why didnt the allies push on toward arnhem free their men and push into the ruhr?

they were only a few miles away from their objectiv.

doesnt this mean that all the men fallen during market garden were a complete waste of good men?

whats your opinion on this?

Market Garden was a partial failure as opposed to a partial success. The Brits stopped short of Arhem through a combination of factors.
1. The Brits not George Patton's 3rd Army was spearheading the armor push.
2. The Brit paras were spread out and surrounded and trying to releave multiple locations would be difficult.
3. Bernard Montgomery thought up this plan and it was bound to fail - a bridge too far...

The losses from Market-Garden were severe and the Allies instead of shortening the war actually prolonged it.

why do you say that, british tankers were more battle proven, and experienced than US ones.
remember thay had been fighting from 1939!
and always against a very tough enemy.

cheers

joe

I don't think the Brits leading the armoured assault was a problem. They were as good as the allies had. It was everything depended upon getting down that road and there were a hell of alot better and more German soldiers in the way then was thought. Intell let the operation fail. Also the distance from their objectives the 1st Para div had to travel too.

Hasty

Market Garden was a partial failure. The major objective was never achieved as part of this organization. Several things led to this:

1. The earlier stop by Montgomery after seizure of Antwerp resulted in the failure to seal off the Scheldt and the German 15th Army was able to participate in the german defense - forcing the Allies to fight on three sides while advancing towards Arnhem.

2. The British 1st Airborne dropped too far from their objectives and only LTC Frost's battalion reached the highway bridge. The British could not defend the bridgeheads and their drop zones with the available forces.

3. Reference comments about British tankers - there are reports that after the Guards Armored Division crossed the Nijmegen Bridge, they stopped for tea, when there was some opportunity to gain valuable ground while the Germans were still off-balance.

4. Another problem was limiting the avenue of advance to the Nijmegen highway, when there were parrallel routes that would have given the XXX Corps a broader front, more river/canal crossing sites and put more pressure on the Germans. I have driven Hell's Highway from the Belgian border to Arnhem and to make it sole route was a serious tactical and operational error.

5. But the biggest error was the complete rejection of available human intelligence from Dutch citizens and from other sources. Allied Command completely discounted the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions stationed outside Arnhem

6. Even if XXX Corps had gained the Arnhem Bridge there is no guarantee they could hold the narrow lane all the way from the Belgian border and been able to gather sufficient combat power to cross the North German Plain. The Germans still had significant combat power, evidence the 2nd Ardennes Offensive. If Montgomery had received all of the supplies he needed to conduct his Northern excursion to Berlin, the 12th and 6th Army Groups would have been at a standstill. This would have freed a lot of German divisions to strike into the flank of 21st towards Antwerp, and the Germans could have made it. This would have isolated almost the entire British Army in the Netherlands.

Just some thoughts.

It was a failure due to really poor intel and Mont'ys ego. Patton had an equal ego, but the American logistic system helped him acheive those fantastic advances by US forces. Besides, airborne was obsolete even back then. I think Ranger covered all the details exceedingly well.

Well, define "failure." To some apparently, if it is not 100% successful it is a failure. If this is the criteria applied, Market Garden along with D-Day, Okinawa, etc must also be considered failures. It certainly is not a resounding success story. Why? I think primarily it is a failure to adequately plan against the "what if" portions of any plan. The planning staffs simply assumed away German opposition. It is some 64 miles from the original start point to the Arnhem area. The plan was overly optimistic in calling for a link-up in Arnhem within 2-3 days. I also fault the planners for the sequence of drops. Here you have the 1st British Airborne going in with a division commander who has not led the unit in combat. Why didn't they drop them in the Grave/Son area where they could have more easily linked up with the British ground force, then place the 82nd at Nijmegan and the 101st at Arnhem? The latter two were combat tested divisions serving with leaders who had led them into battle since the drops in Sicily. Air support and follow-up supply drops could have been much better performed. When Browning did not hear from the 1st Airborne wasn't he suspicious that something was wrong? No one on the ground sent messages to the air formations about winds, ground fire, etc and they shoved tons of suppies on the Germans! Astounding! Yet, the Allies held most of Holland as a result and the Germans suffered substantial losses. While, I hardly consider Market Garden the best of military operations, it was far, far from the disaster that we often hear, see and read about. It did not work perfectly, but it also did not fail miserably.
DJ

Could'a Should'a - I don't think that a US push would have been an option. As far as the Hierarchies of leadership during MG goes the British were at the top. It was a collaborative effort.
It really shows that the supply chain, communications, and mobility are crucial.

I can look at it from the stand point of attrition and deception. MG could be deemed a success because it created confusion on Germans part. It also kept the II SS Panzer Korp busy and depleted.

DJ - The 1st ABN was dropped on Arnhem for political reasons - The British knew that in event of failure to relieve the Arnhem drop force, it had better be a British force that is lost. Montgomery was the commander and tfor him to lose an American division at Arnhem would have been a political disaster.

There are other considerations, even though the division commander had not commanded the division in combat, the subordinate commanders and units had combat experience. Due to shortage of airlift, only part of the 1st Airborne was dropped in first lift and the 17-pounder AT guns were left in England. The famous incident of the incorrect radio crystals caused the communications failure. The Division could not inform England of drop zone conditions, so supplies were dropped blind.

