artillery in the area. Think about KG Peiper turning north behind the Elsenborn Ridge towards Spa, then curving back towards Monshau. Strategically this would have made much more sense, but as we well know Hitler was long beyond sensible decision-making by the fall of '44.
Greg

I've got a PBS Documentary video on the Battle of the Bulge. I really enjoy hearing the Vets tell their stories about how they saw the battle and how their lives were during that time.....

Greg--Jim is posting some shots I took during my last trip to the region. The more you wind your way through some of those valleys and ravines, the more you appreciate the effects of terrain and weather on movement. One of the shots is of the King Tiger in the town square of La Gleize. She looks just as fierce as when she roared down that road. The front slope took about three hypershots which gouged out metal before bouncing into space. One of the many amazing tales of the Battle is that of the 14th Cavalry Group which held the Losheim Gap. Puny little outfit, they held off two German Divisions for almost three days. Brave Rifles!
DJ

i have to admit i dont really know all that much about it.My step-father was captured at bastonge,but he wont talk about it.

Oooh! Oooh! More pictures! Where do we find them, Jim?
Greg

Greg--Look under Armor Reference. Let me know what you think.
DJ