Having just watched (and am not re-watching) all 10 episodes of Band of Brothers, I decided to watch two other classic WWII movies in my DVD library, that being The Longest Day and A Bridge Too Far. I have noted a similar theme through many of these stories. With the exception of the paradrop scenes showing the sheer scale of these two historic operations (D-day and Market Garden), I am not seeing a whole lot of scenes showing the true air superiority that we had. In one early scene in ABTF we see a German anti-tank unit pounded by 500lb bombs in the trees (interesting they didn't fire their MGs once). But that is the last scene in the movie showing the use of fighter or bomber aircraft. Surely there must have been more than this? There are many scenes of German armor moving at will in Arnhem. Why didn't we just attack everything in plain sight? There are even some similar scenes in Band of Brothers where I wonder "why didn't they call for an air strike?". So my question is... "was our allied air superiority used correctly in that phase of the war?"

Cheers,
Jim

Hi Jim, I have read many times that air to ground support was patchy after D-day. The British had developed it to a high degree during the fighting in North Africa, indeed it was customary for air and ground commanders at tactical level to have their planners working closely, but then seemed to forget it all during the Normandy battles. During the invasion and imediately after the majority of fighters were employed patroling and protecting the ships and beachead from possible German air attacks. The light bombers were used to delay German reinforcements from reaching the battle zone. During the Arnhem assault many fighters were protecting the gliders and transports and attacking flak batteries. The British had special comunications with the Guards Armoured manned by RAF personal to call in air support but they were not in suficient numbers. The 1st airborne lacked the comunications to call in close air support.
Both the US and British had excellent fighter bombers in the Thunderbolt and Typhoon and when used well were devestating as at Falaise. I wonder if the strategic comanders were guilty of an unwillingness to work together fully? I know Bomber Harris was against his heavy bombers being used in attacks directly in suport of the Normandy landings for any length of time as he was convinced strategic bombing alone could win the war.
From what I can gather tactical air/ground co-operation is accepted as vital by the armed forces of both countries today. It seems we do sometimes learn from history.
Martin

Before D-Day, most of the fighter/bomber aircraft were used primarily for escorting the heavy bomber into Germany or wherever. Shortly after D-Day it became apparent that even though they were still a formidable force to fight, the Luftwaffe was not what it used to be so therefore the fighter escorts such as the P-51, P-47, and P-38's were given permission to attack ground targets on the way home. That was without bombs. In saying all that though, there were still many targets that primarily P-47's bombed such as tanks, troops, buildings,etc. but they were not used in great numbers. As I said you still had hundreds of bombers that needed help on the way in and on the way out. Also the concept of calling in air strikes on certain targets was relativly new and most of the time it never happened. What the aircraft would do is either A) Provide air support for advancing troops and would attack any enemy providing opposition or B) Just fly low and hope you can see a target and destroy it.

I had ventured the following guess in another thread, I think I will repost it here:

Yeah this is something I always think to myself, it seems that in the pacific, you seen a lot of Marine/Navy fighter/bombers gave the troop on the ground close support, but in the ETO, it seems to be less the case.

Correct me if I am wrong, I think this might have something to do with the WW II Army's layout, they had more artillery on their side, and once they were in trouble, the first thing they called up was the tube artillery, then armors, and whilst in the Pacific, when it was a main Marine cmapaign, the Marines because they usually fight on beach head that there were no real rear area for actual big caliber tube artillery to be properly deployed, so they more relied on close support Fighter/Bombers, hence, perfect the art of aerial close support.

My guess.

I just have to ask the question;-
"Why on earth are we discussing historical fact based on the whimsy of Hollywood movie makers?"

Regards Dave

SS-74 that is a good point about the US relying on close air support in the pacific rather more than in europe. The fact that this air support tended to be carrier based or from hastily built airstrips meant that it war predominantly fighter or light bomber aircraft which gave support. In europe there were massive nimbers of medium and heavy bombers and these were used more to "punch" a hole in the enemy lines for ground forces to advance into. Then, as you say, artillery was the first call for troops rather than air support. The British used fighter bombers in "cab rank" patrols to provide close air support on many occasions but it relied on good comunications from the ground which wasn't always present.
Martin

I think Dave hit the nail on the head. The first thing the Army howls for is arty. I also thnk that airpower was concentrated on protecting the big bombers, and tactical was an afterthought after Normandy. Of course, if one recalls, the Germans did almost all of their troop movements at night or in heavy fog. Rommel as shot up by a straffing fighter and he was in a softskin, not a convoy

Maybe soldiers were less costly to train than to use bombers which each bomb could only be used once that is equivalent to 1-3 soldiers. I mean, a bomber can destroy a target and go home, refuel, and bomb again. While an infantry (group of infatries) can finish an entire mission without going home to replenish. Ofcourse, there is a 70% possibility that infantries could die in the field but their death is not as costly as building a plane. Also airstrike cannot be useful in POW camps. They might kill everything in sight.

Close air support does not come of age until the breakout from the Normandy beach head for the Americans. It does so because of the effective connection between the USAF units supporting the 3rd Army. Those Air Force Officers made a cultural and doctrinal shift from the way airpower was conceived to be correctly employed before and during the lead up to Normandy. No one thought that close air support meant "close." It is still one of the most risky firepower support operations you will ever experience. It comes out of no where and devastated whatever it hits. Sometimes it hits the wrong thing or person. But, I digress. The reliance on artillery by the USA is a doctrinal foundation. For example, artillery holds the Anzio beachhead. It was and still remains the most reliable, accurate and dependable source of supporting firepower. During the Arnhem operation, weather was more often the deciding factor in the lack of air employment and supply. The artillery brought into the fight by the 1st Airborne Division was limited. Its more than just the lack of an air employment doctrine that dooms them. In the Pacific, you were forced to employ air power because you landed assault troops then brought in your organic firepower. Thus, you see a reliance on ship borne weapons (never designed nor concieved to be used in this role) and airpower. Note the USMC gets and still retains its own air power. They do not like depending on anyone outside their control.
DJ

Jim
This is all quite correct. The first use of tatical air power was the beginning of
operation cobra or Pattons break out of the third army.Weather was a factor
in operation market as some troops were not landed until 3 days later
( part of the polish brdg i think). Another factor was this idea was Monties
now monty liked a nice tidy battlefield, and would not before he was ready.
Monty I believe had no concept of how armor should be used,he still used
armor in support of infantry. We used infantry in support of the armor.
Everthing I have read has said that Monty had no bridging equipment in this
flying column. The bridging equipment should have been very close to the front
of the column. The one good thing operation market garden did was it froze in
place many german armor div, that could have been used against patton.

ponysoldier