I still believe it was a partial failure, in that the main objective was not achieved - in fact the Germans still held the right bank of the Rhine at Arnhem and the population centers of The Netherlands at the end of the war.

It could have been a complete success with a better plan (Drop all of 1st Airborne in one lift closer to Arnhem) and more imagination/less restrictions on XXX Corps.

Jeff--- Well, I recall seeing the 17 pounders they did bring in the area surrounding their drop zones so I don't think they left them all behind. The blind drop is what drives me nuts. Didn't anyone ever say "we haven't heard from them?" Unforgiveable assumptions.
DJ

One of the critical mistakes made by the British was in not using Dutch resistance help when it was offered. There was a ferry near Oosterbeek that could have been valuable early in the battle and apparently the phone lines were working which could have helped in comunicating with the advancing XXX corps. The reason that the British were loathe to use Dutch help was that the British OSS agents dropped in Holland earlier in the war were captured and the Germans had an iron grip on many of the spying rings the British tried to set up.
As for the seemingly slow advance of XXX corps at critical moments of the battle it should be remembered that just previous to the start of the advance they had already been involved in heavy fighting. [Remember in a bridge Too Far how Micheal Caine as Joe Vandeleur says "Christ not us again!" when told he is to lead the attack.] This must have been a factor.
I cannot understand why the British paras were not allowed to land on the strip of land south of the bridge because it was too boggy and yet the Polish brigade was originally slated to land there to reinforce the bridge after it was captured.
A major flaw with the raising of an airborne army was the dificulty of getting them successfully into combat, many earlier airborne operations after D-Day were cancelled simply because the land armies over ran the objectives before the airborne could be used. I once read the term "Coins burning holes in the generals' pockets" to describe the airborne armies, ie they seemed to rush to get them into some sort of battle before the war ended simply because they had created an elite and needed to get some use out of them.

Martin--- great point on the use of the Dutch resistance. Everything I read seems to support your observation. As to landing on the banks to the south of the bridge, in my opinion and based on walking that area, I would have landed the parachute elements there on Day One. The gliders would have been risked given the softness of the bank, but the abundance (and I mean abundance) of flat areas to the south of the bridge is impressive, Holland is made for airborne operations. I once again, would never have placed the British 1st Airborne at the furthest point. Rather I would have revesed the order and placed them at the closest point with the Americans in the middle and to the North.
DJ

How on Earth do you come up with an observation like this. Airborne forces have and continue to provide valuable mission capabilities to the Armed Forces of many countries. The key to Airborne troops is that they must be employeed properly and releived quickly. Obsolete????? Ya lost me there.
Chuck
Proud US Army Paratrooper

Complete failure? I don't know. Tactical loss, certainly. The main "failures" with this operation dealt with the Allies (not just Montgomery) continuing to under estimate the German ability to reinforce points of crisis and put out fires. The Germans had been fighting a fluid defensive war since Kursk and had pretty learned how to rapidly reinforce breaches in their lines. OMG was just a huge breach. They threw in massively disorganized ad hoc forces just long enough to cut off the British at the bridge in Arnhem and continued to harass the forces driving north on "Hell's Highway." The entire operation was flawed from the start.

If you have only seen the movie "A Bridge Too Far," read the book. If you have only read "A Bridge Too Far," read "It Never Snows in September," a great book that details the battle from the German perspective.

Just my thoughts...

Shaun

Oh, and Ranger74, from what I have read, if the 1st AB would have been dropped closer to the Arnhem bridge, things would have actually been worse because the Germans had their forces centered around Arnhem. Instead of having to move their armored forces to Oosterbeak to assault the LZs, the Germans could have crushed them way earlier.

Shaun-- I share that belief that if dropped closer to the target the losses would have been significant, but I also believe that two considerations need to be thrown into the pot. One, a US rather than a British outfit should have been placed at the farthest point of the drive. My reasoning is that the American divisions were more experienced and had a combat tested command structure. Not so the British 1st Airborne. Second, and most importantly, some should have been riding British XXX Corps like a hairshirt to get to the Arnhem area. Nothing should have been held back. Neither Monty nor Ike were personally pushing and shoving Horrock. Tragedy that should have never happened.
DJ

Another problem facing the 1st airbourne was the inability to get the whole division into Arnhem on the first day. This meant that a large number of troops were used to protect the drop zones for the next 2 days. If these troops had been available to attack the bridge it may have been possible to capture the whole bridge and surrounding area making resupply and reinforcement easier.
A lot is said about the plan being too risky and with hindsight yes it was flawed in many areas, but the British forces at that time had just made massive advances through Belgium and it must have seemed that German resistance was broken. I agree that one strange aspect was Montgomery's seeming lack of drive once the attack had begun, he seemed not to push his commanders at critical times in the battle. General Horrocks had been wounded during the battles in the western desert and suffered occasional bouts of illness. Monty turned a blind eye to this as he was an exceptional corps commander. I wonder if Horrocks was suffering at the time of the attack and coldn't give his usual energy and drive when it was needed?